INDIA AND ITS FUTURE;

OR,

AN ADDRESS TO THE PEOPLE OF GREAT BRITAIN AND THEIR REPRESENTATIVES.

BY

A RETIRED BENGAL CIVILIAN,

AUTHOR OF "A GLANCE AT THE EAST."

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A FEW WORDS ADDRESSED TO THE READER.

THE Author feels much diffidence in placing this small pamphlet concerning affairs in India before the public; he is well aware that he has discharged a duty which he felt was imperative on him, in a very imperfect manner, and he is also perfectly conscious that many may take exceptions to his various proposals to remedy past errors. A considerable Indian experience leads him to believe that there is nothing very impracticable in what he has advanced, and that a system such as he advocates, however faulty, which, while tolerating religious freedom, is calculated to encourage settlers, promote works of irrigation and railways, improve our monetary system, reduce our expenditure, remove all shackles from commerce, bring the governors and governed into closer contact, make every one responsible from the highest to lowest for their acts, place our army on a greatly superior footing, reorganise our police

do away with a great deal of litigation, simplify the forms of justice and the complexities of law, and remove the double or quadruple Government and their monopolies, will go far not only to vastly improve our position in British India, but to lead the natives eventually to bless our advent among them, and give an impetus to European trade, while simultaneously opening out new marts for our goods and new fields for our enterprise, such as we have hitherto had no conception of.

INDIA AND ITS FUTURE.

CHAPTER I.

At a period so momentous, when the Houses of the Legislature are about to re-assemble, to investigate into the causes of the great Mutiny in India, and to determine what course shall be pursued in the future government of that immense Empire, it becomes a paramount duty in all who have had experience in the troubled districts, to endeavour to place before those in whose hands the remedy rests for evils resulting from misunderstanding and misgovernment, such facts as may be known to them, so that it may not be said at any future period that no one raised a warning voice; for there cannot be a doubt that, if the errors of the past be persisted in, they will inevitably lead to a repetition of the fearful scenes that are still fresh before our eyes, and to a revolution which, from being more consolidated, must be still more disastrous in its effects, and more difficult to deal with. It is a most curious result of nearly all investigations made into the conduct of public men, even where there can be no doubt of gross mismanagement, that no one is ever rendered subject to blame; the fault being invariably placed in the system, or in some other inapproachable position, and the person in fault escapes scot-free. However faulty the system may be, or however perseveringly erroneous practices have been followed up, the system, and not the ignorarnus who persisted in it, is reproached; and so we shall see t be the case with affairs in India gross as has been the misru

ce. Thus, if among our Indian Potentates A did wrong, B s equally foolish, thinking A to be a clever fellow, and followed the same path; C and D did likewise; E and F thought all must be right, as A B C and D had set the example; and so, instead of any one of the responsible parties taking the trouble to consider whether he was acting rightly or not, he simply contented himself with thinking that his predecessors having done such and such things, he could not be far wrong in doing likewise; and thus nothing has been done to abolish old customs and rules, as erroneous in themselves as injurious to our Indian Empire. It may be useful to consider some of the more obvious of our errors in the East. The first of these clearly arises from misgovernment in England. It is only by reversing the position of things that we can clearly understand this: thus, let us imagine that a fearful Chartist conspiracy had taken place in England; that the Houses of Parliament were in India; and that we had to communicate with India ere proper measures could be taken to put it down,—the stupid anomaly would be at once apparent, and the disastrous consequences of having to communicate and obtain relief *viâ* India would become clearly visible. Let us carry out this similitude a little further, and imagine that every law enacted for England had to make a voyage to and from India before it could be brought to bear. Could such a state of things be for one moment tolerated? What Englishman would submit to it? Now, let us reflect, are we not doing exactly the same by India, only in a still more cumbrous and ridiculous way? It would seem a matter of common sense in the despatch of every day's business, that, were an English merchant to require transactions to be carried on with Russia, Germany, or France, he would employ some one in his counting-house that could speak Russian, German, or French, and select persons who, by their residence and experience in those countries, could at least give him some assurance that they were competent to undertake the responsibility of the duties entrusted to them. But such a trifling matter as the government of poor insignificant India obviously does not require much consideration; and whether the Board of Control or the Court of Directors know anything or nothing of

the language, people, or country of that trifling territory consigned to their care, evidently matters not. Let us, however, again reverse the state of things, and suppose that the people of England had to complain to certain great people in Indic constituting Boards and Courts, learned in Hindostanee, but ignorant of the English language, of the character of the people, and of the nature and resources of the country, could such a state of things be allowed to exist for one day?

Again: were the people of England informed that their rulers in India consisted of same twenty people, not one of whom were in any way individually responsible for their acts, would they not open their wondering eyes? It could never be believed by them, that a nation professing to rule on the principles of equity and justice would allow the existence of an irresponsible Government. To carry on our example of an Indian rule existing over England, what would be the surprise of the English if they were to see Governor-General Nawab Shumsh-ood-deen Bahadoor arrive from India to rule England with all his Indian notions, and unable to speak a word of English to any one; full of novel ideas of what he intended to do to set things to rights, and improve this benighted country after his own model, all derived from the depths of his own brain, or from hearsay and miscellaneous reading? Great—and deservedly so—would be their indignation against a people who would thus venture to trifle with, under the pretence of governing, them. If such, indeed, be the case, and the above be not a misrepresentation of our rule in the East, the sooner a reform be established there in these particulars the better. Representatives of the British nation! the subject before you is not one of light moment. Let not old and established customs weigh with you, if you find them opposed to common-sense; allow the truth to prevail; do not imagine that a Government so erroneously conducted under your auspices on this side of the water, is free from blame for the military revolution now taking place on the other side of it, and never rest till you see a Government established to rule India, founded on such principles, that if *you* had to be under its influences and orders, you could yourselves heartily approve of it. Do

not be led away with arguments tending to prove the mildness of our Eastern rule, and be induced to suppose that nothing else is requisite, and that, therefore, neither error of commission nor omission exists. Let the new order of things be an improvement on the mistakes of the past, and, as far as practicable, unimpeachable. It is with this view the suggestions contained in the following pages are placed before you, not with the remotest idea that the best-devised system possible has been traced out in them, but with some hope, that, as emanating from the result of many years' residence and practical experience obtained by the Author in the North-western Provinces of India and Bengal, in magisterial and revenue employ, they may be deemed in some measure to bear a guarantee that they are not offered in utter ignorance of the subjects treated of, or from a mere spirit of speculative imagination, and may thus possibly be rendered the means of assisting in preventing those who have not had a fair opportunity of ascertaining facts from being led away by the warmth of political debate

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CHAPTER II.

DELHI AS IT WAS, AND OTHER INTRODUCTORY MATTER.

READER! imagine a city situated on the banks of the beautiful river Jumna, bounded by it on one side, and surrounded by a somewhat modernised, crenellated wall and ditch on the other three (the entire circuit of which is about seven or eight miles), filled with superb mosques, with their glittering domes; a noble palace, the residence of the ancient Moguls; some fine gardens, and splendid native mansions, occasionally bounded by squalid huts; a few very fine streets with innumerable small and dirty ones leading into them; a great many bazaars, in which are sold almost every description of article that can be imagined; a gigantic magazine, and a splendid arsenal; and you will have some slight idea of what the general appearance of Delhi was. It was a city that, to the eyes of the natives of

India, especially of Mussulmen, was equivalent to what London is to an Englishman, Paris to a Frenchman, or Moscow to a Russian. The palace at Delhi, and the Jumma Musjid there, are as well or better known to the Easterns, as St. James's, the Tuileries, or the Kremlin to Europeans. The language of Delhi is considered quite as refined, with comparison with the *patois* of the rest of India, as the Court language of London or Paris as regards the dialects of Yorkshire or Cornwall. Delhi conveys to the native mind the concentration of all that is elegant, *recherché*, and beautiful, in language, manners, luxuries, or dress. It is supposed by them to *contain everything* (to use their own phrase), except it be their fathers and mothers; whether the imagination revel on valuable gems, beautiful shawls, elaborately-worked guns, finely-bound and illuminated books, superb horses, splendid vehicles, grand houses, handsome men, or beautiful women. Say you want anything, and ask where it is to be procured; the answer is sure to be (whether probable or improbable, and though you may be a thousand miles off), "Oh! it can be had at Delhi!" Delhi is a complete cynosure in the eye of the Hindostanee: many of their most learned men of the Mahommedan religion, as well as numbers of the wealthiest of the Hindoo persuasion, live there; it is filled with the ancient Mogul-nobility of India, and its palace alone contained between 3000 or 4000 Sŭllātēens, or descendants of former, as well as of the present Emperor of Delhi. No wonder, then, that the natives generally looked up to Delhi as something very extraordinary and that (smarting from being held in subjection by a nation deemed by them infidels), the Mahommedans especially considered this splendid city their own, and prayed night and day for the restoration of their power. No wonder that the disaffected to our rule have swarmed there; no wonder that all the mutineers have looked forward to it as their rallying point, and have strained every nerve to reach it; no wonder that Delhi always has been the hot-bed of conspiracy, and been filled with the seeds of revolution: the real cause for wonder is, that, with such chances placed before them, and such opportunities at hand, the smouldering fire has not long ago burst

forth; that with a large fortified town, having the advantage of an extensive river-front, by which men and supplies of every description can be poured into it, and of such extent as to render it impossible properly to surround it; with an enormous magazine of military stores left quite at their mercy, and unprotected save by their own people; the disaffected have not long since availed themselves of all that our rulers have, in their utter ignorance of India, stupidly, foolhardily, and unsuspiciously, been for years placing at their disposal.

Is it possible, that any one conversant with the Bengal side of India could ever have ignored all these facts; and that, at this moment, there should be any man found bold enough to assert that our rulers there knew nothing of the true position of affairs? that they were not fully aware of the actual state of Delhi, and have been now, at the eleventh hour, taken by surprise? that they were like moles, grubbing about in the dark, and knew no more of the storm likely to burst over them, than that sable animal knows at what time it is probable that his hole will be dug up! when they have, beyond all question, for years run the risks and braved the chances which have now been taken advantage of, placed Delhi in the hands of the insurgents, the Mogul Emperor on our throne (however temporarily), and shaken our power in the East to its very foundations? No Governor could say that he was ignorant that many of our fortresses and principal magazines have been for years either wholly, or nearly so, in the charge of native troops; it is a great mercy, and through the providence of an over-ruling Power alone, that the fortress of Delhi only, and not these of Allahabad, &c. also, were not in the possession of the mutineers.

What, then, may be asked, would have been our position? A hundred thousand British soldiers would, in that case, have hardly hoped to regain the country, considering the length of time likely to be occupied in reducing each fort, and the effects of climate on the European constitution, added to the chances of war—for we are not now contending against the ignorant natives of former years, but against our own disciplined troops, who are quite as good at fighting behind walls, and in constructing them, as the Russians were at Sebastopol. There is

no option between conceding either that our Indian rulers have been grossly ignorant of India, and were taken aback by the storm, or that they were rash and foolhardy enough to brave it, and place themselves in a position to feel its dire effects, almost to the destruction of our empire in the East; and, in either case, were totally unfit to hold the high office entrusted to them. What, then, are we to do with India? What *has been done* with it, is gradually becoming apparent; we have been trying the foolish experiment of attempting to rule some 200,000 millions with a few hundred civil and a few thousand military officers, without giving to those delegated to that responsible task the power necessary to assert their authority. We have been steadily pursuing the fatal course of elevating to an equality with our own position in the East the native, whose mind, from his birth, is imbued with immorality, and whose soul is steeped in a lie. We have vainly imagined, that the mere routine of education can eradicate the force of that tuition which is derived from a mother's lap, which the native imbibes with his mother's milk, which surrounds him like a mantle at every step, from his cradle through life. We have placed the person, with whom we should be very sorry to associate in private, on the same judicial bench with ourselves; informed the natives of India, that justice from men whom they know would sell them for a song is equivalent to that administered by Englishmen; and that a native, because possessed of the outward form of humanity, is just as good as an European. On the other hand, the European officers have had their hands tied to the greatest possible extent, and every act of theirs looked upon with the utmost possible suspicion. We boldly assert, that many more Englishmen would be punished and hanged in England under similar proofs than natives in India, owing to written evidence alone (which is often erroneous) being relied on by the final Court, and the complex forms required to be gone through. The numerous statements called for from civil servants are so onerous, that hours and hours of their most valuable time are periodically wasted in their preparation; and this with a view only to satisfy the superior authorities as to the trustworthiness or otherwise of their subordinates. Everything is reduced to the

fixed standard of rule; and no one is trusted, even to the extent of an hair's breadth. This order of things has not been arrived at in one day, but is the result of a false system, steadily pursued by those high officials who were too blind to see that the result must eventually be a total want of respect for, and consequently, a complete undermining of, the authority of both services, civil and military. Is it not obvious, that if you take away from an officer his power of flogging, admit the most frivolous appeals against his orders, and curtail his authority, he is rendered incapable of commanding the respect of the unruly spirits in his regiment? There can be no question as to one point, viz. that neither civil nor military officers should be entertained for service in India without the exercise of the greatest caution, nor should those who are subsequently found to be unfit or unworthy, be promoted to posts of responsibility; but, after due trial, once placed there, once in office, they ought to be and must be trusted and upheld, and not surrounded by trammels which are fatal to that respect, and I may add fear, which forms the basis of all subordination in the native mind. An honest purpose, a determined will, and a tight hand, with proper support in a conscientious discharge of his duties, form the requisites for all officers employed in the East, to whatever service they may belong.

The misfortune of our position there is, that our governors generally commence their career in utter ignorance of the native feelings and the native character. They go out from England filled with all sorts of philanthropical notions, imagine that they see civilized and enlightened Old England, only with a black face, before them, and legislate accordingly. It never occurs to them to imagine, for one moment, what the impression formed on the native minds by their own religion is, and what the sort of moral degradation in which they are born, steeped, and live. They forget that those they rule over do not either mix or associate with them, and that they are as distinct from each other as any two contraries can be. And we have witnessed the result? No good can arise from attaching blame to any particular individual; the whole system of government is rotten to its core: the Civil Courts especially,

not from any want of benevolence, far from it, for so mild a system of government never existed; but from carrying a misplaced philanthropy to a great and most dangerous excess: precisely as if a child seeing a tiger with a sleek skin in a cage should, in its simplicity and ignorance, open the cage door, and say, "Poor thing! why should it not have its liberty? why keep it in confinement?" and go and caress it as a pet. The result would in the latter case be obvious. We now perceive that our pet lambs were in reality only tigers of the most ferocious species, and that there was nothing diabolical, nothing of the most savage and cruel nature, that has escaped their malignity in the hideous massacres they perpetrated among our unfortunate countrymen, when once they had them in their power. It may well be asked, Shall we revert to that false order of things which had prepared the way for this hecatomb of our slaughtered brethren? Great must be the fool who would go out as the servant of the East Indian Government, unless vast and radical changes are made on the restoration of something like order. That the time has arrived for introducing a complete revolution in, and greatly simplifying our system of Indian Government, cannot be doubted. In all Governments no authority should be delegated to any, from the highest to the lowest, without immediate responsibility. The great evil attending all Companies is, that the responsibility is so divided among numbers, that virtually there is none left; and it is on this account we find that Companies do acts collectively that each member would, if he did them in his individual capacity, be ashamed of. As to those who have ruled India, it is sufficient that the slaughter of our infants, the violation of our women, the mutilation and massacre of our men, and the hellish contrivances to torture all who fell into the hands of these demons in the shape of men, must be an everlasting reproach to them for their misgovernment, and determination not to take advice in due season of people competent to give it. The following extract, among numerous others, from the "Bombay Telegraph," throws some light on the character of the Hindostanee nation:—"On the evening

of this engagement the column encamped outside the walls of Cawnpore, and on the morning of the 17th our soldiers entered the city. Accustomed as they had been to scenes of slaughter, the spectacle that met their eyes nearly petrified them with horror. They marched straight to a place where they were told 175 women and children were confined, but on their arrival they found that they had come too late! They only found the clothes of the poor victims strewn over the blood-stained ground. The scene of this horrible catastrophe was a paved court-yard, and one of the Highlanders in writing to a contemporary says, 'there were two inches of blood upon the pavement, and from the report that we got from the residents of the place it appears that after we had beaten the enemy, the evening previous, the Sepoys and Sowars entered the place where the unhappy victims were, killed all ladies, and threw the children alive, as well as the ladies' dead bodies, into a well in the compound. I saw it, and it was an awful sight. It appears, from the bodies we saw, that the women were stripped of their clothes before they were murdered.' A feeling more terrible than vengeance arises in the heart at reading this, and even the most reverent shudder when they think that Omnipotence could have deemed such a terrible ordeal necessary. The history of the world affords no parallel to the terrible massacres which during the last few months have desolated the land. Neither age, sex, nor condition has been spared. Children have been compelled to eat the quivering flesh of their murdered parents, after which they were literally torn asunder by the laughing fiends who surrounded them. Men in many instances have been mutilated, and, before being absolutely killed, have had to gaze upon the last dishonour of their wives and daughters previous to being put to death. But really we cannot describe the brutalities that have been committed; they pass the boundaries of human belief, and to dwell upon them shakes reason upon its throne." A people so devoid of all natural and moral feeling, and who have acted so basely, deserve no promises respecting religion, for, as regards this, it is obvious they have none deserving the name in any true sense; for even

savages know that the slaughter and violation of inoffensive women and children forms no part of any religion. If we give any promise of this sort it will be a grave error, and must end in evil.

If we ever hope to re-establish our honour, our name, and our prestige in India, Delhi, Cawnpore, and other places where our women and children have been dishonoured, must cease to exist, save on the page of history. Not one stone should be left on another. What must be the outraged feelings of Englishmen to find themselves called upon, at some short period hence, to administer justice where such foul crimes have been perpetrated? Shall we leave those accursed cities standing as perpetual records of our shame? If there be but one grain or spark of feeling in the heart of Englishmen, Delhi, and other similar places, must be made to resemble Babylon, and become the dwelling of the beasts of the desert; their precincts should be reserved as places for the execution of these barbarous miscreants and rebels, who should be buried there with every circumstance of ignominy that could render that burial dishonourable and degrading. As for Delhi, in a more healthy locality in its neighbourhood, let another city be founded, commanded by a strong Fort, and call it Victoriapoor (or the *city* of Victoria), in honour of her Majesty. Let Delhi and other cities be made, to all time, examples of what shall befall that city which shall dare in future to raise the standard of rebellion among us. This should be our first work. The ruins of Delhi would yield plenty of material for a new and much more splendid city, which might be erected on either bank of the Jumna, and connected in the middle by a stone bridge. We could then regulate the size of the streets and squares, and the magnitude, architecture, and quality of the buildings and bazaars, &c., to our own wishes. Each person who had suffered by loss in the old city, who was *known to be a good man*, should have a spot made over to him in the new one. This accomplished, those who have been faithful to us in the struggle should be immediately rewarded with honours and titles, together with the lands, houses, and possessions of the re-

bellious. The army should forthwith be reorganized, and nothing left to chance. It is clear that, for some time to come, a large European force must be retained in India; an European force alone, however, is obviously unsuited to carry out the entire duties hitherto performed by natives. Each corps should be officered to the full extent of our English regiments of the line, or rather in excess. Caste should especially be set aside, and an understanding on enlistment should clearly be established, that as regards military duties, caste, or religion, was to have no existence. This, of course, would not refer to their private devotions. Flogging should be reintroduced, and the commanding and other officers have increased authority. The Europeans of each regiment should always be kept together at a central head-quarter's station, and the natives sent about to do detached duty in the surrounding neighbourhood. Each company of natives should have officers selected from among its own men; the existing faithful Sepoys should be promoted, and be divided into companies, one of each being attached to each new regiment, and as they died, or were pensioned off, cease to be replaced, except by new companies of Sikhs, Goorkhas, or low-caste men: by this means our army might be reorganized, much reduced in size, and rendered much more effective, for each corps would be as well officered, and almost equal in quality of material, to a British regiment. No possibility for combination should again be permitted. At each station there should be a proper cantonment and buildings for the troops, &c., constructed; in the first place by the Government, and then kept in repair by the occupants. One of the main causes that gave strength to the present outbreak was, that no Sepoy had a home, and but very few their families with them. They had no one to care for; their relatives were far off, and safe. There can be no hold on people so situated; no Sepoy had any one to care for but himself, and when they went off, it was either to join others or to go to a distance to their homes. If the men at Delhi and Meerut had been incumbered with wives and daughters, however disaffected they might have been, they would not have ventured on the cruelties practised

on our poor helpless women and children, as they would have feared, even though without good reason, a retaliation on their own.

The Sepoys, pampered, and fed, and upheld by a Government too ignorant and too presumptuous to listen to any remonstrance, suggestion, or advice—their cases, however trivial, the first always to be attended to on the Civil List before all other claimants, however pressing *their* suits might be—did not require much to persuade them to believe what they already felt; viz. that they were the true masters; and that it was because we could not do without them, that we listened to all their foibles: they thus became, in process of time, fit and proper tools for the originators of a conspiracy to operate on. The patience with which these conspirators bided their time, and the effectual and secret manner in which they have done their work, should be a dear-bought warning to us, that *the Asiatic is never to be trusted.* It has been proposed to have regiments of Sheeahs, and others of Soonees, to prevent concert. Alas! are we still ignorant, that where the slaughter of the *infidel* has to be accomplished, diversity of sects vanish? If Christendom were to be attacked by the Mahommedan powers, Protestants, and the followers of the Pope, would soon unite in one great cause, and the minor points concerning differences of creed be, *for the time*, forgotten. To *extirpate* the *infidel* is an article of the Mahommedan faith; and this is equally binding on both Sheeahs and Soonees. This set aside, they would fight among themselves like cat and dog. It would, indeed, be a fatal error to entertain entire Mahommedan regiments of any sect. The enlistment of native regiments has not hitherto been properly conducted; each aspirant for such employment should, in the first instance, be made to apply to the magistrate of his district, who would then ascertain his whereabouts, his character, caste, and relationship, in short, his entire history. This having been recorded on the spot, he could then proceed to the officer in command at the station where he proposed enlisting, with his certificate signed by the magistrate; and that officer would, if he considered him a proper person, enlist him. His certificate should be registered on the books of the corps, and no further trouble would be necessary.

At present, when a man presents himself to be enlisted, he comes from a distance, such that for all practical purposes it is as far off as if he had dropped from the clouds; thus he may be a Choomar, or a low-caste man by birth, and call himself a Brahmin or Rajpoot; he may be at home a scamp and a thief; but when presenting himself as a recruit, he appears as an honest man, and there is no possibility of detecting him, or finding out who he is, or anything about him: for, unless the recruit is sent to be identified on the spot—a very roundabout business at long distances—he may very readily call himself what he pleases. It is often found out that Sepoys tell great falsehoods about themselves; but the discovery is generally made too late, *i. e.* after the man has proved himself unworthy of his calling. By enlisting none but those identified by the magistrate, each man must become a known and marked man. A copy of each regimental register should be always sent to head-quarters, to prevent the possibility of its being lost; so that each soldier enlisted might be made to feel that his subsequent apprehension must be certain, should he prove a deserter or an offender.

As regards the number of regiments to be raised, in the event of the village police, which amounts to nearly 200,000 men, being reorganised, remodelled, and incorporated into the regular police body—and these so far drilled as to be able to act, to a certain degree, in concert in cases of emergency for local purposes—the regular army, if properly constituted, need not be large, as, in case of external invasion, both Hindoos and Mahommedans would prefer our known mild and gentle rule to that of fresh conquerors, knowing the plunder that is always committed by an hostile army, and the almost complete certainty of being worse off under foreigners who were unknown to them than under ourselves. Of foreign invasion there is but little fear, though we must always be prepared for the worst. It must never be forgotten that the Mahommedan and Christian are, as it were, born enemies: the reason is obvious; they think us infidels; we think them so: the propagation of their respective faiths is the creed of both, though the former believe that the sword is the chief and most proper agent,

Next to the Christians, the Mahommedans are, as a body, the most intelligent class, and have, from being widely spread, a stake in the empires of the world. They are fanatics to the last degree; and once subjugated by persons of another faith, become as unruly as a Christian would if placed under the Mahommedan yoke. They, *as a race*, are never to be trusted, though there are many trustworthy and excellent men among them: let this be a warning for the future against an evil day. The Asiatic Mahommedan ever resembles the tiger about to make his spring; however sleek his coat may be, his teeth still exist, and only bide their time to come into play. As long as it serves their end they will pay homage to Christians, and be subservient to them; but it is only to gain their great end of eventual supremacy in both worldly and religious matters. Such a chance in India, at all events, should never be allowed them. Let all classes, both Hindoo and Mahommedan, be once thoroughly and *practically convinced*, that any attempt at rebellion will only recoil fearfully on their own heads, without even a chance of their success, and they will gradually cease to agitate the question. Have the foolhardiness to again form your army on the same general basis as at present, and however much you may alter your internal regulations, you will, sooner or later, have the same fatal results. In the judicial administration, the amazing quantity of written evidence hitherto taken down ought at once to be dispensed with; thus a short abstract of each case in the vernacular, with the order passed, written in English by the presiding officer, attached to the plaintiff's petition, is an ample record for all criminal cases within the cognizance of the magistrate and his subordinates. In cases requiring committal, greater detail, together with written evidence, would be requisite. The collector and magistrate should also be unshackled, and his power of nominating and dismissing all his subordinates, from the Tehseeldars and Thannahdars downwards unrestricted; his orders should, in this respect, be *final*, and without possibility of appeal. All Mooktyars, or native pleaders, should forthwith be dispensed with in criminal matters.

It ought never to be lost sight of that, to all intents and

purposes, the greater part of the Bengal Presidency will, after it has been reconquered and restored to order, be, by the very nature of things, placed on a different footing from what it was when we originally became possessors of the country; and we shall no longer be bound towards the people by the strict letter of former pledges regarding their religion; and it is for this reason obvious, that now no promises should be made to them on this score, otherwise we shall be re-committing our original errors. To interfere wilfully with a man's faith, and try and force his creed, is one thing; and to give a solemn pledge that no measure shall for any time to come be passed interfering with a religious prejudice or an ancient legend, let the future state of the country, or the private feeling of individuals in a more enlightened time, be what they may, is another. Such pledges, once given, the Government become tied hand and foot. Religious toleration is, undoubtedly, the correct system to be adopted by all Governments; but for any rulers of a country to bind themselves on any subject by a law resembling that of the Medes and Persians, which (however inapplicable time and circumstances may render it) "altereth not," is simply ridiculous; and the fact of making such concessions, in itself shows a weakness in the tenure of the ruling power, the exhibition of which to the governed is much to be deprecated.

CHAPTER III.

THE NECESSITY OF HAVING A HOME GOVERNMENT AND ITS NATURE CONSIDERED.

We may well consider, in the first place, what should be the constitution of the Indian Government in England. All that is required is obviously a channel to communicate to the English Government the acts performed by the local administration in India. To attempt to govern India in England, or to control the acts of the local functionaries by references and appeals to

England, is not only most injudicious, but cruelly injurious; it is injurious to the people, by causing great delays (often to the perversion of justice); it is injurious to the rulers, by lessening their prestige and local authority. The people are thereby taught that there is another power superior to the local one, to *which* they will naturally turn, as they have hitherto done, as the real authority; and in proportion as they do so, behold with less respect those placed immediately in contact with them. The fearful events of the past prove that we must strengthen the hands of our Indian officials to the utmost: there must be no more appealing to this country; the Indian Government must be all powerful to legislate, and be constituted in itself the final Court of Appeal. This being the case, there will no longer be any necessity for having either a Board of Control or a Court of Directors, but only that one of her Majesty's Ministers should be appointed "*Indian Minister*," to *supervise, not control*, the affairs of India, aided by a sufficient number of experienced secretaries and clerks for each department. The Ministers and the Houses of Parliament will then, through his annual reports, become the controlling authority, exactly as they now listen to the Lord Chancellor's budget, or the statements of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and control them. One judicial, one financial, one foreign, and one military secretary, with two clerks for each department, would be ample for the Home Office of India. These should all consist of gentlemen who had served out there, and of whose individual experience and competency in his own department there could be no question, after due inquiry had been made as to the qualifications of each while in India. Need I add, that the Minister selected to hold an office so highly responsible ought also, if possible, to have served in India? The salary for the Minister for Indian Affairs might be fixed at 4000*l.*, that of each secretary at 2000*l.*, and of each clerk at 500*l.* a-year. Thus the expenses of the establishment in England for India would be as follows:—

1 Minister	£4,000
4 Secretaries	8,000
8 Clerks	4,000
Total	£16,000

The East India House should be sold, as the present office of the Board of Control could easily afford one room for the Minister and four rooms for his four secretaries and their eight clerks; thus five rooms would be ample for the despatch of business: and for holding such records as were deemed necessary to be preserved, one or two more rooms could be set apart. It would be more convenient to retain the present office of the Board of Control than the East India House; and the latter being in the heart of the City would doubtless, if let, realise enough annually to cover the expenses of the Home Office of the Indian Government.

CHAPTER IV.

WHAT SORT OF MAN THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA OUGHT TO BE.

THE Governor-General of India ought not only to be a practical man, but also one whose life and energies having been spent in India, and one who, having distinguished himself above his peers, has proved himself worthy of so high an office; such a man, for example, as Sir John Lawrence, whose skill, patience, energy, local experience, honesty, rectitude of purpose, and commanding talents, have saved India at her time of dire need and severe trial, would be worthily rewarded by being selected to fill a post which he has proved himself so well fitted for. It would indeed be lamentable for a ministry to say, "It is true, Lawrence was one of those who saved India, but that is a secondary consideration; it suits us best to send out a Peer, who, from his influential position in and out of the House, would increase our political power." What a cruel farce! The poor Lord is, perhaps, first-rate at committee work—knows something of railways—may have been in the army, and may possibly also have an extended connexion and influence: but, is India

to be sacrificed to such considerations? Is a person utterly ignorant of the Eastern languages, and whose knowledge of India and of the natives is most probably confined to seeing the bespangled, and many of them pseudo-Nawabs, who come over to England, to be sent out to be the puppet of, and be dictated to, by a council composed of gentlemen whose experience is not uncommonly confined to Calcutta and its precincts? Forbid it, Common Sense! forbid it, Houses of the British Parliament! You would all hesitate to make a Bishop Chancellor of the Exchequer, or a Lord Chancellor a Bishop. You would not make a Judge of an Admiral, nor ask a Judge to command your fleets. You would not make the Attorney-General take the command of your forces, nor ask the Commander-in-Chief to become Attorney-General. But why multiply examples? you would never be guilty of such anomalies! Why, then, commit a far more serious error in the nomination of the person appointed to rule India? Suppose, then, that you have selected as your Governor-General a man long experienced in Eastern service; one of his first and chief duties should be that of personally supervising the Local Governments, which can only be accomplished by his travelling over the country, and for which he should be provided accordingly. Instead of giving him a salary of 30,000*l.* for knowing nothing, and being an incapable incubus for years to come, let his salary be 18,000*l.* per annum,—an ample sum in itself,—for having at least some pretensions to efficiency. He should have a movable staff, consisting of a private secretary, on 1000*l.* per annum; two aides-de-camp, on 500*l.* each; a secretary for the judicial and revenue departments, another for the foreign, a third for the home, and a fourth for the military department, each on salaries of 5000*l.* per annum. Each department should comprise six clerks; thus: a head clerk, on 500*l.*, a second, on 400*l.*, a third, on 300*l.*, and the remaining three, each on 200*l.* per annum; making an aggregate sum of 1800*l.* for each secretariat; or the total expense to the state of the Governor-General, including his movable staff and native office, should not exceed 59,200*l.* per annum

Thus:—

Salary of Governor-General	£18,000
Ditto of Private Secretary	1,000
Ditto of 2 Aides-de-Camp on 500*l.* each	1,000
Ditto of 4 Secretaries on 5000*l.* each	20,000
Ditto of 6 Clerks for each Department as above detailed	7,200
Total	£47,200
Add establishment of 4 native offices, at 500*l.* each office *	2,000
Add for entertaining, including all travelling charges for his and his secretaries' offices	10,000
Grand total	£59,200

An *experienced Governor-General,* travelling with his staff from one Presidency to another, does not require the aid of a Council. The practical knowledge of his Secretaries, themselves selected for their superior local knowledge, and therefore the best advisers each in his own department, is sufficient for all purposes; and you will by this means have a Governor-General having some personal responsibility: but trammel him with a Council residing in Calcutta, and he at once loses three-fourths of his utility. The only case that could ever occur for the possible necessity of such a Council would be, where it was requisite to declare war against a foreign power; and in this case the advice of the four Secretaries of State, together with that of the Commander-in-Chief, would, in these days of rapid and telegraphic communication to Europe, be sufficient. It is now scarcely necessary to imagine the occurrence of such a contingency; but should such a case ever happen, this arrangement would amply provide for it. There need not be any Law Commission. The existence of this body is a notable scheme for wasting the public money, and transferring the responsibility of legislation from a puppet government to irresponsible parties. The official pretender once removed, and an efficient practical man there, it would be a hard case if, aided by his Secretaries, after receiving the reports of the local Governors, and all the

* Detail of native office for each Secretary—

A Serishtadar, or head officer	£200
A second ditto	100
Four Writers on 50*l.* each	200
Total	£500

detailed reports furnished by experienced local officers, the new Governor-General could not legislate to some purpose; especially when, by moving to the spot with his whole office, he could see and judge for himself. Local circumstances and local usages and customs would require special legislation, which he could, by this means, readily and speedily accomplish.

CHAPTER V.

THE LOCAL ADMINISTRATION.

While having a Governor-General whose duty it would be to visit all the Presidencies, it would be necessary to have, as now, local experienced Governors, each being selected from among those who had had long experience in the country, and from that Presidency in which he had previously had the management of affairs, and not merely chosen from favoritism, to be transferred from one Presidency to another at a distance, where he had no local knowledge. The Governor's salary should be 6000*l.* a-year, and he should have three secretaries under him, one for the judicial, another for the revenue, and a third for the miscellaneous department. Each of these should have salaries of 4000*l.* with three clerks in each department on salaries each of 400*l.*, 300*l.*, and 200*l.*; making in all, including that of the Governor, an annual expenditure of 4900*l.* Besides these there would be a staff, consisting of a private secretary on 800*l.* and an aid-de-camp on 500*l.* Each secretary should also have a *native* establishment, as follows:—

1 Serishtadar on . .	. £200
1 second ditto on . .	. 100
4 Writers on 50*l.* each .	. 200
Total . .	. £500

The three secretariats would each have a native establishment, comprising 1500*l.* per annum. Thus:—

Salary of the Lieutenant-Governor	£6,000
Ditto of 3 Secretaries, on 4000*l.* each	12,000
Ditto of 9 Clerks for offices of ditto, as above	2,700
Ditto of 1 Private Secretary	800
Ditto of 1 Aid-de-camp	500
Ditto of native establishment for all 3 Secretaries	1,500
Total	£23,500
Add for Governor's travelling, including all charges for his own and Secretaries' establishments, and for entertaining	£5,000
Total	£28,500

Under this arrangement, there would be no necessity for an Accountant's or Civil Auditor's Office; each Secretary would look after the accounts and expenditure of his respective department, and each head of a division after those of his subordinate districts; and the business of all these, and all other subordinate offices, being simplified, complicated statements being reduced to something within rational bounds, there would be no difficulty in the rapid disposal of public business. Further: by the alteration in the present faulty system of administration, the Sudder Courts, that is, the Sudder Board of Revenue, and the Sudder Judicial Courts, could be abolished; they are now only clogs to expedition and justice, and add nothing to the efficiency of the details of Government. The existence of these offices involves long detailed correspondence, and acts as a sort of irresponsible, round-about, middle agency between the head of the Government and the local subordinates. The correspondence has to travel hundreds of miles to and from these circuitous channels ere it can reach head-quarters, the delays thus incurred being often ruinous to the parties whose cases are to be disposed of. The judicial farce of the Sudder or head Judicial Court trying people for their lives and heinous crimes on mere written evidence, in the absence of prosecutor, witnesses, and defendant, by merely perusing the documentary evidence prepared by the lower Courts, would thus also be done away with, and a sounder principle established for the administration of justice. The office, as well as name of *Commissioner*, should also be abolished, as a further incubus and waste of time in the despatch of business, and the administration be divided between the district executives and the immediate head of Government.

aided by his secretaries. This could easily be done as follows. Let each Presidency be divided into six divisions, and each division into four subdivisions; each of the former having the following offices :—

A Judge and Collector, uniting the powers at present vested in a Commissioner of Revenue and Judge of the Sudder Courts, as well as that of Accountant and Civil Auditor, but only in his own district	£3,500
4 Deputy Civil Judges and Collectors, each in charge of a sub-division, with full powers of magistrate, on salaries of 2000*l.* each	8,000
16 Assistants (8 having special powers), 4 on salaries of 1000*l.* each, 4 on salaries of 600*l.* each, and 8 on salaries of 400*l.* each	9,600
	£21,100

OFFICE FOR EACH JUDGE AND COLLECTOR.

English Department.

6 Clerks to Collector and Judge's Office :— 1 on 400*l.*, 1 on 300*l.*, 1 on 200*l.*, 1 on 150*l.*, 1 on 100*l.*,* 1 on 50*l.**	£1,200

Native Omla or Office.

1 Treasurer on 100*l.*, 1 Deputy-Treasurer, 50*l.*, 1 Serishtadar, or head officer, 150*l.*, 1 Deputy ditto, 100*l.*, 5 Writers on 25*l.* each, and 5 ditto on 15*l.* each	600
	£1,800

OFFICES FOR EACH DEPUTY DITTO.

English Department.

3 Clerks—1 on 200*l.*, 1 on 100*l.*,* and 1 on 50*l.**	£350

Native Omla.

The same as above for Judge and Collector	600
	£950

OFFICE FOR EACH ASSISTANT DITTO.

English Department.

1 Clerk on	£100

Native Omla.

3 Writers—1 on 50*l.*, 2 on 25*l.* each	100
	£200

ABSTRACT OF THE ABOVE.

Establishment of Judge and Collector, and covenanted Officers	£21,100
Office to Judge and Collector	1,800
Office of 4 Deputy ditto	3,800
Office for 16 Assistants	3,200
Total	£29,900

* Many of the clerks in India are either Eurasians or Bengalees, born there, for whom such salaries would be ample.

The Deputy Civil Judge and Magistrate would have charge of a subdivision, which should comprise 4 Tehseeldarees, 8 Thannahs, and 16 outposts. Thus each Tehseeldaree would comprise 2 Thannahs and four outposts. There would be no separation of police and revenue functions; but from the Tehseeldar down to the lowest peon the officers should belong to the conjoint office: in short, be both revenue collectors and police officers. The establishment for each subdivision would be as follows:—

4 Tehseeldars*—2 on 200*l.* each and 2 on 150*l.* each	£700
8 Thannahdars†—4 on 100*l.* and 4 on 60*l.* each	640
16 outpost Jemadars—4 on 20*l.* and 12 on 15*l.* each	260
8 Jemadars‡ at Thannahs on 25*l.* each	200
60 Policemen at each Thannah, or 480 at the 8 Thannahs—100 on 5*l.* 200 on 4*l.*, and 180 on 3*l.* each	1,840
4 Policemen at each outpost, or 64 Policemen at 16 outposts—20 on 5*l.* 44 on 4*l.* each	276
Total cost of one sub-division	£3,916
For all the 4 sub-divisions of one division, the total cost would be .	£15,664
The total expenditure for all 6 divisions, or one Presidency, would be .	£93,984

The Judge and Collector should constitute the final appellate authority for his division in all matters, both Civil and Criminal. He should be the active Supervisor of the whole district; his four deputies, with their sixteen assistants, being the executives. He should make his circuit from subdivision to subdivision, and dispose of business not by mere routine of visitation, but as his presence might happen to be most required in any part of his division. He should supervise and audit the accounts of all his subordinates, and perform, in his own person, what is now done in a most cumbrous way by the offices of Accountant and Civil Auditor. He should, finally, try and dispose of (without reference or appeal) all heinous cases of crimes, and take up cases in appeal from his subordinates, whether revenue, civil, or criminal, within certain defined limits. He would, by this means, have an entire knowledge of his division, and of the characters as well as of the proceedings of his subordi-

* Tehseeldars are collectors of revenue, and are generally natives or Eurasians.
† Thannahdars are native head police officers.
‡ Jemadars are subordinate native police officers.

nates, and his communications would then be made direct to the Governor of his Presidency, through the Secretary of the department which related to the business to be disposed of. There should be seven Presidencies, as nearly equally divided as possible, as follows: viz. Calcutta, Oude, Agra, Lahore, Scinde, Bombay, and Madras.

The cost of each Presidency being	£93,984
That of the whole 7 would amount to	657,888
To which we must add the cost of the Governor-General and his offices, viz.	59,200
Which will give a total Indian administrative civil expenditure, amounting to	£717,088

If from 29,133,050*l.*, that is, taking the revenue of India for the year 1854-55, as a standard, we deduct the above proposed expenditure of 717,088*l.*, 2,035,915*l.*, the interest of the debt, and 16,000*l.*, the proposed expenditure of the Home Office, we shall have a balance of 26,364,047*l.* to meet the expenses incumbent on the Army, Navy, Political Departments, and Public Works, which could easily be done, on the handsomest scale, and still leave a broad margin to pay off debts and loans, &c.

CHAPTER VI.

FREE TRADE, AND THE ABOLITION OF THE SALT AND OPIUM MONOPOLIES.

All duties and customs are burdensome to the people of a country. It is astonishing the difference in the happiness and in the prosperity of a people, where they are relieved from trifling burdens on each article of import or export. A free port becomes speedily prosperous; in India, especially, all such taxes are collected with great difficulty, and give such opportunities to the native executives to pilfer and annoy traders and others, that the trifling gain to the revenue is not to be placed in comparison with the expense of keeping up the large establishments required both for collecting the duties and preventing smuggling, to say nothing of the real injury done to trade

in a thousand different ways. All Customs Duties, whether derived from inland or port dues, should be done away with. India should be free to the trade of the world.

The English merchant and the English settler should receive every encouragement, and the foreign trader meet with no repulse. India is large enough for all: her markets could supply the world, and take in the manufactures of every country without any fear of a surfeit. With the abolition of Customs Duties would also follow that of the Salt and Opium monopolies: the former, a most iniquitous one; the latter, to say the least of it, most injudicious. In lieu of the latter the following arrangement could be made. Any parties wishing to grow the poppy and trade in opium, might be allowed to do so by a direct license from a Collector of a district,—a bond to be entered into by the party under heavy penalties that he cultivated so many, and no more, acres in the district, the statistics of which should be entered in the bond,—and for which license he would have to pay a large sum, proportionate to the extent of land so cultivated. The amount would be determined by reference to the known capability of one acre for producing a certain quantity of opium, so that without any monopoly, without any establishments for preparing opium for the markets, without any opium sales, and large storehouses, and without giving any umbrage on the part of Government to the trader, a much larger revenue could be realized without trouble or extra expense by the present collectors of the land-tax. A year or two's notice by proclamation would be ample to introduce this change.

CHAPTER VII.

REGARDING SOME OF THE DUTIES OF THE CIVIL SERVICE.

It may appear to some, from what has been above written, that no provision has been made in this scheme for the performance of those duties now disposed of by Mooniffs, Sudder

in its aim to introduce a complicated and intricate code of laws, with all its attendant evils, amongst the natives of India, and to encourage litigation to the utmost? The fact is, that a most faulty system of registration of property now leads to the institution of hundreds of suits that would otherwise never exist, and the absurd plan of causing large fees to be paid prior to registration, involves the matter in still greater difficulties, and prevents the poor man from registering. It should be rendered compulsory to register every bond, and each transfer of property, of whatever nature. The registry should be effected through a local functionary, such as a Tehseeldar, and be free of all fees and expenses. The judges, and their subordinates, could easily dispose of all the civil suits that would be likely to occur under a good system of registration. All registered cases, that could possibly be so advantageously disposed of, should be referred to that ancient native tribunal the "Punchayet," *i. e.* to arbitration; and cases not registered should be immediately non-suited. The trial by Punchayet is always deemed final, and would involve no further trouble or appeal, and would, at the same time, be more consonant to native ideas. By enforcing its observance. the perpetual litigation, which now renders such numbers of subordinate courts necessary, and the people paupers, by being compelled (for want of some simpler process) to resort to them, would be got rid of. Our courts now afford a ready method for the rich to oppress the poor, and might still find advocates among the former class. The poor, also, by resorting to a curious process termed "suing as paupers," (which they do generally where there is a family feud, and are backed by others,) are enabled, without having any real or solid basis for their suits, to bring the wealthy to ruin. It is no wonder that on the whole the natives hate our civil administration. It was, and, we believe, still is, a common custom in the district of Backergunge, for great numbers of cases involving civil suits to be disposed of before the magistrate, the native arguing that it is a better and shorter method to involve an opponent in a false case before a magistrate, where he would most probably, (whatever the result of the complaint,) be de-

tained just at sowing or at harvest time, and thus be nearly ruined; for this end each landed proprietor would have dozens of his tenantry drilled by a native pleader into the proper method of giving suitable answers in courts to completely fictitious cases, that might be brought forward suddenly, on the spur of the moment. In the district of Chittagong they argued differently, the notion there being that as it was no satisfaction to the person aggrieved to have the aggressor imprisoned for having committed a breach of the peace after all the expense and vexations attendant on bringing him to justice, it was, therefore, the better plan to involve him in a civil suit, and ruin him, if possible, by litigation; criminal proceedings were therefore few, and civil ones abundant. There can be little doubt that, from simplifying the judicial processes, the Punjab is much better administered than the Bengal Presidency.

There are other reasons why the present system should be altered. We must never again (at least not till India becomes a greatly altered country) fall into the error of placing the natives on the bench, or, in other words, on a par with ourselves. Let the past be a warning for the future. As regards justice to be awarded to Europeans in India, except it be in the towns of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, the less that is heard of English law and lawyers the better. Under the competitive system for the civil service, it can never be contended that the best man has not been sent out. The *ablest* men *being there*, it is right that *they*, and no *others*, should administer justice: they are fully as well able to decide upon rights and wrongs between man and man up the country, as their brethren in Calcutta; there must no longer be those anomalies taking place of cases occurring a thousand miles off, being sent down the country in order to be decided in Calcutta. If Europeans wish to settle in India, let them do so, and give them every encouragement; but they must thereby become amenable to the laws of the country, the same as if they went to reside in Russia, France, or America.

That there should be a legislative enactment strictly applicable to the cases of Europeans we fully admit; this should

be prepared with much care and deliberation; but the law once promulgated, all classes of Europeans should be made amenable to its administration by the local authorities. It must be the paramount duty of the British Legislature to take care that those who go to the East to administer justice, should be properly educated for the purpose; so that it may never be objected, that though the men sent passed the best examinations, still they were not properly instructed in the Civil Code prepared for European residents in India.

It will, doubtless, be asked, what, in the case of such changes occurring, is to become of all the European and Eurasian uncovenanted service, attached to the Customs, Opium Departments, &c. &c.? The reply is simple. On the abolition of those departments, the greater number must be absorbed into the regular service, by being made Tehseeldars and Thannahdars, and writers in the offices, according to their qualifications, superseding the natives. Those who are aged should be pensioned off; and those who cannot be retained have a bonus given to them of six months' or more salary, and their names registered as first to fill such vacancies as they were suited for, as they occurred. By this means a highly efficient body of trustworthy Christians would be thrown into the civil administration. This rule should also be observed,—that should, among the natives, two candidates for office offer themselves, of equal eligibility as regards qualifications, the preference should invariably be given to the Christian, and thus add to our stability of rule.

CHAPTER VIII.

FINANCE.

INDIA is a country of such extent, and of such amazing resources, that its land revenue may be deemed but a small part of what it is capable of eventually producing; it should be the duty of the Legislature to open out those resources, by the introduction of European capital. The Government has an

undoubted lien on that part of the soil which yields revenue, and can always sell its right to those disposed to purchase; thus, a native landed proprietor having 1000 acres sells it, subject to the land-tax, to an European, who, being anxious to redeem this tax, should always be at liberty to do so, by paying a fine equivalent to say thirty years of the revenue or rental due to Government: the present laws not admitting of this, should at once be altered. Should the person so having redeemed his land-tax wish to cultivate opium, tobacco, or any drug that the Government thought proper to lay an impost upon, he would come under the same rules as others doing so, as the only thing redeemed by him would be the usual land-tax. Capitalists anxious to speculate in cotton and sugar plantations would thus have every opportunity of so doing unrestrained. The Himalaya, and other ranges, abound in copper, iron, and other mines; these should be let out to proper companies. The raw materials for nearly every manufacture abound in the hills, forests, and plains, and might be similarly farmed to different companies. As the mountain ranges abound in splendid culturable valleys, English settlers there should be encouraged. Our Indian army could easily be recruited from these sources; and if it were made known to the men serving in the army, that a small farm in the mountains would be given to each on being pensioned, there would be no lack of volunteers. Compensation having been given by Government to the Hill Rajahs, the land should be divided into counties; proper localities fixed on for towns, and sites traced out for houses and public buildings: these sites would soon be bought up by settlers, the hill colonies in India flourish, the English in India would assuredly avail themselves of this chance, and finally settle in the land made by long years of residence and association the land of their adoption, when they found that schools and masters made education in the hills cheaper and as efficient as in England, and send their families there, instead of undergoing that separation from them which untoward circumstances and small finances often make nearly perpetual. We cannot see why the hill towns should not rise and flourish as fast as the great American

cleus, a few years find them expanding into immense cities. Here would be a grand refuge in time of trouble (the occurrence of which God forbid), and hence could our troops be poured down upon the plains. The hills (our natural Indian boundary), being in our own occupation, and peopled by our own colonies, foreign invasion could be set at defiance, and large marts established, by which our home manufactures would be sent into the heart of Asia, as well as Thibet, Tartary, and the frontiers of China, and thus we should get all the benefits of a return trade; the English merchant could travel rapidly by rail through the torrid plains of India, and find himself, after enriching others, by depositing his goods at the various marts *en route*, a rich and happy man, enjoying the gorgeous scenery and cool climate of those magnificent mountains, which are the envy as well as glory of the world.

There are other methods by which a revenue, if necessary, could be raised. Thus, each Bunya's shop might be licensed according to its size. The Bunya comprises in one and the same person a corn-factor and general dealer in groceries, tobacco, and most of the common articles of consumption. The tax need not be onerous, and would not be felt much by either customer or shopkeeper, as the amount of the tax would be distributed by him over all the articles sold, and would bring in a large revenue, easily to be realised by the local native revenue collectors. Another tax might be levied on tobacco, on the same principle as that advocated for the opium; *i.e.* by granting licenses to persons wishing to grow it, under heavy security bonds—the extent of land placed under tobacco cultivation being specified. Thus opium and tobacco, two most deleterious drugs and articles of luxury, might be taxed, while salt and other necessaries were free. Another source of profitable taxation is from the licenses granted for the sale of spirits; these ought to be manufactured at the head-quarters of each division by licensed distillers, and the produce sold by them to the retail dealers, at a fixed royalty per gallon. The retail dealers would also, as now, have certain districts farmed out to them, and the abkaree, as it is termed, of other drugs,

Besides this, there is another means of realising a large revenue, that would simultaneously confer a great benefit. Cowrees, or shells, have hitherto formed part of the coin of India, and the traffic in them is lucrative, and confined, comparatively speaking, to only a few traders. These cowrees, though useful as representing a very small fraction of a rupee, and, consequently, admitting of many very small purchases being made, are still the cause of great vexation and annoyance, owing to their being bought up by local capitalists and money-dealers, and being sold out by them at an exorbitant price at particular seasons, as at marriage and other festivals, when their use for various purposes becomes almost imperative. Their value also fluctuates exceedingly, so that the poor are always at the mercy of the cowree-dealer or jobber. The substitution of cowrees for coin should be at once abolished, as a most mischievous practice, and a metallic coinage of inferior value issued to take their place. Thus a half-pie piece, of copper, of the same diameter and half the thickness of a pie, and also a quarter pie, of nearly its size and thickness, could be coined, formed of an alloy of zinc and copper, or brass; a piece the value of an eighth of a pie could further be struck of the same metal, by reducing the thickness in proportion to the value, and retaining the same diameter. The following table will show the relative value of the proposed new coinage to one rupee, which may, for ordinary calculation, be assumed to be worth two shillings:—

1 rupee	=	16 annas	Copper.
1 anna	=	4 pice	
1 pice	=	3 pies	
1 pie	=	2 half-pies	
1 half pie	=	2 quarter-pie	Brass.
1 quarter pie	=	2 eighths of a pie	

Thus one rupee would be equivalent to 2 shillings, or to 16 annas, or 64 pice, or 192 pies, or 384 half pies, or 768 quarter pies, or 1536 eighths of a pie, which last subdivision would be sufficiently minute for all practical purposes, and the smallest purchase, and, while doing away with all necessity for the present cowree system, be the means of yielding the Go-

vernment a very large revenue in their issue of coinage. The system now adopted in England of having receipt stamps for sums beyond a certain amount is a good one, and might be safely adopted in India. The stamps on which suits are required to be brought are too high in value, and should be reduced; and there should no longer be any permission to stamp documents, after being once drawn up, unless it can be proved that the stamps at the head Treasury were exhausted at the time when application was made, and that the stamp required to be affixed was applied for prior to drawing up the document. Such a case could hardly occur under a properly regulated system. The Government loans are a subject requiring great consideration. There can be no doubt that every effort should be made to diminish their amount. The bad faith of the Government, in suddenly issuing promissory notes at higher rates of interest, without rendering composition on account of loans bearing lower rates of interest, so materially depreciate the value of the latter, that a continuance of such a system must end in causing the Government future difficulties in borrowing money; for who can tell whether Government necessity may not cause another loan, bearing a still higher rate of interest than that now given, to be raised? It should be an invariable rule never to issue promissory notes, bearing higher rates of interest, till the holders of other notes bearing less interest have had the prior option of converting the whole of it into the more valuable security, by paying at least one half in paper and the other in cash. Again—all loans should be raised at the lowest possible rate of interest; and if cash is to be had in England, on the Continent, or in America, cheaper than in India, the Government should raise the loan there. There can be no doubt that the Imperial Government could negotiate a loan on small interest, which would enable them to pay off all the present loans, as the time for the payment of each fell due, and also to purchase up much of the promissory notes as they came into the market, owing to its being much depreciated; large quantities could thus be bought up at a profit, and even at par it would be worth while to go on purchasing up and destroying the paper: thus, in reality, by a simple

method, getting rid of the loan before the time agreed on. Those willing to sell would do so, while those anxious to hold on would keep their paper. The first thing to be done is to raise a large loan, and to settle India in the most complete and efficient manner, whether by having forts and public buildings built, or railways and other works of general utility constructed. It is unnecessary to enter into the consideration of other methods of realising a revenue, such as the Post-office, stamps, &c.; enough has been said to show that the resources of India, if properly availed of, are abundant.

CHAPTER IX.

PILOT SYSTEM AND OTHER GOVERNMENT INSTITUTIONS.

With the free ports there should be free pilots. It is, however, the duty of all Governments to take care that no incompetent person should be permitted to pilot a ship; examinations of all candidates should be instituted, and a fixed scale of examinations established by law for piloting Government vessels, similar to the arrangements made for conveying goods by railways. Thus, also, it is incumbent on the Government to have Colleges in various convenient situations, where surgery, medicine, engineering, surveying, chemistry, mining, geology, navigation, astronomy, and other sciences could be taught free. The buildings should be Government ones, and the professors salaried Government servants. Every one desirous of entering who could pass a certain preliminary examination should be allowed to do so, and have a free education in the English language, in the department which he chose to select. Certificates from these Colleges would be the student's passport to employment by Government, without the production of which no one should be entertained. A great deal has been said about the language to be taught, and many have been the advocates for teaching Hindoos through the medium of the Persian character, which is as unknown to them, save by intro-

duction through conquest, as the English character. If our intention was to give up India, I would then advocate translating a few books into Persian and Hindostanee; but as our ideas of retention are pretty strong at present, and we desire a real and permanent improvement, it is a much simpler as well as better process for the natives (the young especially) to learn the English language and its literature than to commence bungling over imperfect translations of a few books, the great mass of scientific literature still remaining a sealed book to them, as the learner could not avail himself of it, save by acquiring English.

CHAPTER

WHAT SHOULD BE THE TENOR OF THE FIRST PROCLAMATION ISSUED ON THE RESTORATION OF ORDER.

When that Empire which has been nearly lost to us by various causes, shall be again firmly in our possession by force of arms, and due retributive justice administered, a proclamation to the following effect should be issued:—

"Her Majesty, Queen Victoria, having seen with grief the rebellious spirit shown by her army and subjects, in various parts of India, and the wicked attempts made by people of high rank, (who should have known better than to involve themselves and their more ignorant countrymen in the horrors of a civil war, which could only result in destruction to themselves and the misguided people led on by them,) to subvert order, and also the cruel manner in which her European subjects, men, women, and children, without respect to sex or age, have been ruthlessly and barbarously murdered, under the false pretext of religion, has, with a view to the restoration of order and confidence, in conjunction with the Houses of Parliament, resolved to take the Government of India into her own hands, and to be crowned Empress of India; and the Governor-General for the time being there shall be her representative. She therefore proclaims to all her subjects, that it is her intention that Delhi, Cawnpore, Hansi,

and other places where humanity has disgraced itself, shall be rased to the ground, as a memorial and warning to others of the consequences of rebellion. The religions of all classes shall be respected, and each shall be at liberty to use that form of worship most in accordance with his own conscience. This, however, it is clearly to be understood, shall have no reference whatever to the law of the land, which, having in its view solely the good of the entire community, will, so long as that good is concerned, not respect any peculiar religious observances, which individual sectarians imagine may interfere with their tenets. Further, to prevent any more misapprehension as regards the law of inheritance, any one not having children shall be at liberty to adopt a person to succeed him. This, however, shall not be held applicable to political succession: thus a Nawab or Rajah possessed of territory, not having an heir male, shall not be able to appoint a successor to his Raj, or to that political authority which appertains to the government of his country, and to the regalia, whatever they may be, though he may do so as regards his private personal estate, the rule over the territory lapsing to the Crown. In the affairs strictly appertaining to Government, respect for caste shall no longer hold a place. Thus all applicants for office shall, if qualified, be deemed eligible, whatever their rank or denomination. The Government of India, however, being a Christian one, and therefore one of toleration, does not, and never did, desire forcible conversion; nevertheless, it will not permit that religion of which it is the representative to be held in disrespect by any of its subjects: preference will therefore be given in all appointments, where parties are equally qualified, to the Christian applicant. Furthermore, it shall not be competent to any one to disinherit any member, male or female, of his family, merely on the ground of change of religion, in any case where by law the party so changing his other religious opinions would have had legal title, had he or she remained in the ancestral faith. In like manner it shall be competent to all widows, of whatever creed or caste, to marry again, without losing their right to such property as they would otherwise have been able

reconstructed, to meet the exigencies of the State. A Court shall be appointed with powers to try and to punish all persons, without appeal, except Sepoys, who have been concerned in the late rebellion. The latter shall be tried and punished by courts-martial. These courts shall sit till all the rebels have been apprehended, tried, and their cases disposed of; and it shall be their duty to search for and hunt them out from wherever they shall have taken refuge or concealed themselves; and all persons harbouring such men shall render themselves liable to severe penalties."

A Proclamation of this tenor would soon restore order to India, and clear away all misapprehensions, and the issue of it should not be delayed.

CHAPTER XI.

ON THE REORGANIZATION OF THE INDIAN ARMY.

Much has been said and written on this subject: the following is the outline of a scheme that might be found to answer practically. Each regiment should be composed of 500 Europeans, the remaining five companies being natives. Of these, one company should be Sikhs, one Goorkhas, one Mĕhtĕrs and Choomars, one Mahommedans—half of the latter, or fifty, being Sheeahs, and the other fifty Soonees, and one Brahmins; and in addition to these, one company of European artillery and one company of European cavalry attached to each corps. The natives should all be entertained on the understanding that caste had nothing to do with service, and that they should one and all perform every duty they were called upon to do. Local service should be set aside;—a man once enlisted should be engaged to the world's end, if his services were called for. The Europeans should be always kept at the head-quarters of the district, the natives performing outpost-duties. Corps should not be triennially marched about, at an enormous

expense, from one end of India to another; but be changed to a neighbouring station if necessary every third year. In each division a strong fort should be erected, and be garrisoned by the Europeans only; the munitions of war being placed entirely under their control. The artillery should be entirely European, and the preparation of the shells and caps also form a part of their duty. Each Presidency need not have more than six regiments for civil purposes, one to be located in each division, the Europeans being at the fort, at the head-quarters of the division, the natives distributed among the four sub-divisions, according as their services were found to be necessary. At the seat of each Government there should be four European regiments—two of infantry, one of cavalry, and one artillery, as a corps of reserve to march on any given point, and from which the corps distributed over the country could be recruited. Thus, there being seven subordinate Presidencies, and ten corps at each, the army of India in times of peace would consist of 70,000 men. If, in addition to this, we allow 30,000 Europeans of all arms to be distributed, in bodies of 10,000, at the seaports of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, we shall not only have the means of recruiting the various Presidencies, but have corps of reserve for all cases of need, ready to march on any given point where their presence might be required. By this means an army of 100,000 men, of whom 58,000 would be Europeans, and the remaining 42,000 trustworthy natives, added to an enormous and well regulated Police force, would be infinitely more efficient than the 300,000 men hitherto employed by us, chiefly to fight against ourselves. An army so organised would be safe from internal revolt, and from the nature of its construction could be much more speedily recruited from the natives than the old army was, and the expenses attending it be much less.

CHAPTER XII.

EDUCATION AND RELIGIOUS INSTRUCTION.

It being the undoubted duty of each person to educate his own children, the burden of doing this should not be thrown upon the State; but each village should pay a per-centage (as now paid for making roads) for education also, in proportion to the land revenue assessed, for the support of village schools. The masters should be selected by the local authorities, and be placed under their management, under proper rules. For instruction in the English language, missionaries should be sent out, and half their expenses paid by Government. These should have charge of all schools where English was taught, and where the Bible would be read and explained. A certain knowledge of English should, after a certain determined period, be made a *sine quâ non* to Government employ; those, therefore, anxious to be so employed, would most probably resort to these schools: this would show the natives, that while the Government did not force any one's religious creed, it was resolved that the Christian religion should not be placed below the level of all others, and should at least command respect. This is a point that the British Legislature should especially insist on; and it would place the missionaries in a position where they would at least be respected; though, from various causes, they might fail to make proselytes; and it could not then be thrown in the teeth of the Government that they held veneration for their own religion cheaper than their lust for rule at all costs. The dominant power has always the power to select its own *employées*, and ought to exercise it, and of this no one has any right to complain. It would be a part of the duty of the missionaries, as a paid clergy, to perform the services at those stations where there were no military chaplains. Another great object would thus be attained, that there would be no missionaries so paid who were not thoroughly educated and ordained, and their qualifications for the appointment would be thoroughly considered ere they

received Government salaries. A spirit of competition to attain the necessary standard, by a knowledge of the native languages, would thus be engendered, and the missionary character thus be vastly improved. It must be obvious to those who have resided long in India, that sound education must, to a certain extent, precede conversion. The good seed must be sown in virgin soil; and though it may sprout in the rocky and weather-beaten soil of infidel pollution, still the young, uncorrupted, and pure spirit of both sexes is the true soil on which to commence operations. Female schools should also be similarly instituted, under certain rules; and the wives of missionaries, or others who were proved fit, be similarly employed in the work of education. Colleges, such as those at Agra, Roorkee, Calcutta, and elsewhere, should be free to all classes, and be supported entirely by Government.

CHAPTER XIII.

PUBLIC WORKS.

All works, especially such as promote irrigation, locomotion, telegraphic communication, &c., should be carried on with the utmost vigour, and encouragement be held out by Government to companies; along with this, the beds of rivers should be kept clean and navigable, the various harbours made safe, and forts should be constructed. The first class of these may be considered remunerative, the latter not so. It has been too much the custom to look to profit before constructing public works, and this without any consideration as to the effects on the people: thus the erection of toll-gates along the grand trunk-road had for its immediate result the stopping of two thirds of the traffic, the poor man preferring to make a considerable circuit rather than pay the toll. The buildings for offices, jails, bridges along district roads, should never form part of the department of Public Works, but be placed under

the charge of the local civil officers, with efficient persons sent as Superintendants from the Government Engineering College at Roorkie, or other similar institutions.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN CIVIL AND POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS.

THE impolicy of removing officers from their corps for years for staff and civil employ is so obvious, that it is unnecessary to dilate upon it. The question, however, may be asked, Is the army to be shut out for ever from all chance of other benefit? or is an officer who is a good linguist, or a good engineer, or who has done the State good service in the field or elsewhere, not to meet with his reward, and the State be debarred from the use of his services? Men so qualified should certainly be employed for service, but only under the following condition,—that they *ceased to belong to the army*, and that their places were filled up on their removal. The *healthy and efficient state of the army ought not to be sacrificed to anything*. If it be deemed proper to reward great talent and extraordinary exertions, let it be done either by a money payment of some kind, or else, if the ability of the officer is so remarkable as to qualify him for something superior to the army, it is decidedly wrong that he should return to it after a series of years, when by long absence, and employment in a different sphere, he has become unfitted to undertake military duties, and when his prolonged absence must have rendered him an utter stranger to his men and subordinate officers. On no pretext whatever should an officer quit his corps, unless it is for good. A reward in money, conferred by an increase of salary, to be further enhanced by an honorary title, will be found to be the best method of remuneration, as by it the best men will still remain in their corps, and thus render them more efficient.

CHAPTER XV.

THE VILLAGE POLICE.

THE village police in Bengal and the North-west Provinces do not number less, on a rough calculation, than 200,000 men. They are in excess, and do not form a part, of the regular district police, and are now paid by the Zemcendars, and form as inefficient a set of rabble as ever were beheld. These men should be appointed and paid by the Government, and not by the land-owners; and the land now held by them in lieu of payment for services from the land-holders be again made over to the Zemeendars, who should be required to pay the equivalent, in cash, direct into the Government treasuries, as a part of the land revenue. These men, if properly organised, would yield a force amounting to not less than 100,000 men in each Presidency, who should then be incorporated as part of the police, and formed into a sort of movable constabulary, on the plan of the Irish system. This would give a force of about 16,000 men to each division. The seven Presidencies would by this means possess about 500,000 efficient policemen, who, when organised, would form a large force, capable of doing great local service. They would cost the State nothing, as they are now paid by the Zemeendars, and would still be paid by them, only through the channel of Government. They would then cease to be perpetually local, and could be transferred to other divisions, away from their homes, and all that local influence, resulting from their being both nominated and paid by the Zemeendars, which prevents their being of any real use at present, be got rid of.

CHAPTER XVI.

THE CAUSES OF THE MUTINY.

WITHOUT here entering at length into the details of the causes of the mutiny, the Houses of Parliament would do well to

make inquiry into the following matters, viz.: What changes have within the last dozen years been made in the rules regarding Sepoys' pensions, and for granting them leave of absence? Also, into the reasons for the abolition of flogging among native corps, when it was retained in the European ones? Why caste was almost worshipped in the choice and management of the Sepoy? Why the authority of commanding officers was curtailed to the utmost possible limits, and the Sepoy allowed to set his commanding officer at defiance, by the facility with which he was permitted to appeal from his decisions? Why cartridges were allowed to be greased with fat at all, and, so greased, to be issued to any part of an army to which it was pollution to use? Why all the forts and strongholds containing all our magazines have been placed, almost exclusively, in the keeping of native corps? and why, throughout India, the natives have been placed on a par with Europeans in civil employ? If the replies to these, and many more similar questions that might be asked, are not satisfactory, it will be obvious that the Government of India has been confided to wrong hands; that misrule, and misapprehension of the true position of things in India, has long occurred to a most awful and reprehensible extent, and that it must be the duty of the Imperial Parliament to recall all those persons sent out from England, who, from want of proper local experience, are positively unfit to carry on their official duties there, and never again to make similar mistakes. There can be no doubt that for years past the Mahommedans, who hate us, have been trying to undermine our rule, by speaking of us as Kaffirs, *i. e.* infidels, as dirty and unclean, and as unable to legislate ourselves, as our laws were founded with due regard for the tenets of their Koran, &c. The mine has been well, though almost imperceptibly, prepared through a long course of time. The annexation of Oude, &c., which affected hundreds of wealthy people, both Mahommedan and Hindoo, holding high and lucrative posts, not only hurried the crisis, but caused matters to proceed to a much greater length than it could otherwise have done.

The people there did not and do not want us, any more than

the inhabitants of the wilds of America want the Americans, to govern them. The method of annexation, also (viz. as brought about by Lord Dalhousie's sending 20,000 men into the country surreptitiously), was looked upon by them, and by many independent native chieftains, as an act of treachery to a faithful ally; and as they imagined that the same might happen to them next, it is no wonder that some of them have joined the insurgents. It is well enough to talk about the observance of the letter of treaties; it should be remembered that if we permit that letter, or the interpretation of it, to be broken, and to remain so for a long course of years, we give our sanction to the breach, and become responsible for it; and that natives, generally, are not so disposed to look with a lawyer's eye to the letter of an engagement: they cannot so readily see why a Mahommedan Oriental king should not have a seraglio, as his ancestors had before him, filled to his heart's content; and if satisfied to receive a quarter, or a third of his revenue, instead of the whole of it, why he should not be permitted to do so in peace. If it was certain, as asserted, that the misrule in Oude was so great as to call for immediate occupation on our part, why resort to a secret expedition? Would not the nation instead of opposing have gladly risen to join us with open arms? If it is true that the nation at large did not want us, it will explain why a large army was secretly collected, and the country suddenly pounced down upon and seized by force. However, it must not be supposed that the forcible seizure of the Oude territory is now any longer an argument for its restoration, after all the rebellion and treachery of the King and the inhabitants. However strong the position of the King of Oude might have been in pleading for his kingdom, in the first instance, all that has now passed away; and to yield a single inch of territory where such atrocities have been committed, and where the country has been now reconquered by the shedding of so much precious blood, would indeed show extreme pusillanimity. Those who annexed Oude have much to answer for, in the terrible character the mutiny has gradually assumed, and for the torrents of innocent blood

CHAPTER XVII.

THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECTS IN WHICH COMPETITORS SHOULD BE EXAMINED, IN ORDER TO BE ADMITTED TO THE CIVIL SERVICE IN INDIA, CONSIDERED.

It is a serious mistake to require men, whose entire lives are to be dedicated to a peculiar service, to enter it by passing examinations in subjects which will never be of any future use to them. The following is a list of subjects that would be important for every one to be well versed in :—

1. Facility in English composition.
2. A good knowledge of Hindostanee, as a general language, and also of the language of the particular parts of India the young civilian is to be posted in.
3. A thorough acquaintance with the codes he will have to administer, the elements of English law, and the histories of England and British India.
4. A fair knowledge of mathematics.
5. A fair knowledge of mensuration and surveying.
6. Geology.
7. Chemistry.
8. General history.
9. Modern languages.
10. Classics.

The five first headings of subjects should be deemed essentials, without which no appointment should be conferred, whether by competition or otherwise. The five last should be added, if possible.

CHAPTER XVIII.

As great efforts will doubtless be made by those incongruous and double-ruling bodies termed, as if in jest, the Court of Directors, and the Board of Control, to preserve their power, a few words regarding their fitness to rule may not be irrelevant. We may in the first place ask, Is it true that under their joint direction and control India has been brought to its present

pitiable condition? If so, their ignorance in government is obvious, and go they ought, at once, to make room for another and better *régime*. Is it true that many important affairs of India are at a stand-still, while thousands of miles of ocean have to be traversed and retraversed, and while the Board and Court are corresponding with the Local Governments concerning matters that not above one in ten of their number have any practical experience of, or know anything about? If this be true, we must have a new system. The whole subject does not admit of two words of argument; the best intentions of the Board and Court have ended, as all good intentions do, not founded on practical knowledge; just as if some good ignorant man were to try and regulate a steam-engine with the best of good wishes, and after exerting extraordinary strength, succeed in blowing up himself and others together with him. Competition for all services once thrown open, there would be an end to all dangerous patronage. The only patronage reserved by the Crown should consist in having an opportunity of conferring some reward on faithful servants, military and civil, by giving their sons appointments; but a good safety-valve may be here applied, by making it necessary for the nominee to be examined in subjects similar to those now passed in under the competitive system, no nominee being permitted to proceed to India till he shall have passed an examination, as good, at least in point of acquirements, as that passed by the lowest grade now admitted under competition. The defence entered into by the Court of Directors is now before the public, and its details will be, doubtless, fully gone into by Parliament. The object of the Author is not so much with the past as with the future. The Court may prove that others govern as ignorantly as themselves; they may prove that they have done their best; but the true interests of India ought not, and must not, be sacrificed to any personal considerations. The millions that inhabit that land are entitled to the best form of Government the British Legislature can confer upon it, irrespective of the passing interest of Proprietors of East India Stock, and their representatives the Court of Directors.

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THE CENTRAL ASIAN QUESTION.

A Series of Letters by ENGLAND *published in the* FRIEND OF INDIA.

My attention has been drawn, of late, to the very peculiar manner in which affairs in Afghanistan are commented upon by the Press of India. One journal recklessly hazards the opinion that the solid establishment of Russia in Cabul would involve no danger to India. Another commends the inactivity of Sir John Lawrence, and yet, in the same breath, declares that an advance on the part of the English is a necessity. One journal of influence attracts attention by its frequent change of opinion on this question, whilst another is continually parading the correctness of its information. To a thoughtful mind this singular vacillation—a vacillation you have not shared—is a severe condemnation of the attitude adopted by the Viceroy. It is an indisputable proof that men's minds are unsettled, that their belief in the impossibility of danger to India from Russia has been rudely shaken, and that, in the absence of a guiding idea, which a well defined policy on the part of the Government could alone supply, their judgment is being slowly mastered by their anxieties. It seems to me that this unsettled state of men's minds betrays the breaking up of the opinions which have obtained on this subject for the past ten years. But when the English section of the Indian Press exhibits so much uncertainty, we may safely conclude that the Native papers will manifest a nervous anxiety, the more noteworthy the more they attempt to conceal it. A single glance at these papers is sufficient to show how powerfully they are affected by everything which takes place in Central Asia. For months past the Mahomedan journals have dwelt upon the incomprehensible attitude of Sir John Lawrence. The Hindoo papers, too, have wondered at an indifference, the justification of which they have failed to discover, and even a journal supposed to represent an important department, has not hesitated to condemn the policy of the Government. From personal observation and knowledge I can affirm how truly, how faithfully, the anxiety of the Native press echoes the prevailing sentiment of native society. I appeal to those who have within, say a week, had much to do with the bazaars of the metropolis, to bear me out when I say, that the most absurd and therefore the most unsettling rumours have found ready circulation. In India, these rumours—

afwāh-o-shuhrah—are the pulse of native sentiment and opinion. There is a feeling of alarm and anxiety abroad which can neither be glossed over nor ignored. It must be acknowledged if it is not to work us harm.

No native can comprehend a masterly inactivity. It is a policy which his whole training and nature teach him to disbelieve. He can believe in the conquest of the Franks by the Muslimeen, although he knows the weakness and admits the decadence of the latter, because he has heard of the Imam Mehdee and looks for some supernatural interference. But, a strength which deliberately sits still, in an elected indifference, whilst a rival and ultimate foe appropriates every advantage, is a something he cannot believe in. It is beyond his experience and therefore he will not even try to comprehend it. If he argue on the point at all, he will say that a strength to justify such an attitude must be beyond all irresistible, enormous ; and even then he will shake his head and say its quiescence is not wisdom, for the *pehlwan* who reposes on his laurels loses, not gains strength. Natives, however, of intelligence and education assert our strength is not of such gigantic proportions as should lead Sir John Lawrence to be indifferent to the possibility of its being most severely taxed. For a whole decade they have been taught to see in it only a powerful precaution against internal disturbances, so that it cannot now be a source of wonder if they doubt its capacity to deal with external disputes, in a way consonant alike with the necessities of our position, and the demands of our reputation. Hence they resolutely refuse belief to a policy of masterly inactivity. Putting aside, therefore, the stock arguments in its favour, they seek for a reason which shall account to them for the policy of the Viceroy, and they find it, as Louis Blánc found it four years ago, and almost in the same words :—"England is afraid of war; that is the truth.....England neither wishes to draw the sword, nor will she draw it unless she is absolutely compelled to do so. In that case she would fling the scabbard far away, for the Saxon race has something of the bull-dog's nature. But that very thing stops her. She is afraid of having to stay too long with her feet in blood !" Is it worth England's while to allow such an opinion to ingrain itself in the minds of her Indian subjects, as it has done in the minds of the peoples of the European continent? Looking to the character of the races of India, is her indifference either honourable to herself or fair and just to them ? Will it not compel her, at no distant date, to put forth efforts, strenuous, exhausting, and prolonged, in order to wipe out an impression she has herself fostered, but which can only result in the intensification of every difficulty she may be called upon to surmount ? The *Times*, according to M. Blanc, is the principal—it is now I am glad to say the only—exponent of this fear of war. It ridicules every view but its own, but its own view is narrow and unwise to a degree, because it sets itself above Anglo-Indian experience and starts from a point

essentially non-Indian. It takes no thought of the effect which the circulation of rumours of a Russian advance must necessarily exercise upon masses so impressionable as the people of India. Yet this effect is precisely what an Anglo-Indian has first to consider, and, in shaping a policy, first to provide against. In overlooking so vital a point the *Times* abandons its duty to England.

I am aware I expose myself to a charge of Russophobism by writing thus. But to such a charge I am content to plead guilty, for I think I can justify my guilt to myself. It is the misfortune of England that she has attached such importance to a mere nick-name, and deliberately blinded herself to the truths it was meant to render distasteful. Russophobia, intelligently understood, should be the guiding principle of every English politician's conduct in dealing with oriental questions. For never, in the history of the world, have two nations had so many causes of political rivalry, and ultimate contest, as Russia and England. Russia has not only admitted this, but, from the day she first acknowledged the fact, she has acted upon its acceptance with a farsightedness, craft, ability, and tireless persistence which extort admiration from the most unwilling. Russophobism is not a mere dread of a Russian invasion of India, but an oppositian to Russian policy as steady and persistent as that policy itself. In this view I am a Russophobist, because I think by being so I can best do my duty to England. I repeat that the time has not yet come when Russophobism shall be a dread of invasion; though I cannot deny events seem likely, at no distant date, to make such a contingency perilously near. What we have to meet now is a policy, a policy, too, the more powerful and threatening because, dreading a sneer more than we love to examine facts, we pretend to ignore it.

For a century no nation has been so constantly at war as England, nor have any troops seen so much service as the English, yet English politicians have succeeded in persuading Europe and the world, that the English spirit is either dead or dying, and that the English, as a nation, are the most peaceful race in Europe. Hence England has had at different times a Russophobia, a Gallophobia, a Yankeephobia, a Chinaphobia. Of all these Russophobia has been the most justifiable and therefore it has been the only *phobia* that has survived criticism, and unfortunately the only *phobia* that has given rise to a term of witless reproach. It had its origin in the reaction caused by the disaster in Afghanistan. This catastrophe has been pressed on me *ad nauseam* as a reason why we should never advance beyond Peshawur; as a reason why a Russian advance is impossible; as a complete and unanswerable refutation of all Russophobist arguments; and, finally, as a something, the mere remembrance of which gave an authority in questions of Central Asian politics at once complete and decisive. I cannot, however, accord it so preposterous an importance, for I belong to a generation in no way responsible for the blunder out of which it arose. The pre-

sent generation has, however, to reap the consequences of the folly committed by Lord Auckland and Sir John Hobhouse. It has, therefore, the best of all rights to criticise and probe this folly, that of bearing its punishment,—a punishment which consists chiefly in the denial of a fair consideration to every question in which the name of Russia appears, and the utter neglect of every warning furnished by each new Russian aggression.

I am told, for instance, that the fate of General Elphinstone's army between Cabul and Jellalabad disposes of the question of our ability to deal with Afghans or to hold Afghanistan. Yet a brigade of the army, the main body of which was destroyed, shattered the strength of the destroyers, and held Jellalabad against the whole of Afghanistan. Why should I be denied the right of drawing deductions from the operations of Generals like Cotton, Nott, Pollock, and Sale? Why should my views of the Afghan war be tied down to a misfortune brought about by English political Quixotism, and English military incompetence, rather than by the conduct, valour, or even treachery of the Afghans? The non-Russophobists draw this catastrophe into the argument on every occasion, as proving the danger, as well as folly, of attempting military operations beyond the passes. But the lesson I draw is that if a General will disregard every warning, and violate the commonest principles and rules of war, if, in fact, he will place his army in the power of a barbarian enemy, it will be destroyed. The campaign in Afghanistan of 1840-41 is just as inapplicable to the affairs of to-day, as the earlier Italian campaigns of Napoleon are to the present state of Italy. Lord Auckland conjured up a phantom, and then rushed to a distant battle field to fight it. But to-day no conjuration is necessary; the phantom has become a reality, the danger he unwisely anticipated has arrayed itself against Sir John Lawrence. The difference in the position of the two rulers, is the difference between a possible contingency and an actual necessity.

To-day, Russophobism is once more likely to become a watchword instead of a nickname for an alarmist. We cannot deny nor explain away the popular opinion, which, from St. Petersburg to Calcutta, has arrayed England and Russia against each other. Were the Khans of Khokand and Bokhara guilty of Russophobism when they instinctively appealed to India for help? Are the rulers of Yarkand and Cabul guilty of Russophobism when they look to England to bar the on-rolling wave of Muscovite conquest? Is the instinct of every tribe in Asia wrong, and the opinion based upon an old and ill-founded terror right? I prefer to abide by the instinct of the people of Turkestan, Persia, Afghanistan and India, because the whole history of Asia for eighty years proves nothing, if it do not prove that instinct right.

I come now to the question of a possible invasion of India by Russia. Such an event is possible not probable. The stock objections

to this last opinion are that Russia could not pass an army through a mountainous country like Afghanistan, and that even if she did so, we could meet and crush it as it emerged from the passes! Russia has had more experience of mountain warfare than any other nation on earth. To strengthen herself in Central Asia, and to set free her army—an army most familiar with mountain warfare, she perpetrated an unheard of political atrocity, by deporting the Tcherkessians from the Caucasus. Yet because of Russophobism she is to be supposed incapable of repeating the feats of Napoleon or Suwarrow in the Alps, or Diebitcsh in the Balkan, she is to be supposed incapable of repeating an achievement successfully attempted by every conqueror who ever made India his prey. We have ourselves traversed Afghanistan with armies, the Afghans have been doing so for four years, but Russia—that is quite another thing. We should meet her and crush her as she debouched from the passes, is what we are told by men in all branches of the service. And yet no opinion more baseless, more mischievous, or more dangerous, was ever hazarded.

In the first place, Russia could not, and would not, advance until thoroughly well prepared, unless we tempted her too strongly. To be prepared she must wield the full military resources of Turkistan, Persia and Cabul,—the Afghans being her advance-guard. But even this is not all. Just as our base is the sea, the Russian base would be the Caspian, and we must not forget a Russian army at Peshawur would be nearer its base than an English army. If we have the Ganges Valley Railway, they have the Oxus, even if a Turkistan railway were an impossibility to a power which perpetrated the line between Moscow and St. Petersburgh. Again, if Russia did advance would her emissaries in our rear remain idle? Should we in very deed and truth be able to mass the strength of India at the mouth of the passes? The question is an idle one. The danger for the present is not what we may have to meet, but what we have to guard. But let me deal with this question as a matter of figures. The military strength of the three Presidencies is,—

Europeans	... ...	61,000 men
Natives	... ...	122,000 ,,
Total	... ...	183,000 ,,
Less Abyssinian force, sick, &c., &c., (say) ...	... ...	23,000 ,,
Available	... ...	160,000 ,,

With this force we have to guard the peace of 120,000,000 of British subjects, and the tranquillity of 40,000,000 of people subject to native rulers. That is, taking the population at a very low estimate, the military strength is as 1 to 1,000, and the European army as 1 to 2,600! With this force rebellion has to be rendered hopeless, faction harmless, and treason futile. The ambition, dislike, and disaffection

of native princes have to be brought to nought, and the intrigues of such a nest of traitors, as Captain Parsons unearthed at Patna, confounded and over-thrown. We have to guard against Mahomedan fanaticism, Hindoo hate, Mahratta revenge. How many men then of the European army could we mass at the extremity of the Empire? How far do we dare to meet an invasion, or even a frontier war, with native troops? Of the wonderful organisation of the native army I shall not speak. It is not necessary. But before proceeding to the next part of my subject I will here mention that a reference to Thornton (*Edn.* 1862) and Aitchison, shows that, leaving out Nepal and the Nizam, 60 Native States possess between them a force of 171,000 men, a force representing *the paid fighting class of India.* These have to be guarded as such, in spite of their being distributed in small bodies all over the Peninsula. I say nothing of the Police, because of the new organisation given it by Mr. Strachey, and because I set off against it the thousands of restless spirits who throng the British provinces, *especially in Northern India.*

But now let us consider what we should have to meet in the event of an invasion. Russian resources can be as readily used on the Oxus as on the Black Sea. Persia by the treaties of Gulistan and Turkomanchai is excluded from the Caspian, yet Russia keeps up on this sea a powerful fleet. Why? Her great storehouse of arms and munitions of war is the South Oural, and her manufactories here have direct and easy water-communication with the Caspian, whence it will not be long before, carried by rail to the Lake Aral, they will by the Jaxartes or Oxus be within reach of any point in Turkestan. We must not overlook the fact that Tashkend had scarcely fallen before a river flotilla from the Aral commenced the navigation of the lower course of these two mighty streams. Her Caucasian army has always been separate from her main army, and it is now free to act in Central Asia as it acted for so many long years in the valleys of Daghestan and the Elburz. She has also a perfect knowledge of the countries she would have to traverse, and the chiefs with whom she would have to deal. She wields the strength of the Kirghiz, and she has conquered the whole of the Deshti-Kiptchak which gives her, according to Vambéry—

	Population.	Army.
Bokhara	3,000,000	40,000
Khiva		20,000
Khokan		20,000
		Total 80,000

By her outposts and by her emissaries she has begun to ally herself with the Turkomans, representing a population of 982,500 souls, who could, without difficulty, furnish 30,000 unequalled raiders. The country between Orenburg and Merv can thus, at a *very moderate* estimate yield Russia,—

			Fighting Men.
The Kirghiz	...	...	20,000
The Khanates	...	...	60,000
The Turkomans	...	...	20,000
			Total 100,000

To set these in motion she has, if the prospect of *loot* were insufficient, merely to revert to a plan submitted to her in 1792 by a Prince Nasau-Siegen, to make the restoration of the Great Mogul the pretext for her advance. This pretext, if required, is ready to her hand, for Indian Chiefs have found refuge in Turkistan.

The forces I have named are mostly cavalry, but in Persia the Czar can find an infantry to support them, hardy, temperate, strong, and, if well led, stannch and true. Under Englishmen they have before now beaten Russian regiments. According to Watson, Persia has—

Population		Army.
	Cavalry and Infantry.	95,000
5 to 10,000,000		
	Artillery	5,000
		100,000

Assuming, however, the strength of the Persian army to be, only, the force concentrated during the summer at Meshed, we have 60,000 men. Or, for the Perso-Turkistani contingent of Russia 160,000 men. These troops require little impedimenta, are hardy, brave, *and one and all possessed of traditions of Indian conquest.* Again, Afghanistan, according to Ferrier, has the following Population :—

Afghans	...	...	2,500,000
Parsiwans or Eimaks	...	...	600,000
Beloochees	...	...	300,000
Kuzzilbashes	...	...	800,000
	Total	...	4,200,000

A population fully capable of sending 1,50,000, men into the field, and bound by ties of kindred or service to every Court in India. As I have said, Russia will never advance unless the Afghans are with her. But have we ever tried to realise the full weight and meaning of the figures I have given? I do not, however believe in an *immediate* Russian invasion. She has not yet had time to organise the wild men of the deserts, or teach them to consider India the goal of their warlike hopes. Events in Europe have compelled her to move too quickly. She has had no time to eliminate troublesome nobles, or to win over the masses. She has however thoroughly dominated Persia, which, since the treaty of Turkomanchai, may be said to have

been but a fief of the Czar, as witness her repeated attempts under Russian inspiration and guidance on Herat, notably Colonel Simoneau's conduct of the siege of this place in 1833.

But though we have not to meet an invasion we have to counteract a policy. In 1789 Russia had the wit to foresee the inevitable ascendancy of England in India, and the way in which it would interfere with her designs on Constantinople. She *therefore actually offered Egypt to France* as an inducement for her to act against us in India, and support the Czarina's general designs. From that time to the present Russia has step by step advanced nearer India, until, at this moment, her outposts are nearer Delhi than Moscow, and are about half way between the frontiers of the two countries as they stood in 1840. She has absorbed Central Asia and advanced her borders from the Irtisch to the Oxus, and is now prepared *to interfere as a neighbour* in Afghanistan, against which she has, for the third time, arrayed Persia. Up to the present day she has cloaked her ambition under a desire to extend her trade, but, now, the *Moscow Gazette*—which once threatened to dictate a peace at Calcutta—admits the worthlessness, to a great empire, of the trade of a population of only 3,000,000 whose wants are few, and whose mode of life is simple. Yet this excuse of advancing Russian commercial interests has been accepted without question by English statesmen and English journals. But though abandoned, as far as Central Asia is concerned, the excuse is too good to be given up altogether. Hence its new form is the anxiety of the Czar to see Russian goods supreme in the markets of South Western China, a country containing a population of 50,000,000, and open to the French and English, from the sea, by such streams as the Irrawaddy and Cambodia.

Is it to be believed, that, for eighty years, Russia has made the most gigantic efforts to acquire not India, nor the Indian trade, but the trade of the nomades of Central Asia, of Thibet, of South Western China? *Is it to be believed, that, having made India a watchword for eighty years, she will, as the hour for a final effort approaches, consent to pass India by, and, committing her army to an advance of another two thousand miles, direct its efforts on China?* No! the whole policy of Russia has been, generation after generation—paralyse England by paralysing India. It is this policy which we must meet and check mightily. It is this policy which the non-Russophobists ignore and pooh-pooh.

It requires no prescience to foresee what terrible annoyance so powerful, so unscrupulous, and determined an enemy would work us, were she near enough to influence any section of the Indian population. The danger she would create on our north-western frontier may, however, be estimated from the following figures, taken from Reports by Messrs. R. Temple and R. H. Davies—

	Fighting Men.
Independent tribes from Huzara to Dehra Ghazee Khan	1,15,000
Do. Beloochies bordering on Dehra Ghazee Khan	20,000
Total to Sindh frontier	1,35,000
Tribes within the border	80,000
Total from Cashmere to Sindh	2,15,000

We have thus, not counting Beloochistan, or the Beloochee frontier of Sindh, to watch a fighting class, composed as under—

In India itself	1,71,000
On the Punjab frontier	2,15,000
Total	3,80,000

This we are now doing with an effective force of about 1,60,000 men, which has, in addition, to keep the peace of 160,000,000 of people, at the least.

But to show the materials an enemy might find on the border, I take from the same Reports a statement of the expeditions against the frontier tribes—

		Expeditions.
1849 to 1856	against Independent tribes ...	11
	against British tribes	4
	Total	15

These fifteen expeditions employed a total force of 27,150. The largest force employed at one time was 3,700, the smallest 600. From 1856 to 1864 there were seven expeditions; I give the strength of six.

a	... ...	4,553 with 14 guns.
b	... ...	2,640 ,, 12 ,,
c	... ...	4,897 (guns not given.)
d	... ...	3,990 with 13 guns and 1,131 levies.
e	... ...	5,196 with 12 guns.
f	... ...	The Sittana campaign.
		½ Battery Royal Artillery.
		Huzara Mountain Train.
		Peshawur Mountain Train.
		Detachment of Guides.
		11th Bengal Cavalry.
		Sappers and Miners.
		2 European Regiments.
		8 Native Regiments.

Now, leaving out the Sittana campaign as exceptional, and not counting levies we have the following figures :—

		Men.
1849 to 1856	average of 15 expeditions	1,815.
1856 to 1864	average of 5 expeditions	4,237.

Mr. Temple remarked in 1856 that these tribes had never combined. Yet no sooner did we receive a check in the Sittana affair, than they combined so rapidly and readily as to give ample employment to a small and well appointed army! We dare not then deny to ourselves the possibility, nay probability, of such a combination, if Russia be able to influence Afghanistan from Herat and the line of the Oxus. Before striking us herself it would be to her advantage to propel the tribes inward upon us.

Russian policy is, then, preparing such a state of things as must render an increase of Indian military expenditure inevitable. She will force us to increase our European troops, and will render India an intolerable burden to England, just as the cost of the army will be an intolerable burden to India. England, under such circumstances would, in the event of a European convulsion, find her main strength locked up in India. If the conditions of the question as a whole condemn the attitude of the Government, the actual position of affairs renders that attitude perilous. If Russia cannot advance without the Afghans, duty as well as policy, honour as well as the instinct of self-preservation, urge us to range their tribes of wild but splendid soldiers on our side. Recent events in Afghanistan have given us another opportunity of interfering, and have made the necessity for doing so more imperious than ever. Shere Ali's cause is ruined, he has fled towards the Russian frontier, and Persia is hastening to take advantage of the consequent confusion. The latest news states she has sent a detachment to Furrah ! The full significance of this movement is only seen, when we remember, that *the road from Herat to Candahar is open all the year round*, whilst the road from Cabul to Candahar is closed in winter by the snow. The Afghans express the general opinion of the East when they say, it is now a race between England and Russia which shall first get Cabul. Whoever wins Cabul wins the sabres of the Afghans, and, if it be Russia sooner or later India. Should the news of an advance on Furrah be confirmed the force at Peshawur should at once be moved on Jellalabad and close alliance entered into with Afzul Khan or his son, by which the English should guarantee not only the independence of the Afghans, but the integrity of the kingdom as left by the Dost. The advance of Persia on Herat, without a reference to England, is a defiance ; *an advance on Furrah would be a declaration of war, which we should ignore at our peril !*

We have to deal with a great question which we have allowed to become a great difficulty, and to do so, now, we must secure Afghanistan at all risks. A war on the Oxus is better for us than a war on the Indus. We have, however, yet time to avoid this contingency, for Russia is not ready to meet us. The duty laid upon the Indian Government is exactly expressed in the saying—"Whatsoever thy hand findeth to do, do it with thy might." We require the restoration of a European army for India, strong in cavalry, and very strong in artillery. The Railway should be pushed up to Peshawur. The Government might undertake the work itself by raising a loan in the English market. A military convention should be made with Cashmere, of the same character as that with the Nizam, and the political action of the Jummoo ruler restricted. And lastly, and chiefly such a policy should be enunciated as should restore confidence in our strength, *and silence the bazars.*

On 24th October last you did me the honour to publish a letter which I addressed to you on the Central Asian Question. Since then the pressure of business has prevented my returning to the subject, but the renewed efforts made by a section of the London Press to blind the people of England to a by no means distant danger induce me to again solicit the use of your columns. My former letter was commented upon unfavourably by the *Times of India.* The criticism, however, appeared so feeble and unimportant as to render a reply unnecessary. The writer in the Bombay paper, for instance, impugned the correctness of my geography, yet wisely refrained from correcting it; he disputed my figures but omitted to show where they were in error, and generally he traversed all my statements, but, whereas, I had, stage by stage, advanced my authorities, he was content with vague allusions to the opinions of "our best generals," and so on. He seemed, however, conscious of the weakness of the cause he defended, so recklessly, for he appealed to another writer, in the same paper, whose information he vaunted, and whose opinions he declared worthy of the highest consideration. And yet this writer only repeated the extraordinary statement of some of the French papers and reviews, that the advance of Russia in Central Asia is due, not to the deliberate following up of a policy first sketched out by Peter the Great, but to the lust of power and corruption of the Russian officers commanding on the frontier. Such writers advancing such views deserve no reply. It is sufficient to point out the absurdities in which they indulge to counteract any mischievous tendencies their ill-digested generalisations may have.

The *Times* has of late returned to the task of writing down this great question. At this I felt no surprise, but I was astonished to find such a paper as the *Spectator* displaying

confusion of ideas very foreign to its usual treatment of Indian questions. I have read the articles in the *Times* and *Spectator*, but without gleaning from them any new facts, or indeed any information calculated to asist me in revising what I already know of the matter The articles deal in generalisations, and consequently offer no assistance towards the forming of new opinions, or the modification of old ones. As, however, the following extract from the *Spectator* gives a very fair summary of the views of the opposite side, I propose to examine it somewhat in detail :—

> Setting the whole question of Afghan right aside as one which it is useless to argue with Anglo-Indians, there remains the single great and, to our minds, unanswerable argument against the occupation of Afghanistan. To stretch our border northward, is to help, not to impede, Russian advance ; to make her desert march shorter, not longer ; to ensure her the aid instead of the enmity of the discontented Afghans. They may help her, if we are not keeping them down ; they will certainly help her, if we are keeping them down. If she comes to the Suleiman as a civilised Power, with railways, and treasuries, and civil order, she will be a better neighbour than the hereditary brigands we are asked to tame ; if she comes as a mere invader, a white Timour, the place to fight her is the Punjab, whence we have railway communication with the sea. In any case, to expend our revenue and waste our scanty force of men in holding that valley of desolation between the Khyber and Herat, where sepoys are in winter about as useful as sheep, before Russia has arrived at the latter place, is a wantonness of exertion of which only an Anglo-Indian accustomed to believe that his mere volition is exentive could possibly be guilty. But Quettah, and the project of fortifying the Khyber ? Well, Quettah is a strong post, and if the Treasury is too full we may spend money on fortifications ; but as against Russia what use can either ever be ? We could not hold either a week if the country rose behind us, and if it does not rise, but, acquiesces in our rule, Russia would but be pouring into a lake of fire. If all the soldiers between the Caucasus and Tobolsk were pouring through the passes, and the Punjabees remained faithful, they could accomplish nothing beyond killing a few valuable officers. So long as the people obey, no power on earth can affect India by land, for the Government could raise a milion of soldiers in six weeks, arm them, expend them, and renew their armaments without the sense of fatigue or overstrain, and with no further injury than the necessity for raising a 20 million loan at home. On the other hand if the natives are to rise, the nearer our armies are to the sea, the less hampered by mountains behind them, the better for our security. Calcutta, the only impregnable city in Asia, the only one which neither fleet nor army can assail by sea, is our true base, and the Suleiman, the end of our possible railway system, our true frontier. Every departure from either of those principles involves danger, and we, like the *Times*, are not certain whether, in the present temper of the Anglo-Indian mind, the latter may not be abandoned.

Here, at the very outset, the *Spectator* postulates the occupation of Afghanistan as the object for which Anglo Indians are striving. But the fortification of the Khyber, the possession of Quettah—which does not even belong to the Afghans—would not necessarily involve the occupation of the kingdom of Dost Mahomed Neither would an advance, such as you recommended some months ago in favour of Afzul Khan, lead to the permanent occupation of the country. Anglo-Indians, with whom it is indeed "useless to argue" when their opinions are distorted and their words perverted, desire, not the occupation of Afghanistan, but such action on the part of the Viceroy and

Government of India as may restore to the Afghans the peace they enjoyed at the death of Dost Mahomed, and to his successor the kingdom as it was left by the Dost. English parsimony and English shortsightedness have provoked an Afghan civil war, and have furnished Russia and Persia with motives, as well as opportunities, to interfere. We committed a gross blunder in withdrawing from Shere Ali the countenance and help we had lent his father, and when, as from our knowledge of orientals we ought to have foreseen, the inevitable struggle for the crown broke out, we, instead of at once repairing our first blunder, committed a second and even worse mistake by leaving the Afghans to fight the quarrel out. A vigorous diplomatic action at the beginning of the war, the mere restoration to Shere Ali of his father's pension, would have prevented all the bloodshed which for the last four years and the half has stained the mountains of that unhappy country. It is simply folly to talk of the character of Shere Ali's rule as a reason for our conduct. He never had a fair trial in the first place; and in the second, not even the crime of parricide has prevented our acknowledging Syud Salim as Sultan of Muscat, and assisting him to come to an arrangement with a pretender to the throne, in the person of his uncle, Syud Toorkee. If our policy were consistent we should have given our support to the latter prince, and have compelled Syud Salim to descend to the status of a pensionary.

Anglo-Indians do not contend for the occupation of Afghanistan, any more than the *Spectator*. What they contend for is the establishment of an independent kingdom between British India and Asiatic Russia. If this can be brought about by diplomacy so much the better, but if not, they would by no means give up the advantage of having such a shield from fear of having to resort to arms. They would, in fact, redress one disadvantage of the annexation of the Punjab by strengthening and defending the kingdom revived by Dost Mahomed. Sir Henry Lawrence (p. 84 of his *Essays*) says—

"It has ever been the wish of the British Government to assist in the maintenance of a strong Sikh government in the Punjab. It is understood that those who had the best means of forming a judgment on the question, Colonel Richmond, Major Broadfoot, Colonel Lawrence, and Mr. Clerk—in whatever other points they may have differed, were all agreed in this, that no advantage that might be gained by annexation, could equal that of having an independent and warlike, but friendly people, between us and the loose, wild, Mahommedan hordes of Central Asia."

If, having annexed the Punjab, we change "loose, wild Mahommedan hordes of Central Asia" into "the legions and designs of Russia," and read the passage as applying to Dost Mahomed's kingdom, it will exactly express the Anglo-Indian idea of what ought to be our Afghan policy. It will thus be seen that the bugbear of Afghan enmity" which the *Spectator* conjures up, is a bugbear and nothing more, The *Spectator* says :.

"They may help her if we are not keeping them down ; they will certainly help her if we are keeping them down."

The Caboolee knows perfectly well the designs and purposes of Russia and the position and necessities of India, and is by no means inclined to further Russian aggression. He prefers, if we will let him, the alliance of England. He knows he can ride at our side as a friend, but only as a servant or slave by the side of the Muscovite. He knows, too, that if India, or any province of India, were to fall under the Russian yoke it would only be after the dependence of Afghanistan on the Czar had been placed beyond doubt. He admits, therefore, that our interests are his, and he asserts that whoever wins Cabul wins India, an Afghan way of putting the old saying, 'Cabul is but the outwork of India.' The popular feeling here glanced at prevails also in the Punjab, where our supineness has won for us no friends.

The *Spectator* next presents us with Russia as a possible neighbour looking down upon the plains of India from the tops of the Suleimans. The writer, carried away by his pen, avers the Czar will be a better neighbour than the

"hereditary brigands we are asked to tame. If he comes as a mere invader, a white Timour, the place to fight him is the Punjab whence we have railway communication with the sea."

Now I take it, this passage contains the real substance of the case for the other side. We are to welcome Russia as a civilised power amenable to the international laws current in Western Europe, and if our confidence be misplaced we are to let her descend from the hills, and then repeat—I had almost said the *rôle* of Porus—the glories of Sobraon, Aliwal, Goojerat. But is Russia without ambition? The *Spectator* a little further on calls Cabul a "valley of desolation." The Russian papers have only within the past few months confessed that the trade of Turkistan is not worth having. What then? Only this, that Russia is to be content, having possession of a few oases between Siberia and India, and being mistress of "a valley of desolation," to look down, without greed and without longing, upon the fertile, rich, and historically glorious plains of India at her feet. If Napoleon, instead of leading his ragged regiments into Italy, on his first campaign, had turned back into France, or, from fear of Austria, had kept them harmless in that region of desolation, the top of the Alps, the world might have had a companion picture to the wonderful abnegation of ambition, policy and conquest, which the London Press expects at the hands of Russia. But, then again, what is to become of the "hereditary brigands?" It is unfortunate for the writer that he mentioned these elements of discord. With whom would rest the duty of keeping them in order? To whom would appertain the honour of their allegiance? Anglo-Indians who know these "hereditary brigands" declare, without fear of contradiction, that Russia for her own sake would be compelled to propel them inwards on India. This

was the opinion, to quote one, of Nicholson. An astute power like Russia, who has proved herself capable of expatriating a nation to leave her hands free in Central Asia, would expend these wild; but gallant tribesmen in wearing out our strength. If Russia were at the Suleimans sincerely devoted to peace, and even sworn to it as the *Times* says of some of the Governors-General, these "hereditary brigands" would render peace an impossibility.

But again these "hereditary brigands" can now provoke only expeditions, or a blockade of the passes. Russia, as good neighbour, could provoke a war which should rage on every sea and give her enemy plenty of occupation even at home. Close at her feet is Cashmere, how long would she admit our right to control the Rajah's foreign policy? How long would she remain content to be kept out of Rajpootana, with its numerous petty courts? What reply would she return to vakeels from Scindiah or the Nizam, seeking aid against the restrictions placed by British jealousy on the development of Russian "trade" with Central India and the Deccan? What, in short, on a people recklessly fond of change, would be the effect of the presence of a great, a warlike and ambitious power, which, behind the screen of the Suleimans, should find itself compelled to organise and expend those "loose wild, Mahommedan hordes" spoken of by Sir Henry Lawrence? In Europe we see Russia cannot be a good neighbour to Austria, or Turkey. France cannot be a good neighbour to Prussia, or even to her own child, Italy. Yet Russia, having marched across a continent to possess a "valley of desolation," is to be a better neighbour to us than the "hereditary brigands," who, when they last gave us a taste of their quality—*unsupported*—compelled us to enter on the Sitana campaign. The gentlemen how sit at home at ease may well say, "it is useless to argue with Anglo-Indians," if their arguments are those offered for discussion by the *Spectator*.

But that paper, itself, foresees the possibility of Russia at the Suleimans leading to a conflict, and declares that "the place to fight her in the Punjab." I wonder the writer does not assert there is no such thing as native public opinion in India, that, in fact, we rule over an enormous inert mass, careless alike of past and future, and content with a dull present. Russia at the Suleimans would be the signal for the production of long buried arms, for the perusal of old charters and grants, for the disappearance of the hoards of native bankers, for a preparation on every side to meet the return of a period of convulsive war. The masses would, as in 1856-57, show by their altered and "impudent" behaviour their readiness for the storm, which would inevitably burst as soon as it was known the enemy's columns were on the Indus. This is no speculation. Her presence on the Oxus has shaken all India as with the breath of a mighty and strong wind. Her presence on the Indus would see our empire crumbling into a wilderness of anarchy. To say "*the place to fight her is the Punjab,*" is the same as saying that the place to fight an

army invading England is Wimbledon Common. If ever the axiom 'carry the war into your enemy's country' held good, it is in the case of England in India. If we meet Russia at all, we can only meet her, with a chance of success, by combating her legions on the Oxus as defenders of the independence of the Afghans. If she ever reached the Indus our strength would be withered by the native belief that every invasion from the North-West *must be* successful. Natives declare, even, that we ourselves have proved that the rule holds good, for in 1857 we lost India and re-conquered it from the Punjab. This may be fanciful, but in such a question as this victory depends upon those very fancies of the masses of the people of India which the English papers, with their comfortable and glib generalisations, ignore altogether.

Before proceeding to see what force we should have to fight an enemy, I will quote Burnes as to the value of Cabul, and as to its character as 'a valley of desolation.' But first, he speaks of the Oxus thus—

The advantages of the Oxus, both in a political and commercial point of view must then be regarded as very great, the many facilities which have been enumerated point it out either as a channel of merchandise, or the route of a military expedition; nor is it from the features of the river itself that we form such a conclusion. It is to be remembered that its banks are peopled and cultivated. It must therefore be viewed as a river which is navigable and possessing great facilities for improving the extent of that navigation. This is a fact of great political and commercial importance, whether a hostile nation turn it to the gratification of ambition or a friendly power here seek for the extension and improvement of its trade.

Of Cabul he says :—

"A large army might still find a comfortable quarter in the city of Cabul and draw the supplies which it required, additional to the resources of the country, from Peshawur and the valley of the Cabul river near Jellalabad. Forage for the cattle is most plentiful; artificial grasses are cultivated to a great extent and prove a most nutritious food to horses. There are likewise extensive meadows both at Cabul and Ghuzni; one called 'Nawar,' in particular, near the latter place would supply a force of 20,000 cavalry."

Again, on the subject of a Cabul alliance :—

"The Chief is certainly worthy of notice since his country lies on the great road by which the manufactures of Great Britain are imported, and which have of late been considerably increased by his equity and justice. It would require no great expenditure of the public funds to conciliate this chief, *and it is to be remembered that he is in possession of the most important position in Asia as regards the protection of British India.* Had circumstances brought us into an alliance with Cabul instead of Persia, we might now have possessed more trusty and useful allies nearer home than we can boast of in that country."

Lastly, Burnes thus speaks of the changes which ensued on the break up of the Doorance empire :—

"This speedy dissolution of a power which was so formidable merits attention, since *these political changes in a country which borders on British India may ultimately influence her destinies.*"

The changes, which our apathy and theorising have provoked in Afghanistan since the death of Dost Mahomed, have invited the Russian generals to advance as speedily as possible, and have thrown Persia, and the legitimate successor to the Dost, into their hands. I shall return to the subject.

I come now to the fighting strength which the *Spectator* speaks of so glibly —

> If all the soldiers between the Caucasus and Tobolsk were pouring through the passes, and the Punjabees remained faithful, they could accomplish nothing beyond killing a few valuable officers.

"If all the soldiers between Caucasus and Tobolsk" is very easy to say, but, what does it mean? The Russians have now no Caucasus to bind their right arm, and their own journals tell us the Turkistan army is composed of 67,000 infantry. This army, if poured through the passes, would be preceded by hundreds of thousands of Turkomans, Khirghiz, Cossacks, and Afghans. They would, in fact, enter on a campaign which would resemble another irruption of the Tartars. (I take the idea from Lumsdaine, I believe.) A campaign against India, the glories and wealth of which are a tradition in all the lands likely in such a case to be subject to Russian influence, would attract the sword of every adventurer in Asia, more surely than the enterprise of the first William drew to his standard the flower of the youth of Europe. But against these hordes we should be safe if "the Punjabees remained faithful." The Punjab is not India, neither would our greatest difficulty in such a crisis proceed from the Punjabees. In our rear we have a vast country, in which we are not too well loved, while from the Sutlej to the Cauvery we have to deal with individual ambitions, which a very slight reverse of fortune would set loose against us. Vast as the forces might be which we should have to meet, they would be, at all events, within some sort of manageable distance, but the equally vast forces of disaffection and semi-independence, which we should have to guard against, are scattered over a continent, in such a way, as to imperil every foot of the line of communications between what the *Spectator* calls "our true base," and the field of battle it has chosen for us. I do not say India would rise, but I do say we should have to act, and be on our guard just as if we knew it would rise.

But if the "Punjabees remained faithful" success might be with us. Now the Punjab is not an inexhaustible store-house of men. It is the home of a brave and gallant race, but I doubt whether it could give us, under any circumstances, much more than 1,00,000 soldiers. The Punjabee again is a born mercenary. He cares little for "*Queen and* country." He cares for his country, for he has, as a rule, a stake in it, and he cares for himself and his people. He went

with us in the Mutiny because he was ruled by a man with wit and strength enough to make him believe we were the strongest. Even then, however, his notions of self came into play, for having decided we were worthy of help because we were the strongest, he discovered that by helping us he could satisfy an ancient grudge against Delhi and its princes. But if he marched by our side he still retained his own war-cry *Khalsa-jee ke futteh,—Victory to the Khalsa.* Our cause is not necessarily his cause when a hurricane of war gathers on the slopes of the Suleimans, neither in fighting for us does he necessarily combat *pro aris et focis.* If he deem us unable to contend with the foe arrayed against us, what motive has he to counterbalance this conviction—and to induce him to peril his life on the weaker side? An abstract feeling of loyalty is but a poor guarantee of fidelity under such circumstances. Policy and justice unite in declaring that it would be unfair, as well as unwise, to subject such a man as the Punjabee to such a trial. If, however, we can persuade him of our power, and convince him of our strength, his faith in our star, our luck—*ikbal*—will make him, not simply a valuable auxiliary, but the most valuable we could have.

Again, how ridiculous it is to talk of "*all the soldiers between the Caucasus and Tobolsk*" accomplishing "*nothing beyond killing a few valuable officers.*" The war would be a war of giants and would lead to a prodigal waste of life. Our last campaign against the hill-tribes at Sittana cost us 847 men, of whom 51 were officers. To me there is something horrible in such flippancy.—

"So long as the people obey no power on earth can affect India by land, for the Government could raise a million of soldiers in six weeks, arm them, expend them, and renew their armaments without the sense of fatigue or overstrain, and with no further injury than the necessity for raising a 20 million loan at home."

Placed thus in all its unadorned absurdity this assertion reads curiously like some passages in Munchausen. To notice the passage would, under ordinary circumstances, be only less culpable than the penning of it, but unfortunately it is upon just such passages that a great and erroneous policy is sought to be based. The *Times* lends itself to the diffusion of such nonsense, and to the task of using it to blind the people of England to the real nature of one of the gravest questions in England's history. Let us then examine this statement, for it is upon some scarcely less preposterous notion of our strength that all the anti-Russophobists take their stand. The cry is cuckoo-like. "Let them come, we can overwhelm them as soon as they debouch from the passes!" "We can array against them ten men for every one man they can bring!" and so on *ad nauseum.* Reason and facts are put aside as troublesome, or as putting those who use them beyond the pale of argument. Boasting is made to take the place of statistics. A blind and unjustifiable confidence usurps the seat of forethought and judgment.

In a period of SIX WEEKS the Government of India is to raise one million, not of levies or recruits, but soldiers; arm this mighty host;

"Expend them;"

"Renew their armaments"—

And all this "without the sense of fatigue or overstrain."

The only inconvenience, in fact, is to be the necessity for "raising a 20 million loan at home."

I would ask whether France, Austria, Prussia, and Russia combined could, in *six weeks*, raise, in addition to their normal armies, one million of men between them, equip that million, expend them *and then repeat the gigantic process?* Tush! The boast of the Russian that if the heavens fell the bayonets of his master's troops could hold them up, sinks besides this tremendous effort to the merest gasconade. Let us, however, descend to actual facts, and from them endeavour to ascertain a common sense, every day view of the resources of the Government of India.

The *Spectator* presents us with the picture of a power mightier than that of Napoleon even at his mightiest, a power to which the dream of an universal empire would be a legitimate object of ambition, a power which, if we possessed it and still considered a masterly inactivity the height of political wisdom, must make our neighbours echo, with Clive, the astonishment they cannot but feel at such a superhuman moderation in the face of such wondrous opportunities. For not only does he presume a command of men such as not even conquerors like Timour or Genghis Khan could have conceived, but he goes further and postulates for British India a military organisation and administration capable of absolutely indefinite, yet absolutely perfect, expansion at a moment's notice: possessing, he says, the power to raise a million of soldiers, we possess what is more wonderful, the *materiel* to arm them at all points, and even to renew the miraculous effort "without the sense of fatigue or overstrain." Compare this with President Lincoln's calls for one-third the number of men and his difficulties in securing one-tenth, and we have a faint perception of the awful strength he imagines placed at the disposal of the Viceroy. Yet in sending 12,000 or 14,000 men to Abyssinia we have been obliged to indent on all three Presidencies, and to place a world under contribution. Instead of furnishing the army for the work at once and "without the sense of fatigue or overstrain", we have seen Bombay indenting on Madras for subalterns! and on Bengal for mountain guns. Bengal moreover felt at once compelled to increase her native army by the number of men she contributed to the expedition. We are here brought face to face with a fact which to the writer in the *Spectator* will be as foolishness. The order to increase the Bengal Army demonstrated, what all Anglo-Indians had long known, that the classes which supply our native soldiery have imbibed a disinclination to enlist. Instead of men pouring in countless crowds to our standards, we found, when we re-

quired some 4000 recruits, an absolute difficulty in obtaining them. So much for the million of men. The matter of armaments supposes arsenals numerous, enormous, overflowing : where have we such in India? How far could England help us in equipping one-fourth of the tremendous forces of men the *Spectator* has conjured up as a kind of good bogie to pacify us naughty, " puerile" Anglo-Indians? In India—at least in Bengal—the officers on whom we ought to rely are drifting into grades where employment for them all becomes an expensive impossibility. Since 1862 the lower grades have not been strengthened by a dozen officers. Since 1864 not a single cadet has entered the service. The Indian military machine, as it at present stands, is simply incapable of expansion. No organisation in the world is more faulty or more incapable of a supreme effort at an emergency. When the *Spectator* boasts so unwisely of the strength of the Indian Government, he should remember not only the smallness of our armies in the great trial of the Mutiny, but the ease with which the forces of the enemy, led by native officers, were everywhere overthrown by native regiments led by Europeans. The Army of India having to meet an European foe would, under its present constitution, be mainly led by native officers. The question of a 20 million loan at a moment's notice is another outrageous assumption. The money market has no patriotism. If it indulge in sentiment it does so by demanding a better interest for a greater risk. But since when has the credit of the Indian Government been so unimpeachable as to render it necessary for the Viceroy simply to telegraph for money, should the empire be in danger, to get it?

Again, the Indian Army is at present at an ebb too low for safety. And it makes no allowance for contingencies, and no provision for, say, an Abyssinian war, a campaign at the mouth of the Tigris, or a demonstration in force on any two points, simultaneously, of our lengthened mountain frontier. Its state and the state of our arsenals would justify us, taken in connection with the Meerut panic of last year, in repeating the words of Sir Henry Lawrence,—" With few exceptions *there is no preparation to meet sudden danger. There is the most helpless alarm when it does occur.*" The Italics are Sir Henry's. Sir Henry wrote thus in March 1856 at which time he gave the strength of the Indian armies at :—

Europeans	...	...	48,519
Natives	...	...	275,304
Total force		...	323,823

Turning to your Number for 16th January, I find the strength of the Army given as under—

Europeans	...	...	57,117
Natives	...	...	128,851
Total force		...	185,968

This is "exclusive of officers," and is stated to have been gathered from the official returns up to 1st August 1867. Compared with Sir H. Lawrence's statement it gives the following result, taking the whole present force *including officers* at 190,000 men—

Europeans, increase	...	...	8,598
Natives, decrease	...	...	146,453
Army of 1856 ...	...	...	323,823
Army of 1867...	..	...	190,000
Decrease	...	...	133,823

This army of 190,000 men has lately given off 12,000 or 14,000 men for the Abyssinian expedition, and the remainder is scattered over an area "of 1,350,000 square miles, and protects or overawes about 150,000,000 of people." In Rajpootana alone, according to a recent report, the eighteen States under the Ajmere Agency keep up between them 100,000 fighting men. We have had recently practical experience of the difficulty in obtaining recruits, and yet this is the overwhelmingly mighty military array with which we are to convert the Punjab "into a lake of fire" for the reception of an enemy pouring through the passes, with "every soldier between Tobolsk and the Caucasus" at his back.

But now let us see what alternative the *Spectator* offers in case the people do not "obey."

> "On the other hand, if the natives are to rise, the nearer our armies are to the sea, the less hampered by mountains behind them, the better for our security."

He next declares Calcutta "our true base." So that this passage means, if it mean anything, the nearer we are to Calcutta the better for our safety. In other words the writer's alternative is a simple abandonment of the country between Peshawur and Rajmahal. Woe to England if such be her guides, men who have no halting place between the most outrageous boasting and the most abject despair. I claim for those who are called Russophobists not only the support of the greatest of Anglo-Indians, but the credit which is due to a patient and exhaustive examination of facts, and I charge their adversaries with wilfully shirking a criticism of these facts, and with an ignorance which ties them down, inexorably, to mischievous generalisations. But others than Anglo-Indians adopt the views I contend for. The Editor of the *Siecle*, M. Louis Blanc, General Ferrier, M. Vambéry, cannot be called Anglo-Indians. Yet they all share Russophobist opinions, and wonder, with an amazement which not even the popular continental idea of the careless stubbornness of the English character can altogether account for, at our attitude and our policy. In Europe we are misunderstood and are told we *fear* that which the *Spectator* would insinuate we despise. In India we are

even more misunderstood, and with what result? If we are to judge by the purely Native press, we shall find the belief in our power, by which I mean strength to execute what we have wisdom to plan, has been rudely shaken. Knowing this it is downright heart-breaking to find we are shut out from the ear of England by the *Spectator*, who winds up his remarks with the warning.—"Every departure from either of these *principles* involves danger." What principles? We are to suffer an invasion of India before preparing for it? We are to suffer an invasion of India before we attempt to cross swords with the invader? We are to wait for the natives to declare sides before moving? We are to take no precautions, but, when the time for action comes, we are to raise and expend a million of men in six weeks and get a 20 million loan from England?

Lastly, on the other side, if in addition to invasion we have to put down a rising, we are to get our armies as near to the sea as possible? How lofty, how English are the "*principles*" we are to extract from these neatly turned platitudes. Not such are the ideas of Anglo-Indians who desire neither war nor annexation, but only such a policy as shall add a new guarantee to our peaceful occupation of India, and give us, if we are to fight, at least an equal chance with our adversary No Anglo-Indian believes in an *immediate invasion* of India by Russia, but every Anglo-Indian believes such an event to be the object of Russian policy and action in Asia; and he believes, moreover, that our theories and supineness tempt the very danger we wish to avoid. English policy invites Russian policy to be aggressive, and whereas Russophobists would look facts in the face, and postpone war by being ready for it, their opponents preach up political doctrines which will hasten the conflict, and make it inconceivably bloody,—witness the *Spectator* speaking of expending a million of men.

Having written so much, may I trespass on your kindness by a swift glance over the whole question as it now stands. The other day a writer in the *Englishman* quoted Sir Henry Lawrence against the views you have consistently supported; and claimed for the quotation the merit of exactly representing what our line of policy ought to be. There was a certain cleverness in this, for, as you will see, the passage is, in fact, the basis of the exaggerations of such writers as those of the *Spectator* and *Times*. The passage will be found at pages 270—274 of Sir Henry's published *Essays*, and occurs in the article on "Indian Army Reform," first published in September 1856.

"Insensibly and almost by *coup-de-main*, the Russian Empire has been extended for thirteen thousand miles across the whole Continent of Europe and Asia, and for twenty degrees over America. Curbed to the south and west

to the mighty Amoor. Her old policy will now more vigorously than ever be pursued, and though the dream of a century will never be realised, her position in Persia will speedily be strengthened, and posts will be established in Central Asia and even in China. Bomarsunds, if not Sebastopols, will arise at Orenburgh, Astrakhan and Astrabad, perhaps even at Balkh and Herat. The wave has receded, to return with redoubled force, though at a different angle. Such has ever been and will be Russia's policy. There will be no Russian invasion of India, nor probably will the tribes be impelled on us. The latter now understand our strength; Russia has long understood both our strength and our weakness. There will be no foolish raid as long as India is united, in tranquillity and contentment, under British rule. Russia well knows that such an attempt would only end in the entire destruction of the invaders. India has been invaded some forty times, but always by small armies acting in communication with domestic parties. A small Russian army could not make good its way through Afghanistan, a large army would be starved there in a week. The largest army that could come with Afghanistan and Persia in its train, would be met at the outlets of the only two practicable passes, and while attempting to debouche would be knocked into pieces. A hundred thousand Anglo-Indian troops might, with the help of railroads, be collected at each pass in as few days, as it would take an unopposed Russian army weeks to traverse them. Hundreds of eight-inch guns would there be opposed to their fieldpieces. The danger then is imaginary. Herat is no more the key to India than is Tabreez, or Khiva, or Kokan or Meshed. The chain of almost impenetrable mountains is the real key to India. England's own experience in the western passes, and in the Crimea, have proved the absurdity of the tale of Russian invasion. No, the dream is idle: England's dangers are in India, not without; and we trust that it will be in India they will be met, and that there will be no third Afghan campaign. Such a move would be playing Russia's game. We are safe while we hold our ground and do our duty. Russia may teaze, annoy, and frighten us by her money and by emissaries. She may even do us mischief, but she will never put foot in Hindostan."

Now, I would ask, have circumstances not changed in all these twelve years? Sir Henry wrote just after the conclusion of the Treaty of Vienna and when it was thought Russia had been curbed. He wrote before the Mutiny, at a time when no one dreamed of a little war at Sitana, fed by traitors within our own borders; and when the regular Indian Army numbered 323,000 men. In September 1856 Russia had not crossed the great deserts of the Kirghiz. She had not established herself in Turkestan, and, above all, she was not sure of the subservience of Persia. At the end of 1867, she has not only defeated the troops of the Khanates, she has a Governor General of her new province of Turkestan, who, if he turn to the notification of his appointment and the limits of his Government, will find its boundaries carefully laid down on the east, north, and west, *but not on the south.* The notification is silent as to the border in this direction, although it might have been drawn along the Ak Tau range, or extended to the well marked line of the Oxus. Russia, when Sir Henry wrote, had just been defeated and humiliated, India was strong and at peace, and had an army of 323,000 to support the policy of the Governor General. Hence he remarks that if Russia advanced she could be met by an Anglo-Indian army of 100,000 men at each of the passes. The gist of Sir Henry's confident prophecy is contained in the remark —"There will be no foolish raid as long as India is united in tran-

quillity and contentment under British rule." Since then the great convulsion of the mutiny has occurred, and even of more significance than this, we have had to deal with a rebellion, which chose for its battle ground the country beyond the frontier held by the most fanatical of the tribes, and which demanded from us an exhibition of force greater than we put forth in the Persian war, and as great as that now displayed in Abyssinia. Lastly, the mutiny has given us a new military organisation which has done us no credit yet on the frontier, and which did us no credit in Bhootan, because it is imperfectly pointed by European valour and skill. There is not a single factor of the grounds of Sir Henry's opinion in 1856 which has not, since he wrote, been changed, and changed to our disadvantage. The opinions of great men are to be received with respect and deference but not with slavish, unreasoning, unthinking obedience. They serve us as teachers serve us, not as infallible guides. To quote Sir Henry Lawrence is one thing, to accept his opinions abjectly is another. The latter is a lazily convenient, and most un-English way of shirking discussion, and blinding the public to the circumstances of to-day, and to the real character of the questions of the time.

But, strange as it may seem, I claim Sir Henry Lawrence as the greatest of the Russophobists, as the man who of all others saw what was coming, and who with all his eloquence, earnestness and strength reiterated the warning to be prepared. He foresaw the Mutiny but was too wise to speculate as to what would be, or might be, after it had swept over the land. If he had been spared to the empire he was apparently so chosen to govern, I, for one, have the most confident belief that India would never have heard of a policy of masterly inactivity, nor would Afghanistan have been given over, after the Dost's death, to a war, which transports us of the nineteenth century to the worst periods of Oriental history. I will, however, quote a few passages in support of my claim to rank the greatest of Anglo-Indians on my side. *Essays* page 275 :—

"That America *will* strive for Oriental sovereignty is certain....Let England work out her destiny, let her govern India for the people, and as far as possible by the people, and neither England nor India need fear Russia or America, *or both combined.*"

Again,—

"Let us not for once learn only from disaster. Let us use our opportunities."

Again,—Page 273.

"We are happy to perceive that, for once, peace has not thrown the home authorities off their guard. There can be no lasting peace. The time has not come. The war of principles has yet to be fought. Russia *must* have her revenge, and America *must* try her strength, her gigantic frigates, and her ten inch guns."

And, in the next paragraph, three sentences which the writer

"We regret, however, that nothing was done on the treaty of peace to control Russia in Asia. We are aware there were difficulties; but the right of a consul at Meshed, and trading vessels on the Caspian might have been obtained. Information on Central Asian matters is greatly wanted."

So that Sir Henry saw the necessity of obtaining a recognition of some well marked boundary to Russian progress in Central Asia, and, according to his own confession, the very passage which the *Englishman* considers conclusive on this question, was based on insufficient information. Again, page 235—

"We repeat that our arrangements are for the storm as well as the sunshine; for the possibility of a Russian army at Herat simultaneously with an American fleet at Bombay."

These quotations will show that Sir Henry Lawrence felt no blind confidence in our capability to meet successfully any sudden emergency; and throughout his Essays there is an ever repeated warning to be "ready," "to stand to our arms," to act as if we were sure to be called upon to display the qualities which won for us our position in India. He is ever repeating in various ways what he says at page 185—

"The morale of our dissertation is, to take advantage of the present crisis in Europe and, while we have no *present* cause of alarm in India, to take warning from the past."

Who then that has studied, and not merely read, his works can, with justice, venture upon so astounding a feat as that involved in the endeavour to persuade the public that Sir Henry Lawrence, if he had lived, would have been in favour of any such system as that which now obtains in the Indian Army, or any such policy as that which now prevails? Take what he says, (page 187) about the Irregular system which is now supreme:—

"Honor will be to him, who, notwithstanding the outcry that will follow, will change the system that has brought irregular troops into fashion to the disparagement of regulars, thus averring that these selected, and comparatively young officers, are preferable to a dozen or sixteen haphazard ones, commanded by such men as are generally found at the head of regiments of the line."

Sir Henry foresaw indeed the storm of the Sepoy revolt, but he saw beyond it the storm which would sweep down upon us, if we preferred to remain unprepared and careless of the lessons of the past, from the great wastes of Central Asia, and he was therefore what is called a Russophobist.

This great question, call it you what you will, is the question of the day, since by an inevitable law all the other questions of the time are involved in its consideration. At its very outset it brings us face to face with the army question, and through the army to matters of finance, railway extension, and the fortification of important strategical points. Lastly, it demands, as one of the conditions of our rule in India, such an absolute unity of purpose and power, as precludes the very discussion of the federalisation of the different Governments. This is an idea borrowed from John Bright, an orator whose preten-

sions to statesmanship have yet to be made known. Sir Henry Lawrence places our *unity* before everything. Yet, just as the time draws near when we may, without croaking, expect a crisis, the men who will not argue with Anglo-Indians on the Central Asian question, are desirous of imposing upon us a new theory of Government, which shall make the Viceroy an expensive nonentity, and present British rule to the natives, and to the world, in the condition of the loosened bundle of sticks. The form of the Empire is to be retained, but the cords which gave it an unbreakable strength are to be cast away as out of place, unsuited to the time, and as something which has served its purpose and become superfluous. It is this feature of the question, the way in which it embraces the very conditions of our rule, that is the cause of its being shelved and voted a nuisance. It involves too serious an *exposé* to be discussed. Hence its importance is denied, or explained away by senseless vauntings or absurd generalisations. Take the question of the army. No one will venture to say that its efficiency is a matter of congratulation. It cannot be pretended the officers are, as a body, satisfied; neither are they so distributed in the various grades as to allow of the army being increased as required. Even more difficult than the question of money, is the question of the officering of any addition to our strength. The European army has not, what it should have at any cost, the very best armament that can be procured. And if we were to mass, as Sir Henry suggested, two armies of 100,000 men at the mouths of the Bolan and Khyber passes, where are we to find two officers to command those armies? Where is the *materiel* for their use? Where is the transport for their service? And lastly, if as a writer in the *Delhi* suggests, our Artillery is dangerously below its strength, where are we to find the means of placing their superiority in guns beyond question? We cannot have our Indian Aldershotts and Chobhams because our army is too small to be mobilized. In fact the sooner the Home public is brought to recognise the smallness of the Indian army as compared with the work it has to perform, and the viciousness of its present organization, the better. I shall not speak of fortifications behind which our columns might retire, or behind which they might be formed for service on the field, for India is almost as bare of such places of strength as England. Colonel Fraser, the last who has taken up this subject, only developes Sir Henry Lawrence's idea of a fortress in every province, and a fort in every cantonment. Considering its formation no country in the world ought to be so easily defensible as the triangle we call the Punjab. This is the chosen battle-field of the *Spectator* for the prize of Asiatic dominion, I might almost say world supremacy, for, if India were in the hands of a power like Russia it would not be long before Sikhs and Rajpoots fleshed their swords in European conflicts. But if defeated at Peshawur or in Sind where could an Anglo-Indian army rally? Where unite for a final struggle? Here, I take it, must be seen the main objection to

a defence of India on Indian soil. Our armies would be divided, would have separate and widely diverging lines of retreat, and if unfortunate would each be utterly, impossibly incapable of rendering assistance to the other. We should commit Benedek's mistake only on a vaster scale and with vaster interests at peril. Ferrier says, page 469—/

"It is only of late years they—(the English)—have had hard battles to fight especially against the Sikhs who were organised and manœuvred upon the system of European tactics ..... If they imagine they will have less with the Russians and their allies they will make a serious mistake, and it is because we consider them more formidable that we recommend the English not to wait for their first attack behind the Indus, if they manifest any aggressive intention. This river is a line of defence of which they ought to avail themselves only as a last resource, after they had been forced back upon it. It would be dangerous to hazard on its banks the issue of the first conflict, for the Indians, accustomed to look upon this splendid stream as an impregnable barrier, would be paralysed at seeing the Russians cross it, and the English might from that moment consider them as lost to their cause."

This should dispose of the reckless demand that we should await an attack from behind the Indus. But if General Ferrier speaks only on the military side of the question, there are not wanting authorities who write as politicians. I will now quote one such, who wrote after a full consideration of our relations with those "hereditary brigands" the *Spectator* treats so lightly. At page 71 of a Report, dated 31st January 1856, "showing the relations of the British Government with the tribes on the North-West frontier of the Punjab, from annexation in 1849 to the close of 1855," Sir Richard Temple says— /

In fine, the whole argument terminates in this, that if expeditions were not resorted to, then all the territory within a night's run of the hills would virtually be given over to devastation. If the latter event were to happen and if the Government were not to be willing to chastise the hill tribes, then our own Trans-Indus subjects would lose confidence, and would cease to be loyal, while the enemy gained heart. There would be some general combination against us, and sooner or later we should evacuate the Trans-Indus territory and the right bank of the Indus. If the right bank were lost, then the river itself would pass from our control; and then, with the loss of the Indus, there would be a sacrifice of advantages political, physical, commercial and moral which it is not within the scope of this paper to describe.

Sir Richard Temple considered only the effect of our waiting for the "hereditary brigands" behind the Indus, but from what he says one can judge of the effect to be produced in India by our waiting behind this river the coming of a foe with a prestige as great as our own, and with all the tribes we abandon united in his favour against us. Even greater than our military reputation is our fame in India for wisdom and political skill. According to native ideas one of the characteristics of this age is the wisdom given to Europeans—*Danaie-i-Fering*—of whom the English are to them the highest and best representatives. This being so how much should we lose when the natives lost faith in our wisdom.

Thus, we see, no merely military reasons can govern our conduct.

Political reasons must be even more largely an element in our calculations than they were with Napoleon before Austerlitz, when he declared he must finish the war with a thunder-clap. Political reasons, however, which urge us to keep war out of India, come in aid of military reasons which teach us the danger of dividing our strength against an enemy operating behind such a screen as the Suleimans. If India is to be at war with Central Asia, England with Russia, the war must be fought out upon the Oxus rather than the Indus, for of what use would it be to us to hurl back an invader from Peshawur to Cabul? We should be compelled to follow him up, since I suppose not even the *Spectator* would recommend our standing to our arms whilst he gathered up his strength in the hills for a fresh attempt. Defeat might indeed set the Afghans about his ears, but would any European General advance through such a country as Cabul without taking some of the fortresses, without holding some of the passes? Modern warfare does not permit of such operations as the burning of ships behind an invading force, or the abandonment of *all* lines of retreat. If then we are victorious, and I am Englishman enough to suppose this certain, we are forced, not merely to defeat our enemy, but to destroy him; not merely to rely upon a rising of the Afghans, but to assist such a rising in the only way to make it formidable, overpowering. If victorious we must press sternly on the retreating enemy, press on for very existence. We must win a Marengo, a Jena, rather than a Bull's Run, a Frederiksburgh, or a Chancellorsville. Thus then our very success would compel us to advance into a country which we should have originally abandoned to the invader, and whose friendship and alliance we had despised. I think it would be wiser and better, whether from a soldier's or statesman's point of view, to advance at first if we must advance at all; and if at war with Russia to flurry her eagles in her newest acquisition, rather than that she should flurry our dovecotes in India. Why, I would ask, should we give her the immeasurable advantage of the allegiance, even temporarily, of such men as the Afghans and the frontier tribes; men who as soldiers bear almost the same relation to the races of Hindostan proper that the Briton does? It is idle to speculate as to whether Russia would propel the tribes inward on us, for she has to-day reached a position from which, if she were at war with England, she could compel India to fight. The next war is certain to see India and Central Asia crossing swords. It rests with us at present rather than with Russia to say where. The *Spectator* says in the Punjab. In other words he accepts what Sir Henry Lawrence dreaded, what the Sitana campaign has shown to be a most formidable contingency, the impulsion of the tribes on India. The military value of these wild soldiers is patent on the very face of our tenure of India, thus,—

Total Indian Army ...	...		1,90,000 men.
Punjab Army *exclusive of officers*—			
Europeans ...	...	14,100	
Natives ...	...	26,792	40,892 men.

It is not alone the number of this Punjab army *but its composition* that demands attention. *The Europeans are more than half as many as the natives.* Why? Why too have we been compelled to form such a border guard as the Punjab Frontier Force? Only madness could blind us to the military value of the tribes on our frontier, or render us indifferent to the necessity for having them with us. For us, an invasion of India would be a tempting of Providence, for the passes of Afghanistan would be "lakes of fire" to the invader. Against us, the frontier would become a circle of fire to us, rendering our action in masses almost impossible, and causing confusion in our councils as well as death and disaster in our ranks.

It is folly, too, to speculate on the fidelity of all India. We must secure for ourselves a position which shall render us indifferent to partial risings; in which, in fact, we may knowingly fight with the certainty of some outbreak in India itself. As I said in my letter of 24th October, it is not what we have to meet but what we have to guard which should guide us in choosing a policy. Difficulties cannot daunt Englishmen or Wilson would never have taken Delhi, or Havelock Cawnpore. If we doubt our own strength we shall provoke a general rising, if we show we are still the men of Assaye, Jellalabad, Goozerat, and the Mutiny, we may do what we did in the Mutiny, smash a district with a handful of horse, or overawe a province with a Regiment. Those who dislike us will never, in a great war, keep quiet because we expect them to do so. They will only refrain from a rising from a conviction of its folly. There is no central native interest to bind provinces together, hence there can be no general rising unless there be such a general conviction of our weakness as shall warrant an universal scramble for power. Yet there are elements of danger. Let us see what they are. Such chiefs as Cashmere, Gwalior and the Nizam must be made to feel their only safe place is by our side. Russia it is reported is trying to secure a trade route through Kashgar. If successful she must be brought into communication with Cashmere. If then we were at war with her, and Cashmere felt within reach of her help, we should have to guard against a diversion on our right flank and rear which would light up the Punjab. It may be idle to speculate thus in the opinion of some, and yet Cashmere has been accused of sending agents to the Russian chiefs in Turkistan, and has never yet shown any disposition to conciliate British India. He acts as if he believed he held the key of the gate of British India in his hand.

At Gwalior we have a restless and ambitious chief, with decided military predilections, who has shown a marked anxiety to keep up a larger force than is permissible by treaty. Sindhia is anything but a willing vassal—the events of 1857 to the contrary notwithstanding—and if disposed to give trouble he would have all that popular support at his back which, in a country like India, is derivable from a popular prediction that the next masters of Hindoostan proper will be the Mahrattas.

Rajpootana, without being disaffected, offers an excellent recruiting ground to our enemies, and can never be overlooked in any disposal of our forces for a frontier campaign On the west of this great country we have the Gaekwar, a chief who has only recently endeavoured to invest in Armstrong guns!

The Nizam in any great struggle ought to be our best ally, the feudatory who should enable us to set free our main strength for the point where it might be most needed. He has, however, no control over his own fierce and turbulent mercenaries, and his idea of policy appears to waver between quarrelling with his minister, and preferring impossible requests to the Indian Government. It was only the other day he demanded half Mysore, if we intended to annex it, all Kurnool and half Goomsoor, with the surplus revenues of the Berars, say, an increase of revenue of about Rs. 60,00,000. Such an ally must be watched and guarded against, such a feudatory can be no source of anything but weakness.

But even in our own provinces we have several snakes, scotched indeed, but not killed. The Wahabees for instance are not yet loving subjects, nor are the Mahommedans, as a race, conciliated. The aristocracy of this country is not yet with us, and the ryots have not yet so bettered their position as to feel their interests are in the maintenance of our rule. We have not yet succeeded to the national character of the Mussulman rule whose place we have supplied. Hence we must look in an hour of supreme difficulty for partial outbreaks, and hence we must have a reserve to hold India while we are fighting for its preservation. This would best be done by the establishment of places of strength, the head quarters of well armed flying columns, to connect the frontier with our true base, the sea, to guard our communications, and to overawe those districts or cities which experience may have taught us are the least to be depended upon.

I ventured just now to say Russia has now actually obtained a position which will render a collision between India and Central Asia *certain in the event of war, even if this were to break out during this spring—a contingency by no means unlikely.* For twelve years she has planned such a contingency, for five years she has been gradually, but surely, making it year by year more certain. In the Crimean war she saw regiments on the Indian establishment arrayed before Sebastopol. The significance she attached to this fact is proved

by the mighty and sustained efforts she has since then directed to ensure the subservience of Persia, and the possession of Turkestan. In a future war no regiments will be moved from India to oppose Russia on the shores of the Black Sea. Even the *Spectator* must admit so much. Russia has secured for herself between the Caspian, Siberia, and the Aral several roads well provided with wells and stations. She has steamers on both seas, and she has commenced a secondary line for the conveyance of stores from the Ural, by means of a railway, with Orenburg for its main terminus. In Turkestan in spite of the doings of the Khirghiz Tantia Topee, Sadyk, she has absorbed Khokand and reduced Bokhara to a lower state than Gwalior or the Nizam, and, if the Cabul correspondence is to be believed, she has a powerful force in a strong cantonment at Samarcand, and permission to form a strong post at Chardjui. From Chardjui she could reach Herat before a force from Peshawur, even if Cabul were our ally. With a Persian army at Meshed she could always reckon on seizing that city by a *coup de main*, before the Government of India could collect a force to prevent it. Herat is practically lost. But the seizure of Herat by Persia would be a gross infraction of the existing treaty with that power, and would certainly be regarded as tantamount to a declaration of war. The effect of such a move by Persia alone would be very great, since the people remember how we resented such a proceeding in 1856. But if a single Russian battalion marched into Herat we should, of necessity, have to make a more strenuous effort, since it is downright impossible to disguise the fact, that their presence would set loose all the local elements of discontent in India, and give form and substance to the floating rumours, now current in every bazaar, that Russia has hostile designs on India. The effect on India would be exactly that produced in England and Scotland by the announcement General Grant had landed with a large army in Bantry Bay, or that a French Admiral had appeared with a powerful fleet off Portsmouth. Yet should war break out in Europe this contingency is absolutely certain to occur. Its certainty indeed makes the urgency of the Central Asian question, and measures exactly the fatuity of those who would have us wait until the storm bursts before we commence preparations to guard ourselves against its ravages. Russia at Herat, or on the Oxus can compel us to take the field, for she can reach our frontier, along which are echelloned "loose wild Mahommedan hordes,"—a line of tow to an intriguing and incendiary enemy, a shield of iron if we can but hit upon the method of binding them to our side.

Following then the advice of Sir Henry Lawrence and the great men of his school, Anglo-Indians desiderate between Anglo-India and Russo-Turkistan a friendly and warlike power, which shall act as a buffer to the empire, and render collision in case of war with Europe

at home. By not supporting Shere Ali as we supported his father we threw back the Afghans upon the warlike instincts which had rendered a stable government at Cabul a dream, which no chief before Dost Mahomed seemed capable of realising; and by permitting, what promised to be an interminable civil war on our frontier we alienated the Afghans and their Chiefs,—even the rebels against Shere Ali—encouraged the frontier tribes to bide their time, and lastly and chiefly opened a door to Russian intrigue, and gave Russian ambition a motive for pushing on without pause or rest. The recent success of Abdool Rahman in the province of Balkh has for the time baffled any intrigue Russian emissaries might have opened with Shere Ali, and has once more given us the opportunity of calling into being a strong and United Kingdom with Cabul for its capital. If we sacrifice this last chance we deserve to lose India. Anglo-Indians do not desire a third Cabul campaign, but they do desire an independent Cabul under the guarantee of Britain, or under such a treaty as shall make Russia think seriously ere she provoke a coalition, which, without any great effort, could return her frontier to the line she held ten years ago. We see with dissatisfaction, the non-definition of the boundary of Russia to the South in Turkestan, and we think Azim Khan might be encouraged by the Viceroy to open negotiations which shall fix the Oxus as that boundary; the more so as the Cabul Chief must, with us or without us, soon enter into some such arrangement for his own interests and safety. A small power between two great powers can only exist by the countenance of one, or the agreement of both. Left to itself it will either be subjugated or subordinated by the power which is of the two the more ambitious or the more unscrupulous. This is just now the position of Afghanistan and therefore we strongly advocate India's taking advantage of her enemy's rashness in her latest conquests, to extort such terms as shall secure for us a strong independent kingdom between our possessions and the Muscovite hordes of Central Asia. We advocate this simply because we would not have Anglo-India and England drifting into a war in Central Asia, as England drifted into the war in the Crimea.

There is one last part of the subject which I have to remark upon and then I shall have done. Sir Henry Lawrence speaks of a coalition between Russia and America. At the time he wrote this appeared but a distant contingency. Is it so to-day? The Eastern question is once more sure to be brought before the world. Crete is not pacified. Servia is hostile and arming. A shot fired north of the Balkan would be echoed at Herat, and would light anew the conflagration smothered by the treaty of Vienna. But in this new war would our fleets sweep the seas unopposed? How busy a part has not the American fleet played in the Mediterranean since 1856. How many causes of grievance and even war have not American statesmen treasured up against England. In fact the American and Russian press have actually had the folly to threaten just such a combination as Sir

NOTICE

SUR

L'HISTOIRE DU NÉPÂL,

PAR M. LÉON FEER.

EXTRAIT DU JOURNAL ASIATIQUE.

LIBRARY
16 JUN. 04

HISTORY OF NEPÂL.

Translated from the Parbatiyâ by Munshi Shew Shunker Singh and Pandit Shri Gunânand, with an introductory sketch of the country and people of Nepâl, by the editor Daniel Wright. Cambridge, 1877, in-4°, xv-324 pages, 16 planches.

Le Népâl possède une chronique indigène intitulée *Vamçâvalî* (série des dynasties); elle est écrite en parbatiyâ, quoiqu'elle représente la tradition bouddhique et que le parbatiyâ ne soit pas la langue de la portion bouddhiste des habitants du Népâl; un manuscrit de cet ouvrage est entre les mains de M. le professeur Cowell, à Cambridge. Il existe un autre texte qui est la version gorkha ou hindoue, et dont le British Museum et la Bibliothèque de l'Université de Cambridge possèdent des exemplaires. Nous ne savons pas (et je crois pouvoir dire : on ne sait pas encore) quelle différence il y a entre les deux relations, si ce sont des chroniques absolument distinctes, ou une seule et même chronique dont chaque race ou chaque parti religieux aurait voulu avoir une rédaction qui lui appartienne en propre. Il serait désirable que la comparaison pût être faite; car il est évident que, pour bien connaître l'histoire du Népâl, il faut entendre les deux partis. Mais peut-être va-t-on nous trouver bien insatiable, quand nous devrions nous estimer trop heureux d'avoir à notre disposition l'une au moins des deux versions, celle des bouddhistes, qui est, selon toutes les apparences, la principale et la plus ancienne.

C'est M. Daniel Wright que nous devons remercier pour cette belle, intéressante et utile publication; il en a pris l'initiative et dirigé l'exécution; mais il a eu des collaborateurs. La traduction anglaise du *Vamçâvalî* est l'œuvre d'un Hindou attaché à la résidence britannique du Népâl, Shew Sunker Singh; il s'est fait assister du pandit nepâlais Shrî Gunânand, issu de la famille des rédacteurs de cette chronique.

M. Daniel Wright a revu le travail; il s'est procuré, pour orner sa publication, des dessins faits par un Népâlais, des photographies tirées par un de ses amis.

L'Université de Cambridge a fait imprimer l'ouvrage à ses frais en un volume soigné contenant seize planches de gravures généralement coloriées, remarquables par la netteté et l'exactitude, et qui nous font connaître l'aspect des principaux monuments du Népâl et les traits de quelques personnages éminents, entre autres ceux du roi actuel et de son premier ministre, feu sir Jung Bahâdur. L'ouvrage se compose d'une *Préface* (xv p.), d'une *Introduction* (p. 1-75), de la traduction du *Vamçâvalî* (p. 76-291) et d'un *Appendice* (p. 293-324) fournissant divers renseignements classés sous neuf rubriques différentes. Les principales sections sont : une liste de manuscrits en diverses langues, mais surtout en sanscrit, dont M. Wright a doté l'Université de Cambridge; un petit glossaire anglais parbatîyâ-newari, un petit recueil de chants newarî avec traduction; une liste des souverains du Népâl classés par dynasties, liste dressée d'après la chronique, et qui permet de mieux suivre l'ensemble du récit. Les autres sections de l'appendice, relatives à la mesure du temps, aux poids et mesures, aux monnaies, aux instruments d'agriculture et de musique, facilitent l'intelligence de certains points traités dans l'ouvrage, ou complètent les notions qu'il fournit sur le Népâl.

M. Daniel Wright a adopté l'orthographe nouvelle, celle qui cherche a reproduire par un calque aussi parfait que possible les noms orientaux, sans s'asservir aux bizarreries de l'orthographe anglaise. Cependant, pour un petit nombre de noms très-connus, il s'est conformé à l'usage ancien. Son système de transcription n'est pas rigoureux et n'a pas d'ailleurs la prétention de l'être : je le jugerais susceptible de perfectionnement; mais, au total, il est très-satisfaisant. Certains noms ne sont pas toujours transcrits de la même manière; mais M. Wright nous avertit que ces variations correspondent à celles du texte original lui-même. On re-

marque en particulier des différences quelquefois assez grandes entre les noms de rois donnés à l'appendice (p. 312-315) et ceux qui se trouvent dans le corps du récit : ceux de la liste paraissent les plus corrects. En effet M. Wright nous avertit qu'elle a été faite avec un soin particulier.

Le Népâl est un pays petit, mais bien digne de fixer l'attention. Cette vallée où M. Hodgson a retrouvé les débris de la littérature sanscrite du bouddhisme ne peut nous être indifférente. Nous croyons donc utile de présenter ici au lecteur une description du Népâl d'après l'introduction de M. Wright, et un résumé de l'histoire du pays d'après le *Vañçâvalî*. Dans cette seconde partie de notre travail, nous supprimerons, ou du moins nous réduirons considérablement l'élément religieux qui pénètre tout le récit et se mêle pour ainsi dire à chaque événement, pour lui donner une physionomie particulière. Nous tâcherons de noter seulement les faits les plus saillants de l'histoire politique, civile et religieuse. Du reste, pour fournir au lecteur les moyens de compléter son instruction et de contrôler nos assertions, en même temps que pour ne pas dissimuler l'origine de nos connaissances, nous renverrons pour les principales mentions que nous aurons à faire aux pages du livre de M. Wright.

Nous empruntons d'abord à l'introduction quelques détails sur le pays; nous donnerons ensuite un résumé de son histoire.

I. GÉOGRAPHIE DU NÉPÂL; ETHNOGRAPHIE, MŒURS, RELIGIONS, ETC.

Géographie. Si claire que puisse être une description géographique ou topographique, l'existence d'une carte ou d'un plan qui aide à la suivre est quelquefois nécessaire, toujours utile. La description géographique que M. Wright nous donne ne manque pas de clarté, mais une carte manque à son livre, et nous regrettons cette lacune. Nous allons essayer d'indiquer la position des principaux points du pays dont il nous parle.

La vallée du Népâl, longue en moyenne de 20 milles anglais et large de 15 [1], est entourée de montagnes dont les principaux sommets sont au nord le Munichûr, le Seopûri, le Kukani, le Kowhilia; à l'est le Mahadeo Pokâri; à l'ouest le Nâgârjun; au sud le Chandragiri, le Champa Devi, le Phurphing et le Phûlchowk : ce dernier, le plus haut de tous, s'élève à 9,720 pieds anglais au-dessus du niveau de la mer. Le pays forme un réseau de vallées et de plateaux; les vallées sont sillonnées par des cours d'eau presque toujours à sec une partie de l'année; le plus considérable d'entre eux est celui qui est formé par la Vishnumatî qui arrive du N. E. et la Bagmatî plus occidentale, dont les eaux se rejoignent, se mêlent près de Kathmandu et continuent leur course dans la direction du S. E. Kathmandu, fondé en 723, actuellement capitale du Népâl, est situé à peu près au centre du pays. A un peu plus de 2 milles au S. E. est Pâtan, appelée aussi Lâlitapattan ou Lâlitpur, autre capitale du Népâl fondée en 299; enfin à 9 milles à l'est se trouve Bhatgaon, troisième capitale fondée en 865. De Kathmandu partent deux routes, l'une dans la direction de l'est vers Bhatgaon, l'autre vers le N. E. sur laquelle on rencontre, à environ 3 milles de Kathmandu, Paçupati, le plus ancien sanctuaire et l'un des plus vénérés du Népâl (p. 21). Il s'en trouve deux autres dans les mêmes parages, Gaukarna, à 2 milles au N. E. de Paçupati, et Bodhnath, entre ces deux localités à 3 milles $\frac{1}{2}$ de Kathmandu. Le temple bouddhique de Bodhnath attire un grand nombre de Boutaniens et de Tibétains (p. 22). Le lieu le plus remarquable à l'ouest de Kathmandu est Simbhunâth ou Svayambhunâth (à 1 mille $\frac{1}{2}$), remarquable par son temple et sa statue colossale de Çâkya-Sinha (Çâkyamuni). Si l'on part de Kathmandu dans la direction du S. O., la ville la plus considérable que l'on rencontre

[1] Il ne s'agit ici que du Népâl proprement dit, de la vallée où est la capitale; car le royaume de Népâl est beaucoup plus vaste et s'étend sur une longueur de 500 milles anglais et une largeur de 133. Seulement, tout ce territoire est fermé aux Européens; la vallée centrale est seule un peu accessible, et c'est seulement à elle que se rapporte le livre de M. Wright.

est Kîrtipûr, ville de 4,000 âmes, importante pour la religion, et célèbre par son héroïsme et par ses souffrances dans la guerre des Gorkhas. A 5 milles au S. E. de la capitale est Bogmatî, célèbre par le culte de Macchindra, la divinité protectrice du Népâl.

Deux routes partent de Pâtan, l'une dans la direction du sud, l'autre dans celle du S. E.; celle-ci se termine à Godâvari, lieu vénéré, rendez-vous des pèlerins pendant le mois du *Méla* qui s'y tient tous les douze ans, et où se trouve une source qu'on prétend en communication avec la Godâvari du Dekkhan, qui l'alimenterait de ses eaux; elle est située au pied du mont Phûlchowk (p. 20).

Ethnographie. Les habitants du Népâl se partagent en plusieurs races diverses, parmi lesquelles il y en a deux principales, les Newars et les Gorkhas. Les Newars forment le fond de la population et descendent des anciens maîtres du pays; ils ont le type mongol et parlent le newari, langue non âryenne. Les Gorkhas sont la race dominante, et descendent des envahisseurs qui conquirent le Népâl il y a un siècle; ils ont le type hindou; leur langue, le parbatiya, est de souche indo-européenne. A côté et au-dessous de ces deux groupes se trouvent dans quelques cantons les Magars et les Gurungs à l'ouest, les Limbus et les Kirâtis à l'est, les Bhotiyas sur la frontière du Tibet au nord, les Lepchas sur celle du Sikkim au S. E. Chacune de ces races a son langage spécial; les Limbus et les Bhotiyas parlent des dialectes du tibétain.

M. Hodgson s'était occupé de ces différents peuples, et il a donné des listes de mots dans leurs langues respectives. Les Lepchas du Sikim ont été l'objet spécial des études du capitaine Mainwaring, qui a publié tout récemment une grammaire très-complète de leur langue, précédée d'une introduction fort instructive. Nous comptons rendre compte ultérieurement de cet ouvrage.

Religions, mœurs. Le bouddhisme est la religion des Newars, des Bhotiyas, des Limbus, des Kirâtis; l'hindouïsme celle

des Gorkhas, des Magars et des Gurungs ; l'islamisme est professé par un certain nombre d'étrangers. Il y a donc une assez grande liberté comme une assez grande variété de cultes. Cette variété se manifeste surtout par le nombre des fêtes religieuses ; il n'existe pas moins de 2733 sanctuaires dans le pays, et les solennités qu'on y célèbre durent quelquefois des semaines entières et même des mois. Ces fêtes sont le grand attrait et la principale occupation des Népâlais.

Les pratiques religieuses de chaque culte sont plus ou moins dénaturées par des alliages et des mélanges. Les fleurs et les fruits sont les principales offrandes ; toutefois quelques sectes sacrifient encore des animaux, il y a même des exemples de sacrifices humains qui ne sont pas fort anciens. Ces tueries s'accomplissaient jadis avec une grande barbarie ; mais de généreux et persévérants efforts en ont modifié le caractère. La même influence s'est exercée sur les lois pénales, qui ont été fort adoucies, et sur certains usages tels que celui du sacrifice des veuves, qui n'a pas été aboli, mais qu'on s'est efforcé de restreindre. Du reste, il y a sur ce point des différences selon les races ou les religions. Ainsi c'est chez les Gorkhas que les veuves ont de l'inclination pour le bûcher, à cause de l'interdiction de se remarier. Chez les Newars bouddhistes, les veuves peuvent se remarier et ne se brûlent généralement pas, quoiqu'elles aient le droit de le faire. La polygamie est admise et fort en usage chez les gens riches. L'adultère est puni très-sévèrement, surtout parmi les Gorkhas, car les Newars sont beaucoup moins rigoureux, et admettent même le divorce. Toute jeune fille newari est mariée dans son enfance avec un fruit de l'espèce appelée Bel, qu'on jette à l'eau après la cérémonie, et qui est toujours censé le véritable époux, ce qui diminue singulièrement la gravité des incidents matrimoniaux qui peuvent survenir par la suite.

L'esclavage existe au Népâl, et le nombre des esclaves y est considérable. Indépendamment de ceux qui le sont de naissance, il y en a qui le deviennent en punition de certains crimes.

La nourriture animale est plus usitée au Népâl dans toutes les classes de la population qu'on ne le voit dans l'Inde propre. C'est sans doute un effet du climat. La liqueur enivrante appelée *rakshi*, tirée du riz et de l'orge, est un objet de grande consommation de la part des Newars et des basses classes; le thé est la boisson favorite des classes supérieures; mais les inférieures ne le dédaignent pas.

Il n'y a point d'écoles au Népâl, l'instruction se donne dans les familles, par le concours des pandits, moyennant salaire; il en résulte que les basses classes sont dans une profonde ignorance.

Les pèlerinages et les processions n'empêchent pas les Népâlais de vaquer à l'agriculture, leur travail de prédilection. Chaque famille a son lopin, et il n'est pas un coin de terre cultivable qui reste en friche. Le peu d'industrie qu'il y a dans le pays est entre les mains des Newars, tandis que la profession des armes est réservée aux seuls Gorkhas. L'armée peut compter de 60 à 70,000 hommes; elle est organisée à l'image de l'armée anglaise; malheureusement l'armement est insuffisant et surtout très-inégal, le commandement est défectueux. C'est une armée impropre à l'attaque, mais qui pourrait, dans ses montagnes, opposer une défense vigoureuse.

Les Népâlais sont fiers de leur indépendance, décidés à la maintenir et très-défiants à l'égard des étrangers : de là vient que les communications avec eux sont difficiles. L'état des routes les rendrait d'ailleurs presque impossibles, et la pauvreté du pays peu fructueuses. D'après M. Wright, tant que les Gorkhas seront les maîtres du Népâl, il n'y a rien à espérer par les voies pacifiques. Si donc on voulait absolument établir des relations commerciales entre l'Inde anglaise, le Népâl et le Tibet, la première chose à faire serait d'annexer le Népâl; il en coûterait quelques millions et plusieurs milliers d'hommes. Encore peut-on douter que « le jeu en valût la chandelle » (p. 70). Tel est l'avis de M. Wright; nous le donnons tel quel, sans hasarder l'examen minutieux de cette grosse question.

HISTOIRE DU NÉPÂL.

Si les cartes sont nécessaires pour l'intelligence des descriptions géographiques, les index ne le sont pas moins pour les recherches historiques. Il n'y a pas d'index à la fin du volume de M. Wright. Nous ne lui en faisons pas un reproche ; les circonstances dans lesquelles ce volume a paru rendaient sans doute la composition d'un index particulièrement difficile. Du reste, nous ne nous plaignons de cette lacune que dans l'intérêt des travailleurs ; le résumé que nous offrons en ce moment au lecteur n'en a pas souffert, et il n'eût guère été meilleur qu'il n'est ou plus facile à exécuter, si le volume avait été pourvu d'un index.

On peut distinguer dans l'histoire du Népâl plusieurs périodes : 1° la période fabuleuse des Buddhas et des Bodhisattvas, pendant laquelle la vallée du Népâl fut presque toujours un lac de Nâgas, où les Asurs faisaient revenir les eaux que les dieux avaient fait écouler ; 2° la période assez prolongée, et susceptible elle-même de divisions, pendant laquelle plusieurs dynasties se succédèrent, transportant à plusieurs reprises d'un lieu à un autre le siège de l'empire ; 3° la période du partage de l'État entre plusieurs membres d'une même dynastie, celle des Mallas ; 4° la période actuelle de la dynastie Gorkha.

Nous laisserons presque entièrement de côté la première période. Citons seulement, parmi les bizarreries qu'on y remarque, le transport dans cette période fabuleuse du règne de Vikramâditya avec la fameuse histoire de son trône, sur lequel le roi Bhoja voulut s'asseoir, ce dont il fut empêché à trente-deux reprises par les « attributs » du trône. La théorie de la transmigration rend ces fantaisies faciles ; car il est bien entendu que le Vikramâditya de cette période fabuleuse et le Vikramâditya postérieur, créateur de l'ère qui porte son nom, ne sont, à trois mille ans de distance, que des apparitions d'un seul et même individu.

Dynastie Gupta. L'histoire du Népâl commence avec Ne-

Muni, qui donna son nom au pays; il institua roi, dans des circonstances merveilleuses, un fils de pâtre appelé Bhuktamâna, chef de la première dynastie népâlaise appelée Gupta, du nom que prirent tous ses descendants. La dynastie Gupta compte huit rois qui régnèrent en tout cinq cent vingt et un ans. Ils avaient leur résidence au lieu appelé *Mâtâ tîrtha* « l'étang de la mère », ainsi nommé à cause d'une légende qui s'y rattache (p. 107-108).

Dynastie Ahîr. Cette dynastie, qui régna après l'extinction de la dynastie Gupta, était originaire des plaines de l'Hindoustan; elle compte seulement trois rois. Les Kîratîs, qu'on nous dit ailleurs être venus dans le Népâl pendant la période fabuleuse, avant les dieux, et y avoir dominé dix mille ans (p. 106), firent la conquête du pays et y fondèrent une puissance nouvelle.

Dynastie Kirâtî. Cette dynastie compte vingt-neuf rois. Ce fut sous le sixième, Humati, qu'eurent lieu la fameuse querelle de succession racontée dans le *Mahâbharata*, l'exil des fils de Pandu dans la forêt et le combat de l'un d'eux, Arjuna, avec un Kirâtî qui n'était autre que Mahâdeva. Sous le septième roi, Jitedâsti, Çâkyamuni vint visiter le Népâl, et les fils de Pandu livrèrent à leurs ennemis la formidable bataille de Kuruxetra; Jitedâsti, leur allié, était avec eux et périt en combattant (p. 109-110); synchronisme plus que douteux, mais qu'il ne faut pas oublier de noter. Un autre synchronisme se rattache au nom du quatorzième roi, Sthunko, c'est le voyage au Népâl du grand roi Açokà. Sa fille, Çârumatî, qui l'accompagnait, s'y fixa, s'y maria, et y mourut Bhixunî dans un vihâra qu'elle avait fait construire. Sous le vingt-huitième roi, Patuka, commença l'attaque des Rajputs de la race lunaire (Somabansi), qui mirent en fuite le vingt-neuvième et dernier Kirâtî, appelé Gasti; ils s'établirent près de Godâvari, au sud-est de Népâl, et fondèrent une dynastie nouvelle (p. 112).

Dynastie Somabansi ou lunaire. Elle ne compte que cinq rois ; le quatrième, Paçuprekhadeva, introduisit le régime des quatre castes et restaura le temple de Paçupati. Les heureux effets de cette belle action ne tardèrent pas à se faire sentir ; car, par la vertu des Mantras de Paçupati, le cinquième roi, Bhâskara-Barmâ, fit de grandes conquêtes et soumit le monde entier. Il ne laissa pas d'enfants, mais il avait demandé à Paçupati cette faveur, ordinairement peu enviée ; il laissa son trône à un membre de la race de Gautama, Bhûmi-Bharmâ, fondateur de la dynastie solaire (Sûryabansi) — (p. 113-114).

Dynastie Sûryabansi ou solaire. Elle compte trente et un rois. Le premier, Bhûmi-Barmâ, transporta sa résidence de Godâvarî à Bâneswara ; le onzième, Haridatta-Barmâ, institua le culte des quatre Nârâyana, ce qui signifie indubitablement qu'il favorisa l'hindouïsme (p. 114). Sous le dix-septième, Rudradeva-Barmâ, il y eut une réaction dans le sens bouddhique. Un brahmane, appelé Sunayasrî-Misra, originaire de Kapilavastu, était allé à Lha-Sa et y avait reçu les leçons de trois Lamas. De retour au Népâl, il répara les caityas d'Açoka, mit des offrandes dans quatre d'entre eux et fonda un vihâra ; il en fonda ensuite deux autres pour deux de ses disciples, qui vinrent de Kapilavastu au Népâl pour le rejoindre. Sa femme et ses enfants y vinrent aussi, et il établit cette loi dans sa famille que ses descendants, aussitôt qu'ils auraient un fils, embrasseraient l'état monastique. Toute cette histoire paraît être l'indice d'une recrudescence du bouddhisme (p. 115-117), succédant peut-être à une période d'affaiblissement. Mais sous le règne suivant, celui de Brikha- (ou Vṛxa-) Deva-Barmâ, frère du roi précédent, eut lieu le terrible mouvement anti-bouddhique dirigé par Çankara Âcârya, qui serait venu de sa personne au Népâl, aurait confondu les docteurs bouddhistes (lesquels, en ce temps-là, n'étaient pas, paraît-il, de première force), ordonné les sacrifices d'animaux, le mariage des nonnes, la destruction des quatre-vingt-quatre mille livres sacrés, et établi le çivaïsme sur les ruines du bouddhisme. Cette

révolution causa dans le pays un trouble profond et prolongé. Les docteurs qui n'avaient pas su tenir tête à l'adversaire furent affectés du goître, en punition de leur faiblesse ou de leur incapacité, et dans les Népâlais atteints de cette difformité, on reconnaît encore aujourd'hui les descendants de ceux que Çankara Âcârya avait vaincus (p. 122). Les bouddhistes n'acceptèrent pourtant pas leur défaite avec une entière résignation; ils oublièrent la patience, le mépris des injures et leurs autres vertus pour exercer des représailles; on nous parle de sept cents Brahmanes de Bisâlnagara massacrés par mille Banras bouddhistes; les meurtriers furent réduits en cendres par les malédictions des femmes de ces Brahmanes qui avaient suivi leurs maris dans la mort, et dont les esprits causèrent tant de trouble qu'un roi dut les apaiser par une cérémonie religieuse. Si éclatante qu'eût été la victoire de Çankara Âcârya, il n'avait pas totalement extirpé le bouddhisme, qui finit par se relever de cette chute profonde. Les derniers représentants du culte vaincu s'étaient réfugiés dans le vihâra de Pingalâ-Bahâl-kot, d'où ils sortirent dans des temps plus heureux pour se répandre dans le pays et y faire refleurir leur doctrine (p. 121-122 et 157-158). Le vingt-septième roi, Çiva-Deva-Barmâ, transporta sa résidence de Baneswara à Deva-Patan, il institua ou réforma plusieurs cérémonies, parmi lesquelles la plus notable est le sacrifice humain offert tous les ans à Bachla-Devî, la principale divinité (femelle) du Népâl (p. 126). Il finit ses jours dans les pratiques religieuses, et renonça même au trône; il s'était lié d'abord avec un fakir, adorateur des divinités brahmaniques, ensuite il rencontra un bhixu qui le décida à construire un vihâra et à se faire bouddhiste (p. 127-129). Le trente et unième et dernier roi, Viçva-Deva-Barmâ, tenta en vain d'abolir les sacrifices humains; la divinité sanguinaire ne voulut pas lâcher ses victimes. Il mourut sans postérité mâle; sa fille unique épousa un Thakurî ou Rajput légitimé, et le fils né de cette union, Ançu-Barmâ, fut le chef d'une dynastie nouvelle. Viçva-Deva-Barmâ était contemporain du célèbre roi Vikramâditya, qui

vint au Népàl, y acquitta, par l'ordre du dieu Ganeça, les dettes nombreuses dont souffrait le pays, et institua, en mémoire de cette généreuse libéralité, l'ère qui porte son nom (p. 131).

Dynastie Thakurî ou Rajput. Elle compte dix-huit rois. Le premier, Ançu-Barmâ, transporta la résidence royale de Deva-Pattan à Madhyalakhu. C'est sous son règne que les dieux cessèrent de se montrer aux hommes. Le quatrième roi, Nand-Deva, introduisit au Népâl, par une sorte de caprice (peut-être par force), l'ère de Çâlivâhana, autrement dit, l'ère Çâka, qui, néanmoins, ne fut pas imposée aux habitants, ne supplanta pas celle de Vikramâditya et fut employée concurremment avec elle. Le cinquième roi, Bar-Deva, fonda la ville de Lalita-Patan ou Lalitpur, la plus ancienne des capitales du Népâl encore subsistantes. Sous le sixième, Candraketu-Deva, le pays fut subjugué et ravagé par des envahisseurs, venus de tous côtés, qu'on ne désigne pas autrement. On attribue à la piété du roi et à l'intervention d'une divinité (Lomrî-Masâkalî-Devi) la cessation du fléau. Les Râjas ennemis, effrayés par son apparition, rapportèrent ce qu'ils avaient enlevé (p. 138). Sous ce règne, un célèbre docteur bouddhiste, Bandhudatta, commença à se faire connaître; son influence continua sous le septième roi, Narendra-Deva; ce fut alors qu'il apporta du Tibet le culte de Mahàkâla (p. 139). Le Népâl subissait donc alors d'une manière très-sensible l'influence tibétaine et bouddhique. Le huitième roi, Bar-Deva, transporta sa résidence à Lalita-Pattan, fondée peu de temps auparavant. Bandhudatta, dont l'influence ne faisait que croître, institua sous son règne le culte de Macchendra-Nâtha[1], protecteur du Népâl. Macchendra-Nâtha, dont la légende est longuement racontée (p. 140-152), n'est autre que Avalokiteçvara, le Bodhisattva principalement vénéré des Tibétains, et qui renaît perpétuellement dans leur Dalaï Lama

[1] Macchendra est la prononciation du mot qui s'écrit *Matsyendra*, «prince

(d'institution plus récente). Les créations de Bandhudatta sont un épisode important de la réaction qui suivit la révolution violente dont Çankara-Âcârya avait été l'auteur. L'influence du Tibet dans ce grand mouvement est visible. C'est ce qui ressort, entre autres indices, d'une légende relative à un Brahmane, incarnation de Çankara-Âcârya, qui serait venu au Népâl pour voir si son œuvre subsistait encore, y aurait confondu quelques docteurs, et serait passé ensuite au Tibet, où le Lama l'aurait complètement vaincu (p. 152-153). Cette légende, dont nous ne racontons pas toutes les bizarreries, signifie sans doute que le rétablissement du bouddhisme au Népâl n'y détruisit pas l'hindouïsme, dont la persistance dans ce pays est manifeste, tandis que, au Tibet, nulle doctrine ne put subsister à côté du bouddhisme.

Le quinzième roi, Guna Kâma-Deva, régna cinquante et un ans, fonda Kantipur ou Kathmandu, et y établit sa résidence (p. 154). Nous voyons ainsi se fonder successivement les villes qui sont aujourd'hui les plus importantes du Népâl. Ce même roi institua plusieurs solennités religieuses, entre autres celle de Lâkhyâ-Jâtra, en l'honneur de Çâkya-Muni, vainqueur de Mâra sous l'arbre de Bodhi (p. 155). C'est aussi à lui qu'on attribue la création du jeu de Siti, dans lequel les enfants se battent à coups de pierres. Dans les premiers temps, on sacrifiait les prisonniers que faisaient les deux partis : les sacrifices furent abolis, mais l'usage du combat fut maintenu jusque dans ces dernières années. Le résident anglais, Colvin, ayant eu la curiosité d'assister à ce jeu dangereux, fut atteint par un des projectiles, et Jung Bahadur supprima cette coutume barbare. — Jaya-Kâma-Deva, le dix-huitième roi, mourut sans postérité. Les Thakuris du mont Nuwakot créèrent roi l'un d'entre eux qui fut le fondateur d'une dynastie nouvelle.

Dynastie Thakurî de Nuwakot. Cette dynastie dura peu : elle ne compte que cinq rois. Il semble que dans cette période on se soit encore ressenti des troubles religieux causés par Çankara Âcârya. Le premier roi de la dynastie, Bhâskara-Deva

construisit un vihâra pour les Banras (docteurs) de Pingala Bahâl et leur divinité, qui avaient quitté la retraite où les persécutions de Çankara-Âcârya les avaient contraints de chercher un refuge; légende assez obscure, qui indique une sorte de malaise religieux, de même que l'érection d'un emblème de Çiva pour apaiser les esprits des sept cents brahmanis qui s'étaient brûlées sur le bûcher de leurs maris, massacrés par les bouddhistes, et d'autres cérémonies de purification, imaginées par le cinquième roi, Çankara-Deva (p. 159-160). Ce prince mourut sans postérité; le pouvoir passa alors à un descendant d'Ançu-Barma, de la race solaire, Bâma-Deva, qui fonda ce qu'on appelle la deuxième dynastie Rajput.

Deuxième dynastie Rajput. Cette dynastie compte douze rois. Le troisième, Sadàsiva-Deva, fut le fondateur de Kîrtipur; le dixième, Abhaya-Malla, est surtout remarquable pour avoir donné son nom à une dynastie qui régna plus tard sur le Népâl. Il eut deux fils qui lui succédèrent simultanément, le premier, Jaya-Deva-Malla, à Lalita-Pattan et à Kathmandu; le deuxième, Ananda-Malla, à Bhaktapur ou Bhatgaon, troisième capitale du Népâl, dont il fut le fondateur. Sous son règne, un çudra appelé Sâkhwal, devenu extraordinairement riche, paya les dettes existant dans le pays, et ce fait notable fut le point de départ d'une ère nouvelle, l'ère nationale du Népâl, qui commence en octobre 880 de notre ère (p. 164). Il y a donc au Népâl trois ères : celle de Vikramâditya, celle de Çalivâhana (ou Çâka), apportées du dehors l'une et l'autre et communes à l'Inde et au Népâl, et l'ère népâlaise proprement dite (Népâl-Samvat). En l'an 9 de l'ère nouvelle, une invasion formidable mit fin à la domination des deux rois Mallas et de leur dynastie. Nànya-Deva-Râja, venu de la contrée méridionale Karnâtaka, et suivi de bandes parmi lesquelles étaient les Newaras[1], originaires du pays de Nayera,

[1] Ce nom ressemble beaucoup à celui des Newars, qui forment le fond de l'ancienne population du Népâl. Cette population se confondrait-elle avec

conquit le Népâl, expulsa la dynastie régnante et fonda une puissance nouvelle. Il apporta l'ère de Çâka-Sahkâla (p. 167). Cela signifie, je suppose, qu'il eut la prétention d'imposer exclusivement l'ère de Çâka ou Çâlivâhana qui paraît, en effet, être employée de préférence dans le midi de l'Inde.

Dynastie Karnâtakî. Elle ne compte que six rois. Sous le troisième, appelé Narsinha-Deva, Râjà-Malla-Deva et Kathya-Malla fondent le village de Chapagaon (ou Champapurî), ce qui indique une sorte de retour offensif de la dynastie précédente. Sous le sixième roi, Hari-Deva, toute la ville de Lalita-Pattan s'insurgea, et le roi fut défait par les rebelles (p. 170). Un chef voisin, Mukunda-Sena, profita de ces troubles pour envahir le Népâl, amenant avec lui des Khas et les Magars; on dit même que ce fut à l'instigation d'un Magar qu'il entreprit cette conquête. De grandes atrocités furent commises par les bandes envahissantes; mais la contagion se mit parmi elles et les détruisit, si bien que Mukunda-Sena s'enfuit presque seul. Ainsi parle la chronique, mais elle avoue que les Khas et les Magars n'en restèrent pas moins dans le pays, où ils avaient importé deux aliments nouveaux, le *sinkî* (radis qu'on enterre jusqu'à fermentation) et le *hawukâ* (riz qu'on met en tas avant qu'il soit mûr, et qu'on recouvre de terre jusqu'à sa maturité; après quoi on le fait sécher). Cette invasion causa un trouble profond, elle fut suivie d'une période d'anarchie et de division qui dura deux cent vingt-cinq ans. Chaque ville, même chaque quartier des grandes villes avait son roi. Tous ces tyranneaux étaient des Thakurî, il y en eut tant que leurs noms n'ont pu être conservés. On remarque qu'ils furent en général favorables au bouddhisme, ou du moins que, pendant cette période, le bouddhisme put se développer plus librement.

Dynastie Ayodhyâ. Enfin, en 1324, un prince d'Aoude, Ha-

risimha-Deva, fuyant les Musulmans, arriva, après bien des aventures, dans le Népâl. Les Thakurîs de Bhatgaon l'accueillirent bien; il repoussa une attaque des Bhotiyas (Tibétains ou Boutaniens), et fonda une dynastie qui ne compte que quatre rois et ne se distingue que par le calme relatif dont jouit le pays (p. 174-179). Les Newaras de Nayera, venus avec Nânya-Deva-Râja, occupaient [1] encore le pays (p. 179). Sous le dernier roi de la dynastie d'Aoude, un tremblement de terre causa, en 1408, d'effroyables malheurs. Çyâma-Sinha-Deva (c'est le nom de ce roi) ne laissa qu'une fille, dont le mariage avec un descendant des Mallas chassés, comme on l'a vu plus haut, par Nânya-Deva-Râja, ramena cette famille sur le trône (p. 180).

Dynastie Malla. Tous les rois de cette dynastie, la plus glorieuse et la plus prospère du Népâl, portent le nom de Malla; ils régnèrent trois siècles. On peut distinguer deux périodes dans cet espace de temps. Pendant la première (huit règnes), l'unité du royaume fut maintenue; pendant la deuxième, elle fut brisée; il y eut alors plusieurs États distincts, parfois réunis momentanément. Le règne du premier roi, Jayabhadra-Malla, fut signalé par l'abondance des récoltes. Le sixième, Açoka, repoussa les rois Thakurîs et leur enleva leurs possessions; il régnait sur Lalita-Pattan et Bhatgaon, à l'est. Son successeur, Jayasthiti-Malla, occupa le trône quarante-trois ans et fut le roi législateur par excellence du Népâl. Il légiféra sur la propriété, institua des amendes proportionnées aux crimes, réglementa les funérailles des rois et des particuliers, renouvela, rassembla et fit exécuter les lois sur les castes. Cinq pandits l'assistèrent dans ces grands travaux législatifs qui ne furent, en grande partie, que la révision et la codification des anciens usages et de lois plus ou moins oubliées

[1] Dans la traduction anglaise, il y a le présent «occupe». La phrase

(p. 182-186). Jayasthiti-Malla ne négligea pas la religion. Ainsi, pour apaiser Sîtalâ (la petite vérole), il érigea Unmatta-Bhairava, avec une pierre portant une inscription datée de l'an 542 (ère népâlaise) = 1422 de notre ère. La chronique mentionne antérieurement une ou deux de ces inscriptions lapidaires; mais sous les rois Malla elles se multiplient, et les mentions en deviennent très-fréquentes. Yaxa-Malla, fils de Jayasthiti-Malla, régna quarante-trois ans, comme son père. Il fortifia Bhatgaon. La religion l'occupa beaucoup; il se montra très-large; car le culte de Paçupatinâtha, divinité locale, celui de Ganeça, divinité hindoue, et celui des Bodhisattvas, par conséquent le bouddhisme, furent les objets de ses soins (p. 188). Yaxa-Malla mourut en 1472, et laissa trois fils qui se partagèrent ses États (p. 189). Il exista d'abord trois royaumes, ceux de Kathmandu, de Bhatgaon et de Banepa. Il y eut treize rois à Kathmandu et onze à Bhatgaon. Le royaume de Banepa n'eut pas de durée; mais il se forma un peu plus tard un royaume de Lalita-Pattan, qui compte treize rois. La chronique raconte successivement l'histoire des royaumes de Bhatgaon, de Kathmandu et de Lalita-Pattan. Cette disposition, qui a ses avantages comme elle a ses imperfections, nous convient d'autant moins que nous n'avons pas la prétention de faire une histoire complète. Nous noterons donc les événements les plus remarquables dans l'ordre des temps, en quelque lieu qu'ils se soient produits. Mais nous nous attacherons plus particulièrement au royaume de Kathmandu, que l'éclat de ses rois, sa position centrale, le rang que sa capitale occupe encore, et même l'annexion qu'il s'est faite plusieurs fois du royaume de Pattan, semblent désigner comme le principal.

Royaumes multiples (dynastie Malla). Le premier roi de Kathmandu, Ratna-Malla, s'assura le pouvoir en empoisonnant les douze rois Thakuris dans un festin; après quoi il mit à mort leur kâjî[1], qui les avait trahis, et dont il se défiait à

[1] *Kâji* n'est que la transcription du mot arabe قاضي qui signifie «juge».

bon droit. Il fut ainsi engagé dans une lutte contre les Thakuris de Nuwakot et les vainquit. Il fut ensuite obligé de recourir à l'aide des brahmanes du Tirhut, au sud, pour repousser une attaque des Bhotiyas de Kuṭu. Il changea la monnaie courante et substitua au *sukicâ* le *paisâ*, d'une valeur huit fois moindre. C'est sous lui que les Musulmans commencèrent à paraître dans le Népâl. Pendant les soixante et onze ans qu'il régna à Kathmandu, plusieurs rois se succédèrent à Bhatgaon; le deuxième d'entre eux, Suvarna-Malla, réunit à ses États celui de Banepa qui cessa d'exister à la mort de Ran-Malla, deuxième fils de Yaxa-Malla. Une cruelle famine désola son royaume, et Bhatgaon fut un instant dépeuplé (p. 189). Amara-Malla, deuxième roi de Kathmandu, régna quarante-sept ans et fonda de nombreuses institutions religieuses; il régnait sur vingt-six villes (p. 206). Le troisième roi, Sûrya-Malla, enleva deux places au roi de Bhatgaon; le cinquième, Mahindra-Malla, alla à Delhi rendre hommage au Grand-Mogol, et obtint de lui la permission de frapper une nouvelle monnaie, le *mohar*, première monnaie en argent qui se vit au Népâl. Le sixième roi, Sadâsiva-Malla, avait la passion des chevaux, qu'il faisait paître sur les terres de ses sujets, et des femmes, qu'il séduisait par tous les moyens possibles; il en résulta un soulèvement qui le força à prendre la fuite : il chercha un asile à Bhatgaon, dont le roi le fit enfermer, et l'on n'entendit plus parler de lui (p. 207-209). Çiva-Sinha-Malla, frère du roi expulsé, fut mis sur le trône, malgré la tache de sa naissance : il était fils d'une Thakurî. Ce fut « un homme sage. » Sa femme, la Râni Gangâ, s'occupa des affaires publiques et surtout des affaires religieuses; plusieurs temples furent réparés. Un de leurs fils, Laxmî-Narsinha, régna à Kathmandu, après Çiva-Sinha; l'autre, qui était d'un caractère violent, à Lalita-Pattan, royaume spécial qu'il s'était déjà formé du vivant de son père (p. 209 et 233).

En népâlais, il paraît avoir eu autrefois un sens plus large et désigner un

Laxmî-Narsinha, huitième roi de Kathmandu, fit un traité de commerce avec le Tibet. Les négociants népâlais eurent la faculté d'aller à Lha-Sa, et les biens de ceux qui y décéderaient devaient être rendus au gouvernement népâlais (p. 211-212). Le deuxième roi de Lalita-Pattan, Siddhi-Narsinha, qui protégea aussi le commerce et attira beaucoup de marchands dans sa capitale, participa à ce traité et en fit bénéficier ses sujets; il institua, en outre, une cérémonie de purification pour ceux qui feraient le voyage du Tibet, afin qu'ils pussent être réintégrés dans leur caste (p. 237). Cette particularité semble indiquer sinon une faveur spéciale pour l'hindouïsme, du moins une grande tolérance; car on nous dit qu'il y avait sous ce règne dix vihâras, dont cinq d'un rang supérieur, et qu'il fut pris des dispositions pour le gouvernement de ces couvents bouddhiques (p. 234-235). Ce même roi de Lalita-Pattan fit beaucoup de règlements sur la religion et d'autres matières; il eut un règne prospère et finit en fakir.

Le traité de commerce dont il vient d'être question avait été négocié par Bhîma-Malla, parent et kajî (conseiller) du roi de Kathmandu, homme intelligent et zélé, qui était allé de sa personne à Lha-Sa et en avait rapporté beaucoup d'or et d'argent. Il fit rentrer Kuti sous la puissance de Laxmi-Narsinha, et n'aspirait pas à moins qu'à étendre la domination de son maître sur tout le Népâl. Mais des envieux persuadèrent au roi que Bhîma-Malla nourrissait des projets d'usurpation, si bien que Laxmî-Narsinha fit périr son fidèle et habile kajî. La femme de Bhîma-Malla le suivit dans la mort, en prononçant cette malédiction : « Que cette cour soit à jamais privée de jugement! » Le roi perdit la raison peu de temps après, et son fils, Pratâpa-Malla, lui succéda (p. 212).

Pratâpa-Malla régna de 1639 à 1689, ce qui fait cinquante ans; mais le texte attribue à son règne une durée de soixante et un ans. La différence tient peut-être à la manière dont on compte le temps pendant lequel le père de Pratâpa-Malla vécut encore, fou et détrôné. Dans sa jeunesse, Pratâpa-Malla

s'était laissé entraîner par sa passion pour les femmes; mais il finit par s'amender (p. 216). Il eut des démêlés avec les autres rois du Népâl. Une de ses rânîs étant morte, Siddhî-Narsinha, qui régnait encore à Lalita-Pattan, ne prit pas le deuil et n'interrompit pas la célébration de la fête de Dasaîn (p. 238). Ce fait, en lui-même peu important, semble déjà dénoter de la mésintelligence entre les deux rois. En effet, nous voyons, dix ans plus tard, le roi de Bhatgaon se liguer avec celui de Lalitpur contre le roi de Kathmandu et rendre libre le chemin de Bhatgaon, apparemment bloqué par Pratâpa-Malla. Mais, par un revirement soudain, « le lendemain (*on the next day*), » les deux rois de Lalitan-Pattan et de Khatmandu s'unissent en prêtant serment sur le Harivañsa et le Kâlî-Purâṇa et sur un couteau, puis débarrassent le chemin de Kathmandu à Lalita-Pattan et d'autres voies obstruées par un ennemi qu'on ne désigne pas, mais qui ne peut être que le roi de Bhatgaon, car la guerre continue entre ce roi et les deux autres. Dans un coup de main, le roi de Bhatgaon, Jagat-Prakâça-Malla, ayant surpris un poste avancé, fit trancher immédiatement la tête à huit hommes et emmena vingt-deux prisonniers, qu'il fit ensuite décapiter en les sacrifiant aux divinités (p. 244). La guerre finit par le succès des rois alliés de Kathmandu et de Lalita-Pattan; ils forcèrent Jagat-Prakâça-Malla à leur livrer un éléphant et de l'argent, puis rentrèrent dans leurs capitales respectives, après avoir enlevé plusieurs places à leur commun adversaire.

Ces démêlés, qui ne paraissent avoir eu de gravité que par les sacrifices humains dont ils furent souillés, n'empêchèrent point Pratâpa-Malla de vaquer aux soins intérieurs de son royaume. Il construisit ou fit réparer nombre d'édifices religieux, entre autres le monument de Svayambhû-Nâtha. Ce fut un lama tibétain, Syamârpâ, qui exécuta les travaux de réparation et d'embellissement, en particulier la dorure des images du temple. Le roi composa à cette occasion une prière à Svayambhû, qui fut gravée sur une des pierres du temple (p. 215); il fit de même pour plusieurs autres édifices.

Ses hymnes, ses pièces de vers décorèrent les monuments publics.

En effet, Pratàpa-Malla se distingua par ses goûts littéraires, son amour de l'étude; il s'entoura de pandits venus de divers côtés et prit le titre de *kavîndra* « prince des poëtes », qu'il finit par ajouter à son nom sur sa monnaie. Parmi les nombreuses inscriptions qu'il a fait graver sur la pierre des monuments, il en est une qui mérite une mention spéciale, parce qu'elle nous présente, sous un jour inattendu, les goûts, les tendances, les prétentions, les connaissances mêmes du roi (p. 213-214). Elle avait frappé le P. Joseph, qui en parle dans sa relation, et M. Wright a eu l'heureuse idée de la reproduire dans son livre, dont elle forme la planche XLII. Cette inscription, vraiment curieuse, est en sept lignes tracées sur une pierre encastrée dans le mur du premier édifice qu'on trouve à gauche, en arrivant sur la place royale de Kathmandu. Elle renferme une prière à la déesse Kâlîkâ. On lit clairement le nom et les titres du roi à la quatrième ligne, qui commence ainsi : *Mahârâjâdhirâja-çrîçrî-Kavîndra-Jaya Pratâpa-Malla*... « le grand roi des rois, l'auguste auguste prince des poëtes, Jaya-Pratàpa-Malla... », et à la cinquième ligne, vers le milieu, la date de l'inscription, *samvat* 774, ce qui donne l'année 1654 de notre ère. Mais ce qu'il y a de curieux dans cette inscription, œuvre d'érudition bien plus que de religion, c'est que l'auteur y a réuni des spécimens de toutes les écritures et de toutes les langues qu'il connaissait ou qu'il avait étudiées. Parmi ces types divers, qui sont au nombre de quinze, et où dominent, parmi les écritures indiennes, les variétés du devanâgari, on n'est pas peu étonné de voir se détacher en grosses lettres, à la fin de la cinquième et au commencement de la sixième ligne, les caractères latins : AVIOMNE WINTER LHIERT « automne, winter, l'hiver ». On étudiait donc le français dans les vallées de l'Himâlaya au XVIIe siècle ! Assurément, il y avait bien des progrès à faire. Mais le fait n'est-il pas bien remarquable ? Et n'est-il pas permis d'y voir les premiers symptômes d'une influence qui

promettait de devenir puissante et que l'indigne gouvernement de Louis XV a laissé perdre comme à plaisir dans le siècle suivant? Saluons en Pratâpa-Malla un prince indien qui aimait notre langue, a fait des efforts pour la connaître, et nous a témoigné une sorte de sympathie que nous ne devons pas oublier.

Mahîndra (ou Bhûpalendra) Malla, successeur de Pratàpa-Malla, réunit à ses États le royaume de Lalita-Pattan, lorsque Yoga-Narendra-Malla, désespéré par la mort de son fils, renonça au trône. Les deux fils de Mahîndra, Çri-Bhâskara-Malla et Jaya-Yoga-Prakàça, lui succédèrent, le premier comme roi de Kathmandu, le second comme roi de Lalita-Pattan. Çrî-Bhâskara-Malla succomba au fléau appelé *mahâmâi*, qui ravagea ses États. Il ne laissait pas d'héritier ; un parent éloigné, Jagajjaya-Malla, lui succéda et mourut en 1732. Jaya-Prakâça, qui vint après, fut le dernier roi de Kathmandu ; c'est sous son règne qu'eut lieu la lente et cruelle conquête des Gorkhas.

Jaya-Prakâça-Malla commença par être en lutte avec son frère, qui se réfugia à Pattan. Ses principaux officiers, les Tharîs, se soulevèrent contre lui et voulurent même créer un autre roi. La Ràni Dayàvatî se joignit aux révoltés; mais le roi fut le plus fort, quelques-uns des rebelles furent punis, et Dayâvatî finit ses jours en prison. A ces dissensions intestines s'ajoutèrent des démêlés plus graves à l'intérieur. Le roi de Kathmandu fut en lutte avec ses voisins de Bhatgaon et de Lalita-Pattan. Le dernier roi de Bhâtgaon, Ranjit-Malla, était prudent et économe, il avait fait une bonne opération financière avec Lha-Sa, en achetant une grande quantité de métaux précieux du Tibet qu'il paya en monnaie du Népâl. Il recourut à l'aide du roi de Kathmandu pour ériger une colonne; Jaya-Prakâça-Malla témoigna dans cette circonstance des dispositions peu loyales. En 1737, les trois rois du Népâl étaient en pleine discorde; le roi des Gorkhas, Narbhûpâla-Sah, en profita pour tenter la conquête du Népâl, et fut repoussé principalement par les rois Vaiçyas de Noakot (loca-

lité dont on a vu plus haut le nom écrit Nuwakot). Il était réservé à son fils, Prithwî-Nârayana, de mener à bonne fin cette grande entreprise.

Prithwî-Nârayana avait été reçu par le roi de Bhatgaon qui l'avait gardé trois ans près de lui, réchauffant le serpent dans son sein. Le prince Gorkha en avait profité pour étudier le Népâl et méditer sa conquête. Aussi, déjà avant la mort de l'avant-dernier roi, s'était-il emparé de Noakot que Jaya-Prakâça-Malla lui reprit plus tard. Vers 1740, le roi de Kathmandu fit périr Kasiram-Thâpâ qui avait des intelligences avec Prithwî-Nârayana. Le roi des Gorkhas vengea son ami par l'occupation d'un territoire népâlais, et vint bientôt après assiéger Kîrtipur; il fut repoussé, et on croyait les Gorkhas détruits: mais pendant dix-huit ans, ils revinrent à la charge (p. 227). Dans cette lutte, soutenue avec constance, Jaya-Prakâça se heurta à toutes sortes de difficultés. Sans parler des ravages causés par la petite vérole, ses officiers le trahirent et livrèrent plusieurs places à l'ennemi. Le roi de Bhatgaon, au lieu de le secourir contre l'ennemi commun, fut en guerre avec lui. Quant à Lalita-Pattan, l'anarchie la plus complète y régnait. Les six pradhânas (ministres ou eunuques) y étaient maîtres absolus; après avoir crevé les yeux à Râjya-Prakâça-Malla, ils firent et défirent les rois à leur guise, appelant au trône pour les renvoyer ou les tuer bientôt, le roi de Kathmandu, le roi de Bhatgaon et divers autres personnages. Les actes religieux de Jaya-Prakâça ne le sauvèrent pas de la ruine. En 1767, un tremblement de terre causa de grands désastres, et les Gorkhas se montrèrent plus menaçants que jamais; quelques troupes, envoyées par les Anglais, sous la conduite du capitaine Kinloch, pour les repousser, n'eurent aucun succès, et, en 1768, Prithwî-Nârayana entra vainqueur dans Kathmandu. Jaya-Prakâça, après s'être bravement défendu, s'enfuit à Bhatgaon, où régnait encore Ranjit-Malla. Le vainqueur l'y suivit, s'empara de la deuxième capitale du Népâl, et fit les deux rois prisonniers. Ranjit-Malla fut envoyé, sur sa demande, à Bé-

auparavant le conquérant Gorkha avait pu, sans peine, se rendre maître de Lalita-Pattan, où il avait mis à mort les six tyrans qui l'opprimaient depuis si longtemps. Maître des trois capitales, il étendit sa domination sur tout le pays. D'horribles cruautés signalèrent cette conquête, des villages entiers furent exterminés, et les corps des habitants trouvés pendus aux arbres de la campagne. Kîrtipur ayant été pris, après une résistance héroïque qui avait coûté un œil au frère du vainqueur, Prithwî-Nârayana fit couper les lèvres et le nez à huit cent soixante-cinq défenseurs de la place; la vue de ces malheureux qui, pour la plupart, vécurent encore longtemps après cet événement, était navrante : le colonel Kirckpatrick, lors de sa mission au Népâl, en 1792, en rencontra plusieurs. Cette affreuse guerre a eu un témoin oculaire européen, le P. Joseph, chef de la mission italienne, dont les notes sur le Népâl et la conquête gorkha ont été insérées dans le tome II des *Asiatic Researches*, sous la forme que leur a donnée John Shore. Castera a traduit cet article en français et l'a mis à la suite de la traduction de la *Description de l'Indostan*, de Rennell, par Boucheseiche (Paris, an VIII).

Dynastie Gorkha. La dynastie étrangère qui s'établit alors de force au Népâl y règne encore aujourd'hui : les Gorkhas sont toujours les maîtres du pays; mais leur puissance n'est plus redoutable. L'établissement de ces envahisseurs avait été une cause ou une menace sérieuse de troubles pour les pays voisins. Les deux puissances entre lesquelles ils se trouvaient serrés, la Chine au nord et l'Angleterre au sud, les mirent à la raison.

Depuis le conquérant Prithwî-Nârayan, mort en 1775, cinq rois ont régné sur le Népâl. Sinha-Pratâp-Sah, le premier d'entre eux, ne régna que trois ans; Ran-Bahadur-Sah, qui vint ensuite, régna dix-neuf ans, « avec puissance, » dit la chronique. Il s'étendit de l'est à l'ouest, fit trembler les Anglais, et envoya ses forces dans le Tibet, où elles pillèrent Digarchi. L'empereur de la Chine voulut tirer vengeance de cette insulte; mais ses armées furent détruites, et il fut trop heureux

d'obtenir la paix. Ainsi parle la chronique (p. 267); la vérité est que les Népâlais furent complètement battus et obligés de subir un traité ignominieux. Ce fut dans ces circonstances que les Anglais envoyèrent au Népâl le colonel Kirckpatrick; mais il arriva trop tard pour intervenir utilement, et le seul résultat de sa mission fut la conclusion d'un traité de commerce. Ran-Bahadur-Sah succomba sous les coups de son frère. Son fils, Girban-Juddha-Vikrama-San, régna vingt ans (1797-1817). On le représente comme un adorateur de Viṣṇu et un soutien du brahmanisme. Nous avons déjà dit que les Gorkhas ne sont pas bouddhistes, leur religion est l'hindouïsme. Le nouveau roi était doux et pacifique; néanmoins, il ne put éviter la guerre avec les Anglais, à propos du Teraï, mais il les battit, et pourtant voulut bien leur permettre de demeurer près de Tambahil (p. 265); c'est ainsi qu'on écrit l'histoire à Kathmandu. On l'écrit un peu différemment à Calcutta et à Cambridge. Les relations du gouvernement de l'Inde anglaise avec le Népâl avaient toujours été difficiles. Un nouveau traité de commerce, signé en 1801, et en vertu duquel la puissance britannique devait avoir un résident au Népâl, fut si mal exécuté, que l'Angleterre le dénonça en 1804; la mésintelligence dura entre les deux États jusqu'à l'explosion de la guerre, en 1814. Les Anglais éprouvèrent d'abord quelques revers; mais à la fin leur victoire, sous la conduite du général Ochterlony, fut complète; le traité de 1816 assura aux Anglais une cession de territoire et le droit d'avoir un résident au Népâl, droit qu'ils ont toujours exercé depuis cette époque. Parmi les faits divers du règne de Girban-Juddha, nous signalerons un sacrifice offert à Guhjeçvarî par un brâhmane; ce sacrifice se composait d'un homme de basse caste, d'une brâhmanî et d'un cheval. Heureusement, la chronique déclare que ce brâhmane était fou. C'est sous ce règne que le grand et habile ministre Bhimasena commença sa carrière. Girban-Juddha-Vikrama-Sah succomba à une épidémie meurtrière de petite vérole et laissa le trône à son fils, Ràjendra-Vikrama-

pelée *mahâmâi*, le choléra (Bisûci), l'explosion de la poudrière de Noakot, et surtout le désastreux tremblement de terre de 1833 (p. 269-270). En 1837, le général Bhimasena, qui était à la tête des affaires depuis plus de vingt ans, fut disgracié; il se coupa la gorge en 1839.

La chronique *Vamçâvalî* ne va pas plus loin; mais le livre de M. Wright nous permet de continuer l'histoire jusqu'à nos jours. En 1847, Râjendra-Vikrama-Sah fut déposé (il vit encore) et remplacé par le roi actuel, Çrî-Surendra-Vikrama-Sâh, dont M. Wright nous donne le portrait (pl. XV). Çrî-Surendra fit une guerre heureuse avec le Tibet, et fut toujours en paix et en amitié avec l'Angleterre. La prospérité de son règne est due au talent de son premier ministre, Jung-Bahadur, homme éminent qui, arrivé au pouvoir par les plus détestables moyens, s'y maintint par la plus grande habileté et la plus grande sagesse. Il nous semble à propos d'esquisser ici cette brillante carrière.

Jung Bahadur avait sept frères; il était fils d'un kâjî, et neveu de Matabar-Singh, neveu lui-même du fameux ministre Bhimasena. Entraîné dans la ruine de son oncle, Matabar-Singh, après une sorte d'exil, était rentré au Népâl et s'était élevé au premier rang, après avoir fait périr les ennemis de Bhimasena qui étaient aussi les siens. Les progrès de son neveu, Jung Bahadur, nommé colonel en 1844, l'inquiétaient, et il n'avait que trop de raisons de s'en défier; car, en 1845, Jung Bahadur, ayant gagné la confiance d'une des rânîs, assassina Matabar-Singh, et mit le crime sur le compte du roi, qui eut l'ineptie de s'en vanter; la vérité fut connue plus tard. L'année suivante, le chef du nouveau ministère qui, cependant, avait la confiance de la rânî, fut assassiné, et, à la suite de ce meurtre, il y eut un massacre de ministres et de grands personnages, au nombre de trente-deux, sans compter une centaine de gens de moindre état qui périrent dans cette boucherie (p. 57-58). Tout avait été concerté entre la rânî, qui n'eut

mêmes procédés de trente-deux serdars (officiers supérieurs) qui voulaient lui résister, exila la rânî, sa complice, à Bénarès, déposa le roi qui vécut depuis en prison, et mit sur le trône le roi actuel qui fut toujours son très-obéissant souverain. Pour mieux s'assurer le pouvoir, Jung Bahadur eut soin de contracter lui-même et de faire contracter aux membres de sa famille des mariages importants qui missent dans ses intérêts tout ce qu'il y a de notable au Népâl. Aussi jouit-il paisiblement du pouvoir jusqu'à sa mort, malgré quelques tentatives pour le renverser, tentatives dont l'insuccès ne fit que mieux démontrer sa solidité.

Ce pouvoir acquis et conservé par des moyens tout orientaux, Jung Bahadur l'exerça quasi à l'européenne, d'une manière intelligente, dans un esprit de progrès et avec un sentiment vrai des intérêts et des besoins du pays. Il eut toujours soin de s'appuyer sur l'alliance anglaise, et, dès 1848, il offrit à ses voisins du Sud, engagés dans une guerre contre les Séikhs, un concours qui ne fut pas agréé, mais qui était un témoignage clair et certain de ses excellentes dispositions. Un voyage à Londres, exécuté en 1850, en fut une nouvelle preuve et exerça sur lui la plus heureuse influence. Une des conséquences immédiates de cette exploration lointaine fut la révision du code criminel, l'adoucissement des peines et beaucoup d'autres réformes, entre autres, les mesures prises pour entraver les sacrifices des veuves. Ne pouvant les interdire absolument, il déclara que celles de ces malheureuses qui auraient de jeunes enfants ne seraient pas admises aux honneurs du bûcher, et que celles qui, au dernier moment, reviendraient sur leur décision, pourraient y renoncer sans être lapidées, comme cela se faisait autrefois. Ce furent sans doute ces tendances réformatrices qui motivèrent les tentatives faites en 1851, 1852 et 1853 pour renverser Jung Bahadur; le frère du roi et un de ceux du premier ministre étaient entrés dans le premier complot; ils furent détenus à Allahabad, dans l'Inde anglaise, et rappelés plus tard par le gouvernement népâlais

des mœurs et la force du pouvoir de Jung-Bahadur. De 1854 à 1856, le Népâl fut en guerre avec le Tibet, à cause des vexations qu'éprouvait, en traversant ce dernier pays, l'ambassade envoyée tous les cinq ans par le Népâl à l'empereur de Chine. Le traité qui mit fin aux hostilités assujettit le Tibet à payer un tribut annuel de 25,000 francs, à consentir la réduction des droits imposés sur les marchandises venant du Népâl et à admettre la résidence d'un officier gorkha à Lha-Sa. Les Népâlais avaient donc eu l'avantage dans cette guerre, mais ils l'avaient acheté par de grandes souffrances; les vivres leur avaient souvent manqué. Entre autres mesures adoptées pour obvier aux difficultés de l'approvisionnement, Jung Bahadur avait fait déclarer par l'autorité religieuse que les yaks (bœufs grognants du Tibet) sont des daims et non des bœufs, qu'ainsi les Hindous orthodoxes peuvent en manger sans scrupule (p. 61).

Dès qu'éclata la grande insurrection de 1857, le ministre népâlais offrit de faire marcher ses troupes contre les révoltés. L'offre fut déclinée; si elle eût été acceptée, le massacre de Cawnpore n'eût sans doute pas eu lieu (p. 61). A la fin, les Népâlais vinrent se joindre aux troupes anglaises, qu'ils renforcèrent de douze mille hommes et de vingt-quatre canons. Les frais de l'expédition furent payés par le gouvernement britannique, et un terrain productif de la région du Teraï fut cédé au Népâl. Les rebelles fugitifs avaient trouvé un asile au Népâl, après la répression du soulèvement (parmi eux était le fameux Nana Sahib qui serait mort de la fièvre dans le Teraï, sans qu'on ait la certitude du fait); ces misérables furent expulsés par d'énergiques mesures du premier ministre.

Malgré cette étroite alliance avec l'Angleterre, le Népâl resta fermé aux Européens sous l'administration de Jung Bahadur : ce n'est pas qu'il fût personnellement hostile à des relations plus faciles avec eux; au contraire, il y était favorable; mais sur ce point, comme sur bien d'autres, et plus encore sur celui-là que sur tout le reste, il lui fallait compter avec les préjugés de ses compatriotes. Un traité pour l'extradition des

jamais rien de sérieux ne fut fait pour ouvrir aux Européens l'accès du pays. Quand les frères Schlagintweit demandèrent, en 1855, à y pénétrer pour se livrer à des observations scientifiques, ils essuyèrent un refus formel; en 1856, néanmoins, l'un d'eux put profiter de la tolérance accordée aux Européens de séjourner dans la capitale et aux environs, dans un rayon de quinze milles. A part cette exception, « le Népâl est resté une *terra incognita*, comme lorsque le colonel Kirckpatrick le visita, il y a cent ans (p. 66). »

Jung Bahadur avait reçu de nombreux honneurs. En 1856, le roi lui avait donné le titre de mahârâja et avait épousé une de ses sœurs. Le gouvernement anglais l'avait créé G. C. B. en 1857, à cause des services rendus lors de l'insurrection, puis G. C. S. L. en 1875. L'empereur de Chine l'avait décoré du titre de Thong-lin-pim-ma-ko-kang-wang-syân (p. 66 et 288), c'est-à-dire « chef de l'armée, le plus brave dans toutes les entreprises, parfait en toutes choses, maître de l'armée, mahârâja ». Jung Bahadur qui, en 1875, avait encore tenté un second voyage en Angleterre, dont un accident le détourna, mourut en février 1877, chargé de gloire et d'honneurs, mais non d'années, car il n'avait guère plus de soixante ans.

Je venais de recevoir le livre de M. Wright et je regardais le beau portrait en pied de Jung Bahadur qui en forme la première planche, lorsque mes regards tombèrent sur un entre-filet du journal *Le Temps* du 10 avril 1877, que je crois devoir reproduire ici textuellement.

« Les journaux des Indes nous apportent quelques détails sur la mort de sir Jung Bahadur. Le célèbre allié de l'Angleterre a été trouvé inanimé sur les bords d'un cours d'eau, à Bagonuttee, au sortir d'un bain. Les trois principales ranées, son frère et son fils ont été immédiatement appelés pour constater le décès. Les funérailles ont eu lieu le 1er mars. Après avoir annoncé leur intention de se sacrifier, les ranées ont donné l'ordre d'élever un immense bûcher de bois de sandal et de résine; elles ont pris ensuite un bain et fait des présents considérables aux brahmines. Avant de mourir, elles ont

voulu encore charger leur beau-frère de l'exécution de diverses mesures à prendre en vue du maintien du bon gouvernement du pays et de la paix, et mettre en liberté quelques prisonniers. Elles sont entrées dans le bûcher, sans manifester la moindre émotion et en récitant des prières. Le corps a été placé sur le dos; l'aînée des ranées a pris la tête de Jung Bahadur sur ses genoux, et les deux autres les pieds. Après cette cérémonie, les trois princesses, dont les regards ne quittaient plus le cadavre, ont été entourées de combustibles odoriférants, puis le feu a été mis au bûcher par le fils du défunt. Quelques minutes après, il ne restait plus du bûcher que des cendres. De grands efforts avaient été faits, mais inutilement, comme on le voit, pour détourner les trois ranées de leur sinistre projet. »

Un mot d'abord sur une petite inexactitude qui se trouve au début de ce récit. Au lieu de « sur les bords d'un cours d'eau, à Bagonuttee », il faut évidemment lire « sur les bords du cours d'eau Bâgmatî »; car M. Wright nous dit : « A un mille au S. E. de Kathmandu est Thâtapali, résidence de Jung Bahadur. C'est une immense construction ou plutôt une rangée de constructions, située près du bord septentrional de la Bâgmatî, juste à l'endroit où elle est traversée par un pont conduisant à Pattan » (p. 13). Maintenant, nous nous bornerons à une simple réflexion sur ce récit de funérailles : voilà les obsèques d'un ministre qui, pendant près de trente ans, a cherché à faire disparaître les sacrifices des veuves; trois femmes s'y donnent en holocauste. On voit par là s'il est facile de déraciner les coutumes les plus révoltantes, et combien il faut lutter pour faire pénétrer le bon sens et la raison dans des esprits gâtés par des superstitions séculaires.

Le frère de sir Jung Bahadur a pris sa place dans le poste qu'il occupait, et rien n'est venu nous donner lieu de croire que la mort de l'homme éminent qui a dirigé si longtemps les affaires du Népâl ait amené des désordres ou troublé le régime qu'il avait inauguré.

England in Indien.

Von

Th. Marx,
Königl. Reallehrer in Speyer.

Hamburg.
Verlagsanstalt und Druckerei A.-G. (vormals J. F. Richter),
Königliche Hofbuchdruckerei.
1895.

Das Recht der Ueberſetzung in fremde Sprachen wird vorbehalten.

Druck der Verlagsanſtalt und Druckerei A.-G. (vorm. J. F. Richter) in Hamburg.
Königliche Hofbuchdruckerei.

„Fate looks after the Indian Empire
because it is so big and so helpless.“
Rudyard Kipling.

Indien[1] bildet gleich Italien eine Halbinsel mit zwei langgestreckten Seeküsten und einem mächtigen Gebirgswall, der dieselbe im Norden gegen das Festland hin abschließt. Obwohl das Ganze einen einheitlichen Eindruck hervorruft, wäre doch nichts irrthümlicher, als die Annahme, Indien bilde ein Land.[2] Vielmehr ist es als ein selbständiger Kontinent zu betrachten, wie etwa Europa oder Afrika; giebt es doch in den einheimischen Sprachen nicht einmal einen gemeinsamen Namen dafür. Hindostan, wie es oft genannt wird, ist ein persisches Wort, das eigentlich nur die obere Gangesebene bezeichnet.

In physikalischer Beziehung zerfällt Indien in mehrere scharf voneinander getrennte Theile. Das nördliche Gebirgsland, das die höchsten Gipfel der Welt enthält, gehört in seiner Gesamtheit nicht zu Indien, so wenig wie die Alpen zu Italien. Das eigentliche Indien, der Sitz seiner dichtesten Bevölkerung und seines größten natürlichen Reichthums, besteht aus der ungeheuren Ebene, die sich zu Füßen des Himalaya ausdehnt und von den Flußsystemen des Indus und Ganges bewässert wird, mit Delhi als historischem Centrum. Hier ließen sich zuerst die halbmythischen Arier nieder, hier lebte, lehrte und starb Gautama

Buddha, hier schufen sich die muhammedanischen Dynastien ihre Reiche, hier wurde der letzte Kampf der Engländer um die Herrschaft in Indien gefochten, und hier, in Delhi, wurde schließlich die Königin Viktoria als Kaiserin von Indien ausgerufen. Wer die große Ebene von Peshawer (Peschauer) bis Calcutta hält, ist Herr der ganzen Halbinsel.

Südlich von dieser Ebene erhebt sich ein Tafelland — das Deccan oder Südland, das sich vom Ganges bis zum Kap Comorin erstreckt. Auf beiden Seiten wird das Deccan, den Küsten entlang, von fruchtbaren Niederungen umsäumt, welche die Verbindung mit dem Meere vermitteln. Obgleich dieses Tafelland die größere Hälfte der Halbinsel darstellt, spielte es doch nur eine untergeordnete Rolle in der Geschichte und war von jeher in viele kleine, unabhängige, stets einander feindliche Reiche getheilt.

Wenn wir die Halbinsel in die beiden genannten großen Theile zerlegen, so haben wir damit nur die allerallgemeinsten Umrisse gewonnen; denn jeder Theil bietet wieder in sich die größen Verschiedenheiten dar. Die Sandwüste des Sind trägt einen ganz anderen Charakter, als das nördlich davon gelegene Punjab; die Nordwestprovinzen und Oudh bieten wieder ganz andere Lebensbedingungen, als Bengalen, dieses wieder andere, als das schwach bewässerte Deccan, und in diesem wiederum zeigen die Küstenstriche weder Aehnlichkeiten unter sich, noch mit dem eigentlichen Tafelland.

Dieser Mannigfaltigkeit in physikalischer Beziehung entsprechen auch die ethnographischen Verhältnisse, aber nicht in der Weise, daß beide sich decken und einander entsprechen. Im Gegentheil. Gerade wie Indien nicht als ein Land aufgefaßt werden darf, sondern als eine Vielheit von Ländern, so begreifen auch seine vielen Länder nicht gesonderte Nationalitäten in sich. Vielmehr bildet die Bevölkerung in ethnologischer Hinsicht ein

fast unentwirrbares Gemisch, in das auch heute noch nur wenig klare Einsicht besteht, dank dem ungeheuer großen und äußerst komplizirten Material, das zu bewältigen ist. Mit einiger Sicherheit steht das Folgende fest:

Die Nachkommen der Urbevölkerung haben wir vermuthlich vor uns in den Bergstämmen des Centrums der Halbinsel. Im allgemeinen gehören sie dem Negritotypus an und sind alle geborene Jäger; aber die meisten von ihnen betreiben auch den Ackerbau. Man schätzt ihre Zahl auf 20—30 Millionen.

Die Brüder dieser halbwilden Stämme, die in der Ebene wohnten, wurden durch die einströmenden Fremden nicht ausgerottet, sondern nur unterworfen. Sie bilden jetzt die Sudras oder untersten Kasten im sozialen System der Hindus und sitzen vornehmlich in Niederbengalen, sowie in den Präsidentschaften Bombay und Madras. Aus ihnen rekrutiren sich in ganz Indien, mit Ausnahme des Nordwestens, die Ackerbauer, Handwerker und Arbeiter. Die Gesamtzahl dieser untersten Kasten — Hindus und Muhammedaner — beläuft sich auf etwa 200 Millionen, oder vier Fünftel der Totalbevölkerung.

Sehr schwer ist eine Schätzung des arischen Elements. Es findet sich mehr oder weniger mit der vorerwähnten Klasse vermischt, besonders mit dem Theile, der im Norden ansässig ist; sicherlich hat es der Masse der Bevölkerung Sprache und Civilisation gegeben. Aber in Bezug auf Reinheit des Blutes finden wir die ungemischten Arier nur noch in der priesterlichen Kaste der Brahmanen. Helle Hautfarbe, anmuthige Gestalt, geistige Ueberlegenheit verrathen zu gleicher Zeit den Eingewanderten und den Eroberer. Wenn das Kastenwesen weiter nichts gethan hat, so hat es doch durch drei Jahrtausende einen Menschenschlag rein erhalten, trotz aller Einwirkungen des Klimas, des Bodens, wie aller politischen Wechselfälle. Die Brahmanen sind die Aristokraten Indiens und leben unter den stets gleichen

Verhältnissen in allen Theilen des Landes, im höchsten Norden, wie im tiefsten Süden; am häufigsten sind sie in der Nähe der heiligen Stadt Benares anzutreffen. Sie zählen etwa 10 Millionen. Mit den Brahmanen beanspruchen die Rajputen die Prärogative, „zweimal geboren" zu sein. Ueber den Ursprung der Rajputen oder „Königssöhne" ist nichts bekannt, außer daß sie immer eine herrschende Klasse waren. Heute sitzen sie am dichtesten in den Nordwestprovinzen und in Oudh. In den Eingeborenenstaaten, die nach ihnen benannt sind (Rajputana), bilden sie nur das herrschende Element unter Anführern, die ihre Abstammung auf die Sonne und den Mond zurückführen. Die Rajputen zählen ungefähr 6 Millionen.

Zur Vervollständigung dieser ethnographischen Skizze der indischen Völkerschaften muß noch zweier oder dreier Elemente in Kürze gedacht werden. Die zahlreichen dravidischen Stämme im Süden und die kriegerischen Mahratten, die in dem Gebirge hinter Bombay ihren Wohnsitz haben, mögen nur genannt sein. Ueber ihren Ursprung ist absolut nichts bekannt; es sind hinduisirte Eingeborene. Aber zwei andere Stämme, die bisher nicht erwähnt wurden, haben innerhalb der historischen Zeiten einen gewaltigen Einfluß in Indien ausgeübt. Es sind dies die muhammedanischen Eindringlinge, die vom Nordwesten her in das Land einbrachen, und die indochinesischen Schwärme, die aus dem Nordosten kamen. Die muhammedanischen Eroberer gehörten verschiedenen Stämmen an — es waren Araber, Afghanen, Mongolen, Perser und andere. Die meisten dieser wurden entweder von der eingeborenen Bevölkerung allmählich aufgesogen oder blieben in kleinen Gruppen inmitten derselben isolirt. Die Afghanen allein, in Indien unter dem Namen Pathanen bekannt, scheinen fähig gewesen zu sein, sich ihre Nationalität bis zu einem gewissen Grade zu wahren. Sie sitzen natürlich am dichtesten längs der Grenze des unabhängigen Afghanistan.

Stämme indo-chinesischer Abkunft wurden theils durch stärkere Gegner, theils durch den Himalaya vor einem weiteren Vordringen in das eigentliche Indien abgehalten. Sie bevölkern hauptsächlich die Provinz Assam.

Wie in ethnographischer, so herrscht auch in religiöser Hinsicht ein buntes Gemenge. Die Mehrzahl der Einwohner, etwa 208 Millionen, bekennt sich zur Religion Brahmas; Muselmänner giebt es ungefähr 57 Millionen, Sikhs 2 Millionen. Gegenüber der Anzahl der Anhänger dieser Religionen verschwinden die des Parsismus (90 000), des Christenthums, des Judenthums und anderer Bekenntnisse. Das Christenthum zählt beiläufig $1^1/_2$ Millionen Bekenner, von denen 13 Fünfzehntel dem Katholizismus angehören.[3]

Eine, wenn auch noch so gedrängte, Uebersicht über die gesamte historische Entwickelung Indiens würde hier zu weit führen. Die geschichtliche Betrachtung kann erst an dem Punkte einsetzen, wo Indien mit dem modernen Europa in Beziehung trat, und nur in Umrissen die Ereignisse zeichnen, die es in Verbindung mit England brachten.

Vasco de Gama landete im Jahre 1498 in Calicut, und die Portugiesen waren ein ganzes Jahrhundert die europäische Macht, die sich des Monopols des indischen Handels erfreute. Ihnen folgten die Holländer, die es aber weniger auf das Festland, als auf die gewürztragenden Inseln des indischen Ozeans abgesehen hatten. Am letzten Tage des Jahres 1600 erhielt die ein Jahr vorher gegründete Ostindische Handelscompagnie ihren Freibrief. Die Absicht der Londoner Kaufleute war, die Holländer aus ihren Besitzungen zu vertreiben. Dies gelang ihnen jedoch nicht, und so setzten sie sich im Jahre 1639 auf dem Kontinente fest und bildeten dort die erste englische Niederlassung, das Fort St. George, das heutige Madras. Von einem eingeborenen Häuptling erlangten sie die Erlaubniß, diese

Besitzung zu befestigen. Die Insel Bombay erhielt Karl II. als Theil der Mitgift seiner Frau, einer portugiesischen Prinzessin, im Jahre 1661; Fort William, das heutige Calcutta, wurde im Jahre 1686 erbaut. Allein die territoriale Macht Englands entsprang erst seiner Rivalität mit Frankreich. Dupleix, der französische Gouverneur von Pondicherry, war zwar nicht der Erste, der einsah, daß der Zusammenbruch der Herrschaft der Moguls einer europäischen Macht die Gelegenheit zu bieten vermöge, auf ihren Trümmern ein neues Reich zu gründen; das erkannte Leibnitz schon im Jahre 1672. Wohl aber war er der erste, der die Küste verließ, um den Krieg ins Innere des Landes zu tragen, und der Eingeborene gegen Eingeborene ausspielte.[4] Seine geistreichen Pläne wurden jedoch durch die überlegene Kraft Clives vereitelt, der die Franzosen aus dem Süden der Halbinsel vertrieb und Bengalen durch die Schlacht von Plassey (1757) eroberte. Dem Beispiele Dupleix' folgend, suchte Clive durch die vorhandenen muhammedanischen Fürsten zu regieren und erwarb dazu die schriftliche Ermächtigung von seiten des Großmoguls im Jahre 1765. Der Nachfolger Clives, der erste Generalgouverneur von ganz Indien, Warren Hastings (1772—1785), dessen Genie sich bald in allen Zweigen der Verwaltung Bahn brach, führte ein europäisches Regierungssystem ein. Lord Cornwallis (1786—1793) organisirte die Verwaltung; der Marquis of Wellesley (1798—1803) bezwang Tippu und führte das System der Subsidienverträge mit den eingeborenen Mächten ein, welches System die Engländer zu Herren von ganz Indien machte. Lord Bentinck (1828—1835) hat das Verdienst, den Versuch gemacht zu haben, den Prinzipien der Humanität im Verkehr mit den Eingeborenen einen breiteren Boden zu verschaffen. Dieses Bestreben wurde fortgesetzt von Lord Dalhousie (1848—1856), nur auf andere

und die eingeborene so schlecht, daß man keine Gelegenheit verlieren dürfte, um die erstere auf Kosten der letzteren zu befestigen. Wie die Eingeborenen dies aufnahmen, zeigte der Aufstand im Jahre 1857, welcher eine neue Epoche in der englischen Geschichte einleitet. Die Ostindische Compagnie brach unter dem Aufstand zusammen, die Regierung Indiens wurde durch Parlamentsakte im Jahre 1858 der Krone anvertraut, und mit der Ausrufung der Königin von England zur Kaiserin von Indien (Kaisar-i-Hind) am 1. Januar 1877 wurde die immerwährende Zugehörigkeit Indiens zu England aller Welt proklamirt.

Dieses ungeheure Land mit seinen beinahe 300 Millionen Einwohnern ist also heute England unterthan. Durch das Schwert gewonnen, ruht die britische Herrschaft über Indien auf keinem anderen Rechtstitel, als dem der Gewalt,[5] wenn man nicht die Fiktion aufrechterhalten will, daß, wie früher die Ostindische Handelscompagnie, jetzt die Königin oder vielmehr Kaiserin von Indien als Erbfolgerin des Großmoguls zu gelten hat.

Politisch wird Indien in zwei scharf zu scheidende Theile getrennt: in die britischen Territorien und in die eingeborenen Staaten. Die ersteren werden direkt durch englische Beamte verwaltet, ihre Bewohner allein sind Unterthanen der Königin von England. Die eingeborenen Staaten werden auch Vasallenstaaten (feudatory states) genannt, um so ihre losen Beziehungen zur englischen Krone zu bezeichnen. Diese Beziehungen genau zu definiren, dürfte unmöglich sein. Zu verschiedenen Zeiten entstanden, durch verschiedene Methoden herbeigeführt, variiren sie zwischen halber Unabhängigkeit und vollständiger Unterwerfung. Einige Fürsten sind die Repräsentanten derjenigen, die zur Zeit der Ankunft der Engländer herrschten; andere wurden durch diese erst geschaffen; mit einigen

wurden, als mit gleichwerthigen Mächten, Verträge geschlossen; andere nahmen ihre Bestallung als Vasallen aus den Händen des Oberherrn entgegen; mit einigen wurden schriftliche Uebereinkommen getroffen, mit anderen nicht; einige zahlen Tribut, andere nicht. Wie ihr politischer Status, variirt auch ihre Macht und ihr Gebiet: der Nizam von Hyderabad herrscht über ein Reich von 80 000 (englischen) Quadratmeilen mit 10 Millionen Einwohnern; einige der kleinen Häuptlinge von Kathiawar schwingen das Scepter über ein paar Hufen Landes.

Die Zahl dieser eingeborenen Fürsten wird verschieden angegeben: die obengenannte Halbinsel Kathiawar (nördlich von Bombay) besitzt davon fast 200; Manche reden von im ganzen 600, Andere gar von mehr als 1000. Die Art der Verträge mit ihnen ist ebenso bunt und mannigfaltig, wie ihre Menge. Jedoch hat sich im Laufe der Zeit ein allgemeiner Typus herausgebildet, dessen Merkmale also charakterisirt werden können:

In erster Linie haben alle eingeborenen Fürsten das Recht verloren, Krieg zu führen und Frieden zu schließen, sowie Gesandte zu einander oder zu einem auswärtigen Staat zu schicken. Dieses oberste Zeichen der Souveränität wohnt einzig und allein der britischen Macht inne, die dafür den Frieden auf der Halbinsel garantirt. Als zweites und aus dem ersten fließendes Merkmal gilt, daß allen einheimischen Fürsten, mit Ausnahme eines einzigen, verboten ist, eine über eine festgesetzte Zahl hinausgehende militärische Macht zu unterhalten; auch darf kein Europäer sich in einem Eingeborenenstaat aufhalten ohne Genehmigung der Engländer. Drittens wird ein gewisses Maß von guter Regierung verlangt bei Strafe der temporären oder dauernden Entthronung des Fürsten. (Als Beispiel für dieses Prinzip mögen die Verordnungen gegen die Witwenverbrennung

ist, wie in England selbst, die Krone die Quelle aller Ehren, und die Fürsten sind stolz darauf, unter die Ritter des „Stern von Indien" gezählt oder in der Liste der englischen Generale geführt zu werden. Von den erwähnten Einschränkungen abgesehen, besitzen die mächtigeren einheimischen Fürsten fast alle Prärogative der Souveränität: sie können Gesetze erlassen, die Todesstrafe verhängen und aufheben, eine bestimmte Zahl Soldaten anwerben, Geld prägen, Steuern erheben. Sie führen den Titel „Königliche Hoheit" und unterstehen nicht der gemeinen englischen Gerichtsbarkeit. Was nun das äußere Band anlangt, das die einheimischen Staaten mit der englischen Obermacht verknüpft, so giebt es hierfür keine einheitlich geregelte Methode. Die meisten der größeren Staaten verkehren direkt mit der Regierung, andere ressortiren von den Gouverneuren der Provinzen, innerhalb deren sie liegen; wieder andere können nur direkt mit dem Distriktsvorsteher verkehren. Aber in allen großen Hauptstädten und an gewissen Orten, um welche herum mehrere kleine Staaten gruppirt sind, ist ein britischer Beamter unter dem Namen Resident oder Agent stationirt, der alle politischen Fäden in seiner Hand hält und zugleich Gesandter und Kontrolleur ist. Seine Aufgabe ist, die suzeräne Macht zu repräsentiren, ein wachsames Auge auf alle Mißbräuche zu halten und Reformen zu ermuthigen. Aber er tritt nie nominell als Minister oder Rathgeber auf; und wenn er einmal einen Rath ertheilt, so steht ihm kein Mittel zu Gebote, demselben Eingang zu verschaffen, wiewohl Macaulay recht haben mag, wenn er meint, daß der Resident seine Befehle in der Form von Rathschlägen ertheilt.[6] Seine Stellung verlangt viel Geschicklichkeit und Takt, zumal ihm das glückliche Gedeihen des Staates, bei dem er beglaubigt ist, nicht zu Gunsten geschrieben wird, während die Mißregierung in demselben ihm in gewissem Grade zur Last fällt.

Als Muster eines Eingeborenenstaates mag Mysore angeführt werden, das von einem durch englische Lehrer herangebildeten Prinzen beherrscht wird, welches Experiment hier zum ersten Male ausgeführt wird, und zwar zur vollen Zufriedenheit aller Betheiligten. Der Maharajah[7] regiert mit Hülfe einer Volksvertretung, die alljährlich in seiner Hauptstadt zusammentritt, bei welcher Gelegenheit der eingeborene Premierminister ausführlichen Bericht über das abgelaufene Verwaltungsjahr erstattet. In der am 4. Oktober 1892 abgelegten Rechenschaft wird hervorgehoben, wie die Einnahmen sich vermehrt, ja einen Ueberschuß ergeben haben, und zwar nicht durch vermehrte, direkte Belastung des Volkes, sondern aus den Ergebnissen des Goldbergbaues, der Forstwirthschaft, der Eisenbahnen und des regulirten Schanksystems. Dem durch Mißernte herbeigeführten Mangel wurde abgeholfen, so daß kein Fall von Hungertod vorkam, wie überhaupt die Sterblichkeitsziffer unter der der letzten fünf Jahre blieb. Die Zahl der Schulen wurde erheblich vermehrt und besonderes Augenmerk der weiblichen Erziehung zugewendet. „In den Prüfungen für den höheren Staatsdienst," sagt der Minister, „werden höhere Anforderungen gestellt, als in den indischen Universitäten." Eine staatliche Lebensversicherung wurde organisirt, die in der kurzen Zeit ihres Bestehens von mehreren Monaten für 341 525 Rupien Policen ausgegeben hat. Den Tempeln und den damit in Verbindung stehenden Wohlthätigkeitsanstalten wurde erhöhte Sorgfalt zugewendet, besonders in der Zuführung von Luft und Licht. Die schwierige Frage der Kinderheirathen wurde in Angriff genommen und, wie der zwei Jahre jüngere Verwaltungsbericht bestätigt, erfolgreich gelöst. Kein Wunder, daß der Vizekönig Lord Lansdowne bei seinem Besuch in Mysore seine größte Zufriedenheit mit dem Wahrgenommenen äußerte und erklärte, daß die Centralregierung die Vorgänge in Mysore mit ganz besonderem Interesse verfolge.

Die zweite der Hälften, in welche Indien in administrativer Hinsicht zerlegt wird, steht direkt unter britischer Verwaltung. Diese Verwaltung ist eine der größten Anomalien, die die Geschichte uns kennen lehrt, eine der riesigsten Aufgaben, welche je eine Nation übernommen. Das römische Reich war größer an Ausdehnung, China mag mehr Einwohner zählen, als Indien; allein in keinem Falle finden wir eine herrschende Rasse von Fremden, deren Heimath in so weiter Ferne jenseits der See liegt. Denken wir uns Europa mit seinen vielen Völkern, Sprachen, Religionen und mannigfaltigen Gesittungen von Japan aus regiert, und wir haben ungefähr ein analoges Verhältniß. Daß ein Regierungssystem, auf solcher Basis aufgebaut, in seinen Einzelheiten nicht immer einer strengen Kritik Stand halten kann, versteht sich von selbst. Allein es ist unmöglich, nicht von Bewunderung erfüllt zu werden für die Art und Weise, wie England seiner selbstauferlegten Aufgabe Genüge leistete, und für die Hingabe und Tüchtigkeit Derer, die sie ausführten und noch ausführen.

Die indische Verwaltungsmaschine ist äußerst komplizirt. Das Wort „Verwaltung" schon bedeutet in Indien etwas ganz anderes als in Deutschland oder, noch mehr, als in England, in welch letzterem der Staat kein anderes Geschäft betreibt, wenn man so sagen darf, als das der Posten und Telegraphen. Während sich in Europa die Verwaltung mehr oder weniger auf die Oberaufsicht beschränkt, greift sie dort in alle Verhältnisse ein.[8] Das gesamte öffentliche Leben, alles, was nicht reine Privatsache ist, untersteht dort der Regierung. Der Begriff „Bürger" hat keine Geltung; öffentliche Pflichten existiren nicht; die Gesamtheit der Individuen bildet nichts als eine große Herde unter der Aufsicht eines Exekutivbeamten — der Zukunftsstaat unserer Sozialdemokraten ist in einer Hinsicht hier verwirklicht.[9] Dem war zwar nicht immer so. Allein es

ſcheint, daß das jetzige Syſtem dem Gefühl der Verantwortlichkeit entſprang, das auf den engliſchen Behörden laſtete. Beim Vergleich der europäiſchen mit der indiſchen Civiliſation ſtellten dieſe ein Ideal auf, das weniger den wirklichen Verhältniſſen als einem Reich Utopien entnommen zu ſein ſchien. Deswegen waren es gerade die thätigſten Reformer unter den maßgebenden Engländern in Indien, die ſtets die vermehrte Einmiſchung des Staates verlangten; ſie alle (wie Munro in Madras, Thomaſon in den Nordweſtprovinzen, Lawrence im Punjab) glaubten das Los des Volkes günſtiger zu geſtalten dadurch, daß ſie Pflichten und Aufgaben der Regierung vermehrten. Daher kommt es, daß, wie geſagt, die Regierungsmaſchine ſo komplizirt iſt, daß ſie nur ſehr ſchwer verſtanden werden kann und daß ſie überdies von dem Volke mehr als Laſt, denn als Wohlthat empfunden wird; das letztere deswegen, weil ſie auf Theorien beruht, die unſerer weſtlichen Civiliſation entnommen ſind, und für welche die Orientalen weder Verſtändniß haben, noch Verlangen tragen, eine Thatſache, die den Engländern ſchon viel zu denken und zu thun gab und noch giebt, wie dies die jüngſten Vorgänge in Behar (Beſchmieren der Mangobäume) und die vorjährigen Unruhen in Poonah zeigen.

Die Adminiſtrationseinheit bildet der Diſtrikt (district), der ungefähr unſerem Regierungsbezirk oder dem franzöſiſchen Departement entſpricht. Allein in dem Maße, als der Begriff „Verwaltung“ in Indien von dem abweicht, was wir darunter verſtehen, in demſelben Maße iſt auch der Diſtrikt verſchieden von ſeinem europäiſchen Gegenbild, und wenn es möglich wäre, eine adäquate Erklärung von allem dem zu geben, was der Begriff „Diſtrikt“ in ſich ſchließt, ſowie von den Obliegenheiten des oberſten Diſtriktsbeamten, ſo wären auch die Geheimniſſe

Die Distrikte weichen an Größe und Bevölkerungszahl sehr voneinander ab. Trotzdem steht an der Spitze eines jeden, des größten, wie des kleinsten, nur ein Beamter, der alle Seiten der Verwaltung repräsentirt. Dieser oberste Beamte führt entweder den Titel Collector (Einnehmer) oder Deputy Commissioner (Vizekommissar), ist entweder direkt dem Gouverneur seiner Provinz oder einem unter diesem stehenden Kommissär verantwortlich und mag selbst wieder viele oder wenige Unterbeamte haben.[10] Wie der Name sagt, sind die Obliegenheiten des „Einnehmers" ursprünglich rein fiskalischer Natur; er erinnert an die Zeiten, da die Hauptaufgabe der Regierung, nach dem Vorbild ihrer muhammedanischen Vorgänger, war, die Steuern anzulegen und einzuziehen. Da nun, wie später ersichtlich sein wird, der Haupttheil der Steuern die Bodensteuer ist, so ist es für den Einnehmer eine Hauptaufgabe, die Bodenbesitzverhältnisse seiner Provinz genau kennen zu lernen — an sich eine Lebensarbeit.[11] Außerdem hat er aber auch richterliche Funktionen; für manche Fälle ist er erstinstanzieller Richter, für andere schlußinstanzieller; für andere wiederum hat er nur das Verfahren einzuleiten. Ihm sind, wie erwähnt, Hülfseinnehmer und Hülfsrichter unterstellt, deren Zahl nach der Größe des Distrikts wechselt; die Hauptverantwortlichkeit lastet natürlich auf ihm. Der „Einnehmer" ist also Regierungspräsident, Richter und Obereinnehmer in einer Person. Allein während er in früheren Zeiten ein selbständiger kleiner Despot in seinem Bezirk war und alles von seiner Initiative abhing, hat sich dies mit der Centralisirung der Regierung geändert: er ist nur mehr noch ein Rad in der Maschine; an die Stelle der freien Charakterentwicklung ist bei ihm, wie bei der übrigen Beamtenschaft, die offizielle Pflicht getreten.[12] Durch diese Centralisirung wurde die Aufgabe des Collectors noch erhöht. Will die Centralregierung Ver-

besserungen eintreten lassen, so hat er die Mittel zu beschaffen; wünscht sie Informationen, so hat er sie zu geben; unter einem Gesichtspunkt ist er der Leiter der lokalen Verwaltungsmaschine, andererseits ist er nur der Chef eines Heeres von Beamten. Zu seinen angeführten Obliegenheiten gesellt sich noch die Verantwortlichkeit für Polizei, Gefängnisse, Schulen, Straßen. Ueber alles seinen Distrikt Betreffende muß er Auskunft zu geben wissen, — über Kasten, Ernten, Fabriken, Handels- und Verkehrsverhältnisse, Wälder und wilde Thiere. Nie und nirgends vielleicht hat es einen Beamten gegeben dessen Verantwortung so schwer und dessen Pflichten so mannigfaltig sind, wie die eines indischen Collectors.

Wie der Distrikt die kleinste, so ist die Provinz die größte Verwaltungseinheit.[13] An ihrer Spitze steht der Provinzialgouverneur, der sozusagen Niemanden über sich hat, obwohl er in der Theorie dem Vizekönig untersteht. Er ist gewissermaßen ein Oberbefehlshaber in Civil, dem in seinem Sekretariat eine Art von Generalstab zur Seite steht. Und ein Autokrat muß er sein. Denn während für das ganze indische Reich wohl ein einheitlicher Kriminalkodex existirt und außerdem ein einheitliches Civilprozeßverfahren vorhanden ist, so wechseln doch die administrativen Systeme mit jeder Provinz, da diese die bunteste Mannigfaltigkeit in Bezug auf Rassen, Religionen, gesellschaftliche Einrichtungen und geschichtliche Ueberlieferungen in sich schließen. Der Charakter des Gouverneurs drückt sich seiner ganzen Provinz auf und kann den Fortschritt hemmen oder beschleunigen; von ihm hängt das Wohl und Wehe von Millionen ab. — Dem Gouverneur zur Seite steht, wie gesagt, das Sekretariat, oder, wie wir sagen würden, ein Rathskollegium. Die Sekretäre sind die Vollzugsorgane des Gouverneurs; durch sie vermittelt er seine Befehle an die untergebenen Distriktsbeamten; ihnen obliegt es, die eingehenden

Berichte dieser zu bearbeiten und ihrem Chef vorzulegen; schöpferisch greifen sie in die Verwaltung nicht ein.

Nachdem nun ein, wenn auch flüchtiger, Einblick in das Innere des indischen Verwaltungsapparates gewonnen, geziemt es, auch das Aeußere der Betrachtung zu unterwerfen.

Die heutige politische Verfassung Indiens ist das Ergebniß einer Reihe von Parlamentsakten, die in dem Gesetz von 1858 gipfeln, welches die Regierung Indiens der Ostindischen Compagnie abnahm und der Krone übertrug. Kraft dieses Gesetzes wird Indien von der Königin regiert und in deren Namen von einem Minister, dem ein Rath zur Seite steht. Dadurch, daß dieser Minister dem Kabinett angehören und in einem der beiden Häuser des Parlaments sitzen muß, während sein Unterstaaatssekretär Mitglied des anderen ist, ist ausgesprochen, daß er dem Parlament von Großbritannien und Irland verantwortlich ist, so daß man sagen kann: der eigentliche Souverän Indiens, wie Englands selbst, ist das Parlament, da es ja das indische Budget im allgemeinen zu verbescheiden hat und im besonderen Indien diejenigen Lasten auferlegen kann, die erforderlich sind, um Kriege jenseits seiner Grenzen zu führen. Der formelle Beherrscher Indiens ist jedoch der Minister, welcher an Stelle der Königin-Kaiserin handelt, während andererseits das Gesamtkabinett sich in die Verantwortlichkeit theilt, wie denn auch, zum Beweis hierfür, nicht der Minister für Indien, sondern der Premier den Vizekönig ernennt und der Oberbefehlshaber der indischen Truppen dem der englischen unterstellt ist.

Dem Minister zur Seite steht ein aus 15 Mitgliedern zusammengesetzter Rath.[14] Die Räthe müssen gute Erfahrung in indischen Angelegenheiten besitzen, werden auf zehn Jahre ernannt und beziehen ein Gehalt von 1200 Pfund jährlich. Aus Zweckmäßigkeitsgründen erhält jedes Mitglied eine Sparte

zur Bearbeitung. Sie leisten dem Staatssekretär Hülfe, aber ohne politische Verantwortlichkeit. Da sie nicht mit dem Ministerium wechseln, mögen sie einen Sitz im Parlament haben, oder nicht. Der Minister kann ihre Entscheidungen umstoßen, und sie haben dann nur noch das Recht, Protest zu erheben.

Stellvertreter der Königin in Indien selbst ist der auf sechs Jahre ernannte Vizekönig, der wohl dem Minister untergeordnet, aber praktisch ganz selbständig ist, weiß er doch an Ort und Stelle, unterstützt von seinen Organen, besser, was noth thut, als der Minister zu Hause. Dem Vizekönig zur Seite stehen wieder zwei Räthe, ein exekutiver und ein legislativer, die mehr oder weniger die Autokratie desselben verbergen. Rechtsgültige Erlasse von ihm können nur unter Mitwirkung des einen oder anderen Rathes ergehen, daher ist sein offizieller Titel heute noch Governor General in Council. Außerhalb des Staatszimmers ist er nur eine Privatperson; im Innern desselben allein kann er seine Autorität geltend machen. Da aber auch ausgiebig. Denn, wie zu Hause der Minister, ist der Vizekönig nicht an das Votum seiner Räthe, die man auch Minister nennen könnte, gebunden; vielmehr ist er befugt, „wenn es nöthig ist“ (in cases of emergency), unabhängig von denselben zu handeln.[15] Der exekutive Rath besteht aus sechs ordentlichen Mitgliedern, zu welchen noch der Oberkommandirende als außerordentliches tritt, und wird nicht vom Vizekönig, sondern vom Minister ernannt. Das Justiz- und Finanzdepartement liegen gewöhnlich in den Händen von dazu abgeordneten englischen Beamten, während die übrigen Zweige indischen Civilbeamten anvertraut sind. Die Sitzungen, in welchen die Fragen der inneren und äußeren Politik, sowie die dem legislativen Rath zu unterbreitenden Maßnahmen besprochen und erledigt werden,

Der legislative Rath schließt den vorigen in sich; außerdem sitzen in ihm sechs bis zwölf weitere Mitglieder, denen die Aufgabe zusteht, Gesetze und Verordnungen zu erlassen. Diese „weiteren Mitglieder" werden vom Vizekönig aus der Zahl der hohen Beamten, der angesehenen seßhaften Engländer und der hervorragenden Eingeborenen, auserlesen; dem Provinzialgouverneur kann auch ein Sitz zuertheilt werden. Den öffentlichen Sitzungen präsidirt der Vizekönig; die Geschäftsordnung gestattet Debatte und Abstimmung. Ein durch die Majorität angenommenes Gesetz erhält Gültigkeit durch die Zustimmung des Vizekönigs, die jedoch auch versagt werden kann, in welchem Falle die Entscheidung beim Minister ruht. Ein neues Gesetz aber kommt auf folgende Weise zu stande. Wenn eine Provinzialregierung findet, daß eine Bevölkerungsklasse irgend eine berechtigte Beschwerde hat, oder daß sich Verhältnisse entwickelt haben, auf welche die bestehenden Gesetze keine Anwendung finden können oder für die sie nicht ausreichen, so wendet sie sich an die Centralregierung und bittet um Erlaß eines bezüglichen Gesetzes. Diese untersucht nun die Nothwendigkeit des neuen Gesetzes in Verbindung mit der beantragenden Regierung, wie auch mit anderen Lokalbehörden, innerhalb deren Bereich sich ein ähnliches Erforderniß einstellen könnte. Ist das Bedürfniß nachgewiesen, so legt die Centralregierung dem legislativen Rath den einschlägigen Antrag vor. Auf diese Weise erhält die Legislatur und zugleich das indische Publikum eine detaillirte Geschichte aller derjenigen Schritte, die unternommen wurden, um sich zu vergewissern, daß die vorgeschlagenen Maßregeln in Wirklichkeit aus den Bedürfnissen des Volkes hervorgehen und ihnen nach jeder Richtung entsprechen. Ist die Sache so eingeleitet, dann legt der legislative Rath den Vorschlag allen Provinzialregierungen zur Begutachtung vor, oder doch denjenigen unter ihnen, auf welche möglicherweise das zu schaffende Gesetz auch

einmal Anwendung finden könnte. Außerdem werden verschiedene öffentliche Körperschaften und anerkannte Vereine um ihren Rath befragt. Nachdem nun alles Material gesammelt und gesichtet, gelangt der Vorschlag von neuem an den legislativen Rath, der, wenn nothwendig, die Bill so umarbeitet, daß sie in absoluten Einklang mit den Thatsachen gebracht wird. Irgend ein Mitglied der Legislative, welches annehmen zu können glaubt, daß dies nicht geschehen, oder welches vermuthet, daß die wirkliche Geschichte der Maßregel nicht vollständig bekannt gegeben wurde, hat in der Rathssitzung, in welcher der Vorschlag zum Gesetz erhoben wird, volle Gelegenheit zu ausgiebiger Kritik.

Die Gouverneure von Madras und Bombay haben ebenfalls zwei Räthe zum Beistand, während der Gouverneur-Lieutenant von Bengalen nur den legislativen Rath zur Verfügung hat. Die übrigen Gouverneure haben weder den einen, noch den andern. Das eben Gesagte gilt aber nicht mehr in seinem vollen Umfange, denn die gesetzgebenden Körperschaften sind im gegenwärtigen Augenblick im Begriff, eine vollständige Umbildung zu erfahren, indem das einheimische Element auf Grund eines liberalen Wahlsystems stärker in ihnen vertreten werden soll, als bisher der Fall war, so daß also den einzelnen Provinzen eine Art Homerule gewährt würde. Dieses Experiment beruht auf der sogenannten Croß-Akte vom Jahre 1892, welche jedoch nur die allgemeinen Prinzipien feststellt, während deren Anpassung an die lokalen Verhältnisse und Bedürfnisse der indischen Regierung selbst vorbehalten bleibt. Im Jahre 1893 wurden den neuen Gesetzen gemäß die ersten Wahlen abgehalten. Die Hauptzüge der nunmehr geltenden Einrichtung für Bengalen, das hier als Muster genommen werden mag, waren folgende. Auf Bengalen mit seinen 71 Millionen Einwohnern entfallen sieben auf die Dauer von zwei Jahren zu wählende Abgeordnete zum

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legislativen Rath. Zum Zwecke der Wahl behielt der derzeitige Gouverneur von Bengalen, Sir Charles Elliot, die höchst einfache, uralte Eintheilung seiner Provinz bei, nach welcher dieselbe in zwei Theile zerfällt: in Calcutta und in das Land außerhalb der Hauptstadt (Mofussil). Calcutta nun stellt drei Deputirte, und zwar derart, daß einer durch die Stadtvertretung, der zweite durch die Universität und der dritte durch die Handelskammer von Calcutta gewählt wird. Die vier übrigen Abgeordneten werden indirekt von den Stadtvertretungen und den Distriktsämtern der Provinz gewählt, in der Weise, daß jede Stadtvertretung und jede Division wechselweise alle acht Jahre einen Repräsentanten entsendet, der auch zwei Jahre im legislativen Rath sitzt. In den rein ländlichen Bezirken ist das Wahlsystem das nämliche, so daß zwei Divisionen alle zwei Jahre einen Abgeordneten wählen und jede Division innerhalb acht Jahren an die Reihe kommt. Die Namen der Erwählten werden dem Gouverneur vorgelegt, der von seinem Rechte, die Bestätigung der Wahl zu versagen, nur im äußersten Falle Gebrauch machen wird. Die Erfahrungen, die man mit dem, allerdings erst seit zwei Jahren bestehenden, System gemacht hat, sind befriedigend, da man in der neuen Einrichtung eine Stärkung der Regierungsgewalt erblickt, nicht, wie man vielleicht erwarten sollte, eine Schwächung.

Diese gesetzgebenden Körperschaften sind jedoch nicht die einzigen Quellen, aus denen das indische Recht erfließt. Außer den Räthen des Vizekönigs und der Gouverneure von Madras, Bombay und Bengalen ist auch das englische Parlament Rechtsquelle; ebenso haben die von den Räthen älterer Organisation geschaffenen Gesetze Gültigkeit; außerdem das einheimische indische und muhammedanische Recht, das jedoch den Auslegungen der obersten englischen Gerichtshöfe unterworfen ist und die Gewohnheitsbestimmungen der Kasten und einzelnen Stämme in sich begreift.

Mit Ausnahme der Fälle, wo der Collector als Richter handeln kann, und eines nachher noch zu erwähnenden ist die richterliche Funktion von der administrativen getrennt. Calcutta, Madras, Bombay und Allahabad sind die Sitze von Obergerichten, an deren Spitze ein Oberrichter steht und deren Beamte und Anwälte theils Engländer, theils Eingeborene sind: ein Richter muß Eingeborener sein. Sie sind sowohl erste als zweite Instanz, während der geheime Rath in London der oberste Appellhof ist. Die niedere Gerichtsbarkeit ist zum größten Theil den Eingeborenen anvertraut, neun Zehntel aller Civilprozesse und drei Viertel aller Strafsachen gehen durch ihre Hände.[16]

Was bis jetzt über das indische Verwaltungssystem gesagt wurde, ist die Theorie desselben. Die Praxis entspricht dieser nicht immer, eine Thatsache, die nicht allein hier, sondern im gesamten englischen Verfassungsleben zu beobachten ist. Der Engländer ist eben, im Gegensatz zum Franzosen, in solchen Dingen kein Systematiker, ein abgesagter Feind jeder Schablone und Prinzipienreiterei; seine ausgeprägte Individualität scheut nicht davor zurück, mit den nakten Thatsachen handgemein zu werden und sich mit ihnen abzufinden, ohne Beiziehung theoretischer Hülfen. Daher ist der Vizekönig, obwohl Chef der gesamten indischen Verwaltung, in der That nichts weniger als dieses. Mit seinem Hof im fernen Simla residirend, muß er sich darauf beschränken, die Dinge zu kontrolliren, viel mehr als sie in ihren Einzelheiten zu lenken. Ihm obliegt die Leitung der allgemeinen Reichsangelegenheiten, die Regelung der Beziehungen zu auswärtigen Mächten und die Begleichung sich etwa gegenüberstehender Interessen der einzelnen Landestheile.

Das Schwergewicht der eigentlichen Verwaltung liegt in der Provinz, und die Tendenz nach Selbständigmachung der Provinz gegenüber dem Reich tritt immer mehr zu Tage. Aber auch die Provinzen zeigen wenig Aehnlichkeit in administrativer

Beziehung, da sie immer noch zu sehr die Spuren ihres geschichtlichen Wachsthums an sich tragen. Man unterscheidet gewöhnlich, etwas vage zwar, drei Provinzen, die den Namen Präsidentschaften führen, welcher Name noch aus der Zeit stammt, da die ersten Faktoreien unter der Leitung eines Präsidenten standen: Madras, Bombay und Bengalen. Nun haben die beiden ersteren noch denselben Umfang, wie zu Anfang des Jahrhunderts; aber eine Präsidentschaft Bengalen existirt nur dem Namen nach, d. h., was man so nennt, ist viel umfangreicher, als das, was in der Geographie diesen Namen führt. Bengalen umfaßt in der That alle Landestheile, die nicht zu Bombay und Madras gehören, das Punjab, die Centralprovinzen, die Nordwestprovinzen, Oudh und jetzt auch noch Britisch-Birma. Die Gouverneure von Madras und Bombay werden vom Minister ernannt, korrespondiren in gewissen Fällen mit diesem direkt und haben jeder, wie bereits erwähnt, einen exekutiven und legislativen Rath zur Seite. Ein Uebertritt der Beamten von einer dieser Provinzen in die andere oder nach Bengalen findet nicht, oder nur sehr selten statt. Diejenigen Provinzen, die man unter dem Namen Bengalen zusammenfaßt, stehen mehr oder weniger direkt unter dem Vizekönig, bieten aber unter sich wieder große Verschiedenheiten dar. Das eigentliche Bengalen untersteht einem Gouverneurlieutenant mit einem legislativen Rath. Die Nordwestprovinzen werden getrennt verwaltet; der dortige Gouverneurlieutnant, der seit 1886 einen legislativen Rath neben sich hat, ist zugleich Oberkommissär von Oudh; das Punjab bildet ein drittes Gouvernement ohne legislativen Rath; die Centralprovinzen, Britisch-Birma und Assam, stehen unter Oberkommissären, und ferulegende Theile, wie Ajmeer, Berar und Coorg werden von besonderen Beamten verwaltet.

Aber damit ist die Buntheit der Administration noch nicht zu Ende. Das ganze System beruht wieder auf einer Zwei-

theilung in reglementirte und nicht-reglementirte Provinzen oder Distrikte. (Regulation und non regulation system). Regulations nannte man die gesetzgeberischen Akte der Präsidentschaftsräthe der Provinzen, sie bildeten die ersten Versuche der Verwaltungsorganisation und sollten den Beamten des ganzen Reiches als Norm dienen. Mit der Zeit aber sah man ein, daß allgemeine Sätze nicht überall Anwendung finden könnten, und man war genöthigt, gewisse Landstriche auf anderer Basis zu regieren. So unterliegen alle neuerworbenen Provinzen, wie z. B. das Punjab, nicht mehr dem Regulationssystem, das überhaupt im Aussterben begriffen ist, zumal die Bevölkerung sich nach und nach an die englische Herrschaft gewöhnt hat und viele Einrichtungen für das Gesamtreich Gültigkeit besitzen. Unterschiede zwischen den reglementirten und nicht-reglementirten Landestheilen bestehen jedoch immer noch. So liegen in den letzteren die administrative und richterliche Funktion noch in einer Hand, während in der ersteren Einnehmer und Richter getrennte Personen sind; der Oberbeamte führt den Titel „stellvertretender Kommissär" (Deputy Commissioner), und die höchsten Beamtenstellen sind nicht nur den dazu befähigten Civilisten, sondern auch Militärs zugänglich.

Wie schon erwähnt, macht sich in der jüngsten Zeit die Tendenz bemerkbar, die Provinz etwas mehr auf eigene Füße zu stellen. Der im Jahre 1872 (von einem afghanischen Sträfling in Port Blair auf den Andamaneninseln) ermordete Vizekönig Lord Mayo war der Erste, der einen diesbezüglichen Versuch machte, und alle seine Nachfolger sind ihm in derselben Richtung gefolgt, dem ausgesprochenen Talent der eingeborenen Bevölkerung für Selbstverwaltung Rechnung tragend, welches Talent sich in jeder Dorfgemeinde mit ihrem Vorsteher (Headman) und Fünferrath (panchayat) ausdrückt. Der Versuch bestand

befugnisse über die Finanzen der Provinzen aufgegeben hat. Diese steuern wohl noch zur allgemeinen Reichskasse bei, allein ein bestimmter Theil der Einnahmen fließt ihnen wieder zurück zur Bestreitung lokaler Bedürfnisse; außerdem steht es ihnen frei, selbst Hülfsquellen zu entdecken, die nur ihnen und besonders ihrem Erziehungswesen zu gute kommen sollen. Und da es in Indien gerade so ist, wie überall, so ist leicht ersichtlich, daß mit der finanziellen Kraft auch die politische Bedeutung der Provinz wächst.

Diese Bemerkung führt zur Betrachtung der Finanzverwaltung des indischen Reiches im allgemeinen.

Nach ungefährer Berechnung beziffern sich die laufenden Einnahmen und Ausgaben auf 60 Millionen Pfund Sterling oder 1200 Millionen Mark, also etwa so hoch, wie die des deutschen Reiches, dessen Etat für das Jahr 1895/96 in Einnahmen und Ausgaben mit 1 247 256 063 Mark abschließt. Zwanzig Millionen Pfund, oder ein Drittel der Gesamteinnahmen, erfließen aus der Bodensteuer; zehn weitere aus den Ergebnissen der Eisenbahnen, Bewässerungsanstalten und Posten; zehn Millionen bringt das Opium, sechs Millionen das Salz;[17] der Rest wird durch die Stempel- und Spirituosensteuer, sowie durch die Zölle aufgebracht, während die direkte Steuer nur ungefähr eine halbe Million einbringt. Unter den Ausgaben figuriren die für das Heer mit etwa 20 Millionen, 5 Millionen erfordert die Verzinsung der sich auf 150 Millionen belaufenden Staatsschuld; aus dem Reste werden die Gehälter für Beamten,[18] die öffentlichen Arbeiten, die Erziehungs- und Schulanstalten 2c. bestritten.

So einfach sich dies nun anhört, so schwierig ist es, es in den Details zu fassen. Einmal wegen der Währungsverhältnisse. In Indien bildet bekanntlich die Rupie[19] die Münzeinheit, eine Silbermünze, die nominell zwei Shillings werth ist; von diesem Nominalwerth weicht jedoch der Marktwerth oft

bedeutend ab, und es ist bekannt, daß er in der jüngsten Zeit auf einen Shilling zwei Pence gesunken ist, ein Umstand, der sehr unheilvolle Wirkungen im Gefolge hatte und augenblicklich noch hat und zur Verwirrung der indischen Finanzen nicht wenig beiträgt. Ein weiterer Umstand, der einen klaren Einblick in dieselben hemmt, ist der, daß, wie bereits bemerkt, in Indien der Staat der größte Arbeitgeber, alles in allem ist. Nicht genug damit, daß er das Land verwaltet und die Justiz ausübt: er ist auch der alleinige Grundbesitzer, insofern der alte Grundsatz Geltung hat, daß die Regierung Anrecht auf einen Theil des Ertrages von jeder bighá Land hat;[20] er ist der alleinige Opium- und Salzproduzent; er baut und unterhält Eisenbahnen, Straßen, Bewässerungswerke; leitet Posten, Telegraphen und Schulen — und hat infolge hiervon auch das finanzielle Gebahren aller dieser Anstalten und Veranstaltungen zu überwachen und zu lenken.

Am meisten Eigenthümlichkeiten bietet die Erhebung der Bodensteuer dar. Im Jahre 1832 wurde mit der Vermessung und Klassifizirung des Landes begonnen; im Laufe der folgenden Jahrzehnte wurde die Riesenarbeit fortgesetzt, und heute ist das Katasterwesen in Englisch-Indien so geregelt, wie bei uns.[21] Auf Grund dieser Regelungen wird die Bodensteuer erhoben, aber, wie das eigentlich bei einem Lande wie Indien selbstverständlich ist, nicht überall auf die gleiche Weise, sondern unter steter Berücksichtigung der geschichtlich gewordenen, den Eingeborenen über alles gehenden örtlichen Verhältnisse. Und so lassen sich drei große Systeme der Grundsteuererhebung unterscheiden. In Bengalen, d. h. in ganz Nordindien, mit Ausnahme des Nordwestens wurde im Jahre 1793 durch das Permanent Settlement des Lord Cornwallis das Land an eine Art von Generalpächtern als Quasieigeigenthum übertragen. Dieser Modus besteht noch zu Recht: die Generalpächter, die Zemindars,

wie sie genannt werden, liefern eine permanent festgelegte Rente an den Staat ab, also heute noch so viel wie vor hundert Jahren, und erheben die ebenfalls festgelegte Steuer von ihren Unterpächtern, ungeachtet der inzwischen eingetretenen Steigerung der Bodenwerthe und ohne Rücksicht auf den jeweiligen Ertrag.

Anders ist es in Madras oder Bombay; hier herrscht das sogenannte Raiyatwari-System. Die Raiyats sind Pächter, welche von der Regierung Land auf bestimmte Zeit, gewöhnlich 30 Jahre, ausgeliehen erhalten, wogegen sie alljährlich eine Rente zahlen, die bemessen ist nach der Bonität des Bodens, einem Ertragsdurchschnitt und nach dem Ertragswerth mit Einbeziehung aller möglichen Umstände und schließlich nach der Antheilsquote, die dem Staate billig zufallen sollte. Nach langen, ungemein schwierigen Versuchen ist man hier auf ein System gerathen, bei dem Bauer und Regierung scheinen gleich gut bestehen zu können.

Im Nordwesten herrscht ein gemischtes System; hier wird die Bodenrente dorfweise (Mahál Settlement) erhoben, d. h. von dem Dorfeigenthümer, der entweder ein Großgrundbesitzer, oder ein kleinerer bäuerlicher Eigenthümer oder auch die Gesamtgemeinde sein kann. In anderen Landschaften wiederum herrschen Systeme, die mit den eben beschriebenen größere oder geringere Aehnlichkeit haben. — Der Gesamtertrag der Bodensteuer beläuft sich, wie erwähnt, auf 20 Millionen Pfund, was einen Durchschnitt von zwei Shillings auf den Kopf der Bevölkerung und den Morgen Landes repräsentirt und sechs Prozent des Ertragswerthes, gegen 33 1/3 Prozent, welche die Regierung der Moguls beanspruchte.

Das Opium bringt, wie erwähnt, zehn Millionen, die thatsächlich zum größten Theile von den Chinesen beigesteuert werden und die auch den Hauptgrund abgeben dürften dafür, daß der neuerdings von einzelnen Eiferern unternommene Feldzug gegen den Gebrauch des Giftes seinen Zweck verfehlen

wird. Das Pflanzen des Mohns ist Monopol des Staates, der in Bengalen, in der Nähe von Patna und Benares große Kulturen angelegt hat, wo er auch die Bereitung des Opiums vornimmt, das er dann an die Calcuttaer Kaufleute abläßt. Der Ueberschuß über die Produktionskosten figurirt dann im Budget als direkte Einnahme. Während aber im ganzen britischen Territorium, von den erwähnten Ausnahmen abgesehen, der Anbau des Mohns streng verboten ist, florirt er in einigen Eingeborenen-Staaten Centralindiens, hier wird beim Uebergang über die Grenze ein Zoll erhoben, der sich nach dem Marktpreise von Calcutta richtet. — Bodensteuer und Opiummonopol liefern also die Hälfte des gesamten Staatsaufwandes, während die andere Hälfte aus den oben bezeichneten Quellen versorgt wird.

Vor und mitten in der eben beschriebenen politischen und finanziellen Verwaltungsmaschine steht zum Schutze derselben im Innern und zur Vertheidigung nach außen die Armee. Dieser ihrer doppelten Aufgabe entspricht die Organisation des Heeres, die während der letzten acht Jahre (unter den Lords Dufferin, Lansdowne und Roberts) ihre jetzige Gestaltung erhielt. Das Gesamtheer zählt beiläufig 100 000 britische Mannschaften und 180 000 Eingeborene, im ganzen also 280 000 Mann, die gegebenenfalls noch durch die Hülfstruppen der Eingeborenen-Staaten vermehrt werden können. Der größere Theil dient als Occupationstruppe, während 70 000 Mann jeden Augenblick in Bereitschaft gesetzt werden können, um an die Grenze zu marschiren, wenigstens ist nach den jüngsten offiziellen Versicherungen der Mobilisirungsplan bis in die letzten Einzelheiten geregelt. Seeküste und Landgrenze sind genügend bewacht, die Eingänge zu den Häfen von Calcutta, Bombay, Karachi und Rangoon sind stark befestigt; ebenso im Norden die Hauptstraßen, die vom Kontinent herein-

führen. Die eine Befestigungslinie deckt Quetta, eine zweite faßt die Brückenköpfe des Indus bei Sukkur und Attock in sich, während eine dritte von Rawal Pindi bis Multan die Zugänge zum Punjab versperrt. Die Schlagfertigkeit der Armee wurde erhöht durch die Neuorganisation vom Jahre 1893, die, den veränderten Umständen Rechnung tragend, an Stelle der drei bis dahin getrennten und selbständigen Armeen von Madras, Bombay und Bengalen vier Armeecorps setzte, die einem Oberkommandirenden unterstellt sind, unter welchem vier Generallieutenants die einzelnen Corps befehligen.

Nachdem nun ein, naturgemäß nur flüchtiger Einblick gewonnen in die Natur Indiens und seiner Bewohner, sowie in das Verwaltungssystem, unter welchem die Engländer ihre Herrschaft ausüben, drängt sich von selbst die Frage auf: Welche Wirkung hat diese Herrschaft auf die indischen Völker ausgeübt? Haben die Indier Ursache, den Engländern dankbar zu sein für das, was sie an ihnen gethan oder nicht?

Es giebt unter den Betheiligten wohl keine Frage, über welche die Ansichten weiter auseinandergehen, als diese. Auf der einen Seite stehen die Pessimisten, welche nicht müde werden, zu behaupten: Indien wird von den Engländern zu ihrem eigenen Vortheil ausgebeutet; der Eigennutz der regierenden Klasse wird nur erreicht von ihrer Unwissenheit und Gewissenlosigkeit; Besteuerung ist gleichbedeutend mit Ausraubung; die Rechtspflege ist privilegirter Meineid; der Boden wird immer mehr ausgesogen; das Volk steht beständig am Rande des Hungertodes und bildet eine Herde Sklaven in den Händen des Geldverleihers. — Demgegenüber stehen die optimistischen Ansichten hauptsächlich der offiziellen Kreise, welche ausführen: Vor allem zieht England keinen direkten Nutzen aus Indien, wenn man nicht die Beamtengehälter hierher rechnet, die zum Theil ins Mutterland fließen und dort verzehrt werden; „kein

englischer Arbeiter, kein englischer Steuerzahler hat einen Pfennig direkten Nutzen oder zahlt einen Pfennig weniger zu den Landeseinkünften, weil wir Indien besitzen";[23] die pax britannica schützt das Land nicht nur nach außen, sondern erhält auch im Innern Ruhe und Ordnung; die Regierung wendet Millionen um Millionen auf, um die aus Mißernten entstehende Noth zu lindern; sie baut Eisenbahnen und Bewässerungsanstalten, unterstützt weitgehendst Schulen und Erziehungsinstitute und verhilft dem letzten Bauern zu ein wenig Eigenthum. Der Handel entwickelt sich ungemein rasch; die Einnahmen steigen trotz der Herabsetzung der Steuern; fortwährend entstehen unter dem Schutz und der Förderung des Staates neue industrielle Unternehmungen; die Bevölkerung mehrt sich stetig.

Wenn es nun leicht und billig ist, sich auf die eine oder andere Seite zu schlagen und, je nachdem, uneingeschränkt zu loben und zu tadeln, so ist es, weil gerechter, weit weniger einfach, einen Standpunkt zu gewinnen, von dem aus die Gegensätze versöhnt erscheinen, zumal bei einem solchen Versuch es sich als nothwendig erweist, altes und neues zu vergleichen und gegeneinder abzuwägen. Erst bei einem solchen Verfahren gelangt man zu einer unparteiischen Werthschätzung der Dinge. Und auch dann noch muß das Urtheil vorsichtig und zurückhaltend sein.

Wohl nichts springt dem Betrachter der indischen Geschichte mehr in die Augen, als der Kontrast zwischen der Unbeständigkeit der Throne und der Stetigkeit der sozialen Verhältnisse. Sieht man daher von den häufigen dynastischen Veränderungen ab, so kann man sagen: die materielle Lage des Volkes zu irgend einer Zeit war typisch für das, was sie zu aller Zeit war,[24] so daß also in dieser Hinsicht das, was wir Fortschritt nennen, in Indien gar nicht oder, bestenfalls, nur wenig und

sehr allmählich Platz greifen kann. Schon die ältesten Besucher des Landes, Griechen, Araber, Italiener, drückten ihr Erstaunen aus über die hohe Civilisation, die sie dort antrafen. Volkreiche Städte, fleißige Ackerbauer, geschickte Handwerker, lebhafter Handel, geschmackvolle Architektur — alles dies scheint dem indischen Boden eingeboren zu sein. Im achtzehnten Jahrhundert war Surat das Emporium des Handels mit Europa, und die Zahl seiner Bewohner wird auf 800000 angegeben. Als Clive im Jahre 1757 in Murschidabad, der Hauptstadt Bengalens, einzog, schrieb er: „Diese Stadt ist so ausgedehnt und volkreich wie London, nur mit dem Unterschied, daß es dort unendlich mehr sehr reiche Leute giebt, als in London." Es wird von fabelhaften Summen geredet, die jeweils den indischen Eroberern als Beute in die Hände fielen, und der Pfauenthron des Shah Jahan (1628—1658) wurde auf 130 Millionen Mark gewerthet.[25] — Nun läßt sich allerdings sagen: Neben dem in wenigen Händen aufgehäuften Reichthum kann die größte allgemeine Armuth hergehen. Von dieser Armuth haben wir jedoch keinen Beweis. Die natürlichen Hülfsquellen Indiens waren unter der Herrschaft der Eingeborenen ebenso entwickelt, wie zu irgend einer Zeit nachher, und ihre Ergebnisse lieferten immer einen großen Ueberschuß, der zudem im Lande verblieb. Was zuerst die europäischen Händler anzog, waren nicht die Rohprodukte, sondern die Erzeugnisse des Gewerbes. Und wer je in der indischen Abtheilung des Kensington-Museums in London einen Blick gethan hat auf die dort aufgehäuften Schätze — von der in Holz geschnitzten Hausfront aus Lahore und der Marmorkolonnade aus Agra, von den wunderbaren Geweben und Stickereien mit ihren blendenden Färbungen vorbei bis zu den herrlichen Metallarbeiten und Elfenbeinschnitzereien und dem goldenen Throne des Runjeet Singh — der muß sagen:

in kunstgewerblichen Dingen haben die Indier von den Engländern und den Europäern überhaupt nichts zu lernen.

Der Ackerbau hat seit Jahrhunderten keine Veränderungen erlitten. Die traditionellen, einfachen Methoden sind dem Boden und dem Klima ausgezeichnet angepaßt. Mit Ausnahme der Kartoffel in einigen Strichen wurde keine neue Kulturpflanze eingeführt; vor wie nach bilden Hirse, Reis und Weizen die Hauptnahrung der Bevölkerung, neben welchen noch allerlei Arten von Hülsenfrüchten, Gewürzen, Küchenkräutern und Oelsaaten angepflanzt werden. Der Bauer ist schon lange aufs genaueste vertraut mit der Zeit der Aussaat und der Ernte, mit der Wechselwirthschaft und dem Düngen, wie mit der für ihn so unendlich wichtigen Kunst der Bodenbewässerung, in welch letzterer Hinsicht die erfolgreichsten modernen Einrichtungen ganz auf der Grundlage der alten ruhen. Nur eins hat die englische Verwaltung dem indischen Bauern gegeben — die Sicherheit, um welche sein irischer Bruder ihn beneiden könnte; aber sie hat nicht vermocht, ihn aus den Händen des an die Stelle des ehemaligen Eroberers getretenen Geldverleihers zu befreien und ihn vor den periodisch wiederkehrenden Mißernten und deren Gefolge, der Hungersnoth, vollständig zu schützen — kurz, die drückende Armuth zu beseitigen, unter welcher der Kleinbauer seufzt. Eine Armuth, deren Vorhandensein wohl manchmal geleugnet wird, die aber doch existiren muß, wie das besonders aus den gründlichen Untersuchungen Dadabhai Naorojis hervorgeht, welcher das jährliche Durchschnittseinkommen auf den Kopf der indischen Bevölkerung auf 20 Rupien berechnet.

Aehnlich verhält es sich mit denjenigen Bevölkerungsklassen, die nicht mit dem Ackerbau zusammenhängen. Die Weber z. B., ehemals eine blühende Zunft, haben sicherlich gelitten; in einigen Gegenden sind sie, wie in Europa, ganz verschwunden; in

anderen fristen sie ein kümmerliches Dasein. Die Baumwollenfabriken von Manchester haben die eingeborene Textilindustrie vernichtet, und wenn in der neuesten Zeit die Indier laut Einsprache erhoben gegen die zollfreie Einfuhr von Geweben aus Lancashire,[26] so verhindern doch die in ihrem Lande selbst entstandenen Fabriken ein Wiederaufleben der alten einheimischen Gewerbethätigkeit. — Mit den Webern sind die Färber dahingegangen, und wie Weberei und Färberei sind die Künste des Teppichwirkens, der Feinstickerei, der Holz- und Elfenbeinschnitzerei, der Bearbeitung des Leders und der Metalle und viele sonstige Hantierungen von ihrer früheren Höhe herabgesunken, ja zum Theil in Vergessenheit gerathen, nicht allein zum Schaden Indiens; und wir können uns nicht wundern, daß es viele einsichtige Leute giebt, die mit Mißmuth zusehen, wie, mit jedem Tage mehr, Indien an England seine Rohprodukte ausführt, um dagegen Industrieerzeugnisse einzutauschen. Ebenso wird, und, wie es scheint, mit Recht Klage geführt über den Umstand, daß die gesamten Kosten, welche die Verwaltung und Vertheidigung Indiens erfordern, ausschließlich auf die Schultern der Eingeborenen abgewälzt werden, während doch ein gut Theil des Reichthums, der Größe und der Bedeutung Englands auf seiner Verbindung mit Indien beruht.[27]

Haben nun diejenigen recht, welche behaupten, daß der Fortschritt der weitaus zahlreichsten, und zugleich allerdings auch konservativsten Bevölkerungsklassen, der Ackerbauer und Gewerbetreibenden, unter der englischen Herrschaft nicht in sehr hohem Maße gediehen, so stehen denn doch auch sicherlich und unbestreitbar lichte Momente gegenüber. Vor allem läßt sich nicht in Frage stellen, daß die Einwohnerzahl des Landes gestiegen ist, und daß Sicherheit, Ordnung und Recht im Innern herrschen, während eine mächtige Armee bereit ist, die Unabhängigkeit nach außen zu behaupten, und alle Einwohner

des ganzen Landes von Loyalität gegen ihre Kaiserin erfüllt sind, wie das aus Kundgebungen aller Art hervorgeht. Das Verkehrswesen hat sich in sehr hohem Maße entwickelt. Im Jahre 1856 zählte man 300 (englische) Meilen Eisenbahnen, die zwei Millionen Passagiere und 250 000 Tonnen Güter beförderten; heute besitzt Indien ein Eisenbahnnetz von mehr als 18 000 Meilen Länge, auf welchem jährlich 121 Millionen Passagiere und 26 Millionen Tonnen Güter befördert werden. 1858 betrug die Einfuhr etwa 40 Millionen Rupien; 1892 hingegen erreichte der Import einen Werth von 79 Millionen und der Export einen solchen von 113 Millionen Pfund.[28]

Der Erziehung widmet die Regierung die größte Sorgfalt; drei nach dem Londoner Muster eingerichtete Universitäten zu Madras, Bombay und Calcutta, die jede von Tausenden Studirender besucht wird, nebst einer Anzahl affiliirter kleinerer Anstalten (Colleges) vermitteln die höhere Bildung. Volksschulen zählte man im Jahre 1893 142 000 mit etwa 4 Millionen Schülern gegen 400 000 im Jahre 1864. Eine Folge der zunehmenden Bildung ist wohl das allmählich beginnende Nachlassen der Spannung zwischen den verschiedenen Rassen und Religionen. In den letzten 30 Jahren haben Hindu und Muhammedaner sich daran gewöhnt, miteinander auf derselben Schulbank zu sitzen, auf der Eisenbahn zu fahren, zusammen den Richterstuhl einzunehmen, gemeinsam im gesetzgebenden Körper zu tagen und so die unabwendbare Thatsache der religiösen Verschiedenheiten ruhig hinzunehmen in einem Grade, wie das in den vielen Jahrhunderten, die der englischen Herrschaft vorangingen, nicht geschah. Wenn auch noch ein weiter Weg ist bis zur vollkommenen Harmonie, so sind die religiösen Streitigkeiten, die allerdings jeden Augenblick auflodern können, doch weniger häufig und weniger blutig geworden, als früher.

Mit der Bildung ist auch die Werthschätzung des Einzel-

lebens gestiegen. Die im August des Jahres 1894 stattgehabte Katastrophe am Ghona-See ist hierfür ein lehrreiches Beispiel. Als einige Monate vorher infolge eines Erdrutsches die Gefahr entstand, daß der genannte See über seine Ufer trete, das umgebende Land überschwemmen und so unermeßlichen Schaden anrichten werde, da ergriff die Regierung in aller Stille mit einem Kostenaufwand von mehr als 6000 Pfund umfassende Maßregeln mit dem Ergebniß, daß, als der Durchbruch erfolgte, kein einziges Menschenleben zu Grunde ging, während einem ähnlichen Ereigniß im Jahre 1840 am oberen Indus ungezählte Tausende zum Opfer fielen.

Die Verallgemeinerung der Bildung, die neben den Schulen einer mächtigen Presse zu verdanken ist, hatte aber noch eine andere Wirkung. In immer weiteren Kreisen macht sich das Streben nach mehr oder weniger Selbständigkeit, nach einer Art Selbstverwaltung bemerkbar. Dieses Bestreben gewann in den letzten Jahren greifbare Gestalt in den sogenannten Nationalkongressen, wo man anfängt, sich, unabhängig von der Regierung, mit der Lösung heimischer Fragen zu befassen, als da sind: Verringerung der Heirathskosten, in deren Höhe die Hauptwurzel der bäuerlichen Verschuldung zu suchen ist; die Wiederverheirathung der Witwen; die Abschaffung der uralten schwesterlichen Erbfolge, gemäß welcher Erben eines Mannes nicht *seine* Kinder, sondern die seiner Schwester sind; die Erziehung der weiblichen Kinder, die Kinderehen, die Seereisen u. dergl. m. Auch der Ruf: „Indien für die Indier", läßt sich bereits vernehmen als Folge der Begünstigung, welche die Regierung den Dezentralisationsbestrebungen hat angedeihen lassen.

Wiederholen wir nun die Frage: Welches sind die Folgen der englischen Herrschaft für Indien? so werden wir sagen können: Die Bevölkerung hat sich vermehrt, und der Durchschnitt der Lebensführung hat sich gehoben; das ganze Volk,

ob direkt unter englischer Herrschaft oder unter eingeborenen Fürsten stehend, ist gegen die Mißbräuche der Gewalt geschützt und kann in Ruhe genießen, was es hervorbringt. Während aber die Macht der Regierung gestärkt wurde, steht die Bevölkerung im Begriff, ihr Jahrhunderte altes Gleichgewicht zu verlieren, und damit ist eine Bewegung inauguriert, die die ganze bisherige geschichtliche Entwickelung Indiens auf den Kopf zu stellen geeignet ist. Mit der Einführung des europäischen Staatenbegriffs und einer bis ins einzelne organisirten Verwaltung hat man, unstreitig von den wohlmeinendsten Absichten geleitet, zu viel neuen Wein westlicher Gedanken und Sitten in die alten Schläuche indischer, festgefugter Formen und Ideen gefüllt. Niemand wird sich unterfangen können, vorauszusagen, zu welchen Resultaten dieser Prozeß führen wird. Ob, vorausgesetzt, daß England dem von Norden her immer heftiger anpochenden Feind stand halten kann, wie Einige meinen, das zwanzigste Jahrhundert in Indien eine Anzahl sich selbst regierender, unabhängiger Staaten sehen wird, deren Oberhoheit in englischen Händen ruht; oder ob Indien sich ganz losreißen wird und man in dem gegenwärtigen Verhältniß Englands zu demselben späterhin nur eine romantische Episode der englischen Geschichte erblicken wird, wie Spencer Walpole meint; oder ob Indien mit Großbritannien und seinen Kolonien zu einem einheitlichen Riesenreich, dem Greater Britain, zusammenwachsen wird — das liegt außerhalb menschlicher Gesichtsweite. Zunächst wohl wird in dem Verhältniß beider Länder zu einander keine Aenderung eintreten. Aber dann bleiben auch die Verpflichtungen Englands gegen Indien ungemein große und schwierige — Verpflichtungen, die einer der besten Kenner Indiens, der frühere Oberkommandirende, Feldmarschall Lord Roberts, wie folgt programmatisch formulirt:

die sich seit mehr als einem Jahrhundert wirksam gezeigt hat für die Wohlfahrt und Sicherheit der Millionen, über die wir herrschen und für die Festigkeit unserer eigenen Macht; wir müssen daher mit der äußersten Vorsicht jeden Vorschlag prüfen, der eine radikale Aenderung in den Prinzipien bezwecken möchte, welche bisher unsere Verwaltung geleitet haben. Wir dürfen nie die Thatsache aus dem Auge verlieren, daß die Interessen und Neigungen, die Sympathien und Vorurtheile dieser Millionen sehr von einander abweichen, ja oft einander zuwiderlaufen. In vielen Beziehungen liegt zwischen dem Muhammedaner des Punjab und dem Bengalen, dem Sikh und dem Madrasi, dem Pathan und dem Mahratten eine viel weitere Kluft als zwischen dem Engländer und dem Russen, dem Deutschen und dem Portugiesen, dem Griechen und dem Schweden, so daß, wenn die Leute von einer repräsentativen Verfassung nach englischem Muster reden, oder von „Indien für die Indier", ich immer gerne fragen möche, welcher Volksgruppe oder welcher Provinz man die Interessen der übrigen anvertrauen, wie man die ungeheure Menge, welche bas indische Reich bildet, als eine einzige geschlossene Nationalität behandeln möchte. Dieses erinnert mich an das Wort eines einsichtigen, wohlunterrichteten Eingeborenen aus Madras, der, nach seiner Ansicht über die Theorie des „Indien für die Indier" befragt, also antwortete: „„Gehen Sie in den zoologischen Garten und öffnen Sie sämtliche Käfige. Alle Thiere fallen übereinander her und über die Leichen der Zerfleischten schreitet der Tiger."" Unter dem Tiger verstand er die rauhen Muhammedaner des Nordens, die, in Gemeinschaft mit den übrigen nördlichen Völkerschaften Indiens, jene kriegerischen Eigenschaften besitzen, die dem friedliebenden, sanften Südländer abgehen, und denen er nicht widerstehen könnte. Die Moral dieser Allegorie ist, daß Indien nicht sich selbst überlassen werden kann, und daß eine überlegene Macht

die verschiedenartigen Rassen zusammenhalten muß. Die Macht, die Indien den inneren und äußeren Frieden bewahren kann, ist England. Aber die äußerste Vorsicht ist nöthig. Denn, obgleich England die Aufgabe übernommen hat, seinen östlichen Unterthanen die Segnungen westlicher Civilisation zufließen zu lassen und sein Regierungssystem den jeweils durch dieselbe Civilisation veränderten Umständen in den Lebensverhältnissen der Völker anzupassen, darf es nie außer acht lassen, daß die westliche Erziehung zur Zeit nur einen unendlich kleinen Theil der Bevölkerung beeinflußt, und daß die große Mehrheit in ihren Sitten und Gewohnheiten, in ihrem Fühlen und Denken immer noch dieselbe ist, die ihre Vorväter vor Jahrhunderten waren: Stärke, Ordnung und besonnener Fortschritt muß daher die Losung sein.

Anmerkungen.

[1] Als Quellen wurden vorzugsweise benutzt: Cotton, India (1883); Wheeler, Indian History (1892); Lyall, Rise of the British Dominion in India (1893); Baden-Powell, A short account of the Land Revenue and its Administration in British India; with a Sketch of the Land tenures (1893); Dadabhai Naoroji, Poverty of India (1888); derselbe: Speech, delivered in the House of Commons 14th August 1894. derselbe: Indian Exchanges and Bimetallism (1886); derselbe: Presidential Address, delivered at Lahore 27th December 1893; the Parliamentary Debates; mehrere Jahrgänge der „Weekly Times"; Macaulay, Essays; Green, A short History of the English People; M'Carthy, A History of our own Times; Seeley, The Expansion of England.

[2] Vergl. Baden-Powell, S. 5.

[3] Vergl. Parliamentary Debates, 2th June 1893, Kol. 128.

[4] Vergl. Lyall, S. 77.

[5] „Disguise the matter how we might, there is no hiding the fact that India is held at present by the sword." General Chesney in der Parlamentsverhandlung am 2. Juni 1893.

[6] Macaulay, Lord Clive, S. 11 (Tauchnitz Ed.). Bemerken wir nicht zur Zeit ein ähnliches Verhältniß in Aegypten?

[7] Der Maharajah, von dem hier die Rede ist, starb am 28. Dezember 1894.

[8] Sie beruht also ganz auf den Prinzipien des Absolutismus, wie ihn Hobbes lehrte. Vergl. Paulsen, Ethik, Bd. II, S. 496—498.

[9] In der allerneuesten Zeit scheint die Selbstthätigkeit der Eingeborenen in etwas zu erwachen, wie das die Ende März 1895 eröffnete Eisenbahn zwischen Tarakeswar und Magra beweisen dürfte. Es ist dies die erste Eisenbahn in Indien (mit Ausnahme der Lehensstaaten natürlich), die ihre Entstehung ausschließlich dem Kapital und der Arbeit der Eingeborenen verdankt. Vergl. „Weekly Times", 1895, S. 262 und 383.

[10] Deputy Commissioner heißt der oberste Distriktsbeamte in den sog. Non-Regulation Provinces (wovon weiter unten). Die Unterbeamten sind der Assistent Collector und der eingeborene Deputy Collector.

[11] To assess and to collect the Land Revenue has been the chief care of all past governments for many centuries; and for this purpose territorial divisions and official agencies have been devised; and these, however modified, still form the basis of modern arrangements, and naturally have affected all other departmental jurisdictions and official forms. To understand the Land Revenue System, is to gain a greater knowledge of Indian government than could be acquired in any other way.....; and the assessment and collection of such a widely levied impost demand an intimate knowledge of land customs and the social features of country life. Baden-Powell, l. c., S. 2.

[12] Ein ausgezeichneter Kenner indischer Dinge, der hervorragende Novellist Rudyard Kipling, sagt einmal: „Die Beamten in Indien thun ihre Arbeit, für sie giebt es nichts als Arbeit, nichts, das ihrer Arbeit gleichkäme. Hier ein Beispiel dieses Gefühls: Ein halbbürtiger Schreiber liniirte Formularien auf einem Steueramt. Er sagte zu mir: „Wissen Sie, was geschehen würde, wenn ich von diesem Bogen eine Linie wegnähme oder eine hinzufügte?" Und mit der Miene eines Verschwörers fuhr er fort: „Die ganze Finanzverwaltung in der ganzen Präsidentschaft würde aus den Fugen gehen. Bedenken Sie das!" Plain Tales from the Hills, S. 287.

[13] In allen Provinzen, mit Ausnahme von Madras, werden eine gewisse Anzahl von Distrikten — drei, vier oder mehr — in Divisions zusammengelegt, an deren Spitze ein Commissioner steht, der die Mittelbehörde zwischen dem Distriktsbeamten und der Regierung bildet.

[14] Vergl. hierüber und über das Folgende: Traill, Central Government, S. 109 ff.

[15] Vergl. Dadabhai Naoroji, Presidential Address, Lahore 1893.

[16] Vergl. Bibliothèque universelle, Octobre 1894.

[17] Am 12. Februar 1895 betonte der Minister für Indien, daß die einzige Taxe, die der indische Bauer nothwendigerweise zu zahlen habe,

die Salzsteuer sei, die sich auf ungefähr 5 Pence oder etwa 40 Reichspfennige pro Kopf belaufe. Parliamentary Debates.

[18] Der Gesamtaufwand für die Civilbeamten beträgt 11726000 Rupien, die Zahl aller Beamten ist: 7991 Europäer, 5347 Eurasier und 119514 Eingeborene. „Weekly Times", 1895, S. 127.

[19] 100000 Rupien = 1 Lakh; 100 Lakhs = 1 crore.

[20] Vergl. Bleibtreu, Persien, S. 111, 127, 130, 139.

[21] Vergl. Wheeler, Indian History, S. 93. Einige Bemerkungen bei Baden-Powell scheinen jedoch dem zu widersprechen. Vergl. z. B. S. 165.

[22] Vergl. „Times", 26. September 1894.

[23] Sir John Lubbock, The use of life, S. 141.

[24] Eine merkwürdige Illustration zu diesem Satze finde ich bei Alexander Burnes, Reise nach und in Bokhara ꝛc. in den Jahren 1831, 32, 33 (aus dem Englischen, Weimar 1834), Bd. I, S. 66. Dort heißt es: „Bei unseren Forschungen nach den Ueberresten der alexandrinischen Städte werden wir zu Betrachtungen über den Zustand des Landes in heutiger Zeit veranlaßt, und eine Vergleichung dieser letzteren mit der damaligen Zeit liefert ein merkwürdiges Ergebniß. Die Geschichtsschreiber berichten, daß Porus, mit welchem Alexander an den Ufern des Hydaspes kämpfte, ein Heer von 30000 Mann Fußvolk und 4000 Reitern, nebst 200 Elefanten und 300 Schlachtwagen, unterhielt, und daß er sämtliche benachbarte Völker unterworfen hatte. Gegenwärtig haben wir, wenn wir die Schlachtwagen in Kanonen verwandeln, damit genau die regelmäßige Streitmacht Runjeet-Singhs, des neueren Porus, welcher ebenfalls sämtliche Nachbarn sich unterworfen hat. Dasselbe Land wird im allgemeinen stets dieselbe Truppenzahl ernähren, sofern nicht die Bevölkerung durch zufällige Umstände vermindert wird."

[25] Vergl. Leopold v. Orlich, Reise in Ostindien, Bd. II, S. 27.

[26] In der Parlamentssitzung vom 21. Februar 1895 wurde die Erhebung eines Importzolles beschlossen.

[27] Einen beredten Ausdruck erhielten diese Klagen in der Eröffnungsrede Dadabhai Naorojis zum neunten Indian National Congress, abgehalten am 27. Dezember 1893. — Gerne ergreife ich diese Veranlassung, um Mr. Dadabhai Naoroji, dem ersten Indier, der je im englischen Parlament saß, meinen verbindlichsten Dank auszusprechen für die freundliche Hülfeleistung, die er mir durch Uebersendung einiger seiner Werke zu Theil werden ließ.

[28] Vergl. „Times", 15. Februar 1895. Angabe des Ministers.

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PREFACE.

The following letters from "Economist," an old English Officer of position and experience in the Punjab, to the Governor General on the Annexation of the Punjab form the third volume of the Punjab Series which was started in 1895—Vols. I and II having already appeared—and will, though consisting of only a few pages, be found to be interesting, showing the insight of the author into Native character, and the reasons that led the British Government to annex the Punjab. How far the facts have been found to be true, and the policy has succeeded, the reader will be able to judge for himself.

The third volume of the Series promised was "Cunningham's History of the Sikhs," but the importance and interest attaching these letters have actuated their being placed before the public earlier. The opinion of the "Economist" on the Sikhs is deserving of note.

THE PUBLISHERS.

ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAB.

LETTERS ADDRESSD TO THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, ON "ANNEXATION OF THE PUNJAUB," BY AN OFFICER OF PRACTICAL EXPERIENCE.

No. I.

My Lord—At last an instalment of long deferred success has attended your arms. Mooltan has at last fallen—and though the Commander-in-Chief has failed to "strike an effectual blow" he is still able to hold his own, and we may hope that sooner or later the Punjaub may be at your disposal—a conquered country. It is therefore well to consider what you are to do with it when you get it, and I hope you will appreciate my motives in tendering you a little advice. If so I may be induced to favour you occassionally with my opinion of men and measures. I know something of this part of India—something of the people—and something of the Officials who will be your instruments—all which knowledge is very much at your service. I shall commence with generals, and as I proceed I may afterwards descend to particulars.

2. The arguments in favour of annexation of the Punjaub are rather negative than positive—rather that no one can devise any other *possible* plan than that the acquisition itself is desirable. Doubtless the territory is large; the people within and around it are made of sterner stuff than those of our earlier possessions; and the revenue is not large in proportion to the area. Were it possible to sink the country into the ocean I am not prepared to say that it would not be expedient to do so; but as we can't get rid of it in this way it comes to the proposition that

some one *must* hold the great plain of the Indus. Is it better that we should do so, or that some once else should?

3. And here I must observe that I consider Scinde and the Punjaub, for political purposes, one. If we withdraw from the Punjaub to retain Scinde—isolated on three sides and exposed to the Beloochees on the fourth—a dead drain on the revenue of India and an utterly *objectless* possession—to retain Scinde under these circumstances would, I say, be too preposterous for argument. If, again, we retain the Punjaub, we shall naturally keep Scinde too —and it will be a useful and *indirectly* profitable possession. When, then, I speak of the Punjaub, I refer to the whole plain watered by the Indus and its tributaries.

4. The question now to be decided is no matter of petty policy—no mere affair of Dulleep Sing or Sir Frederick Currie, nor even a purely *Sikh* question. The Sikhs are the creatures of a day. Dulleep Singh is the creature of an hour. But it is now for you, my Lord, to fix the permanent limits of our Indian Empire. The pillars of Hercules must now be established. We approach (at least, I hope, we do) the termination of a struggle with the last great military power in India. To advance further into Asia were a folly not likely to be attempted after past experience. The great Empire of Hindoostan, differing in its parts, yet retaining a wonderful similitude throughout in the character, the habits, and the institutions of its people, is now our own. A lasting line of demarcation must be drawn; permanent landmarks must be set up; and then, having disposed of our external defences, we may turn to internal management, and do what we have never yet done—make the country *pay*. In truth it ought to pay, and more than pay, and there must be something rotten in the system, if the supreme rulers of India are obliged to borrow money at 6 per cent. I trust, then, that you will be satisfied with no *temporary* arrangement.

Take your life, but when you do take it let it be a permanent settlement of the question. Let us have no engagements for terms of years—no trusting to the chapter of accidents. Act as if your acts were to hold for hundreds of years. I am not going into Lord Hardinge's policy. This is a *fait accompli*, and we are now reaping the whirlwind. But this I will say that Lord Hardinge's plan, so far as the *mode* of governing the Punjaub went, admitted of argument. It *might* have been possible for Sir Henry Lawrence to have governed the Punjaub in the native form—but it is *not* possible that that policy should be justifiable which provided but for eight years, and did not *hint* at what was to follow. Yet 1854 is not so distant, and if there had been no rebellion—if the plan had worked perfectly—What then? Echo answers—what! There are no prophets in our days, and the world sees many changes. Our Indian Empire may stand or fall—your arrangements may exist through ages—or they may be swept away to-morrow—but at least let us have the *possibility* of success. Give us an intelligible theory—and we will be patriotic enough to hope that Britain may rule Hindoostan long enough to give it a fair trial. Patans, and Mahrattas, and Sikhs, one after the other, pass over the stage—but you must treat the Punjaub in a way that will be effected by no temporary changes. Hold it for good, or give it up for ever.

6. India may be said to have a double boundary. The great desert running up from the ocean to within 100 miles of the Hamalayas separates Hindoostan and the Dekkan from the Plain of the Indus. The line of defence between these countries may thus be reduced to the narrow neck between the desert and the hills—what now forms the Cis-Sutlej territory. Here exists no natural barrier (for I hardly consider the Sutlej or the Beas to be such), nor has art supplied the want by a chain of forts. It has

fortifications, and we possess none in this part of the country. The fact merely amounts to this, that the tract is narrow enough to be defended by an army in the field. Hindoostan can only be entered by a supperior force. The protecting army cannot be eluded. So long as we maintain in the Cis-Sutlej territory an army competent to meet all comers, so long is Hindoostan protected.

On the other hand, beyond the Indus we have a second boundary in the great mountain chain with which nature has hedged in India, as with a ring-fence. The boundary line is here much extended;—from the sea to Cashmere the distance is great. But then we have the defence of a natural mountain barrier. The mountainous country is too poor to maintain a force dangerous to us in the field. From a military invasion of Affghans or Beloochees we have nothing to fear; and to a foreign armament India is only accessible by one or two difficult passes—which if we defend with but a moderate force, no power can obtain entrance. You must now choose one of these two lines of military defence. Either occupy the Punjaub—withdraw from the Cantonments East of the Beas and Sutlej all troops but those required for internal administration—post along the line of the Indus the force destined for the general defence of the Empire, and be prepared on the occurrence of alarm to blockade the Khyber and the Bolan. Or if you are not prepared for this, withdraw from the Punjaub and Scinde—draw your military cordon across the Cis-Sutlej territory—build forts and toll off an army to be permanently stationed on the frontier, and at any time prepared to enact the scenes of '45-'46—to repel the occupants of the Punjaub whenever they may choose to measure their strength with us, but never again to cross the Sutlej.

6. I propose to consider,

First—Is it expedient to retain military possession of the Punjaub?

Second—If we retain military possession, in what form should the country be governed—directly by ourselves or in a native form?

Third—To discuss details of the western boundary, military and civil.

Fourth—If we annex the Punjaub—how is it to be administered?

7. The great question, after all, no doubt is—Will the Punjaub pay? and I therefore think it necessary to premise that I do not suppose, nor will I argue, that the Punjaub will pay *positively*—that it will defray the expenses of all the troops to be cantoned within its limits. Why the country which paid Runjeet so well should not pay still more powerful conquerors is not so clear—but that would involve a still broader question—our whole Indian system. Suffice that for the present at least we must take things as we find them—that under our present system the revenues of the Punjaub would not maintain the army—still it does not follow that the acquisition is a losing one. Wherever the frontier be fixed, the army occupying it must be charged to the general revenues of the country—and if, when we occupy the Punjaub, we are relieved from other expenses—if the revenue of the new country adds to our general rent-roll, and eliminates a considerable per centage of the cost of the occupying army—then may we hope that the finances of India will be put on a surer and a better footing, and a great *comparative* gain will be effected.

8. The occupation of a country depends on three considerations. 1—The difficulty of getting it. 2—The difficulty of keeping it. 3—The advantages derived from its possession. The difficulty of getting the Punjaub it is unnecessary for me to enter into. The force of circumstances has already decided that point. I do not anticipate that Shere Sing will be admitted to treat for the possession of the country. The die is cast, and the enemy in the field must be conquered.

9. The difficulty of keeping the country is a more fitting subject of argument. I believe that this difficulty has been very much exaggerated. Nothing is more firmly established by experience than the facility with which territory is retained when made our own—the indisposition of the people to *domestic* rebellion—and their inability to cope with troops unless they have some nucleus—some native army, with guns, discipline, and munitions of war. This fact could not be better exemplified than in the present year. The war has been protracted—there has been, if I may so speak, every encouragement to rebellion. Yet in the proper Sikh country there has been no popular war. The villages have not risen—the brothers and relatives of Shere Sing's soldiers in their villages of Mangha have taken no part in the fight. We are opposed but by the regular army which we left in existence, and, if reduced, yet capable of re-expansion by the return of absent soldiers to the nucleus which remained. If there has been a little desultry warfare it was but the last effort of Bedies and Gooroos and Rajas whom we had not quite stript of their resources It is perhaps fortunate that the *undecomposed* elements have once more been permitted to boil over. The bad humours have come to the surface and may now be eradicated. To be effectually conquered, a country must be twice conquered. It is in the nature of things that it should be so.

10. Whatever it may be geographically, the Punjaub is undoubtedly *ethnically* a part of Hindoostan. Its people, though more hardy are in all their moral and political characteristics the same. They are equally prepared to acquiesce in a foreign rule—equally accustomed to look on such as their normal state. The great mass of the population between the Jumna and the Ravee, and of that from which the Sikh army is chiefly supplied, is "*Jat*"—a tribe of whom it may be truly said that they habitually as much excel in the arts of peace as they occasionally do in those of war. They make good soldiers but equally good subjects.

With the exception of the castes of the Bunniah genus and small loose population of the towns, and the artificers and people of servile race in the villages, the remainder of the population is Mussulman—not turbulent pattans, but agriculturists of converted Hindoo castes—good cultivators and quiet subjects—with all the industry of Hindoos without their religious bigotry, and at the same time without the pride, *nationality*, and fanaticism of the Mussulman; in fact, a people who have *politically* ceased to be Hindoos without politically becoming Mussulmen—just the sort of subjects we want.

I do not refer to the *Un-Indian* tribes about Peshawur and the extreme frontier. Of them I shall more particularly speak when I come to the detail of the western boundary, and point out the coincident, ethnical, and geographical line which there exists. In the meantime, I assert that the population of the plains on this side the Indus is one eminently fitted to make good subjects, that it is ether '*Jat*' or agricultural Mussulman, and that both are all that we could desire. I have not mentioned the Sikhs because they must be separately touched on. I believe that I shall be able to refer the greater portion of them to the general Jat population, and I am of opinion that the remainder may easily, and at no great cost, be rendered quiet and contented like the petty Sikh Patteedars in the protected territory. But here it will be necessary to digress into a little episode to show who the Sikhs of the present day are; a subject on which much misapprehension exists, and upon which, with your leave, I will now enter.

ECONOMIST.

No. II.

A DIGRESSION SHOWING WHO THE SIKHS ARE.

MY LORD—It has been customary to suppose the Sikhs a separate tribe—apart from the population of the country, and separated therefrom by a well-defined, religious, and

political line. Now this may have been pretty correct in former times when Sikhs were Sikhs, and there was no mistaking them; but we shall go very far wrong, indeed, if we suppose that the standard at all applies to the mass of Sikh soldiers in the regular army formed and handed down by Runjeet Sing, and by which we are now opposed. The original founders of the Sikh religion designed it as entirely new and a *proselytising* creed, which might absorb both Mussulman and Hindoo. Circumstances soon placed the Sikhs in violent antagonism to the Mahamedans, and they naturally more and more drew towards Hindooism, and re-adopted the tenets and the prejudices which they had once abandoned. Gradually the boundary line between Hindoos and Sikhs became ill-defined, till eventually the distinction of castes has been admitted, and a man may now become a Sikh without ceasing to be a Hindoo. In fact the Sikhs are held together by no religious, but by a purely, *political* bond. Some go the whole-hog, and become out-and-out Sikhs, some become Sikhs for the time being, or just as long as it suits their convenience, some stop half way, call themselves 'Sings,' and let their beards grow—are Sikhs among the Sikhs—Jats among the Jats—but the distinction of castes is retained by all. Moreover, we see that the Lahore political union is composed not of Sikhs alone, but of people of all creeds. Altogether, I think I may safely assert that no peculiar Sikh religious fervour has anything to do with the valour displayed by the Sikh army. It is a political union and nothing more. The Sikh army is courageous, not because it is Sikh, but because its ranks are filled from a population capable of making good soldiers. It so happens, however, that the Sikhs have practically all the advantage of uniformity of caste, and freedom from inconvenient prejudices, because almost the entire mass of Sikh soldiers are 'Jats,' a people who rank very low as Hindoos, but very high as soldiers. That is the real secret of their strength. The Sikhs are

for practical purposes a confederacy composed of '*Jats*,' and we are now opposed by the same people who opposed us at Bhurtpoor.

Still I admit that there have been Sikhs—taking their origin from and allied to the population, and whose characteristics are more political than religious—but still forming a separate class, and to some extent a dominant one. These are the Sikhs as they existed 50 years ago, and we must analyse the Sikhs of the present day to discover who are true Sikhs, and who are mere Jat soldiers, drawn from the Jat villages, servants of the Lahore State—passing as Sikh for the nonce—but really forming no separate or dominant class. I purpose to show that the valour and strength of the Sikh army lies in the latter class, that they can easily be absorbed in the population from among which they came, and, by a few years of good management, may be made to disappear altogether, or to appear only as useful citizens.

But as the *real* Sikhs came first in point of time, I shall dispose of them first. Previous to Runject Sing's time, when the Sikhs were a political tribe of more or less importance, they had a peculiar organisation of their own. They seized on all they could get, and divided it with reference to the number of horsemen furnished by each. They left their original humble homes in the villages of Malwal and Mangha—spread themselves over the country between the Ravee and the Jumna—and became a dominant class. They had, however, no common head. When they had possessed themselves of all that they could obtain, they turned their arms against one another, and the 'good old rule the simple plan' prevailed in its fullest extent, and was the recognised law of the land. I need not more particularly describe the Sikhs as they then existed, for this has often been done before. Suffice it to say that, as is usually the case under such circumstances, the strong took from the weak—the stronger became stronger—and from them that had little was taken even that they had.

However, many were the ups and downs of fortune till there arose that great centraliser, Runjeet Sing—the greatest enemy of the Sikh confederacy. He founded an Empire by extinguishing and absorbing the Sikh Misals. That Empire is called Sikh because its head was a Sikh, and many of his servants and soldiers were Sikhs; but it in reality rested on the same foundation as that on which Indian empires have rested from time immemorial; not a *national* feeling, but the mere personal and accidental possession of a tract of country, and the power derived from its revenues.

My opinon is that the Sikhs ended where Runjeet rose. They in fact regarded him little more favourably than if he had been a foreign conqueror. So far as *his* power extended he completely deprived them of their possessions and their power. His conquests were at the same time the cause of the remainder of Sikh-land being taken under British protection. The strong arm of our Government interposed in the territory east of the Sutlej —violent changes were no longer permitted—and the whole became stereotyped in the particular phase in which we happened to find it at the moment of our interference. It is in the protected States, not at Lahore, that we must look for perfect specimens of the Sikhs as they were. Indeed the Cis-Sutlej territory comprised the larger and more important portion of Sikh-land—and setting aside Patteealee and the larger States, we have Misals, and Pattees, and many shared confederacies exactly as they were in the olden time—petrified and mummified, indeed, by long inaction—but as perfect as such petrifactions can be. And it is the best proof that there is nothing inherently untameable and turbulent in the Sikh disposition—seeing that for forty years these real and genuine Sikhs have been as quite and loyal as could be desired. Not even when the territory was invaded by the Lahore army did they in any instance attempt to be refractory. It will be remembered that I am talking of the

petty members of Misals and Pattees—not of the larger chiefs who individually hold considerable territory on the same footing as other independent princes throughout India. The one or two instances of bad disposition occurred among the latter class, and I believe that their hostility was popularly somewhat exaggerated. I am far from advocating the grant of considerable revenue and consequent power to individuals—a course which is merely creating a dangerous power at the expense of the State; but I think that where 20 or 30 strapping fellows, whose trust is in their own right arms, can be quartered on one, or two villages, and thereby kept quite and contented, the arrangement is a good one—and the example of many such instances in the protected territory shows how such real Sikhs as remain in the Punjaub can be easily and cheaply provided for. I am not prepared to say what their numbers are, but I imagine that it cannot be great. Runjeet utterly dispossessed and extinguished the greater majority of them. These who remained were taken into his service and very much changed their character. During the whole of Runjeet Singh's reign they have been gradually disappearing. He established a regular army, he entertained in his service, without distinction, Sikhs and Mahomedans, and Europeans; and he enlisted in his regular ranks the village 'Jats' of Malva and Mangha, who, serving a Sikh ruler, generally passed for Sikhs. But as I have already said, these people are quite different from the old Sikhs. They come from the villages on either side the Sutlej. They are members of the Jat village communities, and servants of the Lahore State, just as our Sepoys are in our regiments. One brother ploughs the paternal fields, while another has taken service at Lahore, and many have returned, both before and since the war, to resume their original functions. It is a remarkable fact that they really make the best cultivators.

willing to be controlled by their respectable elders—discover abuses and insist on reforms. But they exhibit no bad spirit. They have plenty of money wherewith to resume their agriculture, seem to have nearly enough of soldiering, and are well content to settle down. If they are but understood, if their grievances are attended to, and they are restored to that position in their villages, which they would have held had they not taken service, I make no doubt that the class will never be troublesome. Such are the *new* Sikhs—the flower of Runjeet's army, and our real opponents. Dissolve the Sikh army, and they are no more seen. Very different are the old Sikhs referred to above—the emasculated remains of a class which never in its best days could bear a comparison with Runjeet's regulars. They have but existed on his indulgence, and are found as Jagheerdar's Suwars, &c. They are not to be found in the ranks of the staunch infantry. They have existed too long to retain their virtue. A long course of idleness and opium has destroyed their energies, and they yielded the palm to young Sikh-land! Some among them may exhibit occasional courage and fanaticism, but it is not lasting.

This class then, I would, where necessary, dispose of by providing for them on a small scale like the Patteedars of the protected States.

To sum up the abstract of what I have said, is this—that the Sikh army is composed of two classes, the most important the regulars or new Sikhs—who will never appear without the nucleus of a regular army—and the irregulars or old Sikhs, much less important, who may cheaply be bought off. This I think will be found pretty near the truth. Of the old Sirdars some few entered on a new character under Runjeet, as servants of the State. Of these the most important is the Attareewalah family, now heading the opposition. It may be remarked, too, that the old Sikhs, driven to desperation, seem to do more this war than last. The regulars are reduced in numbers —but the Gorcharas who in '45-'46 never showed, this

year have done execution. However, it is like the flame which blazes before it is extinguished for ever. The majority of the servants of the Durbar, and of the Durbar itself, are mere creatures of circumstance utterly without a nationality. Tej Sing, the late Sikh Commander-in-Chief, is a Brahmin of Seharunpore, who served Runjeet and became a "Brahmin Sikh." From such people we have nothing to fear, nor need we go to any great expense in providing for them. In short, the Lahore monarchy is like any other native kingdom. If we do but dissolve it, in a few short years the place whereon it stood shall know it no more, and so I end my digression on the Sikh history.

ECONOMIST.

No. III.

MY LORD—12. When I digressed I was discussing the question of the difficulty which we should experience in keeping the Punjaub. This is in fact the most important point of all, and that on which the whole question turns, for it is the apprehension of this difficulty which has so long caused hesitation. "We are much afraid of the turbulence of the inhabitants. There might be peril in our imposing on ourselves the duty of keeping the whole territory in obedience to our rule." Thus reasons the cautious statesman. My object is to show that the difficulty—the turbulence of the inhabitants—is for the most part imaginary; that if we once make the Punjaub our own, and no longer leave the nucleus of a native army, that country may be kept with the greatest ease—almost as easily as our older possessions.

I have tried to show that the mass of the population is by no means turbulent—that they are, on the contrary, good cultivators and quiet subjects. I have explained my belief that the Sikhs of the present day may be divided

absolutely intractable, but that such as exist in the Lahore territory may be easily provided for, and kept quiet like the Cis-Sutlej Patteedars; that the strength of the Sikh power consists in the new Sikhs of the regular army; that these form no separate class; that they are not individually turbulent by birth, education, and disposition; but merely in their collective capacity as the Pretorian guards of a falling empire—an army unbridled and uncontrolled since Runjeet Sing's death, and turbulent merely as all armies will be under such circumstances. I have stated that these men do, in fact, come of an orderly and industrious race—that each has his own place in his own '*Jat*' village community—and that they can and do return to their original occupation as cultivators of the soil. In this respect they possess a great advantage over the other military classes with which India has abounded. They have indeed a singular aptitude for agricultural pursuits which they have inherited as their birth-right—and they can be dispersed and absorbed not only *as* easily, but *very much more easily*, than any army which ever existed in India. If any (and they will be but a small proportion) still prefer military service to enjoying in retirement the good things which years of misrule have thrown into their hands, they may serve us just as well as they did Runjeet Sing. The Sikh frontier regiments have behaved well—and if but a small proportion of them are old soldiers of the Lahore army, it only shows that the handsome pay and easy service were not a sufficient inducement to draw out men well to do in the world, and who had had enough of soldiering. Lord Hardinge was determined to have Sikh regiments—and certainly the number of disbanded or resigned soldiers in our territory was very great; but one had married a wife—another had brought a field—a third was putting forth a claim to take place as one of the elders of his village—and the commandants of the new regiments (appointed before men were found) were obliged to put

recruits, and enlisting, as Sikhs, men who only became Sikhs on entering the corps. However, they are none the worse for our service for that. They are of the same class from which the Sikh soldiers sprung. I only mention the matter to illustrate what I have said of the origin and pursuits of the new Sikhs. I may add that a sufficient number of the native officers, &c., of these regiments are old Lahore soldiers, to show that there is no objection to their serving us and remaining faithful in trying times, where a sufficient premium in pay and promotion is offered to make it worth their while. But the fact is, they generally do not want service unless they are bribed into it. It is enough for us if we offer fair terms to such as cannot settle to any other occupation, and would otherwise become *mauvais sujets*; but their number is very small indeed.

13. I hope then that the facts which I have stated are sufficient to bear out my assertion, that the population generally will be easily managed, and that the Sikhs are by no means an insuperable difficulty. My facts are in some degree at variance with generally-received opinions, and to test them you must look somewhat deeper than the surface of Courts and Camps. For their correctness I must appeal to a careful investigation of the *interior* of the people. I have derived my facts from experience of the most *practical* description—I have been behind the scenes—I have lived among the people—I have have had to do with them in their villages—in their homes—and in their fields. My knowledge, such as it is, has come to me through no second hand—but is derived directly from the fountain head. It would be out of place in a letter like this to go into technical details of each class and caste and sub-division composing an Indian population. You can hardly find time to go into such particulars and must depend on testimony for the general result. Suffice it that I intimately know the different items of the population of of Mangha and Malwa, and the countries from which the

Sikhs sprung, and over which they have ruled ; and I am thoroughly convinced that no population in India possesses a larger proportion of industrial elements and a smaller proportion of elements of an opposite quality. The old Indian system of village communities is yet in full force. Each has its own internal constitution—each is independent of the other—each pays its Revenue to the powers that be, and cares not to enquire too curiously the source from which that power was derived. Such is the people which I recommend to your adoption—and in the people I include the Sikh soldiers and other servants of the Lahore state who are drawn from the general population.

I have already said that I do not include the tribes of un-Indian race in the Western Hills ; therefore let not these be taken as an exception or objection to what I have said. I shall hereafter propose to draw the line so as to exclude these unprofitable clans—to make them over to their Native chief, to whom, as to every body else, they will be rather a source of weakness than of strengh.

14. I have hitherto confined myself to the Sikhs, because they alone are new and singular ; but the Lahore Army and state (by state I mean the individuals who draw the Revenue of the country—their instruments and dependents) contains a large body of that miscellaneous class which is found in the service of every Indian power, doubtless much more numerous than the whole body of Sikhs real or nominal. Of them it would be useless to treat more particularly. Of such classes there has been abundant experience in the many states which have been absorbed in British India—and we know how speedily they disappear. The rapidity with which all traces of a former system melt away is marvellous. Many are the instances which could be pointed out in which, but a few years after the establishment of British rule, it is impossible by the minutest search to discover or imagine what

look at. I would only warn you against mistaking for the *nobility* of the country paid servants of the state, for the most part aliens in blood and in feelings, and urge that it is unnecessary to expend the Revenue of the country in giving to such people a permanent provision, which can do no good, and may some day be turned to harm in their hands. Do not *buy* the consent of such people to a "treaty of annexation." Take a more straightforward and wiser course. In regard to those who have really some claim to be considered the *nobility* of the country—Sikh Chiefs, and Jagheer-possessing Sodies, Gooroos, &c.,—I would only say, keep them down as much as possible. A well satisfied and *unimpoverished* nobility may be all very well to European notions, but, if we are to rule in Asia, we are much better without them. They have become separated from the population. If they retain their revenue, each becomes a petty state in himself and deprives the "*suzerain*" of his rightful revenues but to retain the power of doing mischief when opportunity offers. It is no question of "*property.*" A portion of the revenue of the state has been made over to the favourites of the monarch, just as much as if it were a monopoly of sweet wines in Elizabeth's time, and when the state from which they drive it falls, they fall too. Such people should be reduced to a reasonable subsistence, so that they may neither be driven entirely desperate, nor retain more than is good for them and for us.

The petty Sikhs, the remains of the old confederacies of whom I have already treated, are a different class. They pretend to no more than a mere subsistence, and that, with or without service, it may be well to give them. The revenues of the Durbar, and of the fatter Chiefs, will be sufficient without trenching on the scanty pittances of these petty feudatories who have been already sufficiently reduced.

15. If then you are satisfied, that the elements of the

Empires which have preceded it—that the old Sikhs are but the shadow of their former selves, and neither difficult nor dangerous to deal with—that the new Sikhs are but individuals drawn from the general population—and that that population is neither turbulent nor troublesome—if, I say, you are satisfied on these points you must be convinced that there is no *internal* difficulty in keeping the Punjaub. I have made my statement and I leave it to you to verify my facts.

It is unnecessary to combat the argument, that the events of the present year stultify my reasoning. The Lahore State and Army has never been dissolved. That army is engaged in a last struggle for existence. I argue on the supposition that the Army is dissolved, and the Punjaub held by British Forces.

16. It remains to consider *external* difficulties to holding the Punjaub. These I believe to be very small indeed. The country beyond is one which yields little revenue, and supports but a limited population. It affords every facility for *defence*, but possesses not the resources of *offence*. Runjeet Singh in the Punjaub, and Sir Charles Napier in Scinde, have proved that the wild Hill tribes can be kept within their own limits. We know that the Affghans cannot cope with our Troops in the Field. They want resources—they want discipline—they want the munitions—and they want unity. The Sikhs could beat them well, and I have no doubt that in the open plain half a dozen British Regiments could utterly rout and disperse any Affghan Army which could be brought against them. In short, the Affghans are by no means formidable neighbours—and they know our power too well to be likely to precipitate themselves against it on equal terms. I have moreover little doubt that by bribing them with Peshawur, &c.—territories which would be no loss to us

leave it possible for them to coquet with Russia or other distant power. A wholesome dread, no less than benefits received, would effectually keep them in check. Although the length of frontier is great, the points at which invasion is possible are in reality few and far between, and those points and passes are easily guarded. I conclude then that we have nothing to fear from the Affghans and other tribes bordering the Punjaub—and that very moderate defences will suffice. To meet the Sikhs or other occupants of the Punjaub we must always be prepared with an Army of at least 59,000 men. A very much smaller number will be ample to repel the Affghans, &c.—and we have, therefore, in holding the Punjaub, a very great advantage in the matter of external defence. I have not referred to the defence against more distant and more powerful enemies, because that is not a local question, but one which concerns India in general. I shall, however, shortly have occasion to refer to the facilities of defence against such enemies as one of the advantages of the possession of the Punjaub.

I have considered, then, successively, the internal and external difficulties of keeping the Punjaub, and I come to the conclusion that neither the one nor the other are considerable, and that in fact the country may be easily kept.

I now proceed to specify the advantages to be derived from its retention.

17. The advantages of occupation I take to be as follows:—

I.—It is easier (and especially so in India where the principle of passive obedience to the powers that be is so universal) to hold in check a *disarmed* than an *armed* people. In the one case we must be prepared to keep in check the native rulers of the Punjaub, provided with all the materials, means, and appliances of war. In the other we have but

II.—A considerable force must always be maintained on the Frontier of India. If this force occupies the Punjaub, the revenues of that country are available as an offset to meet a portion of the expense. If it is not occupied, the *whole* expense must be defrayed from the revenues of India within the Sutlej.

III.—By taking the Punjaub we arrive at the natural boundaries of India, and obtain a final settlement of the question. If we do not, it is still an open question—again and again will difficulties arise—every year will bring changes of circumstances and renewed discussion—and we shall never rest till it is done.

IV.—We shall be enabled to establish a sure defence against the hordes of Central Asia—and the Russians, or any one else who may have an eye to the East. With our out-posts at the mouths of the passes, it is absolutely and *definitely* imposible that any power can obtain entrance into India—whereas on the Sutlej we have no defence, and the slightest alarm must be the signal for a *preliminary* contest—a Punjaub war or a Caubul expedition.

V.—Independent of the expense and anxiety of always keeping an army in the field, east of the Sutlej we have, as a question of humanity, to choose between a state of continual war and a secure peace. If we retire from the Punjaub to maintain a continually armed defence, the Punjaubees may be beaten back one year, but they will come again and again, and interminable bloodshed must result.

VI.—Lastly comes the *reductio ad absurdum* argument—perhaps in this instance the most powerful of all. If we do not keep the Punjaub—what then? We must abandon the country and retire

—our prestige will be ruined—and our name will lose its spell. We shall have commenced a backward career. Is any one prepared to advocate this?. I believe that it is impossible. We have gone too far—we cannot withdraw. The best reason for keeping the Punjaub is, that we cannot give it up—and it is an argument which no one gainsays. If any one will say that we should retire altogether, let him stand forth!

18. These are my reasons for retaining possession of the Punjaub. I think they explain themselves. It will be remembered that I am arguing on the *comparative* advantages of the only two possible boundary lines—I have premised that we must select either one or the other. Argument were superfluous to show that a divided military power cannot succeed. That has been a hope finally settled by our present experience. We must take one course or other, and, however little we may covet the Punjaub, I think it is hardly possible to avoid being convinced that occupation is a much less evil that a contrary course. I call it an evil as a concession to those who *will* view it in that light—but I do not myself think it so: and, be the existence of the country in itself an evil or a good it is enough for our purpose that we have, on the one hand, a quiet and disarmed country—yielding a considerable revenue—forming the natural boundary of India —and a sure defence against external enemies—peace secured to India—and the ignominy of retreat averted. On the other hand—an armed and *too* formidable neighbour, causing us great expense in the maintenance of an army of observation—and yet dividing with us the proper Empire of India—a stepping stone and an aid to foreign invasion—a source of continual bloodshed—and a lasting instance of our inability to cope with a persevering foe. Look on this picture, and on that. Say which you will choose.

19. To keep the thread of my argument I am obliged to go back many times, as in the matter of the house that Jack built; but it must be done—so I will remind you that I am discussing my first subject—"Is it expedient to keep military possession of the Punjaub?" That to that end I have shown—that we must get it whether or no—for we are now in the arena—that it is not very difficult to keep it—and that great *comparative* advantages will be derived from keeping it—all which being admitted I think we may fairly proceed—*therefore* it is expedient to occupy the Punjaub. *Quod est demonstrandum.* I hope we have settled that to our mutual satisfation. The Punjaub must henceforth be held by British troops, and by British troops alone. No soldier of any native power must be permitted to exist. The occupation must be complete as to manner—no *concurrent*, but an *exclusive* possession—complete as to place—of no *portion* of the country, but of the *whole*—complete as to time—for no term of years, but for a *permanency.* Of all things—above all things—and before all things—keep continually in mind that there must be no half measures. Rather—a thousand times rather—retire from the country altogether than abate one iota of *the whole animal.* Have a starling taught to halloo in your ear unceasingly "no half measures"—"no half measures"—I believe you are now pretty nearly cut off from the *possibility* of compromise—so think no more of it. Look straight forward—consider that you have burnt your ships (or that the Sikhs have burnt them for you), and all will become easy.

So much for the military question. I shall leave the Civil Government to be touched on another day.

ECONOMIST.

No. IV.

MY LORD—If we retain military possession of the Punjaub, in what form should the country be governed? Directly by ourselves, or in a native form?

20. You may suppose, from the line I have taken, that I will no more admit the propriety of compromise in the form of civil government than on the question of military occupation. Lord Hardinge's most *directly* fatal mistake was military. If he had abolished the Sikh Army, and occupied the forts, appropriating the money saved to the payment of our troops, his scheme of governing in a native form might (if conducted with greater system and discretion than was always the case) have stood for a time. Still, to adopt half measures in civil affairs would be a blunder second in importance only to a similar course in military affairs. I am not one of those who believe that every native government is necessarily and invariably atrociously bad. The country may sometimes prosper under native rule, for it is an unexplained and inexplicable truth that natives generally like to be bullied *in moderation* in their own way, nearly as well as to be particularly cared for in ours. With some good points, the native system has many faults. Still, it cannot be denied that ours has also many and serious defects of inadaptation of the country, and it comes, like many other similar questions, to this, that a good European is better than a bad Native Government—a good Native Government better than a bad European Government. A Native Government may therefore be good or bad. A double Government is most assuredly and *unmitigatedly* bad. Of that be well convinced. It is simply a combination of the evils of either system without one redeeming point. If the Punjaub must be abondoned, we know the extent of the evil, and another Runjeet may some day spring up; but if you attempt a double Government, the evil is a wasting canker. By all means adopt and engraft upon our own the best parts of the native system of administration, but attempt not to make *concurrent* two incompatible systems. It is the worst kind of political immorality, the worst time-serving, the greatest injustice to the country and to the people, which would sanction any such arrangement. The subject has been so often discussed in

this light, that it will not be necessary to go over very fully all the arguments on the subject. Certainly, all experience is against it, and of late, I am happy to say, almost all opinion too. Yet, strange to say, men often for long follow in practice that which has been already exploded in theory, and it is well that you should hold yourself warned against it, I hope and believe that the time for such things has gone by. It is almost the only *compromise* which is open to you, and it is doubtless tempting. Tej Singh and Deenanauth might be thus bought over to a new treaty, and the Duleep Singh and Brummagem morality difficulty would be got over in a way very satisfactory to Exeter Hall. But I hope that you are above such dishonest and shallow farces. You must be convinced that the treaty presents no real difficulty, and that it is your duty to act boldly for the best. You cannot neglect *all* experience, and I need not repeat the many often quoted instances. The latest experiment at Lahore itself is anything but calculated to encourage its repetition—and I believe that the fault lay much more with the system than with the individuals. Sir Henry Lawrence, in spite of all that has been said, is a man of talent and very great energy. Sir Frederick Currie is by no means a bad man of bussiness. But neither had it in his power to introduce any *system*. In fact, the native Government was utterly disorganised, and no other was substituted. If there had been any plan of Government, proper officials would have been appointed and would have made the most of their plan. But the Resident and his Staff were to give advice—and that is a duty for which any one is good enough. It require no particular qualifications. It is quite unnecessary that a man should have drugded in a Cutcherry—or that he should know anything about the country respecting which he is to advise; or, indeed, that he should have any particular knowledge of anything at all. Nott's description of Politicals may be somewhat exaggerated, and there has no doubt existed in India a school of *Political* Officers of considerable exiper-

ence and merit in their own line—but I must say that the modern style of Political nondescripts, who cover the face of the Punjaub, I do not comprehend. I don't blame those who put their friends into the appointments. If Government choose to make appointments, the duties of which are perfectly undefined and unintelligible, and for which no qualifications in particular are required, I don't see why Lieutenant Jenkins, who is the Resident's friend's friend, should not be made a Political, rather than Lieutenants Smith, or Brown, or Jones, who are nobody's friends. Any man is good enough for a Political. It is one of the few things to which there is a Royal road, viz., through the columns of the *Government Gazette*. Hence it is exceedingly natural that half the ambitious young gentlemen of the Indian service should be quartered on the Punjaub where they are to distinguish themselves. It is a sort of "immortality made easy." Their numbers are now much beyond calculation. A few were made *pucka* Politicals—then came extra and tempory Assistants—then whole files were "placed at the disposal of the Resident"—and lastly, the barriers seen to have been burst, and all kinds of people have slipped, or pushed, or insinuated themselves into the Political Heaven. At least, so it would seem, for it is quite startling the way in which mysterious and hitherto unheard-of Politicals start up in every corner, by twos and threes, to be chronicled in the pages of the *Delhi*—and, in truth, one way and another—getting up conspiracies or suppressing them—taking forts or keeping them—fighting battles and wigging kardars—they have hugely illustrated themselves. Still I have yet to learn that the Punjaub is governed. I can compare the system to nothing but Monsieur Ledru Rollin's Commissaires. A Political is sent down to the provinces as a sort of Governor, Commander of the forces, Judge, and corrector of abuses—all rolled into one. The said Political knows about as much of the Revenue system,

things are none the worse for that. A Political is a Political all the same—and he is omnipotent. He flies about from place to place. The kardars look on and admire. Still the twenty-two lacs is not paid up—the country is not contented—and the system is not understood. And it never will be otherwise with a double Government.

21. There is nothing on which so much depends as the feeling of self-responsibility. If the natives are left to themselves, they feel that everything rests with themselves, and they are not altogether depraved. Take away this feeling—support them with a military force—interfere vexatiously in their civil system—and they become but the corrupt instruments of a corrupt system. They lose all power of doing good, and but apply their remaining strength to do unmitigated evil for their own selfish and sordid ends. I utterly deny the *possibility* of a respectable native Government supported by our troops and overridden by our Politicals. If you take away the "*sanctions*" (to use a juridical phrase) to good conduct, you must also take away the power and reduce them to a subordinate position. Nor will it mend the matter to reduce the Political Staff. The natives cannot consider themselves the rulers of the country. They will look on their position but as a fortunate opportunity of acquiring plunder, and their exactions will but be more uncheeked.

22. Another obvious suggestion would be to get a superior class of Political Officer, men who could really perform the duties assigned to them. But this, I fear, is impossible. In the first place, you can't define the duties, and they are so multifarious and peculiar that you could find few men really fit to perform them. Next, where you have no standard of qualification, you cannot prevent abuses.

No compromise will succeed. You must make up your mind. If you keep the Punjaub, it must be in our own name, and you must strive to do justice to the country,

both a crime and a blunder. To retain a native Government, is but to incur all the responsibility, anxiety, and difficulty of governing, without obtaining any of the advantages either to ourselves or to the country.

23. The expense is a powful argument against a native form of Government. We must be prepared to maintain a Native Court—Native Chiefs—Native Pageants—half the revenue of the country must be wasted in Jagheers. In short, we must give up all hopes of deriving any considerable surplus revenue. On the other hand, if we take it into our own hands, the civil expenses may be kept within twenty per cent. of the gross income, and the remainder will be credited to the military department. We should, moreover, leave the materials of disaffection and rebellion, which in our own hands would be utterly extinguished. A native with money and followers, has always a certain power, and, though they could do nothing in the face of our regular army, they must be watched, and would distract us in time of need. The sort of quasi-national feeling which exists in a native state, the *esprit de corps*, and remembrance of more powerful times, would necessarily be retained.'

The people of the country would not feel themselves thoroughly our subjects. They would be exposed to the evils of either system; they would be serving two masters. Unquiet and uncertainly must prevail, and all progress be much retarded.

24. But I know not why I should advance many arguments against the double system, for I have heard literally none in its favour, unless that to which I have already alluded, that it would enable you by a miserable subterfuge to plaster over the treaty, a course which I sincerely believe you will not stoop to. Otherwise I know no possible object which could be proposed by such a course. The general indisposition to the appropriation of territory which had long prevailed is wearing away.

time immemorial might is right, we having the greatest might have also the best right—that when, in the fair course of war, we become possessed of territory lately held by the conqueror of a day, it is no accursed thing, but rather that which it has become our duty as well as our right to hold. We have ceased to acknowledge the divine right of Kings in Europe—and I never could discover why every Oriental Potentate, who yesterday deprived some one else—or rebelled against his liege master—or found the ground empty and quietly took possession—why every such individual should be considered to have an indefeasible, perpetual, unlimited right, of which he cannot be deprived but by the farce of pretended treaties. To act thus is but putting ourselves from the very best ground to the very worst. No sensible man would doubt our right to conquer India. No honest or honourable man would found his right to the country on the treaties drawn up for the edification of Europe. Runjeet Singh deprived his neighbours and founded a state. That state has gone to war with us. When we obtain the territory, seek not to found your right on treaties.

In regard to the particular treaty made by Lord Hardinge, it must be admitted that it was an absurd one. Duleep Singh, being a minor, could do no wrong—so that it was a one-sided obligation. All the Members of the Durbar and Chiefs who have any nationality have made one more struggle in the field. Duleep Singh is a prisoner —and no one will be so preposterous as to look on Deenanauth and Tej Singh as the "State." The treaty has therefore *ispo facto* ceased to exist.

Can you then hesitate? I hope that you will not. In whatever way and on whatever principles the territory may be administered, let it be avowedly and honestly on our own account. I would employ respectable natives, and I think that you may much improve by borrowing many thing from the natives, and dropping many things

I shall go when I come to treat of the mode of administration. In the meantime I but advocate the straightforward course of declaring the country our own, to be administered as shall appear best for our own benefit.

ECONOMIST.

No. V.

ON THE DETERMINATION OF THE WESTERN BOUNDARY, CIVIL AND MILITARY.

MY LORD—25. When I proposed to myself this subject, I had hoped to be able to obtain some assistance in working out the particulars—for I have not that intimate personal acquaintance with all the different tribes on the frontier which I could wish; nor indeed am I properly up in the minute details of the physical geography. I have not found the means of adding to my knowledge, but still I imagine I know enough of the main feature to guide me in suggesting the general principles on which I think that you should proceed, and I shall therefore adhere to the plan which I originally sketched out. Farther details you will doubtless have it in your power to command, when you come to the practical settlement of the question.

The plain of the Indus is bounded throughout by a mountainous country, and at this point there is also, as I have already noticed, a well marked ethnical line. A complete change of race takes place. The people whom we now meet differ in all their characteristics from the people of India. In India itself, although there are several Mahommedan classes professing the religion bearing the name, and in some degree assuming the character of foreign races—yet they have in fact, socially and morally as well as in their blood, become amalgamated in the country of their birth. In spite of outward differences, the Hindostanees are in essentials one people. It is very different when we overstep the boundary. The tribes surrounding Peshawur are other in their habits, in their political in-

not the principle of *passive obedience*; they have not the same industrial organization. They are a vagabond race, who have a mortal aversion to pay rents, and a competent skill in the use of matchlocks and swords. A Yoosufzaee, with his peculiar appearance and language, trailing matchlook, dirt, impudence, and utter faithlessness, is about as unpromising and undesirable a subject as we could wish to find. Moreover, the country in which these tribes are found is far from productive. It never could yield a revenue which would pay half the expense of collection. You will, therefore, hardly think of extending your tax-collecting machinery into such unprofitable soil.

26. I do not think that it would be expedient or politic to exclude from our rule any portion of the country which properly forms part of India, and which at any rate includes all on this side the Indus. I know that rivers do not bound races—but it so happens that on the other side of the Indus come the hills, and the change of races takes place; so I may speak generally of the line of the Indus—leaving as I have said, farther details to be settled hereafter, and as a good Political and Police boundary line is here found, I think that the limit of our Civil administration may with advantage be fixed on or near this line.

27. It is not the least inconvenience of the peculiar and protracted style of warfare in which we have for so many months indulged, that our relations with the tribes which had been subjugated by Runjeet Singh have become very complicated. After having stirred them up to rebel against the Sikhs unassisted by our troops, how we are to persuade them to receive as the price of their exertions a yet heavier yoke I don't know. Abbott's Hazarehs and Edwardes' Pathans can hardly consider themselves to be fighting merely on our account. They look on it as an opportunity of regaining their inheritance. It is fortunate, therefore, that their position may enable us to get rid of

side I suspect the cheapest course will be to excuse them altogether from the payment of *rent*. That is the best chance of securing their affections—or if it don't do that, they will at least always be so hard at work fighting among themselves for the proceeds, that they will have no time to give us any trouble.

28. The first hilly country is that between the Jhelum and Attock. This is undoubtedly an integral part of India and must be held. It may not be a paying country, but you cannot grudge a moderate expenditure for the possession of the very gates of Hindoostan. It is a sort of outwork against all enemies—and there are no serious difficulties in the way of its retention. Its extent is not very great, and our Frontier forces might be cantoned within its limits. They would have the Indus in their front—and for *defence* the nature of the country is an *advantage*. In one portion of this territory are the Hazarehs, whom Goolab Singh could not manage, and who have consented to rebel under Abbott against the payment of their Revenue to the Sikhs—for that is the real nature of the defence which Abbott has carried on so well and successfully. A refusal to pay is one of the few favours which they will always be ready to grant on the least encouragement, and as we can't decently ask them to pay up now, we must just conclude the matter by removing the bone of contention and exempting them from rent as I have above suggested, and they will then give little trouble. They cannot be made over to Goolab again—after what has passed—and though in regard to that Potentate what is done is done, and I am not going to re-open that question, it would hardly do to entrust him with the keys of the gate of India. He might some day take a bribe and let in some one whom he ought not. I don't know that the arrangement of setting him up was bad. His country would not pay, and when we advance to Attock it will be isolated. But he must be an insolated fendatory—not a

29. But what are we to do with Peshawur and the other similarly situated territories? They are eminently subject to the disadvantages which I have pointed out. They have no defence, but are exposed to invulnerable assailants—the dwellers in the hills. Every one who has held them has been constantly in hot water. The Revenue must each crop be collected by Regiments of Infantry, and order (or rather disorder) must be kept by shifts utterly beneath our dignity. It is, therefore, highly inexpedient to attempt to hold in our name the territory in the outskirts of the hills.

But although it is not easy to hold this territory, it is very easy to invade and at any time take possession of the sub-montane portion of it. It cannot maintain a regular army of any strength. While, therefore, our cantonments are on the Indus it is completely at our mercy.

I would take advantage of this state of things to turn it to account in another way. I would bribe Dost Mahomed into friendship by giving him as a "fee" from us, and on condition of an alliance offensive, and defensive the whole or most of the country between the Indus and his own possessions, I think this better than giving it to some separate Chief, because in the one case the advantage would be but negative—the getting rid of a losing concern; in the other we should have the very positive, and considerable advantage of gaining a direct and powerful hold on the Cabul Chief. Holding his best territory at our pleasure, we should but look to his feeling of self-interest, and we might reasonably demand important concessions in virtue of our gift. Sultan Mahomed has committed himself, but the "*Dost*" has not. He, of course, has taken Peshawur and Attock from *our enemies*—and I dare say he will be reasonable enough. He will rather take Peshawur, &c., as a gift than fight for them, knowing that to fight would be hopeless. I would, therefore, when you have beaten the

1. They are held as a fief of the British Crown, and homage done accordingly.

2. An alliance offensive and defensive—our enemies to be his enemies, and our friends his friends.

3. An Ambassador to be received at Cabul as between two friendly powers.

4. The Suzerain to have the privilege of marching through the territory to blockade the Khyber Pass, when such a step shall seem necessary.

5. The Dost distinctly to understand that he will be well served out if he is faithless.

Imagine there could be little doubt of the acceptance of these terms; and I say that, if the arrangements were carried out, our frontier would be much better and more cheaply secured than is otherwise possible.

The accession of territory would not be sufficient to render the Affghans a dangerous power. In fact, it would give them more work at home. The revenues would not be very large, and must always be fought for. The Dost would still be unable to support an efficient regular Army —and his irregulars never would dare to attempt to cross the Indus in the face of our troops. On the other hand, it would no longer be in his power to intrigues with foreign States. Our Ambassador in his Capital, and our troops close at hand, he would be too closely watched. No danger could approach us without ample warning, and abundant opportunity for making the moderate preparations which would be required. I therefore strongly urge that we take as much as is good for us, fix our proper boundary on the Indus—secure an ally with the remainder, and so we shall, at the same time, bound and protect with outworks our Indian empire. I commend my plan to your consideration. As I have gone so far, I will proceed one step farther, and suggest an Ambassador to Cabul. I would name Major Mackeson. Injustice was done to that officer in his last appointment. It was one to which neither his

him. But he is now employed in a way in which he is well fitted to shine, and if Government avail themselves of his services in the right way, he may yet add to a distinguished name. He is a man of *wonderful* temper and sound judgment; a remarkable linguist, and perfectly at home among the natives; the very picture of a real Political Officer. He may not indulge in sudden and original flights; but whatever he does he is sure not to go far wrong; and this, of all others, is the man for a diplomatist. I am not comparing him with Sir H. Lawrence. They are two totally different characters, and each shines in a way the opposite of the other. If I may so express it, they are "*incommensurate*" quantities. But I think there can be no doubt of Mackeson's peculiar fitness for an embassy to an independent power, and I have no doubt that he would succeed at Cabul.

30. One word on Military details. As in civil matters, I would draw the boundary line at the Indus, and advance a Political outpost by opening relations with Cabul—so in the Military dispositions, I would post the main line of defence on the Indus, and would set down as a suggestion (leaving its propriety to be determined by those better qualified to judge such matters), the propriety or possibility of throwing out a small advanced post —an outlying picket in the shape of a moderate and easily garrisoned Hill Fort, at the mouth of the Khyber—a sort of Porter's lodge, where would be kept the key of the gate, and admittance given or refused as we should desire. This would, of course, depend very much on the expense; but if we go about it in the right way, and avoid too large a scale, I imagine that, at an expense very moderate for the object to be effected, a Fort might be established in which a small garrison could bid defiance to the surrounding tribes, and could hold out against an invading power till relieved. We have seen to our cost at Mooltan the

contemptible Force. The Khyberees, few in numbers, and insignificant in themselve, have always been *invincible* from the accident of holding the passes, and, from Alexander to General Pollock, no one has passed, but by paying them. If we have not secured a footing, it might on an emergency come to a question of bidding against another power for the possession of the pass, and we might be outbid; whereas, if we have a paramount post, it can be at any time reinforced, and for *defence* we are independent of the Khyberees. The nature of the country is so favourable, that some hill could easily be crowned, provisioned, and garrisoned with the wing of regiment, which would be perfectly secure against a sudden assault. Witness the defence of Ali Musjid with a mere handful of men during the Cabul outbreak.

I would select the site on the *nearest* defensible point It could thus be at any time approached from this side and yet would give complete command of the pass.

The arrangement would be one which my proposed relation with Dost Mahomed (holding the country up to the Khyber as a fief) would quite justify; nor would it complicate our position, for the garrison would be perfectly isolated, and interfere in nothing so long as we are at peace with the Affghans. It would be quite secure against irregular assaults of unruly tribes, and if we should ever go to war, it is much better that we should find ourselves in so advantageous a position. We should but close the pass—send a divison to occupy Peshawar, and reinforce the garrison of the Fort, and there would be complete defence. The Fort would always be a nucleus on which to base, if necessary, more extended operations.

It would be quite unnecessary to keep up a line of "communications" with the Fort. So long as we are at peace, the customary reliefs would take place in terms of the treaty—if we go to war, it would hold out quite long

may be. It will not affect the disposition of the larger bodies of troops, and the principal cantonments will doubtless be on the left bank of the Indus. The advantage of the river in our front, is, that we are thus saved from all little war. The sub-montane country is left to the possessors of the hills, and it is not necessary for our troops to turn out against every robber chief or band of plunderers. We are separated from these people by a clear line, and till an invading foe attempt, or propose to attempt, the passage of the Indus, we need not fire a shot. Nor is any such foe likely to reach that river. If invasion is attempted, the troops march out of cantonments, and blockade the passes a few marches distant. Altogether, I think that the Indus is a most desirable boundary, political and military, and believe that, if our relations beyond the river are skilfully managed, India may be at peace on her Western Frontier for many a long day.

ECONOMIST.

No. VI.

MY LORD—I am perhaps premature in my present subject but I am not without hope that a battle may be immediately followed by a proclamation of annexation, and therefore it is well to be beforehand with those parts of my subject which must be decided at once. It might be more regular to particularise the work to be done before detailing the machinery which is to do it; but as in practice the machinery will come first—as you will first make the necessary appointments and issue your fuller instructions as you find opportunity to do so—I shall *commence* with a chapter on the machinery, with a few hints respecting things to be avoided—and shall hope that, a little time hence, matters may be in such train as to enable me to proceed more fully into the principles which I would urge

2. In arranging your administrative machinery, the great object (and that which has hitherto been most neglected) is to establish some regular *system*—a consistent —intelligible—working—centralising *system*. It has been too much the custom to make a number of appointments at hap-hazard, without any reference to the *relative* proportion, fitness, and correspondence of the different parts. The consequence has been that too much has depended on the character of individuals. One district is in one man's hands, and is managed according to his ideas; another, in another man's hands, is managed on entirely opposite principles. One commissioner interferes with his subordinates too little; another too much; and in too many instances there has been a total want of any *active* head of the whole—any general superintendence or centralisation whatever.

When the N. W. provinces were first taken possession of, a regular commission was appointed—a system was observed; and it may be remarked that, to the present day, these provinces are much ahead of any other part of India. There generally *has* been some attention paid to them, and the consequence is that the Agra Presidency is far in advance of Bengal, though a much later acquisition. But subsequent lapses of less importance have been differently treated. They have never been properly attended to—have remained neglected appendages of the supreme Government—and each has been fashioned at the caprice of an individual. Of all things avoid this. Try to centralise. Be careful that you do not put on one man duties which one man cannot perform; that, because a man is excellent in one line, you do not impose on him other duties of a different, if not incompatible, description. Provide an efficient head for an efficient system—not a *nominal* superintendence. Next, let the course of administration flow from the superintending head to the

intermediate link—everything that renders more distant the extremities of the machine—tends to weaken its operation and disconnect its parts. Refine not too much—abolish superfluous grades—have but one power to direct, another to execute. With but a nominal superintendence and a chain of subordinate grades, no uniformity can exist.

3. As the directing power in the Punjaub, I advocate a commission. I do not think the work can properly be done by one man. There is too much of it, and it varies too much in its details, to admit the belief that you can find any one man capable of getting through it all as it should be done. One man is possessed of energy—another of a judicial talent—a third of revenue details; but you seldom find them all united. Besides, as I propose to dispense with intermediate grades, and to centralise the superintendence in one point, it will be evident that the mass of business will be quite sufficient to occupy two or three individuals. The advantage of a board will be, that it gives unity, and yet leaves the power of apportioning the departments. You can thus have the best men of each department uniting their labours in a common centre. If the departments were separate they would clash. You must have one power; but it may be composed of two or three members. It were useless to multiply instances; and if experience on the N. W. frontier had not already proved the impossibility of one man doing justice to all departments, a very cursory examination may soon convince you of the fact. For how great is the difficulty and importance of the several subjects, each of which is sufficient to occupy, and will occupy for a long time to come, the best men you can find. Are not the political relations of the frontier territory most delicate and complex, and must not one man give much attention to this subject? Of our Indian police, we only know the lament-

have the Thuggee system to show that a police is *possible*. Its *general* adaptation remains, and to commence a better system in so large and important a country as the Punjaub, would be worthy the exclusive efforts of *any* man. Of the judicial system, it must be admitted that great and growing evil results from our Anglo-Saxon ideas; that we must not be hampered by rules of evidence; that the grand aim must be to discover the guilty—not as in England, only to protect the innocent.' What so fair an opportunity of reform as in commencing afresh in a new country? And is not this a labour worthy of *one* man? Our Indian revenue system has attained considerable perfection—but it is not learnt in a day. Its adaptation to, and introduction into, a new territory will sufficiently occupy, for some years, the best revenue officer you can get. The military details of the Punjaub will be novel and important, and some one must be charged with *this* duty. In short, to administer the country at all, you must have more than one individual; and to do justice to it, you must select several of the best officers to be found in India in the several departments.

4. There can be no greater error than to suppose that any one can administer new territory while the good men are drudging in our older provinces. In fact, new territory, more than any other, requires the very best men; and it would be better that an exchange should be made, and new men sent to old appointments, than that new men should fill new appointments. The first few years of our possession is the critical period which determines the character of a district; and a little money spent in obtaining efficient heads to the administration, and introducing an efficient system, will be well spent. Countries, too like children, are always aptest and most teachable in their infancy; and if, in the first years of the British Punjaub, you can lay the foundation of an improved administration,

provinces (having to unlearn as well as to learn), why then you, my Lord, will have deserved well of your country, and your reign will be an era in India.

I have already argued that the country is not necessarily unruly and turbulent, and I beseech of you not to abandon it to the capricious rule of any man, however distinguished in his way. Pay attention to the subject yourself. Do justice to it, and it will well repay you. You will not suppose, from what I have said, that I argue in favour of selecting men merely because they have had *experience* in our older provinces. We want something more than this. Experience gives habits and talents of business; but the previous system is by no means perfect, and you must therefore discover men who have also enlarged views of general polity, who deduce from their experience of what *is* rational views of what *ought* to be. You want not men of forms, but men of action--not lawyers, but jurists—not collectors, but men who understand fiscal affairs.

5. And now for the *personel* of the "Board of Commissioners for the affairs of the Punjaub." First, will naturally present himself, Sir Henry Lawrence; a very good man in his line, though, like every body else, he can't be universal.

It is a delicate subject to discuss his character. Controversies always run to extremes, and his admirers have made him absolute perfection, while his detractors show him to be all that is bad.

The truth is, that it is as absurd to deny him great energy, knowledge of the Sikhs, and of the countries on the N. W. frontiers of India, and a large share of natural talent, as it is to assert, that he is a man of particularly *mild* temper, or to suppose that he (or indeed any other man under the circumstances) could, single handed, and, in addition to his other duties, found and carry out an entire administrative and judicial system in a great country.

will only say, that it *seems* extremely improbable that he should have made such a blunder as to conduct himself in the way described by one writer, and I think the disclaimer of his assistants sufficient on that point. Of his temper, I may safely assert that the fact of his being a man of decidedly violent temper, is notorious and certain; and when the controversy raged, the great mistake of his admirers was in absurdly denying what is clear as noon-day, and so throwing discredit on their otherwise strong case. Still, I don't think this by any means a *fatal* defect, so long as Sir Henry keeps a decent curb on himself, and so regulates the time and place of his ebullition, as not to cause irreparable evil. That such instances have, or do occur, must be shown by specific proof. I am not aware that they have. Indeed, I consider his temper an essential part of the man; without that, it would be the part of Hamlet omitted. A very mild man is seldom very energetic. Wilfulness is the very soul of energy, and, in my opinion, energy covers a multitude of sins. Lawrence was a famous man before he was a great one, and on his previous fame his popular reputation chiefly rests. His subsequent career, and what he did for Lord Hardinge, and was made a K. C. B. for, rests between him and Government. I don't think he was a man for half measures, if higher powers were willing to consent to whole ones. At any rate he managed the Punjaub for two years, and must have large experience. In civil details, his experience is of a very limited description; but he will have enough of other matters on his hands, and, in virtue of his qualifications as well as of his present position, he would of course be one of the commissioners.

For another Commissioner, I would suggest your making it worth the while of Mr. Henry Lushington. He is just the kind of man you want; great natural talent, combined with great experience, and yet not bound down by the trammels of previous habit. He is a citizen of the world,

Sudder—that asylum of old women. It would be hopeless to suppose that he can ever raise the Sudder. Everything must be re-cast before that can be done. Better, then, do not harness him to the heavy waggon, which has already irretrievably stuck in the mud, but make him one of your new leaders, and start the Punjaub machine on a fresh score.

For a third Commissioner (if, as is probable, it is found necessary) pick out the best Revenue Officer in the N. W. Provinces—not a mere technical man, but a man who really *understands* his work, and if he has any experience of new territories, it will be an immense advantage. I am not at this moment prepared to say *which* is the best man, but you may doubtless find out. If it were not for being all Lawrences again, perhaps, considering Mr. John Lawrence's late experience, he would be as good a man as any.

I would make the General Officer commanding the troops in the Punjaub an *ex officio* member of the Board.

In selecting a Secretary to the Commissioners you would have an opportunity of infusing the best of the younger blood at your command.

6. I forgot to say what would be some compensation for the expense of so formidable a Board, that the present Cis and Trans Sutlej Territories would naturally be incorporated with the Punjaub. These territories have not hitherto been governed. They have been an appanage to the Resident at Lahore when the Resident has other fish to fry, and there has been no uniformity in their management, nor sufficient attention paid to them. They would, equally with the Punjaub, benefit by the new system, and the country managed by the Board would then be equal to a Government, and in its present critical circumstances more important, requiring greater care and greater attention to details than most Governments. That such a country should be governed without a sufficient provision,

be equally unjust to the Punjaub to refuse it a fair start, and to the Sutlej territories to let them continue in their hitherto neglected state.

7. A sufficient Board being provided and set in working order, I would, in pursuance of what I have already said, dispense for the most part with intermediate grades, and go direct from the Board to the actual executive Officers in charge of districts. There is, however, one duty of the very first importance to which I have adverted above, and which, from its nature, must be performed by one Officer, either one, of the members of the Board or a separate appointment—I mean the Superintendence of Police. It is only by uniting the strings in one hand that any system of Police can be attained. You cannot have a Police in each district. It must be one throughout the whole country to give any chance of success. Nor can it ever be properly attended to by a man who has other duties, and regards it as but a secondary consideration. It is the most difficult department of all, and which most needs amendment, and the Police of the Punjaub will be as difficult and important as that of any country in India. You must then have a Superintendent of Police who will, through the Magistrates, work the Police all over the country, as the Superintendent of Thuggee does his system all over India.

8. In apportioning executive districts, I think you should make them as large as you conveniently can, with the view of securing one good man with a sufficiency of assistants to the charge of each. Both a better management is thus obtained and much labour is saved. In practice it is almost as easy to superintend a large district as a small one. The same establishment, the same forms, and the same general rules, apply to both. The Board will also have a much easier task than if the country were split up into very many small and indifferently officered districts—and there will be a considerable saving in expense. The inconvenience to the people will be but very

long-suffering of suitors must be well aware that to walk a few miles additional is a comparatively *very* small hardship. For instance, a district with a 40 miles radius, would contain nearly double the area of a 30 mile radius—yet but a portion of the population would have to walk 10 miles farther—and it could be better worked at a smaller per centage of expense. I would therefore have the districts at least as large as those in the provinces.

9. The *executive* power, especially in a new country, cannot be divided. It would not do to separate Magistrates and Collectors, as in Bengal; for though the departments may be separately *superintended*, in the Executive to work properly they must be worked together—both that they may play to one another and that clashing may be avoided. The duties may be advantageously distributed, but one man must be master of all, and responsible for all.

10. The selection of Executive Officers is a task which requires much care. Having settled to have large districts, I assume that you can afford to pay them well, and get the best men. Unfortunately, people are too apt to run to extremes. You must avoid first the violent "anti-regulation" man—who will be guided by no rules of business or system—or orders whatsoever—but does or omits to do everything simply because it is forbidden or enjoined by rule. Such characters are not uncommon in non-regulation provinces, and once on a time the N. W. Frontier Agency seems to have exhibited some fine specimens of independent dispensers of justice. On the other hand, you must equally avoid violent "*regulation*" men—who without the least regard to the circumstances of the country or the fitness of things, forthwith turn every thing upside down, and will have all things immediately cut according to the pattern provided by the Sudder, for a very different state of things. They at once destroy all that has previously existed, and they generally signally fail in substituting anything manageable in its room. Too

many men are of one or other of these two classes; but you must find those who have on the one hand learnt habits of business, discipline, and subordination—and on the other have a tolerable share of common sense—can temper rule with reason—who do not blindly run through or against everything, but steer with an eye to the ground before them. I dare say that a sufficiency of such men can be found if you look for them. In appointing their assistants and subordinates, I would only ask you to remember that those who can't perform certain duties in other parts of the country, can't do so in a new territory. In fact, you should send *selected* men, not the worst or the most untried. Many people are sent to exercise power which would nowhere else have been committed to them for years. In my opinion, no one should be entrusted with powers in a new territory till he has proved his capability by exercising them satisfactorily somewhere else.

11. The same remarks apply to Uncovenanted appointments. There can be no greater mistake than making these a provision for young gentlemen who can't get anything better—without any standard of training, experience, of fitness. These appointments should be filled in the first instance by drafts from the provinces—where new hands would fill their places and be duly tested. It is difficult enough to *make* a new district under any circumstances—but when the instruments must be made first and the work done afterwards, it is a Herculean task, and the whole is thrown back for years. Of the subordinate native establishment I shall speak when the "annexation" is out, and I come to details.

12. In the meantime I have only one more piece of advice to offer. Let your first instruction to the new functionaries be—destroy not what you find in existence till you are prepared to substitute something better in its place. Do not sweep away every vestige of the native sys-

starting a system of your own. Do not drive away every respectable kardar, and substitute the first disreputable rascal who presents himself, merely because the latter is willing to dub himself Tehsildar or Thanadar. In the first place, take things as you find them. Make the most of the native system of accounts, &c., &c. Before you advance another step, first *thoroughly understand* facts as they are before you. Then *digest* your plans, and introduce your changes and reforms rationally, and with your eyes open. A change of name does not produce a new system —and creating a chaos is not necessarily the first step towards creating order. Yet *this is too often the course pursued*, as if no previous Government had existed; and the consequence is, that it is only by long and painful groping in the dark that a faint light is again obtained. Let it, then, be your maxim not precipitately to *undo* till you are prepared to *do*. What you should do—what undo —and what leave undone, I may be prepared to advise you at a more convenient season.

ECONOMIST.

GENERAL.—No. VII.

MY LORD—I had hoped that the Punjaub question must are this have been decided, and I had anticipated from all the signs of the times that it could be decided but in one way. I had looked to discussing the questions which will arise *after* annexation; but for the present I am disappointed. It seem that I have overrun my game, and I must reluctantly retrace my steps. I am possessed with grave fear that your path has not yet been sufficiently smoothed—that annexation is even yet a stumbling block to you. Why this hesitation? Why this delay? Why this mystery as to the result? Can it be, after bearing the heat and burden of the day—after running all risks

time—when you first approached the scene of action, it was believed that you were all for the one plain and resolute course. Has your courage deserted you at the eleventh hour? Have you reached the barrier, and do you fear to leap? Is the prize within reach of your arm, and do you fear to seize it? Surely, surely, my Lord, the "native hue of resolution" has not been "sicklied o'er with the pale cast of thought." Then, indeed, has an "enterprise of great pith and moment" its "current turned away and lost the name of action." "There is a tide," you know—and now is the turn of your tide—a fine spring-tide too—so I beseech you to make the greatest possible expedition and get into harbour. If you lose it, you will be again carried out to sea, and many sore buffettings you will have before you regain the haven.

They say that you are waiting for orders from home. If this is the case, you disappoint expectation. Do you seriouly for a moment suppose that if you, the Governor-General of India, fear to assume the responsibility of annexation, the Home Authorities will consent to do so? They neither will nor ought. Your position and office make it chiefly your province to determine—situated as you are on the scene of action. The idea of referring it to those whose information is several months behind the event, and whose knowledge of the subject is most obscure and imperfect, is absurd. Seek not, then, to shift or divide the responsibility. By you should it be borne, and you must bear it. You may anticipate the contents of your despatches. They will but consist of an endless array of *ifs* and *buts*. *If* the Punjaub is to be annexed, *you* must annex it. *If* it is to be released, *you* must release it. The credit of success will rest with you. With you must rest the blame of another failure. To you all India looks for a display of the requisite moral courage. The best orders you can receive are those which contain *nothing*. Lord Wellesley went to the other extreme. He used to detain the ships, that the Court might hear nothing of his pro-

prepared to imitate him. Yet he lived to receive thanks and a more substantial reward from this said Court; and you may do well to temper an excess of prudence with a little intermixture of his energy.

But, my Lord, you have brought with you a distinguished reputation. Expectation stands on tiptoe; and we will hope from you better things than hesitation, uncertainty, and delay. Do but avoid that "pale cast of thought." That is what mars everything. You may depend on it that first resolutions are generally the best. A man's natural impulse leads him to what is right—"pale thought" makes him vacillate between right and wrong, but he had better return to his first impulse in the end. I well know the feeling; and so do most men. I believe that your first thoughts were for annexation. Then be not oppressed with doubts and fears and strange fancies. Do what you believe to be right, and trust to your friends for the reasons.

Considering the prejudice which exists in England against extension of the empire, you may naturally be anxious to secure an unanimity of opinion in this country before taking so important a step as annexation: and opinion seems all but unanimous. I understand, however, that Sir Henry Lawrence is opposed to it. Now, I would not for a moment be supposed to impugn the purity of that gentleman's motives, but I beg of you to remember that not only was he a principal artificer in the settlement which has just broken down, but under present arrangements he is King of the Punjaub. As then, human nature is but human nature, you must regard Sir Henry not so much as an unbiassed adviser and a potentate pleading his own cause. By all means hear what he has to say; but receive it with caution as the argument of an advocate. It would be well, too, if you admit an advocate on one side to retain one on the other, to sift and combat Sir Henry's

To another opinion of Sir Henry's I would not be so tolerant. It is said that he has come back to declare that the "Sikhs had been exceedingly ill used," and that if he had stayed there would have been nothing of the kind. Now this is, really, too much. Anything more entirely without foundation it is impossible to conceive, and the assertion is a most unfair one—for his policy was carried out to the letter; and if poor Sir Frederick Currie did wrong, it must have been in *too implicitly* following in the footsteps of his predecessor. It is perfectly clear that the origin of the late struggle was the existence of a Sikh army and Government. The outbreak was a mere question of time. A storm brings a calm, and the prostration of the first campaign was followed by a couple of years peace; but the reaction follows. Sir Frederick carried out in its minutest details the system which Sir Henry had left him, and perhaps the carriage and temper of the former was less likely to provoke resistance than that of his predecessor. Even the particular affair, out of which grew the present, had its origin in Lawrence's time. It was determined to relieve Moolraj before Sir F. Currie joined, and even the deputation of the unfortunate Mr. Vans Agnew had been arranged. That I *know*.

Altogether, I think that if Sir H. Lawrence says that the Sikhs were ill used after his departure, the charge is ungrateful and unfair. What his energy might have done in nipping the rebellion in the bud is another matter. If he had done so it must have been but to break out at another place. The banishment of the Ranee is an absurd handle. Not one of the Chiefs cares in the least for the Ranee, or for any one but for himself. Any one of them would, with all the coolness in the world, hang the Ranee on a tree, if he could be advantaged thereby. It may suit them to talk of the Ranee *now*, but no one will be so weak as to believe that they care more for her than for the other Ranees and Rajas whom they have murdered. If the

be alleged, I say that Lall Singh's was a still more remarkable instance, and in that Colonel Lawrence had a part.

I know not what scheme the present Resident now propounds. Perhaps a contingent. I can only again hope that the time for such things has gone by. A contingent is no new scheme. It is as old as British India, and I leave you to judge whether the result has been favourable —whether all experience and all public opinion is not against it. It is a scheme for taking all the risks and responsibilities of occupation without the advantage of ourselves governing—of making the people our own subjects —and doing justice to those whom Providence has committed to our care. It is the economy of having irregular and local troops in preference to regular ones—and the extravagance of sacrificing the revenues of the country to the drones of a native Court, instead of drawing them ourselves! It is the gross immorality of condemning a conquered country to perpetual discord, plunder, and misgovernment, without advantage to ourselves. It is the folly of leaving on our frontier the embers of once powerful fires. Were the country surrounded by our territories they might continue to smoulder, but touching as it does that country from which previous invaders of India have issued, another conflagration may at any time be kindled. For many reasons, I cannot conceive that you will adopt such a course.

But what more can I say? I can myself imagine no argument in favour of half measures—no *one* advantage, real or imaginary—and I cannot guess what Sir H. Lawrence may allege. I must repeat that you will do well not to give ear to *ex parte* arguments. Your immediate advisers, having no personal knowledge of the facts, cannot be prepared to controvert those of the Resident, and it is very easy to have the best of it when a man has all the talk to himself and nobody to gainsay him. If

should, before adopting the Resident's views, make them patent to others, who have had opportunities of judging, and who may entertain opposite opinions. When you have heard both sides you may settle your facts, and then draw your conclusions, without fear of error.

One fallacy I may suggest. It is absurd to suppose that the Sikhs or the inhabitants of the Punjaub will be better pleased with a contingent and double government, than with annexation. The population will not be better pleased; for they will be subjected to hard task-masters instead of mild ones. The Sikh soldiers high and low will not be pleased; for their occupation is gone all the same, and they had rather cultivate under an easy system than under a grasping one. The Jats and Jat Sikhs are *particularly partial* to our revenue system, and to the zemindaree rights which we accord them. Then why should they prefer a contingent and misgovernment to annexation and a regular system? The petty Sikhs of the olden race, if deprived of their swords and of the privileges of anarchy had much rather enjoy in peace and security under our guarantee a little rent-free land. One class, and but one class (if class they can be called) would benefit by a double government, the vultures which prey on the carcase of every Indian state—the creatures of the Durbar. To such a class will you sacrifice all conscience and all policy—all regard for the rights of the governed, and the interests of the governing?

If Sir Henry Lawrence still stands in the way of annexation, I would say, rather than "turn awry" a great enterprise, compromise the matter. For the civil government associate with him Mr John Lawrence. The latter, from all I hear, is an excellent Officer though he *is* a Lawrence, and perhaps some of those who decry him might with advantage profit by his instructions. He is wrong perhaps in some things—may occasionally rather bully people without any corresponding advantage to Govern-

for jagheers or rent fee lands to those who would be well contented with *half the value in land*, but detest money payment, and are in consequence discontented subjects with the power of doing mischief. But generally he well understands his work, and he has abundant energy to render useful his knowledge. He is neither a genius utterly ignorant of his work, nor a sluggard to whom experience avails not—but a man *bred to the trade*—of good talents and great energy. We want more of such men, and you need not be deterred by a little roughness and hastiness. Family compacts are in themselves an evil, and Colonel Lawrence seems to have made a clique of the Residency—but I had rather have annexation and two brothers, of whom *one* has been bred to, and understands, his work—than a contingent and an autocracy of one brother whose genius lies in an irregular line.

ECONOMIST.

No. VIII.

MY LORD—I am sorry to see that the English papers are not yet unanimous as to the policy to be pursued in the Punjaub. The *Times* proposes no scheme, but rather sets itself to suggest difficulties—and in doing so exhibits a woeful ignorance of the facts. Indeed, some very absurd fallacies concerning the Punjaub, the Sikhs, and the Affghans have gotten possession of the English mind. It is not denied that geographically and historically the Punjaub is part of India—but people at home cling to the belief that it is filled with an unruly and desperate population, and the fear that to hold it would be to walk on hidden fires—and ever since the Caubul catastrophe they have a respectful dread of the Affghans, and are haunted with the idea that to advance our frontier is but to "fly to evils which we know not of." It has been my object to show you that the Punjaubees are not ungovernable, and that on the Indus we have, in all human probability, that much wished-for object, a "*finality*," inasmuch as the

Affghans are, as an offensive military power, *utterly contemptible.* I trust that you estimate the supposed difficulties at their true value. The imaginary dissuasives from the one true line of conduct must be conscience as regards the treaty, fear as regards our ability to keep the country, or policy as regards the *finality* of the measure. I am glad to find that the treaty seems to have died a natural death. No argument is hinged on *that* pretext, and the tenderest conscience may therefore throw over that consideration without fear of offence. In fact, "*the Sikhs*" neither made the treaty nor broke it. The few individuals who went through the farce of consent were nominees of the British power. Dulleep Sing was a mere piece of paper money, and is now as valueless as a note when the bank has broke. Shere Sing has been treacherous, but for the rest they have met us manfully: they have fought for empire, and they must stand by the result, which is against them.

After all, *fear* is the prevailing argument against annexation. The *Times* talks of the Martial tribes commencing with the Sutlej. But *you* are not "afraid!" You know better. You know that the Sutlej is the boundary of no tribe or class of tribes. The Sikhs do not commence with the Sutlej. In fact, most of Sikh-land lies to the east of that river. The population on either side is the same, the Sikhs are the same, the Jat soldiers are the same, the cultivators are the same. Yet it is admitted that the territory on one side is quiet and manageable; then why not that on the *other* side? If you are still unconvinced, let me show you a village on this side and on that, and you will find no point of difference. Let me take you into a village on the left bank of the Sutlej, and I will show you first the *old Sikh* comparatively weak, separated from the population, and depending on the favour of Government for a subsistence. Next, you shall see *scores* of the new Sikhs, men who once served in the

villages, very likely disavowing the character of Sikhs altogether, and making the best and most active cultivators. Lastly, you shall see the fine Jat race which inhabits that country, and members which may be induced to turn Sikhs and serve in a regular army on being paid for the same. There is something manly and substantial about their character. In soldiering they like to be among the regulars, and are seldom found among the irregulars, and the tawdry tail of great men. In cultivating they are regulars too. They are all for long leases and money payments. They make their own arrangements, and pay their revenue like men. The present is a most unfortunate year of famine, but in ordinary seasons I know no part of India, the internal economy of which presents so pleasant a sight. There is a healthy tone which it is pleasant to witness, and a healthy population pleasant to deal with. They are not unruly, but are remarkable for the respect paid to our rule. Even an ordinary affray is now almost unknown. In short, they like our system, and think that it fully compensates for the gain to some of their members in the predominance of the Sikh army. Ask these people whether they would like to go back to a double government and a contingent. It is the only proposition that might perhaps induce them to rebel.

Cross, then, the river, and you enter no new country. Your materials are precisely the same. The zemindars have not yet had the same advantages, and the Sikh soldiers have hitherto continued to serve. But annex, and within six months, if things are managed by people who understand them, the country will assume exactly the same phase at the Cis-Sutlej territory—almost all parties will give in their adherence to the new state of things—men's minds will be set at rest—imaginary difficulties will disappear as if by magic, and you will then discover that you have quailed before phantoms as unreal as any recorded in story. The Sikh country will speedily become

I have spoken more particularly of that portion of the Punjaub from whence the Sikhs spring. Of the other portions it has not been pretended that there is anything to dread. They are now as they were when the country formed a "peaceful province of the Mogul empire," with this exception, that they dislike the Sikh rule, and would welcome our ingress with most sincere satisfaction.

If you yet doubt the result of taking the Punjaub in our own name, I would beg of you to look back to the infinite array of precedents furnished by our history and experience. We have seen many strong and formidable-looking native government succumb, and war has succeeded war, till each was absorbed. But has evil ever *in any one instance* resulted from annexation? Every state which retained the substance or the show of independence has come into collision with us, but, singular to relate, domestic rebellion in our own territory has been almost entirely unknown throughout our whole Indian career. I do not consider the small outbreaks in the Jullunder to be *domestic* rebellion, inasmuch as they were in immediate connection with a hostile and, in their eyes, triumphant army—and these outbreaks were but those of a few individuals, and never made any head. Even the irregular warfare in different parts of India with hill tribes of a race other than Hindoo has been almost invariably on behalf of some puppet potentate. The broad fact remains, that in our own important possessions serious rebellion has throughout our history in India been *unknown*. Will you, then—can you, in the face of this all-powerful fact—give way to imaginary fear? The country is the same, the people is the same, and what has taken place in other parts of India *must* take place in the Punjaub. Annexation will bring safe and lasting peace. Half measures must be followed by troubles, misgovernment, and disturbance. So it has ever been. The only serious outbreak in our provinces which I remember was one at Bareilly, about, I think, the year

Tax, and was completely and finally put down by a couple of companies. Rohilkund and the Rohillas had at one time a great name, and can anything be quieter than that country now is? Look at the records of the old districts of Rohilkund, and you will see that when we first took possession things were by no means so quiet, nor the people so apt, nor so much respect paid to our name, as has been and will be the case in any part of Sikh-land. Armed parties traversed the district—wings of regiments with guns went out to collect the revenue from refractory villages. Yet things soon quieted down, and no one now looks on Rohilkund as a country held but by the force of bayonets. Much more easily would the Punjaub be brought to the same state.

The Sikhs are a military class, much more tractable and more easily moulded to our purpose than Rohillas or other military Mussulmen. I cannot too often repeat, and you cannot too carefully bear in mind, the grand distinguishing mark of the Sikhs, as compared with other Indian soldiers, in their not having yet lost their connection with the soil and their character of agriculturists. I confess to having myself a particular partiality for them. They are fine fellows, without prejudice or nonsense of any kind, who can turn their hands to anything. They are quite free from the ridiculous pretensions to dignity and superiority of the most contemptible Mussulmen. They have not forgotten their origin. Indeed, I think the Sikhs and Jats of the frontier a people whom we should particularly cherish and attach as our subjects. They have much more of our own character than any other Indian race. While the Mahommedan pays but a sulky and constrained obedience, they, can and *do* look up to us —and as soon as the intoxication of recent power has subsided the obedience of all will be hearty and willing. Make much of them, my Lord. You fear to grasp a

subjects, for they may be used at any time against the Mahommedans beyound the boundary. Their sympathy with our Government, conduct, character, and habits, will always be much greater than any other foreign race.

You must be careful, indeed, that you mar not this fair picture by mismanagement. You must have a proper system and proper instruments, and then see if the Sikhs do not soon cheerfully acquiesce in your authority. Under a double Government all parties would be wretched. If they have misgovernment and a revenue system which they dislike, the Sikhs must have military service as an outlet. Under a system which suits their taste and gives its due to industry and capital, they stand in need of no such safety-valve. But if you destroy the Sikh army without at the same time ensuring the requisite facilities for practising the arts of peace, then, indeed, will there be a cankering and pestering sore which may have lamentable results. Such is, and must be, a double government, and such is the frightful slough which it must be your first resolution to avoid.

It is remarkable how much even Sikh chiefs in their prosperity cling to old associations—how little they forget the instability of Indian greatness. It is a sort of proverb among them that soverign power may pass away any day, but that the proprietorship of land subsists through all changes (which is indeed the case till our civil courts come into full play)—and men who have the Government share of the revenue of many villages are yet still more covetous of Zemindaree. I have seen many instances of this—and the trouble they took about it when in the plentitude of their power would almost induce the belief that they anticipated the result, and had an eye to the details of our system. I could show you a village *Cis*-Sutlej, an old possession of the Attaree family, where Sham Sing Attareewala (killed at Sobraon) took immense pains to make himself *Zemindar* of a single Pattee. In short, their natural

an accident. They will readily return to the occupations of their ancestors, and you need not distress yourself with vain fears. Never was there a better hand. You have but to play it in a reasonable way. It is not, as one of the papers says, a choice "between dangerous neighbours and unruly subjects," but between dangerous neighbours and quite useful subjects. The popular delusion is the very opposite of the truth, and you will, I trust, *prove it to be so*

Thinking, as I do, that the Jats and Sikhs make good subjects and good soldiers, I think that if you increase the army you cannot do better than offer service to those who wish it. The Sikh regiments have answered well, and the eating our salt would give us an additional hold on, and connection with, the population from which the men are drawn. Besides, late experience goes to prove that they are much better men than the "*Poorbea*" Sepoys. They have also fewer prejudices—they can put their bundles on their own heads when occasion requires—they eat from the same common cooking vessel—are altogether more hardy and *European-like* in their habits. They would be a great accession to the army. One great mistake was made as to the Sikh regiments, and which deterred many from entering —the insisting on their wearing "Topees." I am no advocate for yielding to prejudices—far from it—but all races and *all* religions have their peculiar ideas, and two things particularly prohibited to Sikhs are *Topees* and tobacco. Why, then, when we are so particular about Hindoo and Mahommedan prejudices, we should go out of our way to make the service disagreeable to the Sikhs without the least object, I can't conceive. A man can't go into village without getting into a quarrel, because the villagers call him "Topeewala." Surely it is an innocent prejudice, and they are so free from this kind of thing that their *one* prejudice might be indulged. English soldiers would be indignant if compelled to wear turbans. I fancy that the

The *Times* makes the question of annexation depend on obtaining a "*finality*," asks where we are to stop, whether we shall annex Affghanistan too? I answer certainly not, for reasons which I have already mentioned. Affghanistan would not pay, it is no part of India, its inhabitants are not Indians. The more the Dost and his subjects fight among themselves the better for us. The Indus is our "*finality*," and as far as the present condition of the world goes, there is every prospect of our being free from fighting on that boundary. If you doubt this, the Affghans are well known to officers of our army; ask those in whom you have most confidence whether there is the slightest probability of their being able to oppose a single brigade in fair fight in the open field, whether they have ever done so? The country does not yield the revenue to give strength to the sinews of war, and the character of the people is entirely against their making good regular troops. Besides, they are utterly disunited, in race and everything else. They are no nation, and we have nothing to fear from them. Most assuredly it *is* for a "*finality*" that I would go to the Indus. Once more then, my Lord, be not afraid. Do not sit at Ferozepore, like a boy afraid to rob an orchard because "Man traps and spring-guns" are duly advertised on a board—make up your mind at once, like a man. There is nothing else for it.

It just comes to this, will you make a temporary arrangement or a permanent one? Will you look to the security of the frontier, or to empty names? Will you do justice to the country which providence has placed at your feet? Your mission is a great one, and you must fulfil it; but, before all things, remember that if withdrawal is a cowardice, any half measure is a *double cowardice* —the cowardice that prevents you from annexing and the cowardice that prevents you from withdrawing. Take either course, but *beware* of the fatal middle course. If you withdraw, the work has but to be done over again, if you compromise we are inextricably committed

I hope I have not been doing you an injustice: but certainly this delay alarms me. Show that I have been mistaken. Do not let Sir H. Lawrence have all the argument to himself. *Do not mistake the Durbar at Lahore for the people of the Punjab or for the Sikh nation.* Remember that it is the great rock on which others have split.

ECCOMINST.

ECONOMIST CONGRATULATES THE GOVERNOR-GENERAL.

MY LORD—At last we breathe again more freely—at last the clouds of doubt and suspense are made glorious summer by the sun of annexation. The 29th of March 1849 will long be memorable in Indian history, and long will be famous the name of the ruler who has given a "*finality*" to the Indian Empire. My Lord, I do most sincerely and heartily congratulate you. The Sikh power, the Sikh army, the Empire of Runjeet Sing, and almost the Sikh name, are things of history. Not only for seven years, but I hope for a *much* longer period, a shot will not be fired in the Punjaub. The permanent pacification of the country follows from annexation as naturally as effect can follow cause. Any serious disturbance is next to impossible. The means of disturbance no longer exist—the spirit and the will must speedily die out. The Sikhs will soon be known but as a quiet and agricultural people. The Punjaub will be a submissive and prosperous province, yielding in the arts of peace to none in India, and, it may be (if advantage is taken of so fair an opportunity of introducing into our system the improvements which experience suggests), surpassing all in good government—in the adaptation of institutions to the circumstances of the people, and the contentment of an industrious yet manly population. It will be found that even if barren tracts make the whole revenue not very large in proportion to the gross area, yet the large fertile territories will yield a considerable and easily-collected revenue, which is a

clear gain to our Indian finances—and more than a clear gain, for it will not only be an addition to our rent roll, but may almost be made the means of diminishing our expenditure—inasmuch as we shall now be free from the enormous cost of defensive and offensive measures of constant repetition and little intermission. You have now discovered the metal of which the Affghans are made, and a few years hence they will be about as little, and as much thought of, as the Burmese now are. The western will be little less secure than the eastern frontier. And while you rejoice in having done your duty to your own country, you will not think lightly of the benefit conferred on your species and on the people of that country, which has been added to the British crown. No humane man could have, by any act of his, permitted the recurrence of the scenes of carnage and sickening waste of human life, which have ensanguined the last year of our history. No wise or benevolent man could have refused to bestow on a subject people that liberty to sow in seed-time and reap in harvest, which forms the simple economy of an Indian population; and by the aid of a genial climate and certain *self-contained* institutions, natural poor-laws and immemorial village corporations perhaps gives more human happiness than the more complicated rights and more artificial institutions which distract Europe. I don't know whether you meant to enhance the value of the boon when you kept the world so long uncertain and distrustful about annexation; but it is now apparent that distrust was out of place. The measure is well-weighed, deliberate, and complete—and the public voice on the subject will be *unanimous*. Other Governors-General have added to the Empire, but you have *completed* it; others have conquered successive parts, but you have consolidated and secured the whole. For the first time India is *really* our own—nay more, for the first time India is under the dominion of *any one* master. You are the first *sole* ruler of the most famous country in

ambition first appeared in the world, the golden prize for which all have struggled--but none have fully obtained. And you may be proud of your position. You have *achieved* it, and I hope that you may keep it long. You have wronged no man, but you have done your duty, and done it well.

Having attained the *finality* of conquest and of empire thus early in your reign, for *you* may be prepared the double glory of both consummating a career of war, and originating a career of peaceable reformation. I hope that it may be so. A reformation is wanted. The laws, the customs, and the consciences of a northern race, and an artificial society, must be more approximated to the plain practical understandings of an Asiatic people who WILL hold that black is black, and white is white, whatever philosophers may say to the country. But on this I may not now enter. I will but once more congratulate you on your position, and I am sure that all India and all Europe will, with one accord, join in the congratulation.

It is singular, in reviewing from the commencement of the whole contest with the Sikhs, to observe how remarkably fortune seems to have favoured the good cause—how everything has turned out *for the best.* I believe that there is much reason to be thankful for all that has taken place. If the Sikh army had been a little less determined, and its resistance a little less protracted, we might have lost the blessings of annexation; if it had been a little more successful—but no—I will not be unpatriotic enough to conjecture what might then have happened. In the first campaign it is very *possible* that if our advantage had been pressed the war *might* have terminated little less abruptly than on the present occasion, and I do believe that the military obstacles overcome, annexation must have been at any time a successful measure. Yet still when we see what the Sikhs have this year done with

the country in their possession—our army shattered, and the hot weather setting in—the result must have been at best doubtful, and we would hardly now run the risk of 1846, in preference to the certainty of 1849. The Sikhs, too, if once conquered, might and probably would have been kept under, but their prostration and subjection could have been nothing like what it now is. That they should have been twice conquered is the most fortunate thing in the world. They will never rise again. They have tried war, and they have tried rebellion, and certainly they had enough of both. The particular events of this last war have been not less favourable in their results than the general fact of the *double* conquest. The compaign has been a protracted one, and I have little doubt that the effects in the permanent pacification of the country must be much more certain and lasting than if the war had been nipped in the bud by a much more dashing and summary termination. I do not go so far as to give your Lordship credit for so *very* far-sighted a policy, but under providence such must be the result. The whole mass has been thoroughly fermented—no portion can have escaped the purifying process—all the bad humours have come to the surface, and have been eradicated. You have now but to strain off the clear liquid and keep it carefully in new bottles (I am glad to see that you do not trust entirely to old bottles for your new wine) all will then go right. You have only farther to take care that no new element of mischief gets mixed up in the process of purification. Keep an eye to the *old* bottles too—especially to one very large and very old bottle—the Patriarch of the cellar. If he should happen to burst great will be the outpouring of good wine. However, as he is such a renowned old vessel, we will hope that he still retains powers of distension to meet the exigencies of the times. I am not disinclined to believe that it will be found so.

But I have diverged from my demonstration of what

strategies of war. My sphere is a more humble one. But this I will say that if ever most sincere and heartfelt thanks were due for a victory it was for Goojerat. It seemed like a special interposition. Men are indeed led to their ruin by being first demented, and never was there a more striking instance of it. Most appropriately might the despatch have commenced with the words of the doughty and God-fearing Hero of a former age. "The Lord hath deliveerd them into our hands." Well did the General and the army do their part in the deliverance—and for the rest, thanks to our "*Ikbal*" and to General Gilbert, another month has ended war; the discomfited Sikhs have laid down their arms, never to be resumed; the country has been purged, purified, and regenerated—and I hope that when you make a tour next cold weather you will find it swept, garnished, and prosperous. Your fiat is sufficient—one dash of your pen changes the scene, as in any Arabian tale, from darkness into light.

If anything were wanting to show the character of the Sikhs, and of the war, the manner of its termination must resolve all doubts. We have had no Guerilla warfare, as the English papers anticipated—no desperate struggle of fanatics Akalies. We have but had a regular army meeting us in struggle on a fair field. The *morale* of that army is destroyed by defeat, and we hear no more of it. The soldiers had little *personal* connection with the Chiefs, and had they been *desperate* men they might have continued a very harassing contest. But no—they are no desperadoes—they are comfortable people, accustomed to serve Runjeet Sing on daily rations and monthly pay. They have wives and children, and lands and cattle at home, and they have no taste for starving in the desert in the Ogre-like hope of one day drinking the blood of a Feringhee. They have little nationality—merely the natural love of domination—but they like the good things of domination—not the life of a dog in the wilderness; and, failing the former alterna-

Erobert oder erräubert?

Geschichtlichen Nachweis wie England Ost-Indien nahm.

* Ein Seitenstück zum Burenkrieg. *

Zeitgemäße Erinnerungen

von

Carl Scholl.

Bamberg
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Vorwort.

Der Krieg in Südafrika, der sich aus dem räuberischen Einfall des Jameson entwickelt hat, das Vorgehen der Engländer gegen die Buren, die ganz entsetzlichen Barbareien, aus denen sie sich kein Gewissen machen, sie haben die Empörung Aller in allen Parteien und allen Ländern wachgerufen, welche die Grundsätze der Gerechtigkeit, der Menschlichkeit hochhalten. Diese allgemeine Empörung würde aber einen noch viel höheren Grad erreichen, wenn Alle vertrauter wären mit der Geschichte, wenn Alle wüßten, daß es nicht das erstemal ist, daß die Engländer in dieser Weise vorgehen, wenn sie wüßten, daß namentlich im 18. Jahrhundert bei den Raubzügen und Kriegen, die sie in Indien geführt, bei der gewaltsamen Eroberung dieses Landes und bei der Gründung ihrer Herrschaft über dasselbe, sie in ganz ähnlicher Weise, mit derselben Hintansetzung aller Forderungen der Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit vorgegangen sind.

Man kann, ja, man muß anerkennen, was England nicht nur in seinem eigenen Land, sondern in allen Weltteilen, wo es seine Herrschaft begründete, für die höhere Kultur der Menschheit gethan hat und noch thut, aber wenn wir dieses sein unbestreitbares Verdienst noch so hoch anschlagen und anerkennen, dürfen wir, um uns ein gerechtes Urteil zu bilden, nicht außer Acht lassen, von welchen thatsächlich nächsten Beweggründen Alles, was es in dieser Beziehung gethan hat, ausging, dürfen nicht vergessen, daß der eigentlich letzte Beweggrund niemals ein an

sichtsloseste, brutalste Egoismus, ein Egoismus, der sich kein Gewissen daraus machte, — wenn er damit glaubte sein Ziel zu erreichen, — die abscheulichsten Barbareien zu begehen, alle Grundsätze der Humanität mit Füßen zu treten.

Um hiefür einen Beweis zu liefern, sollen die hier folgenden Mitteilungen aus der Geschichte der Eroberung Ostindiens durch die Engländer im achtzehnten Jahrhundert, an der Hand unbestreitbarer Thatsachen insbesondere auf zwei Männer und ihre Thaten hinweisen, welche von den Engländern selbst als diejenigen betrachtet werden, die sich zuerst und in hervorragendster Weise um die Eroberung und Gründung der englischen Herrschaft in Indien verdient gemacht haben.

Wir benützen dazu die engl. Biographien von Malleson, Arbutnoth, Gleig, vor allem aber die größeren Werke von C. F. Neumann, der 1822—25 eine Professur in Speier, 1831—1852 in München bekleidete, und — durch seine Reise nach China mit den asiatischen Zuständen genau bekannt, im Jahre 1857 seine „Geschichte des englischen Reiches in Asien“ in zwei Bänden herausgegeben (Leipzig 1857), und das ebenso umfangreiche Werk von Leopold von Orlich: „Indien und seine Regierung“. Nach den vorzüglichsten Quellen und nach Handschriften. (Leipzig 1859—1861.)

Einleitung.

Zum bessern Verständnis schicken wir zunächst einige Thatsachen aus der Vorzeit Indiens voraus, weil im Zusammenhang mit diesen, mit den schon frühzeitig begonnenen Raub- und Eroberungszügen der verschiedensten Völker, diejenigen der Engländer erst ins rechte Licht gestellt werden.

Indien war seit undenklichen Zeiten das Land, welches wegen seiner großartigen und zum Teil bezaubernd schönen Natur allein schon, noch mehr aber wegen der ungeheueren Schätze an Gold, Perlen, Diamanten, Wohlgerüchen, seiner Schätze und Erzeugnisse der Kunst und Industrie, der Gegenstand des Neides und der Sehnsucht für die verschiedensten Völker war, — das Land, um dessen Besitz deswegen seit Jahrhunderten schon gekämpft wurde.

Im 12. Jahrhundert hatten es die Muhammedaner fast ganz erobert.

Seit dem 16. hatten sich die mongolisch-tartarischen Großmoguln die Herrschaft angeeignet, die bis zum Anfang des 19. Jahrhunderts dauerte.

Diejenigen Einfälle aber, welche bei ihrem ersten Auftreten keine gewaltsamen waren, sondern nur aus Handelsinteressen unternommen wurden, solche wenigstens vorgaben, sie begannen am Ende des 15. Jahrhunderts, und waren es hauptsächlich Portugiesen, Holländer, Dänen und Franzosen, die sich an ihnen beteiligten. Wie diese, insbesondere die Portugiesen, Hol-

es nicht nur der Handel war, der sie nach Indien führte, daß ihnen mehr die Lust und Gier nach dem Besitz des Landes erwachte, das bewiesen sie durch die von Jahr zu Jahr zunehmenden größeren Gewaltthätigkeiten, mit denen sie sich im Besitz ihrer Handels-Niederlassungen zu erhalten, diesen Besitz aber auch mehr und mehr auszudehnen suchten.

Am gewaltthätigsten traten die Portugiesen und Holländer auf; die ersteren unterstützt durch die Hilfe, welche die Jesuiten ihnen leisteten, überhaupt die christlichen Geistlichen, die Mönche, welche, wie sie sagten, einzig und allein zur Verkündung und Verbreitung des Christentums, der „Religion der Liebe", ins Land gekommen waren, von deren gemeinsamem Zusammenwirken aber unter der Regierung der portugiesischen Könige, Neumann in seiner „Geschichte der englischen Herrschaft in Asien" uns ein Bild entwirft, welches gerade in unsern Tagen wohl verdient, in den weitesten Kreisen bekannt und gewürdigt zu werden.

Mit Zugrundelegung von Reiseberichten aus jener Zeit faßt er sein Urteil dahin zusammen: „Seuchen und Pest haben zu keiner Zeit der Weltgeschichte so furchtbar gewütet, wie die kahtolischen Könige Emanuel und Johann, wie die Ferdinand und Philipp, ihre weltlichen und geistlichen Gehilfen. Heutigen Tags noch bluten ganze Völker an den Wunden, welche sie der Menschheit geschlagen. Die Religion diente als Mittel der Verfinsterung, als Unterbau zur staatlichen und bürgerlichen Knechtschaft. Das Ketzergericht in Goa schaltete noch viel furchtbarer als sonstwo auf Erden. Verfolgung und unmenschliche Grausamkeit war hier vorzüglich gegen die Reichen gerichtet. Der kaltblütig berechnende Mörder sucht sich diejenigen zur Beute, wo er den meisten Raub davonträgt. Selbst Vizekönige und Erzbischöfe wurden, wenn der Hof zu Lissabon geheime Befehle erteilte, vor die Schranken der allmächtigen staatlich-religiösen

reichen Geistlichen und Mönchsscharen aller Farben und Kulten, welche nicht selten die Zahl der zum Schutz der Handelsniederlassung dort befindlichen Truppen überstiegen. Laster und Ausschweifungen jeder Art kamen schnell als natürliches Gefolge dieser von der Arbeit Anderer lebenden, auf 20—30 000 Köpfe anschwellenden geistlichen Horden." — „Die Portugiesen, so erzählt ein Augenzeuge, leben ohne Redlichkeit, ohne Scham und Gerechtigkeit, überall herrscht Trug, herrscht Grausamkeit und die unverschämteste Wollust. Heimliche Vergiftungen und offenkundige Mordthaten sind gewöhnliche Ereignisse; Männer und Frauen der vornehmsten Familien mißhandeln ihre Sklaven und Sklavinnen in der abscheulichsten Weise. Das Pfaffenvolk plagt die Eingeborenen wo und wie immer es kann. Sein Unverstand und Aberglaube, seine Albernheiten und Grausamkeiten sollen für ihr Christentum und für Portugal die Herrschaft erringen über das Morgenland.*

Nach dieser wahrheitsgetreuen Schilderung läßt sich's denken, welches Gefühl der innersten Empörung sich zunächst derjenigen Eingeborenen Indiens bemächtigte, welche im Umkreis dieser Handelsniederlassungen unter den Gewaltthätigkeiten besonders der Portugiesen, nicht viel weniger aber auch der Holländer zu leiden hatten. Das Land wurde ausgebeutet und verwüstet, mehr als durch die Raubzüge der Mongolen; die Handelsgesellschaften aber machten die glänzendsten Geschäfte, — belief sich damals doch die Dividende, der Reingewinn der holländischen auf nicht weniger als 75% — später sogar auf 425%!

Durch diese ganz ungeheueren Erfolge der fremden Handelsgesellschaften angelockt, erschienen zuletzt die Engländer als die gefährlichsten Rivalen auf dem Plan. Sie hatten vor ihrem Erscheinen auf indischem Boden wiederholte, aber vergebliche Versuche gemacht, in nord-

östlicher Richtung über Rußland, und ebenso in westlicher Richtung, nach dem verführerischen Wunderland mit seinen Schätzen zu gelangen. Das gelang ihnen endlich durch den kühnen Streich, den einer ihrer Landsleute, der Seefahrer und zugleich Seeräuber Francis Drake ausgeführt, indem er nach vielen andern Räubereien bei den Azorischen Inseln ein aus Indien heimkehrendes Schiff freibeuterte, in dessen Tagebuch und Karten die Fahrt ums „Vorgebirge der guten Hoffnung" auf's genaueste verzeichnet war, und zugleich eine Uebersicht über die geradezu fabelhaften Gewinne und Vorteile des Handels nach Indien.

Daraufhin traten eine Anzahl Bürger Londons im Jahr 1599 zusammen und gründeten mit dem Einsatz von 30 000 Pfund Sterling eine Gesellschaft, um, wie es hieß, „zur Ehre des Vaterlandes und zur Vermehrung des Handels innerhalb des Reiches England, eine Reise nach Ostindien und andern östlichen Ländern und Inseln auszurüsten." Diese Unternehmung unterschied sich deswegen gleich am Anfang von allen ähnlichen, insbesondere der Portugiesen, der Spanier und Franzosen dadurch, daß sie nicht von den Höfen und unmittelbaren Dienern der Krone ausging, sondern vom Volk selber, von den Bürgern, in denen durch die Reformation des 16. Jahrhunderts ein freierer, selbstbewußter Geist erwacht war, und die deswegen auch gleich nach Gründung dieser Handelsgesellschaft das Ansinnen der Königin Elisabeth, daß in ihrem Auftrag ein hochstehender Lord die erste Reise mitmachen solle, auf's Entschiedenste von sich wiesen. Sie erklärten mit englischem Freimut: „sie seien nicht gesonnen, jemals einem Gentleman ein Amt zu übertragen. Es möge ihnen gestattet sein und bleiben, die Geschäfte von Leuten ihres Standes versehen zu lassen, man müsse sonst befürchten, eine große Anzahl Kaufleute zu verlieren, sobald diese erführen, daß Gentlemans bei dem Unternehmen verwendet würden." Trotz dieser Abweisung wurde der Gesellschaft von der Regierung der gewünschte

unterzeichnet. Das Parlament, die Vertretung des Volkes, hatte damals auf solche Vergünstigungen noch keinen Einfluß. Die Gesellschaft erhielt durch diesen Freibrief den Namen: „Der Gouverneur und die Londoner Kaufleute, welche den Handel nach Indien betreiben," und das Recht, „auf 15 Jahre in allen Ländern, die nicht im Besitz christlicher Fürsten, östlich des Vorgebirgs der guten Hoffnung bis zur Straße von Magellan einen ausschließlichen Handel zu treiben."

Im Jahre 1600, sofort nach Ausstellung des Freibriefs segelten fünf, von der Gesellschaft ausgerüstete Schiffe ab, welche nur 1500 Tonnen Gehalt und 500 Mann Besatzung hatten. Sie landeten auf der Insel Sumatra mit der Hauptstadt Atschin, und übergaben dem dort residierenden Landesfürsten Aladin ein Schreiben der Königin Elisabeth, worin diese sich beklagt, „daß die Spanier und Portugiesen sich als Herren der doch ihm gehörigen Länder betrachten, und alle diese Länder Indiens mit ihren Fürsten als ihre Unterthanen glauben behandeln zu dürfen." Durch dieses sehr diplomatische Schreiben war den Neuangekommenen der freundlichste Empfang zum voraus sicher, umsomehr, als die Gewaltthätigkeiten zumal der Portugiesen von Jahr zu Jahr eine allgemeine Entrüstung in ganz Ostasien hervorgerufen hatten. Ihnen gegenüber wurden die Engländer mit Freuden, gleichsam als „Retter, als Befreier von weltlicher und geistlicher Knechtschaft" aufgenommen, und der Fürst Aladin, der mit großer Genugthuung von den Siegen Elisabeths über Philipp von Spanien gehört, erklärte sich bereit, „mit den Engländern sich zu verbinden." — Ebenso entgegenkommend wurden die Engländer auch im Fürstentum Bantam auf Java aufgenommen, indem sie auch hier die Spanier und Portugiesen als die zu bekämpfenden Feinde erklärten. Hier wurde auch die erste englische Faktorei gegründet und wie in dieser allerersten Zeit schon die Gesellschaft glänzende Geschäfte machte, beweist die Dividende, der Reingewinn, der sich da-

Von Jahr zu Jahr gelang es ihnen, ihre Handelsgeschäfte weiter auszudehnen, neue Faktoreien zu gründen, — in Siam, an der Ostküste Indiens in Surat, sogar in Japan; ein Versuch in China mißlang. Sie setzten es durch, daß ihr „Freibrief" mit seinen Privilegien erweitert wurde, sie hatten die Genugthuung, daß eine beabsichtigte Konkurrenz-Gesellschaft gleich nach deren ersten Versuchen Fiasko machte, und verwandelten im Jahr 1612, zum Zwecke größerer Geschäftsausdehnung ihre Gesellschaft in eine „Aktiengesellschaft", deren erste Erfolge die Gründung neuer Faktoreien war.

Im Verhältnis dieser immer größeren Erfolge wuchs in ihnen nicht nur das Verlangen nach noch größeren, sondern es erwachte auch der Gedanke nach Besitzergreifung immer weiterer Landstrecken, ja, der kühne Gedanke nach Besitzergreifung womöglich von ganz Indien, und der Verdrängung aller andern Handelsgesellschaften, insbesondere der Portugiesen, Holländer und Franzosen. Der Alleinbesitz und die Alleinherrherrschaft über das an Schätzen unerschöpfliche Land trat immer deutlicher als das letzte Ziel ihrer Bestrebungen vor ihre Seele, und an die Erreichung dieses Zieles setzten sie mit englischer Zähigkeit ihre ganze Kraft.

Aber noch galt es schwere Kämpfe, teils mit den andern Handelsgesellschaften, teils mit den verschiedenen kleineren und größeren Fürsten, welche unter der Oberhoheit des in Delhi residierenden Großmogul in Indien herrschten. Das größte Hindernis entstand ihnen aber in der Heimat selber, in der dort immer energischer auftretenden demokratischen oder republikanischen Bewegung, welche mit vollstem Recht gegen die einer einzelnen Handelsgesellschaft von der Krone erteilten Privilegien, gegen das freiheitwidrige Recht eines ausschließlichen Monopols derselben auftrat, und das gleiche Recht für alle Engländer forderte. Diese Opposition von demokratischer

auf welche auch der holländischen Gesellschaft gegenüber der Führer der dortigen republikanischen Partei, De Witt geradezu erklärte, „man sehe deutlich, daß es der Gesellschaft mehr auf Eroberungen als auf Handel ankomme". Und wie berechtigt diese Erklärung war, beweist namentlich das Vorgehen der englischen Gesellschaft an der Ostküste Indiens, in Bengalen, wo sie nach der Gründung einer neuen Faktorei in Bombay, im Hinblick auf einzelne Fürsten, die ihr Hindernisse in den Weg legten, geradezu aussprach: „wenn es notwendig werde, sollten die einheimischen Fürsten und ihre Unterthanen mit Waffengewalt zum Gehorsam gebracht werden"; das beweist auch die ähnliche Erklärung, als es sich um einen förmlichen von ihr beabsichtigten Krieg gegen die Mongolen handelte, und um Eroberung ihres Landes: „Ohne Herrschaft über Land und Leute, ohne eine ehrfurchtgebietende Stellung, sagten sie, sind wir blos eine Gesellschaft von Abenteuern, denen jede Macht den Handel untersagen kann."

Je kriegerischer und selbstherrlicher nun aber dieses Auftreten der Gesellschaft, desto energischer und immer drohender die Forderungen der Demokraten im Parlament und in der Presse, und selbstverständlich die Opposition der auf die ungeheuren Erfolge der privilegierten Gesellschaft neidischen Londoner Kaufleute.

So sehr nun aber namentlich von Seiten des Parlamentes der Gesellschaft, d. h. ihren glänzenden Geschäften Gefahr drohte, so wenig ließ sie sich von ihrem einmal vorgesteckten Ziele ablenken, ja, die Erreichung desselben wurde ihr sogar gerade durch das Parlament selbst dadurch erleichtert, daß die beiden Häuser desselben — die Parteien der Tories und Whigs —, unter sich in Streit gerieten; in den Tories, überhaupt der ganzen hohen Aristokratie, fand die Gesellschaft ihre Verteidiger.

Die wiederholten Forderungen und Anklagen von

Thatsache war schließlich in nichts anderem zu suchen, als in der gemeinsten Bestechung, zu welcher die in ihrem Interesse so schwer gefährdete Handelsgesellschaft als letztem Mittel griff, und welche ihre beabsichtigte Wirkung sogar auf die hohen und höchsten Persönlichkeiten ausübte! Bestochen wurden, das steht schwarz auf weiß in den vorhandenen Urkunden, nicht nur die Hofleute, die königlichen Räte, ihr Vorsitzender, Parlamentsmitglieder, der Sprecher des Unterhauses, viele Lords, die geistlichen Herren nicht ausgenommen, ja, mit ihrer ganzen Umgebung die Könige selber, namentlich Carl V. und Wilhelm III.* Die Verteidiger der Gesellschaft wußten diese Niederträchtigkeiten damit in ein anderes Licht zu stellen, daß sie diese Gelder für bloße Geschenke erklärten, „wie es eben Herkommen sei, und wußten auch durch allerlei Künste, insbesondere durch Beseitigung der notwendigen Zeugen, durch ihre Entfernung aus dem Lande, und durch plötzliche Vertagung des Parlaments es dahin zu bringen, daß die Untersuchung vertagt, und zuletzt, — weil in beiden Häuser Bestochene saßen! — die Anklage fallen gelassen wurde.

So ging die von hier drohende Gefahr für die Gesellschaft vorüber, — und ebenso auch die neue, welche, auf die doch nicht ruhenden Angriffe der Whig-Partei und eine auf ihr Betreiben hin sich gründende neue Gesellschaft in London entstanden war, die aber in Folge der das ganze Land fast aus Krämergeist in Bürgerkrieg versetzenden Parteistreitigkeiten in kurzer Zeit gezwungen wurde, mit der alten auf ihre Privilegien sich steifenden Gesellschaft sich zu vereinigen, unter der Firma: „Die vereinigte Gesellschaft der Kaufleute in England, welche nach Ostindien Handel treiben."

Durch diese Vereinigung der zuerst sich tötlich bekämpfenden Kaufleute, von denen die Mitglieder der ersten, ursprünglichen, geradezu erklärt hatten: „Die Welt mag darüber lachen, daß wir darauf ausgehn, uns gegenseitig

zu Grunde zu richten, das kümmert uns nicht, wir stehen auf unserm alten Rechte!"* — durch diese Vereinigung gewann die neue Gesellschaft, mit Hilfe ihrer von der Krone gewährten außerordentlichen alten und neuen Vergünstigungen, insbesondere durch das Recht „Länder und anderes Besitztum zu erwerben, beliebige Verfügungen zu treffen, unter der Krone Englands alle herrschaftlichen Rechte auszuüben, gegen „nichtchristliche" Mächte Krieg zu führen, und mit ihnen Frieden zu schließen, Kriegsgeräte aus England zu beziehen und soviel Truppen anzuwerben, als immer nötig, und ihre Beamten und Offiziere ohne Einfluß der Regierung zu ernennen, über sie zu Gericht sitzen nach dem bürgerlichen und peinlichen Rechte des Mutterlandes usw." — Sie gewann jetzt in Indien einen solchen Zuwachs an Macht, daß sie sich mehr und mehr stark fühlte, ihren so lange schon genährten Plan auf Besitzergreifung, auf Eroberung des ganzen Landes auszuführen. Was sie gerade zu jener Zeit am meistem in diesem Plan bestärkte, das war der geradezu erbärmliche Zustand, in welchem Indien nach dem Tode des Großmogul im Jahre 1707 sich befand, ein Zustand des Verfalles, und der von Jahr zu Jahr zunehmenden Auflösung, zu welchem hauptsächlich die forwährenden Streitigkeiten und Kämpfe der einzelnen, in orientalischer Pracht und Ueppigkeit lebenden Landesfürsten beigetragen hatten. Es herrschte in Indien die vollständigste Anarchie, — und auf dieser wurde thatsächlich die Herrschaft Englands über Indien in den kommenden Jahrzehnten aufgeführt und begründet.

Es war die geschichtlich denkwürdige Zeit, in welcher nahezu die ganze Welt sich in Kriegslager verwandelt hatte, und wo namentlich durch die verschiedenen dynastischen Erbfolgekriege, den spanischen, österreichischen, bayrischen, und später durch den siebenjährigen und noch später den nordamerikanischen Krieg alles so sehr in Anspruch genommen war, daß der Plan der ostindischen Handels-

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* Neumann, Bd. I, S. 72. (Bruce II, 257–262.)

gesellschaft in diesem so weitabgelegenen Lande um so mehr Aussicht auf Gelingen bieten mußte, obgleich die politischen Parteistellungen der in Europa und Amerika sich bekämpfenden nicht ohne Einfluß auch auf die Ereignisse in Indien waren.

Hier zeigte sich dieser Einfluß vor Allem in der immer feindseligeren Weise, in welcher die Engländer den Franzosen gegenüber traten.

Die Franzosen, unter der Anführung von Dupleix, trugen sich mit demselben Plan der Eroberung ganz Indiens, wie die Engländer. Sie hatten Madras, wo diese eine bedeutende Faktorei bereits besaßen erobert, aber nach Ankunft einer englischen Flotte, und weil zu wenig unterstützt von der französischen Regierung, entschied sich das Kriegsglück für die Engländer, zumal nach dem kühnen Auftreten des Mannes, der von seinen Landsleuten einstimmig als der Hauptbegründer der englischen Herrschaft über Indien gefeiert wird.

I.

Robert Clive.

Von ihm sagt einer seiner neuesten Biographen, daß „in erster Linie ihm das Verdienst gebührt, daß das jetzt von England eingenommene und beherrschte Indien in der Mitte des vorigen Jahrhunderts nicht den Franzosen zur Beute ward;“ — und Alfred Lyall nennt ihn den Mann, „dem die Engländer vor allen Andern die Gründung des Reichs in Indien zu danken haben*. — Leopold von Orlich in seinem „Indien und seine Regierung“ nennt ihn den „größten Genius, den England in diesem weiten Reich gehabt hat“, setzt aber hinzu, daß er „auch das mit allen Genies teile, daß er sich über Prinzipien hinwegsetzte“, und bezeichnet seine in Indien verfolgte „Politik als eine verräterische“.**

Vom ganz unscheinbaren Handlungslehrling und Schreiber der ostindischen Handelsgesellschaft hatte er sich bald nach seiner Ankunft in Indien, weil unbefriedigt durch diesen Beruf, und nach einer größeren, ihn befriedigenderen Thätigkeit sich sehnend, für die militärische Laufbahn entschieden, hatte sich auch gleich bei den ersten kriegerischen Unternehmungen der Handelsgesellschaft in so hervorragender Weise ausgezeichnet, daß er sofort zum Hauptmann befördert wurde. Diese Unternehmungen galten hauptsächlich der

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* Lord Clive, the foundation of british Rule in India. By Sir Alexander John Arbuthnot, lately a member of the Council of India, London, 1899. S. XI. XII.

** Orlich, Band I., S. 108 u. 115.

Bekämpfung der trotz ihrer Niederlagen noch nicht ganz auf ihren Eroberungsplan verzichtenden Franzosen, und der völligen Vernichtung ihres Einflusses auf die Geschicke Indiens. Am glänzendsten zeigte sich hier gleich Anfangs Clive's militärisches Genie bei der kühnen Ueberrumpelung und Verteidigung von Arcot und der Schlacht bei Kaveripak. Dieses kühne und siegreiche Auftreten Clive's hatte aber auch zur Folge, daß eine große Anzahl indischer Fürsten jetzt anfingen, seine Unternehmungen gegen die auch ihnen feindlichen und von ihnen gehaßten Franzosen zu unterstützen. Und so geschah es, daß diese, trotz tapferster Gegenwehr, wiederholt geschlagen wurden und in folge dessen sich für die Engländer immer mehr die sichere Aussicht eröffnete, in absehbarer Zeit diesen ihnen am meisten im Weg stehenden Rivalen gänzlich zu entwaffnen, und nach seiner Beseitigung ihr letztes Ziel, die Alleinherrschaft über Indien zu erreichen.

Der Mann, dem sie in erster Linie dieses verdanken sollten, war thatsächlich Clive, — sein ausgesprochenes militärisches Genie, seine unbändige Willenskraft und Ehr- und Ruhmbegierde, Eigenschaften, die ihn jedes, auch das sittlich verwerflichste Mittel ergreifen ließen, wenn's nur zum Ziele führte.

Nach seinen ersten großen Erfolgen war er seiner Gesundheit halber zwei Jahre lang, von 1753—1755, in seine Heimat zurückgekehrt, und hatte dort, bauend auf den jetzt schon erworbenen Ruhm als „glänzender Heerführer", sich mit dem Gedanken getragen, eine frei gewordene Stelle im Parlament zu erhalten. Er war bei seiner Ankunft zumal vom obersten Aufsichts- und Gerichtshof der Direktoren der Handelsgesellschaft in ehrendster Weise empfangen worden, sie ernannten ihn zum „General", und überreichten ihm einen mit Diamanten besetzten Ehrensäbel im Werte von 500 Pfund Sterling. Für seine Wahl ins Parlament verschwendete er große Summen, und, berauscht von der Aufnahme, die er in der Londoner Gesellschaft gefunden,

über die großen Mittel hinaus, welche er sich in Indien während seiner bisherigen militärischen Unternehmungen in Hülle und Fülle gesammelt hatte.

Diese Geldmittel setzten sich zusammen teils aus den Prisengeldern, die er bei den verschiedenen Eroberungen und den sich dabei vorgefundenen Schätzen sich hatte zuteilen lassen, teils und in noch viel reichlicherem Maße, aus den ungeheuren Summen, welche die einzelnen indischen Fürsten, um seine Gunst zu gewinnen oder um sich nachträglich dankbar zu bezeigen, als „Geschenke" ihm hatten zukommen lassen. Sein neuester Biograph glaubt ihn gegen den Vorwurf, der ihn damals schon deswegen gemacht wurde, zu rechtfertigen, indem er zwar zugibt, daß bei der dienstlichen Stellung, die er der Handelsgesellschaft gegenüber einnahm, vom strengeren Rechtsstandpunkt aus seine Handlungsweise nicht einwandfrei, daß aber das Annehmen solcher Gelder als „Geschenke" damals etwas ganz Selbstverständliches war, und deswegen „billigerweise nicht nach dem Maßstab öffentlicher Moral, wie sie jetzt anerkannt wird, könne beurteilt werden".*

Daß insbesondere im Hinblick auf seine maßlose Verschwendung und seine ausgesprochene Neigung, durch Großthun von sich reden zu machen, sogar das dunkle Gerücht von „Bestechungen", aufkam soll nicht verschwiegen werden, ebensowenig aber auch, daß er gleich bei seiner Ankunft seinen Verwandten die Mittel gab, um ihre Schulden zu bezahlen.

In seiner Hoffnung auf eine Wahl ins Parlament sah er sich, trotz der dafür aufgewendeten großen Summen, getäuscht, und da auch sein aus Indien mitgebrachtes großes Vermögen nahezu aufgebraucht war, entschloß er sich, noch einmal sein Soldatenglück, mit Aussicht auf die ihm durch dieses winkenden neuen Bereicherungen zu versuchen.

Vom Direktorium der Handelsgesellschaft zum „Gouverneur vom Fort St. David", mit Anwartschaft auf die

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* „cannot fairly be judged by the standard of official morality now recognized." Authentic Lord Clive Incidents.

freiwerdende Gouverneurs-Stelle in Madras ernannt, landete Clive im Jahr 1755 mit drei Kompagnien Artillerie und ebensoviel Infanterie in Indien, und war seine nächste Aufgabe, die — trotz ihrer wiederholten Niederlagen doch noch einmal von den Franzosen versuchten Unternehmungen derselben ein für allemal durch Waffengewalt zu beseitigen.

Dieser Aufgabe entledigte er sich mit seinem bisher so glänzend bewiesenen Feldherrntalent bei den verschiedensten Gelegenheiten, und in ganz besonders hervorragender Weise namentlich bei dem Kampf um Kalkutta, in welchem er im Jahr 1757 mit seinen 700 Engländern und 1200 Sepoys über den indischen Nawab, Surab ud Daulah, der mit den Franzosen in geheimer Verbindung stand, und dem nicht weniger als 20 000 Reiter, 30 000 Fußvolk und 25 Kanonen zur Verfügung stauden, den Sieg davontrug. Dieser Sieg über eine so große Uebermacht, und die gewonnene Ueberzeugung, daß ihm in diesem Fürsten kein ernstlich zu fürchtender Feind mehr gegenüber stehe, zugleich aber auch die Einsicht, die er während seines Aufenthaltes in jener Gegend in die außergewöhnlichen Schätze des Bodens und die leichte Gewinnung derselben genommen hatte, sie weckten in ihm den Entschluß, alles daran zu setzen, um diesen großen, für den Handel so verlockenden Landstrich für die Handelsgesellschaft als ihr Eigentum zu erwerben, d. h. zu erobern. In diesem Entschluß bestärkte ihn ganz besonders der Gedanke, daß durch diese Eroberung er zugleich den Gelüsten der Franzosen ein für allemal ein Ende mache, die vor dieser Schlacht mit dem indischen Fürsten einen Vertrag geschlossen hatten. Raschen Enschlusses wirft er daher die Franzosen aus dem in der Nähe gelegenen Tschandernagar, obgleich zwischen ihm und dem Nawab nach der Einnahme von Kalkutta vertragsmäßig festgesetzt und versprochen war, daß alle Feindseligkeiten aufhören sollen; ja, er stellte an den von ihm besiegten Nawab die gebieterische Forderung, daß er entweder alle noch in seinem Land befindlichen Franzosen vertreibe, oder an ihn selber ausliefere, oder sich unbedingt den Engländern

In diesem gebieterischen Vorgehn wurde er durch die Zustimmung des die engliche Flotte kommandierenden Admirals Watson und noch mehr durch die von allen Seiten ihm zukommenden Berichte über den wahren Charakter des Nawabs bestärkt, der nicht nur, nach der Einnahme von Tschandernagore durch Clive, in den wütendsten Ausdrücken über diesen sich geäußert, sondern überhaupt als halb unzurechnungsfähiger, ebenso grausamer als feiger und treuloser Mann bei allen, die ihm näher standen und besonders den ihm untergebenen kleinen Fürsten bekannt und verhaßt war. Clive hatte sogar von neuen Intriguen gehört, die der Nawab mit den Franzosen gegen ihn angezettelt, und deswegen glaubte er seiner Handelsgesellschaft und seinem Vaterland keinen besseren Dienst leisten zu können, als wenn er, zumal unter so günstigen Umständen, mit einem solchen Mann kürzesten Prozeß mache.

„Asiaten dürfen nicht, sagte er, nach europäischen Gesetzen, nach europäischen Begriffen von Recht und Ehre behandelt werden, das sind treu- und gewissenlose Menschen, die man mit gleicher Münze bezahlen könne".*

Treu diesem Grundsatz handelte er bei der unmittelbar nach dem Sieg bei Kalkutta von ihm geplanten und — wie der Erfolg zeigte — vom höchsten Glück gekrönten, kriegerischen Unternehmung, einer Unternehmung, welche keinen geringeren Zweck hatte, als die gewaltsame Entthronung des eingeborenen indischen Fürsten, und die Einsetzung eines den Engländern mehr ergebenen an dessen Stelle. Dieser Plan wurde ihm erleichtert durch die Mithilfe der dem Nawab wegen seiner Grausamkeit besonders feindlich gesinnten untergebenen kleinen Fürsten, in Verbindung mit einer Anzahl ebenfalls unzufriedener reicher indischer Kaufleute, die alle sich im Geheimen zu gewaltsamem Vorgehen verschworen hatten. An der Spitze dieser Verschworenen stand der Oberbefehlshaber der Armee des Nawab, Mir Dschafar, derselbe, der an die Stelle

desselben treten wollte, und mit welchem zu diesem Zwecke ein heimlicher Vertrag abgeschlossen wurde.

In diesem war zwischen Clive, im Namen der englischen Handelskompagnie, ein Offensiv- und Defensiv-Bündnis festgesetzt, — die Vertreibung aller Franzosen und französischen Niederlassungen in diesem Landstrich, — die Uebergabe dieser Faktoreien an die Engländer, — Entschädigung dieser für ihre Verluste bei Kalkutta, d. h. Auszahlung von 1 Million Pfund Sterling an die Handelskompagnie, — eine halbe Million an die Europäer; 20 000 an die Eingeborenen; 70 000 an die Armenier; Uebergabe eines bedeutenden Stückes Land, Bezahlung aller dem neu eingesetzten Nawab zu Hilfe gesandten englischen Truppen, und Verbot von neu zu errichtenden Befestigungen.

In einem besonderen Nachtrag war Mir Dschafar als der neue Nawab, verpflichtet zur Auszahlung von einer halben Million Pfd. Sterling an die englische Land- und Seemacht, und 120 000 Pfund an die Mitglieder des obersten Kompagnie-Rates, — ein Vertrag, aus dem jedenfalls zu ersehen, welche verlockende Aussichten auch in dieser Beziehung den Engländern winkten.

Dieser Vertrag, in welchem Clive gemeinsame Sache mit den indischen Verrätern machte, um den ihnen allen unbequemen bisherigen Nawab gewaltsam zu entthronen, und Mir Dschafar an dessen Stelle zu setzen, er wurde auf Anweisung Clive's in zwei Abschriften ausgefertigt, deren eine, die unechte, einen sehr wichtigen Punkt enthielt, welcher in der andern, der echten, fehlte. Die Vorverhandlungen zwischen Clive und den Verrätern waren nämlich hauptsächlich mit Hilfe eines sehr reichen Hindukaufmannes geführt worden, welchem — damit er die ganze Sache nicht verrate, die Summe von 300 000 Pfund feierlich versprochen war. Um diese ungeheure Summe aber sollte auf Clive's Veranlassung, entsprechend seiner oben mitgeteilten Ansicht von der Behandlung der „Asiaten", der Hindukaufmann dadurch betrogen werden, daß in dem unechten Vertrag, den der Hindu zu

Gesicht bekam, diese Summe thatsächlich als Bezahlung für denselben angeführt war, während sie im echten Vertrag absichtlich weggelassen wurde.

Wie diese Handlungsweise, die dadurch noch überboten wurde, daß, um den Hindu ganz sicher zu machen, auch die Namensunterschrift des Admirals Watson durch Clive selber oder doch auf seine Anordnung darunter gesetzt wurde, obgleich der Admiral selber sie verweigerte, und wie dieser mit offenbarer Fälschung verbundene Betrug selbst von englischen Schriftstellern, und insbesondere seinen Biographen beurteilt wurde, das mögen folgende Stellen beweisen:

Neumann, in seiner „Geschichte des englischen Reichs in Asien", der den Engländern das große Verdienst zuerkennt, daß sie Indien „aus einem verknöcherten Zustand und moralischer Versunkenheit zu neuem menschlichen Leben, zur Selbständigkeit im Weltstaatensystem erhoben", und „dadurch allein die zahlreichen Verbrechen der Eroberung gesühnt hätten", — er schreibt doch in Beziehung auf diese Handlungsweise: „Damit der Hindu-spion, welcher die Fäden der Verschwörung kannte, und für sein Schweigen große Summen forderte, des Lohnes beraubt werden könne, wird Clive — der gepriesene Clive! an dem sein Biograph General Malcolm auch nicht den geringsten Fehl entdecken konnte, — zum gemeinen Betrüger und Fälscher".*

Malleson, sagte in seinen „Rules of India" (Oxford 1893) in Beziehung auf diesen Punkt: „Dann — begannen jene Abmachungen, von denen eine besondere soviel dazu beigetragen hat, den Namen des großen Soldaten mit Schande zu beflecken".**

Arbuthnot, in seinem „Lord Clive" schreibt nach der Erzählung von den Verhandlungen Clives mit den indischen Verschworenen: „Was nun folgte, waren in gewisser Beziehung die glänzendsten, aber sicherlich auch die ver-

werflichsten Erfolge in Clives Laufbahn. Während sein militärischer Ruhm, den er sich bei der Verteidigung von Arcot, durch den Sieg bei Kaveripak, und die Erfolge bei Trichinopolis erworben, höher denn je stieg, und während er in der bürgerlichen und politischen Verwaltung eine im höchsten Grad glänzende Befähigung entfaltete, wurde der Glanz seiner kriegerischen Heldenthaten verdunkelt durch eine Wortbrüchigkeit, die unmöglich zu rechtfertigen, und durch die Annahme von großen Summen aus den Händen des eingeborenen Fürsten, den er nach der Entthronung des Suraj ud Dalah auf den Thron von Bengalen gesetzt hatte".*

Diese Entthronung war nämlich thatsächlich die unmittelbare Folge der kriegerischen Unternehmung, die Clive gemeinsam mit den Verschworenen Indiern gegen den Nawab beschlossen hatte. Diese hatten den Nawab verräterischer Weise überredet, daß der Krieg gegen Clive seine einzige Rettung vor den verhaßten Engländern sei, und der schändlich rings von Verrat umgebene Fürst hatte eine Armee von über 50000 Mann, Reiter uud Fußvolk mit 53 meist sehr schweren Geschützen, von denen einige von einer Anzahl Franzosen bedient wurden, versammelt, um den Engländern entgegen zu treten. Clive verfügte nur über 3200 Mann, worunter 2100 eingeborene Sepoys, und sehr wenig Geschütze. Im Hinblick auf dieses ungeheure Mißverhältnis der beiden sich gegenübertretenden Armeen berief Clive selbst einen Kriegsrat. Obgleich dieser aber und er selber von dem Kampf erst abgeraten hatte, änderte er seinen Entschluß, und befahl den Angriff, ebenso trotzend auf sein Glück, als ganz besonders auf seinen Plan mit den Verschworenen. Und der Plan gelang. Nachdem der Kampf anfangs, besonders durch die ihnen an Zahl überlegene Artillerie, den Engländern ein heißes Ringen gekostet, wurde er dadurch zu ihren Gunsten entschieden, daß der

Verschworenen diesen Augenblick benützten, um den Fürsten zum Rückzug, d. h. zu seiner persönlichen Entfernung aus dem Kampf, zu überreden, — was zur Folge hatte, daß sofort das ganze indische Heer in wilder Flucht den Engländern das Schlachtfeld überließ. Das war die berühmte Schlacht bei Plassey, — indisch: Palasi — am 21. Juni 1757. Nach diesem Sieg hatten die Engländer „keine europäischen Nebenbuhler mehr zu fürchten, der Widerstand der Einheimischen war kaum zu rechnen, die Briten konnten ungehindert auf ihrer Siegesbahn fortschreiten. Ganz Bengalen, Bihar und Orissa, gehörten jetzt ihnen, denn der von ihnen eingesetzte neue Nawab wurde von ihnen nur als Scheinfürst betrachtet, der ihnen unbedingt untergeben war, und seine Dankbarkeit in verschwenderischster Weise ihn bethätigte, vor allem Clive gegenüber, dem er in erster Linie seinen Thron verdankte. Ihm allein vermachte er eine Jahresrente von 30 000 Pfund Sterling, insbesondere auch in Hinsicht auf den neuen Dienst, den Clive nach dem Sieg bei Plassey ihm erwiesen, durch Unterdrückung einer Rebellion, welche ein Teil seiner indischen Großen gegen ihn beabsichtigt hatte.

Welche Schätze den Engländern in Ostindien winkten, das geht, außer den oben schon mitgeteilten Angaben bei dem Vertrag mit Mir Dschafar, noch deutlicher hervor aus den Summen, welche dieser Scheinfürst damals noch außerdem gespendet hat, und die wohl wert sind, zu einer allseitig richtigen Beurteilung des Auftretens der Engländer und in erster Linie Clive's beachtet zu werden. Clive erhielt für sich persönlich 280 000 Rupien, und überdies später noch 1,600 000; der Gouverneur von Kalkutta 280 000; drei Komiteemitglieder der Handelsgesellschaft jedes 240 000; der Unterhändler Watts 300 000; sechs Mitglieder des Rates jedes 100 000; der Sekretär Clive's 500 000; Sorafton 200 000; Lushington 50 000; Major Grant 100 000. Von der Beute, welche gemacht wurde, erhielt die Regierung in Kalkutta allein 800 000 Pfund Sterling, die in 100 Booten von der Flotte ihr zugeführt wurden!

Mir Dschafar war nach dem Kriege von Clive selbst in

mit kostbaren Geschenken beehrt worden; der Hindukaufmann aber, als er vergebens die auf dem falschen Vertrag ihm versprochene Summe verlangte, und sich betrogen sah, verfiel in Wahnsinn; der entthronte Fürst wurde von einem Sohn des neuen in der Gefangenschaft ermordet, — ohne daß Clive irgend einen Schritt gethan hätte, es zu verhindern.

Wie aber sah es nach allen diesen Vorgängen im Lande selbst aus, zunächst in dem schönen Bengalen, auf dessen Thron jetzt Mir Dschafar saß, der Fürst von „Englands Gnaden"?

Neumann in seiner „Geschichte" schreibt: „Das Loos der armen, von Dschafar „dem Namen nach beherrschten" Lande ist furchtbar: der Fürst plagte die Unterthanen grenzenlos, um seine Versprechungen zu halten. Auch wollte jeder Engländer gleichwie Clive, mit einem königlichen Vermögen nach der Heimat zurückkehren. Die Bewohner Bengalens waren zwar seit Jahrhunderten an alle möglichen Erpressungen gewöhnt, doch solch' eine Tyrannei, wie die stolzen Briten über sie verhängten, hatte die unglückliche Bevölkerung noch niemals erfahren." Ein Zeitgenosse und Schriftsteller, der Muselmann Seir Mutakhereen brach deswegen den Engländern gegenüber in die Klage aus: „Die Menschen seufzen unter ihrem Joch; Armut und Elend ist ihr Loos! O, Gott, komm deinen betrübten Dienern zu Hilfe, und befreie uns aus dem Joch der Sklaverei!"*

Trotz all' den bisherigen Siegen der Engländer und immer größerem Landerwerb infolge von Aufständen, die da und dort auf's Neue in dem unglücklichen Lande ausbrachen, und von Clive niedergeschlagen wurden, war nun aber eine Spannung eingetreten zwischen ihm und der Handelsgesellschaft, welche sich gegen das gewaltsame Vorgehen Clives auf's Entschiedenste aussprach. Sei es, daß diese Spannung mit dem Direktorium, oder die Rück-

sicht auf seine sehr leidende Gesundheit ihn dazu veranlaßte, — er entschloß sich, um sich Ruhe zu gönnen, zum zweitenmal zur Rückkehr in die Heimat.

Er kam reich beladen mit Schätzen, mit baarem Gold und Juwelen, im Jahr 1760, in der Heimat an, und wurde womöglich mit noch größeren Ehren empfangen als das erstemal. Der König, seine Minister, selbst die Direktoren der Handelsgesellschaft huldigten ihm; diese hatten, trotz der Differenzen mit ihm, in ihrem Gesellschaftsgebäude seine Büste aufstellen lassen, und ihm zu Ehren sogar eine Denkmünze geprägt. Von seinen fabelhaften pekuniären Eroberungen, so sehr diese in gewissen höheren Kreisen nicht zu seinem Vorteile besprochen wurden, war es im Volk im großen Ganzen noch stille, so Manches auch in diesem namentlich über seine thatsächlichen „Erpressungen" geredet wurde. Ueber den Ruhm, den er als siegreicher Feldherr sich erworben, wurde vorerst noch über die Art seiner zusammengerafften Schätze ein Schleier gedeckt. Er ward gepriesen als „größter Feldherr, den England seit langer Zeit gehabt", als „vom Himmel geboren", und erhielt jetzt auch seinen Eintritt in's Parlament. Seine Hoffnung auf die Peerswürde wurde ihm zwar nicht sofort, aber doch später erfüllt, und 1764 wurde er sogar mit dem Bath-Orden geschmückt.

In Indien selbst aber gestalteten sich während seiner vierjährigen Abwesenheit die Verhältnisse für die Handelsgesellschaft immer ungünstiger. Ihre Beamten hatten kein höheres Ziel, als auf Kosten des unglücklichen Landes sich soviel als möglich zu bereichern, zu bereichern für sich, während die Kasse der Gesellschaft immer leerer wurde. Es war, wie ein Zeitgenosse sich ausdrückte, „die dunkelste Zeit in der Geschichte des Auftretens der Engländer in Ostindien".

Kein Wunder, daß die Direktoren der Gesellschaft, um diesen Zuständen ein Ende zu machen, Clive's Rückkehr nach Indien wünschten. Sie ernannten ihn zum „Gou-

lische Besitzungen in Indien," und bestätigten namentlich den von Mir Dschafar ihm bewilligten Jahresgehalt von 30 000 Pfund Sterling.

Im Jahre 1764/65 entschloß sich Clive auf das Drängen der Direktoren zur Rückkehr nach Indien, — obgleich er wußte, daß er eine nicht unbedeutende Anzahl Gegner selbst unter diesen in London zurückließ. Welche Zustände er antraf, das beweist einer seiner Briefe, in welchem er in die Heimat Folgendes schrieb: „Wie tief ist doch der englische Name gesunken! Ich konnte mich nicht enthalten, Thränen zu vergießen über den verlorenen Ruhm der britischen Nation, unrettbar, ewig verloren, fürchte ich. Ich schwöre aber bei dem großen Wesen, welches die Herzen erforscht, welchem wir alle Rechenschaft ablegen, — wenn es eine Zukunft gibt, ich schwöre, daß ich jetzt mit einer Seele nach Indien gekommen bin, die erhaben ist über alle Bestechung Ich schwöre, daß ich diese großen, über unserm Haupt schwebenden Uebel vernichten, oder in dem Bestreben dies auszuführen, zu Grunde gehen werde, zu Grunde gehen will."*

Ob es ihm mit dieser Sprache ganz ernst war, ist allerdings sehr bezweifelt worden; war er es doch, von dem gerade bei Erzählung dieser seiner zweiten Rückkehr nach Indien, der für Englands Größe und Kulturmission sehr schwärmende Verfasser der „Geschichte des englischen Reiches in Indien" sich nicht enthalten konnte, die Bemerkung zu machen, daß er nicht nur „seit seinem Auftreten in Indien überhaupt nicht weniger als die anderen Beamten der Gesellschaft immer an seine persönliche Bereicherung gedacht, sondern daß er stets seinen Löwenanteil genommen, und dadurch den englischen Namen, die europäische Ehre mehr als mancher Andere geschändet habe."*

Wie dem auch sei, thatsächlich hat Clive bei dieser

erworben, in die Unordnung der Gesellschaft, in die überhandgenommenen Erpressungen und Ausbeutungen des Volkes durch die englischen Beamten, und in Beziehung auf das Verhältnis der Gesellschaft zu den einzelnen Fürsten durch sein verständiges, entschiedenes und zielbewußtes Auftreten machtvoll eingegriffen und für die Gesellschaft wie für die Eingeborenen bessere Zustände herbeigeführt zu haben. Es gelang ihm dieses namentlich auch gegenüber dem Heer, dessen Gehälter den größten Teil der unverhältnismäßigen Ausgaben der Gesellschaft ausmachten. Derselbe Geschichtsschreiber, den wir soeben angeführt, unterläßt es deswegen nicht, sein Urteil über diese Periode des Wirkens Clive's dahin auszusprechen: „Auf diese konnte der Statthalter in der That, bei den vielen späteren Trübsalen, mit einiger Befriedigung zurückblicken. Seine einsichtsvollen Maßregeln bewirkten eine Verbesserung der peinlichen Lage der Bevölkerung und der finanziellen Zustände des Landes." Er fügt aber freilich an derselben Stelle leider hinzu: „daß sich der unermeßlich reiche Staatsmann auch jetzt aber nicht vergaß, daß er im Gegenteil bei allen Vorkehrungen seinen persönlichen Nutzen im Auge behielt, das zeigen zur Genüge die nachfolgenden Begebenheiten." *

Es entspann sich nämlich ein Krieg der Engländer mit dem Fürsten von Audh, der über einen ungeheueren Landstrich herrschte und sich mit mehreren anderen verband, um die immer mehr umsichgreifenden Engländer zu vertreiben. Nach einem sehr leichten Siege kamen diese in den Besitz eines ganz gewaltiges Landes, vom Himalaya an bis zum Ganges und über diesen hinaus, wenn sie auch aus kluger Berechnung die einzelnen Fürsten dem Scheine nach auf ihren zweifelhaften Thronen ließen. Durch diesen Landerwerb stiegen die Aktien der Gesellschaft zu einer kolossalen Höhe, und Clive, der Alles in Händen hatte, war der Erste, der dieses zu seinem Vorteil zu benutzen wußte. Es ließ sofort alle seine in London verwahrten

scheine" anschaffen, mit denen er sein ohnedies enormes Vermögen nahezu verdoppelte. Ja, gegen das bereits erlassene Verbot machte er sich kein Gewissen daraus, Geschenke von den Fürsten zu erpressen.

Durch diesen neuen Landerwerb war die ostindische Handelsgesellschaft „Gebieterin eines asiatischen Reiches geworden, wie kein gebildetes europäisches Volk es jemals besessen seit den Zeiten Alexanders und der Griechen."* Im Jahre 1765 wurden alle diese Länder „für ewige Zeiten an die Ostindische Compagnie" abgetreten. Es war damit in Erfüllung gegangen, was Clive längst als höchstes Ziel erstrebte, und an dessen Erreichung er seine ganze Kraft gesetzt hatte. Hatte er doch gerade damals über diese gesamte Lage in folgenden Worten sich in einem Briefe an einen seiner Freunde in England ausgesprochen: „Wir sind Herren des ganzen Reiches Audh, und es ist nicht übertrieben, wenn ich sage, wir können morgen das ganze mongolische Reich in Besitz nehmen. Die Bewohner dieses Landes, das wissen wir aus Erfahrung, haben keinen Sinn für Treue und Glauben. Keiner traut dem Anderen. Ihre Truppen sind nicht eingeübt, sie sind nicht angeführt und regelmäßig bezahlt wie die unserigen. Ein zahlreiches europäisches Heer wird uns die Herrschaft erringen und erhalten. Auch sind die indischen Fürsten selbst der Ansicht, daß unser grenzenloser Ehrgeiz solch eine allgemeine Herrschaft anstrebt. Wir können sogar nicht stehen bleiben, selbst wenn wir wollten. Wir selbst müssen am Ende Nabab sein, nicht blos in der That, sondern auch dem Namen nach; wir sind gezwungen, offen und entschieden herauszutreten."*

Das oberste Direktorium der Gesellschaft, dessen Sitz in London im Ostindia-Haus, war freilich mit diesem neuen Zuwachs seiner Besitzungen nicht ganz einverstanden; man fürchtete, daß dadurch die längst vorhandene Mißstimmung des englischen Volkes, welches gegen die der Gesellschaft erteilten

Privilegien war und jetzt die neu eröffneten Aussichten derselben auf immer größere Bereicherung mit neidischen Augen betrachtete, noch mehr Nahrung gegeben werde. Es erklärte ganz entschieden: „Wir wollen keine Angriffskriege, wir wollen die Grenzen unserer Besitzungen nicht erweitern," bemerkte aber auch gleichzeitig, daß „gegen Europäer, namentlich gegen Franzosen, natürlich in anderer Weise zu verfahren sei;" — diese seien um jeden Preis — nur „offene Feindseligkeit ausgeschlossen," aus dem Land zu treiben."*

Welchen Umfang die in Volkskreisen vorhandene Mißstimmung damals angenommen, zeigt am deutlichsten, daß sie nicht nur in einer ganzen Reihe Schriften, Romane und Schauspielen zum Ausbruch kam, in welchen die Aktionäre und Beamten der Gesellschaft, die ausschließlich auf ihre eigene Bereicherung ausgingen, als eine „üppige, hochmütige, tyrannische Menschenklasse" geschildert werden, die ihren „auf schmachvolle Weise erworbenen Reichtum in widerlichem Prunk und Großthun vergeuden," sondern ganz besonders darin, daß die ganze Angelegenheit jetzt vors Parlament kam, wo 1766 ein Ausschuß zur „Untersuchung der Handlungen, Zustände und Erwerbnisse der indischen Hansa" eingesetzt wurde, und welcher zunächst zu dem Beschluß führte, daß „kein Unterthan der Krone Englands für sich die Oberherrlichkeit an Land und Leuten erwerben könne," — daß somit die Handelsgesellschaft mit allen ihren Besitzungen sich der Krone und ihren Verfügungen unterzuordnen habe, selbstverständlich auch dem Parlament.

Angesichts dieser in der Heimat sich vorbereitenden, nicht nur für die Gesellschaft, sondern ganz besonders für Clive selber immer bedenklicher werdenden Dinge, war es für Clive kein leichter Entschluß, nachdem er in Indien seine Aufgabe erfüllt, Ruhe, Frieden und Ordnung hergestellt, das Land seiner Triumphe abermals zu verlassen;

aber seine Gesundheit, wegen der er schon einmal sich zum Verlassen Indiens gezwungen gesehen hatte, sie war infolge der neuen Strapazen und Aufregungen unter dem ungünstigen Klima so sehr angegriffen, daß ohne diesen Entschluß das Schlimmste für ihn zu befürchten war. Das Londoner Direktorium hatte ihn dringend gebeten, noch eine Zeit zu bleiben, er konnte es nicht, weil sein Leben auf dem Spiele stand.

Im Juli 1767 kehrte er heim, ehrenvoll empfangen vom König und der Königin und dem Direktorium der Gesellschaft, in welchem zwar nicht alle mit Clive's Vorgehen in Indien einverstanden waren, aber doch die Mehrheit der Mitglieder. Auf Anraten der Aerzte unternahm er zur Herstellung seiner Gesundheit eine Reise nach dem Kontinent, brach aber vor der Zeit diese wieder ab, weil es ihm keine Ruhe ließ, angesichts der jetzt immer offener und feindseliger auftretenden Anklagen, nicht an Ort und Stelle zu sein.

Die Zahl seiner Gegner hatte sich bedeutend vermehrt; zu denen, welche interesselos früher schon gegen die ganze Art seiner Wirksamkeit in Indien und namentlich seine Selbstbereicherung durch Geschenke und Erpressungen aufgetreten waren, kamen alle die hinzu, welche sich durch seine strengen, aber vollkommen gerechtfertigten Maßregeln zum Zweck der Gesundung der ostindischen Compagnie-Verhältnisse, getroffen und verletzt fühlten, und welche ungerechterweise ihm allein die Schuld an den nach seiner Abreise aus Indien dort neu auftretenden mißlichen Zustände zuschrieben.

Im Jahre **1772** brach der Sturm gegen ihn los. Bei der Eröffnung des Parlaments wurde ein Gesetz angekündigt, welches die „Mängel und Mißbräuche in der Verwaltung der Ostindischen Gesellschaft beseitigen sollte," und kurz darauf kündigte der Vizepräsident des Ostindischen Direktoriums und gleichzeitig Mitglied des „Hauses der Gemeinen", Sullivan, sein persönlicher Gegner, eine Bill an „für bessere Ordnung

der Angelegenheiten der Ostindischen Compagnie, deren Diener in Indien, und die Rechtspflege in Bengalen." Der Name Clives war in dieser Ankündigung nicht genannt, aber die Rede, mit welcher sie von Sullivan begründet wurde, war nichts geringeres als eine ganz formelle Anklage gegen denselben.

Clive verteidigte sich in einer Rede, von welcher der in der Parlamentssitzung zufällig anwesende berühmte englische Staatsmann Lord Chatham sagte, daß „er in seinem ganzen Leben nie eine ausgezeichnetere gehört habe," und deren Wiedergabe in den Parlaments-Akten nicht weniger als 34 Seiten einnahm. Er gab alles zu, was ihm als Vergehen angerechnet wurde, die Annahme von Geschenken, sein Bündnis mit den verräterischen Fürsten, den Jahresgehalt an Mir Dschafar, den niederträchtigen Betrug mit dem doppelten Vertrag, aber er erklärte, daß er alles „**im Interesse der Gesellschaft und für sein Vaterland**" **gethan**, und daß er es heute wieder thun würde. In Beziehung auf den Vorwurf der Selbstbereicherung und seines jetzigen ungeheueren Vermögens schloß er mit den Worten: „Verdiene ich denn nicht weit eher Anerkennung für die Mäßigung, die ich bei all meinem Vorgehen beobachtet? Betrachten Sie doch die Lage, in welche allein der Sieg bei Plassey mich gebracht hat? Ein großer Fürst stand ganz in meinem Belieben; eine reiche Stadt hing ganz von meiner Gnade ab; ihre reichsten Geldmänner überboten sich einander für ein Lächeln von mir; ich schritt durch Gewölbe, die mir allein aufgethan wurden, auf beiden Seiten vollgefüllt von Gold und Juwelen! In diesem Augenblick stand ich da — erstaunt über meine Mäßigung!"

Die Gegner ließen sich freilich durch seine mit höchstem Phatos vorgetragenen Worte nicht verblüffen. An ihrer Spitze standen, außer Sullivan, der Gouverneur Johnston und der General Bourgayne, der den nordamerikanischen Krieg

halten zu haben, er leugnet nur, daß er sie behalten habe. Einem seiner Freunde hätte er 15 000, dem andern 13 000, und dem dritten 12 000 Pfund gegeben. Ja, seinem Herrn Bedienten, man denke sich nur, dem Herrn Philyot, schenkte er in zweien Zahlungen 4000 Pfund. Und dies Alles, man vergesse es nicht, dies alles ist gegen den ausdrücklichsten Befehl des Hofs der Direktoren geschehen. Wenn das kein Treubruch heißt, so wisse man nicht mehr, was so genannt werden könnte. Wie wohl ein öffentliches Gericht, wie wohl die öffentliche Meinung eine Verteidigung dieser Art aufnehmen wird! Beweisen wir dem Herrn morgen, daß er noch 50 000, noch 100 000 in rechtloser Weise angenommen hat, so hat er sie wieder weggeschenkt. Wer erlaubt Euch denn, diesen zu bestehlen, um jenen zu bereichern? Alle Vergehen, welche nur immer den Dienern der Ostindischen Kompagnie aufgebürdet wurden, Seine Herrlichkeit hat sie sich im höchsten Grade selbst zu Schulden kommen lassen. Hat Jemand größere Geschenke angenommen? hat Jemand größe Summen nach Hause geschickt? Hat Jemand die täglichen Bedürfnisse der ohnedies gedrückten Bevölkerung Bengalens, gegen das ausdrücklichste Verbot des Indischen Hauses, höher besteuert? u. s. w.

Auf diese vernichtenden Fragen ist, wie Neumann in seiner Gechichte schreibt, „Clive die Antwort schuldig geblieben." Er hat sich zwar noch einmal dadurch zu verteidigen gesucht, daß er die Hauptschuld an allen Mißständen in Indien auf die Verwaltung der Gesellschaft und auf den „obersten Hof der Direktoren" wälzte, „die ihre Zeit mit den feinsten Mahlzeiten und herrlichsten Getränken verprassen, aber die Dinge gehen lassen, wie sie gehn", aber es gelang ihm mit seiner glänzendsten Rednergabe nicht, das verdammende Urteil von sich abzuhalten. Es gelang ihm um so weniger, als zum Schluß der langen Verhandlungen Herr Sullivan die einfache, aber vernichtende Frage an ihn stellte: Wo denn das [illegible]

lichkeit wiederholt abverlangt habe, weil aus diesen amtlichen Dokumenten klar wie der Tag bewiesen werden könnte, daß der Lord allein die Ursache der gegenwärtigen Mißstände im Indischen Hause ist?"

Clive's Antwort lautete: „Ich habe sie bei meiner Rückkehr von Indien einem gewissen Campbell, einem schottischen Schriftsteller geliehen, und sie nie mehr zurück erhalten."* Durch diese Antwort sahen sich seine Gegner in ihrem Vorgehn nur um so mehr bestärkt, und die Parlaments-verhandlungen spitzten sich deswegen zuletzt in die förmliche Anklage gegen Clive zu, welche lautete:

„Es seien in Bengalen Dinge geschehen, ähnlich den Thaten der Spanier in Peru und Mexiko. Wolle man die Rache des Himmels nicht auf Altengland herniederrufen, so dürften sie nicht ungestraft bleiben. Diese heillosen Reichtümer würden wohl am Ende Freiheit und Gesetz vernichten. Man sagte vom römischen Verres, er war der Reichtümer gierig, weil er im Reichtum Sicherheit fand und Ehre. So ist's auch in unsern Tagen; man braucht die indischen Erpressungen zum Ankauf verfaulter Burgen, zum Erwerb eines parlamentarischen Einflusses."

Um diesem Unfug ein Ende zu machen, und die Wurzel vollständig abzuschneiden, stellten die Gegner am 10. Mai 1773 die folgenden formellen Anträge:

1. Alle Erwerbnisse und Besitzungen, welche durch die bewaffnete Macht oder mittels Verträge mit fremden Fürsten erworben werden, sind Staatseigentum.

2. Die Verwendung solcher Erwerbnisse zum Vorteil eines im bürgerlichen- und Kriegswesen Angestellten ist ungesetzlich.

3. Angestellte dieser Art, welchen die Macht im bürgerlichen und Kriegswesen übertragen war, haben große Summen von den Fürsten und andern Personen des Landes Bengalen erhalten und zu ihrem eigenen Nutzen verwendet. Sie sollen zur Wiedererstattung angehalten werden."

Diese Anträge wurden vom Parlament sämtlich angenommen, aber, — bezeichnend für den Ernst, mit dem sie gemeint waren, und für die Rücksichten, die man auf noch ganz andre, auf **höher** stehende Personen als Clive, glaubte nehmen zu müssen, — die sich auch bereichert, — ja, bezeichnend für den über alle rechtlichen und moralischen Vergehen sich doch zuletzt hinwegsetzenden Großmachtdünkel der durch die Eroberung so großer Landstriche im fernen Weltteil, und durch die dadurch in Aussicht gestellten industriellen und finanziellen Vorteile sich höchlichst bestärkt fühlte — aus allen diesen Gründen endete die so energisch in Angriff genommene Anklage damit, daß am 21. Mai das Parlament mit großer Mehrheit folgenden Beschluß faßte:

„Lord Clive, Baron von Plassey, hat sich zur Zeit der Absetzung des Seradschah ud Daulah und der Erhebung Mir Dschafars auf den Thron von Bengalen eine Summe von 234 000 Pfund Sterling für sich erworben. Dies ist durch Mißbrauch der ihm anvertrauten Macht und zum bösen Beispiel der übrigen öffentlichen Diener geschehen. Robert Clive hat aber zu gleicher Zeit **dem Vaterland große und wichtige Dienste geleistet!**“ *

Dieser Beschluß hatte zur Folge, daß der Anklage keine weitere Untersuchung folgte, daß Clive, wenn auch mit schweren Vorwürfen belastet, von jeder weiteren Ahndung seiner Vergehen verschont blieb. Er überlebte diesen, von ihm nie geahnten Abschluß seiner öffentlichen Wirksamkeit, überhaupt diese in der letzten Zeit immer häufigeren und an Feindseligkeit und Leidenschaftlichkeit zunehmenden Angriffe auf sein Charakter, auf seiner Ehre — nur noch ein einziges Jahr. Am 22. November 1774 starb er nach längerem schwerem Leiden, indem er selber die Hand an sein Leben legte. Seine unheilbare Krankheit und gewiß noch mehr die Schwere der Anklagen, die auf ihm lasteten, die er aber von seinem Standpunkt aus nicht glaubte verdient zu haben, sie brachten ihn zu diesem Entschluß.

Einer seiner neuesten englischen Biographen, der so gerecht ist, von begangenen Fehlern oder Vergehen ihn nicht freizusprechen, der aber, als auf die Größe und Macht seines Landes stolzer Engländer, alle diese Fehler und Vergehen in den Wind schlägt, beschließt deßwegen seine Darstellung unter andern mit den folgenden Worten:

„Caesar eroberte Gallien für sein Vaterland; Hannibal hielt ein Vierteljahrhundert Rom in beständiger Unruhe, Wellington trieb die Franzosen aus Portugal und Spanien. Clives Lebensthat war glänzender als diese alle. Er gründete für das kleine Eiland im Atlantischen Ozean ein großes, herrliches Reich.“ *

II.

Warren Hastings.

Der andere Mann, der an Entschlossenheit, Rücksichtslosigkeit, Härte und Grausamkeit Robert Clive nichts nachgab, und an der Anwendung auch der verwerflichsten Mittel zur Bereicherung der Handelsgesellschaft und in erster Linie seiner selbst, ihn womöglich noch übertraf, war Warren Hastings.

Von ihm sagt Leopold von Orlich, daß er „ebenso gewissenlos“ wie Clive, nennt ihn den „gelddurstigen Generalgouverneur“, der „im Geldauftreiben die verwerflichsten Mittel“ angewendet, und faßt sein Gesamturteil dahin zusammen: „So wie Clive den Grundstein zum indischen Reich legte, so ist es Hastings, der das Fundament zu dessen künftiger Größe und Regierungsweise gründete; wir kennen die Mittel und Wege, deren er sich bediente. Nur ein Mann von so festem und unversöhnlichem Charakter, so herzlos und kalt und so gleichgiltig für die Leiden seiner Mitmenschen, konnte unberuhigt den heilichsten Rechten Hohn sprechen. Ueber Prinzipien setzte er sich hinweg, er kannte sie ebenso wenig, als wie ihm Religion und christliche Gesinnung bekannt waren.“ — Mit dieser Schilderung seines moralischen Charakters stimmt auch der geistvolle Geschichtsschreiber Lord Macaulay überein.*

Auch er hatte seine Laufbahn in Ostindien als einfacher Schreiber begonnen, hatte aber auch schon in den

es so weit gebracht, daß er bei seiner ersten Rückkehr nach England im Jahre 1764 über Geldmittel verfügte, die ihn in Stand setzten, Geschenke von 1000 Pfund Sterling zu machen und Pensionen von 200 Pfund zu erteilen.

1768 erbat und erhielt er aufs neue eine Anstellung im Dienste der Gesellschaft, und brachte es in kürzester Zeit so weit, daß er im Jahre 1772 zum Vorsitzenden des Rates in Bengalen und weiterhin zum Oberstatthalter vom englischen Reich in Indien ernannt wurde.

Sein Hauptstreben ging dahin, das Einkommen der Gesellschaft so weit möglich zu vermehren, gleichviel mit welchen, auch mit den verwerflichsten Mitteln. Besonders die ungeheueren Ausgaben für das Militär suchte er zu ermäßigen; aber so sehr das im Interesse der Gesellschaft anzuerkennen war, welche Schmach häufte er durch die Art seines Vorgehens in dieser Sache nicht nur auf die Ehre seiner Gesellschaft, sondern auf den englischen Namen überhaupt!

Um Geld zusammen zu raffen, schloß er ein Bündnis mit dem Fürsten von Audh, welcher die Absicht hatte, das Land der Rohillas zu erobern, schloß es aber, weil er zugleich den geheimen Plan hatte, bei gelegener Zeit diesem Fürsten selbst sein Land zu nehmen. Dieses zweideutige Bündnis schloß er mit der schmachvollen Verpflichtung, daß er einen Teil seiner englischen Truppen gegen eine gewisse Summe Geldes ihm zur Verfügung stelle; — er erhielt dafür die Summe von 400 000 Pfund Sterling und außerdem ließ er sich noch die Kriegskosten bezahlen; er schloß also denselben Handel mit seinen englischen Landeskindern, wie seinerzeit deutsche Fürsten, welche die ihrigen an die Holländer und Amerikaner verkauften.

Durch diesen schmachvollen Vertrag machte er sich aber auch zum Mitschuldigen an all den entsetzlichen Barbareien, welche in diesem Eroberungskrieg verübt wurden, und die für Hastings um so unverantwortlicher, weil die

unglücklichen Landes fand mit vielen Tausenden in der Schlacht bei Kattarah den Tod, und der Kommandierende des englischen Hilfskorps gab selber an, daß an Hunderttausend in die nördlichen Gebirgsteile sich flüchteten oder in den Moor- und Sumpfgegenden des Landes sich verbargen, um der Gefangenschaft zu entgehen. Ueber tausend blühende Ortschaften, Dörfer und Städte wurden den Flammen preisgegeben, dabei aber Scheußlichkeiten begangen, die, wie Neumann in seiner „Geschichte" sich ausdrückt, gar nicht erzählt werden können, Scheußlichkeiten insbesondere gegenüber Frauen! „Die eingekerkerte Familie des Fürsten selber, die Fürstinnen und andere Frauen mußten die Engländer heimlich um Reis und Wasser bitten", und eine derselben schrieb dem englischen Befehlshaber einen Jammerbrief, der mit den Worten endete: „Besser ist der schnelle Tod durch den Dolch, als die lange Pein durch Hunger und Durst!" *

Aus dem ganzen Vorgehen des mit den Engländern verbündeten Fürsten von Audh ging deutlich hervor, daß es nicht blos um Eroberung des Landes der Rohilla zu thun war, sondern um die vollständige Ausrottung und Vertilgung dieses freigesinnten Stammes; — diese Absicht der Ausrottung war sogar in dem Bündnisvertrag des Fürsten mit den Engländern ausdrücklich ausgesprochen.* Was aber die Beteiligung der letzteren an diesem Ausrottungskrieg erst ins volle Liche stellt, das war die Erklärung Hastings', „daß alle diese gegen die Rohillas verübten Gewaltthätigkeiten und Scheußlichkeiten zwar zu beklagen, daß es aber die „orientalische Kriegführung" so mit sich bringe, so sehr es von den gewöhnlichen Normen abweiche, mit denen man in Europa alles zu beurteilen pflege." **

Jedenfalls hatte der mit den Engländern verbündete Fürst sein Ziel erreicht; das schöne fruchtbare Land der Rohillas war in eine trostlose Wüste verwandelt, seine Be-

wohner nach todesmutigen Kämpfen entweder durch die Uebermacht der Waffen vertilgt oder aus dem Lande vertrieben. Aber die Folgen dieser gemeinsam mit den Engländern verübten Gewaltthaten blieben auch nicht aus, und besonders die letzteren haben sie bis in die neuere Zeit, wo ihre Herrschaft sich über ganz Indien erstreckt, an sich erfahren, erfahren an dem fortglimmenden Haß dieses auch von ihnen so schmachvoll mißhandelten Stammes, einem so tiefgehenden Haß, daß er sich wiederholt in den blutigsten Aufständen gegen die Engländer Luft machte. Neumann sagt, „das Verfahren Hastings' — unter dessen Oberherrlichkeit dieses Alles vor sich ging — trug nicht wenig dazu bei, den englischen Namen bei dem ganzen Afghanenvolk — zu dem die Rohillas gehören — verhaßt zu machen." Dieser Haß ging sogar soweit, daß einige Stammhäupter der so barbarisch unterworfenen Rohillas später ihren Glauben abschwuren, einzig und allein, weil sie nur unter dieser Bedingung ein Bündnis mit einem benachbarten Stamm eingehen konnten, mit dessen Hilfe sie an den Engländern Rache zu nehmen suchten für den Verlust ihres Landes und ihrer Freiheit.

Daß aber auch vonseiten der ostindischen Gesellschaft damals das Vorgehen Hastings', besonders sein Handel mit dem Fürsten von Audh, sein Verkauf englischer Soldaten gegen die Rohillas — ja, weil das schmachvolle Geschäft so viel eintrug, auch zu noch anderen Unternehmungen — nicht widerspruchslos gebilligt wurde, beweist die Absendung englischer Richter nach Indien, um das Vorgehen Hastings des näheren zu untersuchen — eine Untersuchung, welche zur Folge hatte, daß im Jahre 1774 eine förmliche Anklageschrift nach London gesandt wurde, und daß auf Grund dieser vonseiten des Direktoriums sogar die Enthebung Hastings' von seinem hohen Posten beschlossen war. Daß dieser Beschluß nicht ausgeführt wurde, daran waren nur die Aktionäre der Gesellschaft schuld, welche durch Hastings Vorgehen ihre Einkünfte, ihre Pro-

ihm zur Last fallenden Vergehen nicht fallen lassen wollten. Nichtsdestoweniger mehrte sich von Jahr zu Jahr die Zahl derjenigen, welche dem Angeklagten seine Vergehen nicht verzeihen konnten, und nahmen an dieser Englands Ehre so nahe berührenden Angelegenheit insbesondere die ersten Redner des Parlaments, die ersten Staatsmänner den lebhaftesten Anteil.

Die Zahl seiner Gegner mehrte sich insbesondere auch durch sein selbstherrisches Auftreten dem Direktorium gegenüber, er verweigerte diesem die Vorlage der Geschäftsbücher und später seine Papiere. Auch das ganze Treiben der Beamten der Gesellschaft, der höchsten wie niedersten, unter seiner Oberstatthalterschaft trug dazu bei, die Unzufriedenheit zu vermehren. Sich selbst zu bereichern, um mit großen Schätzen in die Heimat zurückzukehren, war das Bestreben fast Aller. Damit hing zusammen ein auf sinnlichen Genuß ausgehendes, aller Sitte spottendes Leben, das sich namentlich dem weiblichen Geschlechte gegenüber in frivolster Weise kundgab, so daß anständige Frauen sich zu einer Reise nach Indien kaum mehr entschlossen.

Ganz besonders war es seine Verbindung mit dem dem indischen Richterstande angehörenden Rentmeister Dewi Singh, den Hastings in seinen Diensten hatte, welche neuen Stoff zu neuer Anklage herbeibrachte. Dieser Eingeborne übte, nur um die Einnahmen der Gesellschaft zu erhöhen, und nicht ohne Wissen seines Vorgesetzten, einen solchen unmenschlichen Druck auf die ihm unterstehenden Indier aus, erhöhte die Steuern ganz nach seinem Belieben in so maßloser Weise, daß Tausende von den Einwohnern an den Bettelstab gebracht wurden. Um die Gelder einzutreiben, begnügte er sich aber nicht mit Gefängnis, mit dem Verkauf alles Hausgerätes, aller Häuser, Aecker, alles Viehs und aller Kleider, er schritt namentlich den Frauen gegenüber, um sie zur Herausgabe des Geldes zu zwingen, zu so scheußlichen Handlungen, daß die Feder sich schämt, sie

Kein Wunder, daß nach alledem sich allmählich ein neuer Sturm gegen den Statthalter erhob, und daß eine neue Anklage gegen ihn beim Rat in Indien eingereicht wurde, welche dieser für begründet erklärte. Für seine Erpressungen und Veruntreuungen sollte er drei Lacks und 40 000 Rupien = ca. 300 000 Mark zurückbezahlen.

Hastings konnte nichts widerlegen, aber er wußte seinen Hauptankläger, mit Hilfe seines Freundes, des Oberrichters Impey durch bestochene Zeugen, indem er ihn der Fälschung bezichtigte, zu vernichten. Der Hauptankläger, ein Brahmane, wurde nach englischem Gesetz gehängt, — Hastings, der wegen dieser Art von Rechtsprechung im Parlament geradezu als „Mörder" des Brahmanen hingestellt wurde, ging frei aus auch aus dieser Untersuchung, — ja, er wurde in seiner hohen Stellung auf fünf weitere Jahre bestätigt. Selbst das Ministerium erklärte sich für ihn, weil bei den zur Zeit in Amerika drohenden Aussichten es in Hastings einen Mann wußte, der — gleichviel mit welchen Mitteln, im Stande war, den in Indien erworbenen so wertvollen Besitz für England zu erhalten und wo möglich noch zu vergrößern.

Jetzt fühlte er sich noch mehr als bisher als Alleinherr in Indien, und in Gemeinschaft mit dem gewissenlosen Oberrichter Impey suchte er auf jede Weise durch Erhöhung der Steuern, durch förmliche Erpressungen die Einkünfte der Aktionäre auf die Höhe zu treiben. Womöglich noch schlimmer trieb es dieser sein Bundesgenosse Impey, gegen den sogar ein „Hochverratsprozeß" im Parlament beantragt wurde, und der sich vor dem Parlament persönlich zu verantworten hatte, der aber trotz der gegen ihn vorliegenden Gründe — freigesprochen ward! Von ihm sagt Neumann in seiner „Geschichte", „daß seit den Zeiten des furchtbaren Jeffrey kein Mann den Namen eines englischen Richters so sehr mißbraucht und entehrt hat, als

Sein Grundsatz war, wie der Hastings, der von Machiawelli aufgestellte: „wer sich nicht scheut und wer sich nicht schämt, der wird sein Ziel erreichen."

Nicht gewarnt durch die seinem Bundesfreund drohende Gefahr ging Hastings auf einen neuen Raub aus. Er brachte es dahin, daß das Fürstentum Benares, dessen Herrscher früher es mit seinen Gegnern gehalten hatte, der Handelsgesellschaft tributpflichtig wurde, ließ den Fürsten gefangen nehmen, und schlug die Empörung, welche dieses gewaltsame Vorgehen hervorgerufen, mit Waffengewalt nieder. Den Raub teilte er mit seinen Soldaten; aber damit nicht zufrieden, wußte er auch von der Fürstin Mutter und ihren Frauen — es waren an 300 — durch Drohungen und namenlose Mißhandlungen noch weitere Summen zu erpressen. Der Hof der Direktoren in London sprach darüber zwar sein höchstes Mißfallen aus, aber, da die Einkünfte der Gesellschaft durch dieses räuberische Vorgehen sich bedeutend vermehrt hatten, blieb es bei schriftlichen Vorwürfen, und Hastings sah sich um so mehr gerechtfertigt, als ihm geradezu erklärt wurde, „er solle diese nicht ernst nehmen". Das berichtet sogar derjenige Biograph von ihm, welcher sich die Aufgabe gestellt, ihn gegen alle Anklagen in Schutz zu nehmen.* Seine Räubereien wurden damit entschuldigt, daß er sie „im Interesse der Wohlfahrt Englands, zu Ehren des Vaterlandes unternommen."

Diesem Raub in Benares folgte auf dem Fuß der im Fürstentum Audh, bei welchem noch gräßlichere Dinge sich ereigneten. Dort hatte Hastings es ganz besonders auf die Schätze der Frauen des Fürsten und ihres Hofstaats abgesehen, und als er sah, daß diese nicht gutwillig ihre Habe ihm ausliefern wollten, schreckte er in seiner Geldgier auch vor den abscheulichsten Gewaltmitteln nicht zurück. Um sie mürbe zu machen, ließ er zwei Verschnittene, alte treue Geschäftsführer derselben, in Ketten legen und in den

Haremsgärten im Angesicht der Frauen mißhandeln. Durch das Mitleid mit diesen ihren treuen Dienern ließen sich die Frauen endlich bewegen, soviel sie zusammenbringen konnten, — es waren 50 000 Pfund — dem Oberstatthalter auszuhändigen. Dieser verlangte aber weitere 50 000, und um diese den Frauen zu erpressen, befahl er, daß die Nahrung aller im Harem wohnenden und ihrer Diener auf ein solches Mindestmaß herabgesetzt wurde, daß nahezu alle fast den Hungertod erlitten hätten! Erst als dieses barbarische Mittel nichts half, wurde den Unglücklichen ihre Freiheit wieder gegeben. Diese 50 000 Pfund wurden dem Oberstatthalter dadurch reichlich ersetzt, daß er den Fürsten selber zwang, ihm ein „Geschenk" von nicht weniger als 100 000 Pfund zu geben! Dieses „Geschenk" wollte Hastings auch ganz als ein persönliches betrachtet wissen, der Hof der Direktoren aber erklärte, daß das den Landesgesetzen entgegen sei, und darüber aufgebracht, hat er — wie er wenigstens sagte, — alle „Geschenke" von damals der Kompagniekasse überwiesen, deren Wert sich in einer Zeit von 10 Monaten auf nicht weniger als 200 000 Pfund belief. Von seinen vorher empfangenen Geschenken war dabei keine Rede.

Im Unterhause zu London wurde, infolge dieser in England immer mehr bekannt werdenden Vorgänge, im Jahr 1782 ein Gesuch an die Krone gerichtet, um Zurückrufung des Oberstatthalters; aber wie die frühere Anklage gegen ihn, blieb auch diese erfolglos, weil die weitaus größere Mehrheit im Parlament sich nicht durch Rechtsgründe bestimmen ließ, sondern durch den Erfolg von Hastings Vorgehn.

Und dieser, allen seinen Gegnern trotzend, ging sogar im Jahr 1784 noch einmal nach dem Fürstentum Audh, weil er fest überzeugt war, dort trotz der vorhergehenden Weigerung der fürstlichen Frauen, doch noch verborgene Schätze zu finden;

Jetzt aber war das Maß voll, und Hastings selbst glaubte, den von Tag zu Tag heftiger werdenden Anklagen in der Heimat dadurch, am erfolgreichsten entgegentreten zu können, daß er sich zur Heimreise entschloß, — es war im Jahr 1785. Er wurde trotz allem Vorgefallenen von dem Hof der Direktoren und der Aktionäre ehrenvoll empfangen, es wurde ihm eine öffentliche Danksagung zu teil, die Kompagnie überhäufte ihn mit Geschenken und Pension zur Bestreitung der Prozeßkosten, alle Prinzen des Hauses, besonders der nachmalige König Georg IV., sogar die anglikanische Geistlichkeit, die Bischöfe an der Spitze, standen auf seiner Seite, — ob — wie es Clive gegenüber thatsächlich vorkam, infolge von Bestechung Einzelner, oder aus dem Klassenbewußtsein heraus gegenüber dem tiefer stehenden Volk und seiner Ausbeutung, — bleibt unentschieden.

Die Verhandlungen im Parlament nahmen sofort ihren Anfang, und es zeigte sich, daß — die oben genannten ausgenommen und ebenso ausgenommen der größere Teil der Aktionäre -- alle Parteien ohne Unterschied der Ueberzeugung waren, es seien Dinge in Indien vorgefallen, welche zu Ehren Englands eine Sühne verlangen. Als Hauptwortführer traten in diesem Prozeß auf die berühmten Redner Burke, Sheridan und Fox, und wenn auch insbesondere der erstere sich nicht frei von oft maßlosen Uebertreibungen hielt, so hatten doch alle die unwiderlegbaren Thatsachen für sich.

Sheridan rief dem mit höchster Gespanntheit ihm lauschenden Parlament unter Anderem zu: „Hastings und Impey — der selbstverständlich als sein Bundesgenosse mit angeklagt war — Impey und Hastings in der That ein würdiges Paar! Der eine hat das Schwert der Regierung zum Dolch des Mörders verkehrt und der andere den schneeweißen Hermelin der Gerechtigkeit mit den niederträchtigsten und verworfensten Gaunereien besudelt.“ Es war eine Rede, welche so sehr die Ueberzeugung Aller aussprach, daß sich am Schluß das ganze Haus erhob, unter

wie er in diesem Hause nie vorgekommen. Die Rede hatte nahezu 6 Stunden gedauert.

Nach dieser und den Reden der anderen großen Parteimänner wurde Hastings 20 Vergehen und Verbrechen schuldig erklärt, und galt für einen verlorenen Mann. Aber das schien nur so; Hastings hatte, was nicht übersehen werden darf, trotz allem und allem, die Mehrheit der Aktionäre für sich, die sich der hohen Dividenden freuten, die sie seinen Räubereien und Erpressungen verdankten, und Hastings war — ein Liebling des Königs und der Königin! Die Verhandlungen dauerten zwar 9 Jahre, bis 1795, aber das Endergebnis war: Hastings wurde **freigesprochen!***

In Beziehung auf diesen Ausgang spricht sich Neumann dahin aus: „Einige Wenige, wie Burke, Sheridan und Fox ausgenommen, war's bei allen anderen nur ein Scheingefecht, gemeine Heuchelei. Ja, es könnte sogar scheinen, das ganze über 9 Jahre dauernde Verfahren gegen Hastings wäre blos ein von den bedeutendsten Männern der Nation aufgeführtes Schauspiel gewesen, um sich in glänzenden Reden zu ergehen, überströmend in erhabenen Sätzen über den Wert der Tugend und Gerechtigkeit."**

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* Parlam.-Histor. Band XXVI., S. 273—342. — Frei sprechen ihn auch die von uns benutzten englischen Biographien,

Schlußwort.

Hiemit seien diese geschichtlichen Mitteilungen geschlossen. Ihr Zweck ist erfüllt, wenn sie an ihrem bescheidenen Teil mithelfen, das, was in unseren Tagen in Südafrika vorgeht, im Zusammenhang mit den Raubzügen der Engländer im vorigen Jahrhundert bei der Eroberung Ostindiens zu betrachten, und darnach über die heutigen Vorgänge ein gerechtes Urteil zu begründen. Sie werden aber auch mithelfen, der Lösung der Frage näher zu kommen, die gegenwärtig überhaupt die Gemüter beschäftigt, und die zuletzt namentlich durch die hochbedeutsame Schrift: „Politik und Moral" von Prof. Dr. Ferdinand Tönnies zur öffentlichen Besprechung vorgelegt wurde. Die Zahl derer ist noch eine sehr große, welche es für Schwärmerei und Wahnwitz halten, auch von der Politik zu verlangen, daß sie nicht ausschließlich das Prinzip des Egoismus, des ohne Rücksicht auf die anderen Staaten und ohne Rücksicht auf die Grundsätze der Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit zu erstrebenden eigenen Interesses und eigener Machtentfaltung zu ihrer Grundlage mache, aber eben so wenig läßt sich leugnen, daß die Zahl derer von Tag zu Tag zunimmt, welche verlangen, daß das vollkommen berechtigte Streben nach Wahrung und Förderung des eigenen National-Interesses, wenn es nicht aller sittlichen Grundlagen entbehren soll, die höheren Forderungen der Menschlichkeit nicht brutaler Weise in den Wind schlagen darf, sondern bestrebt sein muß, die beiden soweit möglich in Einklang zu bringen.

Diese höhere Forderung gilt allen Staaten, sie gilt

der Regierung stehende Männer durch ihr allen Gesetzen der Gerechtigkeit und Menschlichkeit hohnsprechendes Vorgehen gegen die Buren beweisen, daß sie würdige Nachfolger eines Robert Clive und Warren Hastings sind, und dessen leider weitaus größter Teil des Volkes, — dessen Parlament heute wie damals aus lauter Hab-, Geld- und Macht-Gier Männer freispricht, die dem vernichtenden Urteil aller gerecht Denkenden und menschlich Fühlenden verfallen sind.

Möge England diese sittlichen Forderungen nicht zu lange unbeachtet lassen, damit nicht die Kassandra-Rufe in Erfüllung gehen, die zumal in der letzten Zeit wiederholt laut geworden! Gerade in Beziehung auf Ostindien hat ein gründlicher Kenner dieses Landes im „Nineteenth Century", bei Besprechung der dortigen Zustände und besonders der schreckenerregenden Verarmung das verhängnisvolle Wort von dem unter der englischen Regierung drohenden „Bankrott Indiens" gesprochen, und eine ähnliche Warnung brachte vor fünfzig Jahren schon, als ich damals den Winter in London zubrachte, das Blatt „The church of England Magazine", — es erinnerte England an den Fall der einst so mächtigen Handelsmacht Tyrus in Phönizien, und schloß mit den zunächst auf dieses sich beziehenden Worten:

„So warst du in der Mittagshöh'!
Was bist du jetzt — einst „Macht der See"?
Das Fischernetz, es thut bekannt,
Das trocken liegt am Meeresstrand!
Es zeigt, was Gottes Zorn gethan, —
Britannia, — o, denke dran!"

REMARKS

ON

CAPTAIN TROTTER'S BIOGRAPHY

OF MAJOR W. S. R. HODSON

BY

GENERAL SIR CRAWFORD CHAMBERLAIN

G.C.I.E., C.S.I.

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REMARKS ON CAPTAIN TROTTER'S BIOGRAPHY OF MAJOR W. S. R. HODSON

CAPTAIN TROTTER'S recently published book, *A Leader of Light Horse*, has been favourably reviewed by the *Pall Mall Gazette*, the *Broad Arrow*, the *Pilot*, *Athenæum*, *St. James's Gazette*, *Daily Chronicle*, and perhaps by other papers I have not seen. But, with all due deference to the writers thereof, I affirm that the book contains errors, mistakes, and groundless accusations, which should not be allowed to remain uncontradicted; the more especially as in Blackwood's spring list for 1901, of books in the press, there appeared the following announcement in respect of *A Leader of Light Horse*:—

"The story of Hodson of Hodson's Horse remains to this day one of the most thrilling in our military annals. Within recent years a good deal of fresh evidence has been discovered regarding the charges which have always clouded the reputation of the great 'Sabreur'; and of this Captain Trotter has made free use, with the result that he is able to present Hodson *sans peur et sans reproche.*"

And it went on to say that Captain Trotter tells his story with "scrupulous accuracy."

As one of the members of the Court of Inquiry which investigated certain charges brought against Hodson; as the person to whom he appealed for monetary assistance in his hour of need; as the one person cognisant of his subsequent money transactions with Bisharat Ali, Resaldar, 1st Irregular Cavalry; as cognisant of the circumstances which led to Hodson's going

to Khurkhouda, where an engagement took place with the (so-called) rebels, and where Bisharat Ali, *together with some of his relatives who had never been in the army, nor in the Government service,* was executed by Hodson; as the person who has failed to find in Captain Trotter's book much of the "fresh evidence," and has discovered a great deal of inaccuracy in place of the promised "scrupulous accuracy," I feel that I am thoroughly justified in stating what I know, and how and why I disagree with the sentiments expressed, not only for the sake of truth, but also to do justice to the dead who were opposed to Hodson, and to the reputation of officers who were associated with myself in the very unpleasant duty we were ordered to undertake. I took up *A Leader of Light Horse* with much interest, hoping I should really find the looked-for "fresh evidence"; but I closed the book with the conviction that Captain Trotter had never read the appendix to the sixth edition of Bosworth Smith's *Life of Lord Lawrence*, or Mr. Holmes's article,[1] "Last Words on Hodson of Hodson's Horse," in the *English Historical Review* of January 1892; or that he had set aside all the information therein contained as beneath his notice. The officers who supplied Messrs. Bosworth Smith and Holmes with information, and who, be it remembered, stated only what was within their own personal knowledge, have given their names—names which, I submit, guarantee the truth of what they said and exempt them from all suspicion of bias or ill-will. Captain Trotter, in the preface of his book, has given the names of some of his informants; but here and there the statements are merely said to be founded upon evidence "volunteered by important witnesses." Such evidence necessarily carries little weight, and I, for one, cannot accept it without strong confirmation. I am willing to give Captain Trotter full credit for the best intentions; but a biographer is bound to d. prove if he can, and, at all events, not to ignore

[1] The greater part of Mr. Holmes's article was reprinted as an appendix to the fifth edition of his *History of the Indian Mutiny.*

well-authenticated statements derogatory to the character of the subject of the biography. Captain Trotter's failure to refute or even to notice such statements, as well as the partial tone of his book, makes it, in my opinion, weak and unreliable. I will now state my objections.

Court of Inquiry

At page 159 we read :—

"When the Committee of Inquiry was ordered, and the members of it were at last all collected at Peshawar,—some of whom arrived days or weeks before the whole could assemble in those days of slow and tedious travel,—these became infected with the prevailing prejudice to such a degree that they believed him guilty before the Court assembled at all, and actually took possession of his regimental papers and accounts."

Answer.—This statement is as unwarrantable as it is absolutely devoid of truth.

The Court was composed of Colonel J. H. Craigie, C.B., President, Major P. L. Eld, and of myself, all of whom were quartered with their regiments at Peshawur, as was also Major A. Turner, Judge Advocate-General, Peshawur District, who was appointed to conduct the proceedings and clear up legal points.

Again on page 159 :—

"The spirit in which some of Hodson's accusers conducted their case may be gathered from the fact that a regimental order published to the Corps of Guides called upon all who had claims or complaints against their commandant to bring them forward without delay."

Answer.—Hodson made over command of the Guides to Godby, who has long since denied the issue of any such order.

"As commanding the Guides at the time," writes Godby,[1] "I was not aware of any notice having been given to com-

[1] *English Historical Review*, January 1892, page 59.

plainants to come forward against Hodson. Certainly *none* was sent from the regimental office. But it's more than probable that the party whose accusations were the subject of inquiry had invited the discharged men who had claims for arrears of pay to come forward and lay their demands before the Court; but of this I had no knowledge."

The origin of this baseless accusation is plainly traceable to (Lord) Napier (see page 162), who *must have learned it from Hodson.* Reynell Taylor's repetition of this statement, guarded by the words "I believe" (page 161), is due to his not having consulted Godby when he had the opportunity; and also to his not having examined the regimental order book of the period. Both these things he should have done while working up Hodson's case non-officially. Taylor's words are "Voluntary Committee." [1]

At page 161 we read :—

"The Court . . . recording a mass of evidence which, as events showed, was either wholly false, or essentially worthless in its bearing on the character of the man accused."

Answer.—This charge is unfounded and untrue. It was upon the evidence recorded that the Government of India approved and confirmed the verdict of the Court of Inquiry on each head of its investigation.[2]

Again, on pages 162, 163 :—

"The proceedings of the Court of Inquiry had been conducted in so rambling and loose a manner as to elicit a very sharp rebuke from the Judge Advocate-General, who returned the papers to Colonel Craigie with a request for some definite opinion upon the matters which his Court had been directed to consider."

Answer.—I declare this to be a baseless assertion, without one shadow of truth as regards the conduct of the

[1] See Appendix, page 358, par. 7, Reynell Taylor's letter dated 13th February 1856.

[2] Appendix to the sixth edition, *Life of Lord Lawrence.*

inquiry, and as regards the rebuke to be equally devoid of truth.

The Court was desired by the Government of India to record its opinion upon each head of investigation; and this would have been done before, had instructions been given in the letter originally addressed to the Court. The Court performed its duties most carefully, and constantly gave advice to the accused when they could do it to his advantage. The military regulations of those days distinctly prescribed that the duty of a Court of Inquiry was to collect evidence of every kind; and sundry accounts, account-books, and all documents produced in evidence for or against the accused were despatched by the Court to the Government of India. No doubt the Secretary to the Military Department at once advised the return of all such papers, and sent orders to record an opinion. (Captain Trotter may perhaps be able to explain how he came to receive such very incorrect information.) The Court did as it was bid, and the appendix to the sixth edition of the *Life of Lord Lawrence* gives the full case.

Again, page 163:—

"The Court of Inquiry thereupon reassembled in July, and after hearing Godby's evidence, proceeded in Hodson's absence to record their opinion that the accounts of the Guides as laid before it by Lieutenant Hodson were most unsatisfactory.

"On this occasion the accused officer had not been heard in his own defence. Being unable to prepare a full written statement within the time allowed him, he had asked leave to attend the Court in person and submit his accounts for their inspection.

"To this request no answer was given, and the result, as Hodson himself declared, was that he had been the subject of an inquiry 'at which I was not present, and of proceedings of the nature of which I am ignorant save by report.'"

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[1] Letter to Col. H. T. Tucker, C.B., Adjutant-General, dated September 14, 1855.

Answer.—I regret deeply that Hodson should have penned so deliberate a falsehood to the Adjutant-General, or have left papers containing such incorrect statements as regards the hearing of evidence, either of Godby or of himself. This wilful mis-statement leads me to remember another untruth of which he was convicted by Turner, his Adjutant. I reprint my own account of the incident:—

"The Chief Commissioner had called for a return of all men discharged from the Guides, and the reasons thereof, since Hodson assumed command. He prepared it himself and despatched it. It was returned for the Adjutant's signature. He refused to sign it as incorrect, but ultimately did so. After Hodson's explanations, the Court called up Lieutenant and Adjutant Turner. He pleaded entire irresponsibility for papers prepared under his commanding officer's personal supervision, and declared that all he had to do was to obey his orders, to sign *all* papers brought to him for the purpose. Hodson denied this statement *absolutely*. Lieutenant Turner insisted on its truth, and, leisurely searching first in one trouser pocket, and then in another fruitlessly, twisted his pouch-belt round, and, taking from it a note, handed it to Colonel Craigie. Hodson was obliged to admit the authenticity of the letter."[1]

Hodson's many prevarications during the course of the inquiry forced the Court in its final report to Government to write:—

"That from the commencement of their sittings some months ago up to this day Lieutenant Hodson's statements have abounded in subterfuge, and they cannot too strongly condemn the same."

The Court was *bound to have him present when evidence of any kind* was taken; and I will now prove that he heard Godby give his, for it so happened that it was when Godby was under examination that during the adjournment for luncheon I saw Hodson in close conversation in the garden with his principal accuser. I put a

[1] *Historical Review*, January 1892, page 50.

stop to this indecent act at once, and duly reported it to the Court on reassembling. The man claimed the protection of the Court, as he said he had been threatened by Hodson. He lived in a guard-room from that time until the Court closed its proceedings.

"General Godby," writes Mr. Holmes, "stated last year (1890) that he remembered General Chamberlain having mentioned this episode to him at the time; and it was, of course, chronicled in the records of the Court's proceedings." [1]

Now as regards Hodson and his accounts, the 14 days' law recommended by Napier was granted by the Court. At its expiration Hodson presented a "Balance Sheet Account." After a cursory examination he was requested to withdraw, that the Court might deliberate. It was at once plain that the accounts had been cooked. Items were wrongly placed, assets where debits should be, etc. Hodson was recalled and invited to explain matters. He could not do so, and had to admit inaccuracy, but he excused himself under the plea of "Errors and Omissions excepted" above his signature. As he could not render correct accounts, this statement was rejected as worthless.

Godby's evidence was not taken when the Court reassembled in July, as asserted by Captain Trotter. It was taken during the earlier part of the investigation. Captain Trotter must surely know that *all deliberations* by a Court are conducted with closed doors, so of course Hodson was absent under such circumstances.

Page 164 states:—

"In the autumn of 1855, John Lawrence instructed him (Reynell Taylor) to examine and report upon Hodson's alleged misdealings with the regimental chest," etc., etc.

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[1] *Historical Review*, January 1892. Footnote, page 57.

Answer.—Taylor wrote to Mr. Bosworth Smith of a "voluntary committee" of himself, Lieutenant Godby and Hodson.[1]

A Leader of Light Horse, page 358, says:—

"And after Lieutenant Hodson, Lieutenant Godby, and myself had sat in voluntary committee on the accounts for some months," etc., etc.

It is an enigma to my mind how Reynell Taylor ever came to accept Hodson's accounts as correct, when some thousands of rupees were borrowed by Hodson to pay up claims, the moneys for which must have been received from Government. To most minds, accounts squared by private loans are unworthy of acceptance, for they cannot be made correct by wrongful means. The reader is asked indirectly to regard the erasures in the vernacular account-book as the work of the principal accuser, and accordingly to excuse Hodson; but it is important to consider whether the erasures were for the benefit of the accused or not. What benefit would the accuser derive? If the accounts were correct, what need of alteration? if incorrect, the Moonshee would be to blame. I note that some of the native accountants employed by Reynell Taylor gave it as their opinion that some alterations were in the accuser's handwriting. Hodson was present, and every one knows what lies natives will tell to please authority. The real point is, that moneys were smuggled in to meet payments for which there were no funds in the chest. No public accountant would have wasted five minutes in verifying such accounts.

The wording of Lord Canning's letter to the Court of Directors, dated 13th March 1856 (see page 169), makes it very clear that the Government was very glad to accept Reynell Taylor's report as a *means of closing the incident.* Yet we are told (page 1[illegible]) that

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[1] *Historical Review*, January 1892, page 55; also footnote same page for Godby's recollection of the circumstances attending this voluntary committee.

"No action seems to have been taken by the Indian Government beyond a brief note by one of the secretaries, and the briefer comment of a Member of Council. It is almost certain that the report was never shown either to the Governor-General or the Commander-in-Chief. In short, as a trustworthy correspondent assures me,[1] it was filed and put away, nor was seen again apparently by any one until I had it dug out."

These remarks are somewhat invidious, seeing that Lord Canning's letter[2] stated—

"After having given our attentive consideration to all the circumstances connected with this case, we have, in concurrence with the opinions of His Excellency the Commander-in-Chief General Sir W. Gomm, K.C.B., decided that as Major Taylor . . . and have thus closed this case."

That, however, Lord Canning was dissatisfied with Reynell Taylor's report is evident from the following letter, written by the late General Sir Henry Daly:—

"I was appointed to the Guides on or about May 7, 1857. A few days after I had been in command, I received a file of papers (Reynell Taylor's report), with a minute from Lord Canning expressing dissatisfaction and directing explanations on many points of Taylor's writing. This was sent to me by the Brigadier (Sir N. Chamberlain) under the authority of Sir John Lawrence. The papers I never read, but within an hour of their receipt wrote to Sir N. Chamberlain and Sir John Lawrence, stating my inability to do what was required. I took the file with me to Delhi, placing it in the secret drawer of a small desk, known only to the adjutant and myself. After I was wounded at Delhi the command of the Guides fell temporarily to Hodson. On the day of the storm, September 14, I resumed command. After the fall of Delhi I was called upon to restore the file; the desk was searched; the file was missing. Hodson was asked; he replied that he knew nothing of the records during his tenure at Delhi. A few months elapsed, and the siege of Lucknow was in hand. I was with Sir W. Mansfield and Hodson, and in command of the Horse. He was brought in mortally wounded to Banks's house, where I was, and he died that night. I was at once asked by Sir W. Mansfield to take command of Hodson's Horse. I stipulated for freedom in connection with Hodson's affairs and his 'commission of adjustment.' This was accepted by the Commander-in-Chief, and I took

[1] Private letter of September 9, 1899.

[2] Letter dated March 13, 1856, to the Court of Directors.

command; but on the day I did so, remembering the missing file from the desk at Delhi, and having strong grounds for thinking Hodson knew, I went to an independent friend, whose tent was near, and begged him to come with me to Hodson's tent before the assembling of the 'commission of adjustment.' In Hodson's trunk the file was found! I forwarded this to the Government officer, still living, through whom I received it, describing the discovery, and suggesting that Sir J. Lawrence's sanction be asked to leave the matter in silence. Sir J. Lawrence acceded to this suggestion, and so the matter remained till 1866, when, stung by the remarks in Hodson's reminiscences, Sir John spoke to me about publishing the statement I have now made, the particulars of which are known to several still living."[1]

It must be remembered, first, that the secret drawer mentioned by Sir Henry Daly was known to Hodson, who had commanded the Guides before; and, secondly, that the Adjutant was killed in the first engagement. Another fact, which has long been known to me, but which has never been stated before, is very significant. The "independent friend" who accompanied Daly and with him saw the file in Hodson's trunk was Colonel, afterwards Lord Napier of Magdala.

Now I must revert to a personal matter about "the rambling loose manner of the Court of Inquiry, and the sharp rebuke" said to have been administered to it by the Judge Advocate-General. That official shall speak for himself.

On page 189 is the following passage:—

"While doing this the Judge Advocate-General, Colonel Keith Young, came into the room and took part in our conversation. He too, like the many men who have made the reputation and greatness of our Indian Government, was possessed of the highest honour and integrity; and at first he spoke to me with scorn respecting the case.

"The whole matter, he said, had passed under his own review ere it had been submitted to Government, and the verdict of the Court was amply justified by the evidence produced.

"But here Colonel Chester interposed by telling him of this new light thrown upon it, and I left them to go through it together."[2]

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[1] *Historical Review*, January 1892, page 60.

[2] Extract from Mr. Sloggett's letter to the Rev. G. H. Hodson, 1882.

Answer.—The new light was Hodson's "written statement of his case," which embodied Reynell Taylor's report (about the accounts). Is it not unaccountable that this startling evidence has not been produced in order to clear Hodson's character effectually?

If Captain Trotter never saw the document, he leans on a broken reed. If he did see it, he has thought it best not to produce it. Here we are asked to believe that an officer of high integrity and reputation, who *had read all the evidence officially recorded in presence of the accused,* suddenly stultifies himself and his office from *private* and *ex parte information by the accused!*

Those who accept, *as they must accept,* Colonel Keith Young's voluntary expression of concurrence in the Court's verdict—the verdict of unprejudiced officers, bound to state their views fearlessly—will hardly believe that he was a "weathercock" Judge Advocate-General, a character the very reverse of that which Captain Trotter describes.

Reynell Taylor's exculpation had nothing to do with other matters investigated by the Court.

Bisharat Ali

I now come to the story of Bisharat Ali and the Khurkhouda affair.

On page 239 I find these words:—

"Having been informed that a number of irregular cavalrymen, whose homes were in the village, had arrived the day before from Dehli at Khurkhouda, I took measures for securing the several entrances to it and attempting their capture; sending a small party of the Guide Corps to surprise and arrest the leading man, named Bisharat Ali, a resaldar of the 1st Regiment, Irregular Cavalry. Both objects were accomplished, only two sowars having had time to effect their escape before the village was surrounded. I then entered the village with a party of dismounted sowars. . . . I subsequently caused those of the captured who were proved, on inquiry, to have been in the service of Government and to have joined the rebels, to be executed."

Answer.—For the proper understanding of this sad business I must enter somewhat fully into anterior events.

Shahaboodeen, a resident of Khurkhouda, had been a sowar in the 1st Irregular Cavalry. For violence to a superior he was tried by general court-martial, sentenced to two years' imprisonment with hard labour, and dismissed from the service. The principal witness for the prosecution was Bisharat Ali, then Jemadar. Subsequent to his release on the expiry of his sentence, he again came under the law and was imprisoned; and his one object in life was revenge upon Bisharat Ali. The opportunity came in the troublous times of the Mutiny, and through Hodson's agency he fulfilled his heart's desire.

On pages 63-67 of the *Historical Review* for January 1892 is a statement which I drew up for Mr. Holmes's use, and I adhere to and confirm every word therein recorded. I now wish to advert most especially to the *truly prophetic words* of Burkut Ali, native Adjutant, 1st Irregular Cavalry, when I told him that news had been received of his brother-in-law's (Bisharat Ali's) death. He said:—

"You will see that it is Shahaboodeen and Hodson Sahib who have done this. Hodson Sahib has done it to wipe out the debt; and my relatives and friends are those who have suffered. But whatever calamity has befallen them I will be faithful to you and to the State, come what may."

These words were recorded at the time, and a witness yet lives to confirm them. In due course, inquiry confirmed Burkut Ali's conviction, and to the day of his death he was a true and staunch servant of the State, which gave him the rank of Resaldar Major Sirdar Bahadoor, with the Order of British India, and conferred upon him the large "Jaghir"[1] of "Bahadoorghur," some 16 miles from Delhi, as also all the lands and tenements pertaining to his late brother-in-law

[1] Jaghir, a gift of land.

Bisharat Ali, which had been confiscated by the latter's execution as a rebel.

And now to revert to the fighting at Khurkhouda. Hodson's statement leads one to understand that *all* exits from the village had been secured, and that consequently Bisharat Ali was made a prisoner in the village and taken to camp. But this is incorrect. In the statement I gave Mr. Holmes it is recorded that

> "On the sudden and unexpected arrival of the troops he (Bisharat Ali) had at once sent out milk and fruit to the camp, and gone himself by one way, while Hodson and a party had entered the village by another,[1] led, as they subsequently came to know, by one Shahaboodeen, a native of the place."

And I affirm that Captain George Ward, 4th Light Cavalry, who was left by Hodson in charge of the camp outside, told me that Bisharat Ali brought milk and fruit. In the year 1858 at Khurkhouda, Captain Ward's statement, that Bisharat Ali had gone to camp, was amply confirmed by native residents. He was with Ward when Hodson came out of the village, and Hodson then said, "I know this fellow well," or words to that effect, arrested him, charged him with mutiny, and proceeded to carry out many executions, unattended by any British officer, and at some little distance from the camp; Shahaboodeen being the spokesman as to guilt, thereby causing the death of innocent men, *who had never been in Government employ*, including Surrufraz Ali, Burkut Ali's brother, the family accountant. A lad of twelve or fourteen was shot dead clinging to his uncle Surrufraz's body, in the hope of saving his life. I was assured that the fear of Hodson was so intense that the bodies of the victims remained unattended for one or more days. It was a pleasure to me to put a monument over Bisharat Ali's grave in 1859.

Ever anxious to learn the truth in respect of all that had

[1] As regards the fighting which took place in the village, it must be remembered that the natives of India are averse to admitting any one into their houses on account of their women. They therefore not unnaturally objected to having their houses entered by troops, and resisted when forcible entrance was attempted.

occurred, I wrote, somewhat about that time, officially to Harry Lumsden, who had again taken up the command of the Guides, and I begged him to do his best to get me all the information he could. No reply coming to hand, I wrote again; and then came a few lines, saying he could not procure me any information. Below his official signature he wrote in pencil that "no one would open his mouth on the subject," or words to that effect. The reader of these lines may draw his own conclusion. There can be but one.

We read on page 248:—

"It is true that Bisharat Ali had lately been decorated with the Order of Merit by Norman's own hands."

Answer.—This is quite incorrect: he deserved it, but he never got it.

Again, we read on page 249:—

"It is also true that Bisharat Ali had once stood Hodson's security for a loan from his regimental bank. This loan, however, had long since been repaid," etc., etc.

Answer.—Hodson and Bisharat Ali had *several* transactions; and moneys were placed at Hodson's disposal to settle many claims for arrears of pay or other items which never came before the Court of Inquiry, being settled "out of Court," and thus disposed of when the claimants were summoned to Court. These probably were those alluded to by Godby in his note of denial of the issue of any regimental order to the Guides, which has been dwelt upon in this paper under its proper head.

The moneys due to the bankers and standing to Bisharat Ali's debit were only settled by the proceeds of the sale of a house at Umballa, the purchase of which by Hodson has been described by Captain Trotter. The last amicable meeting between Hodson and Bisharat Ali took place at the Jhelum dâk bungalow, as the former passed through that place on his way to Dugshai to join the 1st Fusiliers, after satisfying Taylor about

his accounts. At that tim Hodson had come to dislike me on account of my having don my duty in reporting him to the Court, so we did not meet; but Bisharat Ali came and told me of having been summoned to see him. Some money transaction took place, but I do not know the details.

Hodson's Ride from Kurnaul to Meerut

Now for one word about Hodson's "daring ride" to Meerut from Kurnaul (pages 191-194).

A want of chivalry led him never to give credit to A. R. D. Mackenzie and Sanford, Cornets 3rd Light Cavalry, quartered at Meerut, who met Hodson about five miles out of Kurnaul on his way to Meerut. They told him of a part of the road where rebels were collected, and thus put him on his guard. They were the first to deliver despatches from General Hewitt to the Commander-in-Chief, and they and their escort, men of the 3rd Light Cavalry (which regiment was the first to mutiny at Meerut), were attached for duty to the Kurnaul Column, and accompanied it as far as Paneeput on its way to Delhi; but orders were given for the detachment to return to Meerut, as it was considered unadvisable to have any men of a mutinied regiment in the camp.

Hodson's silence has always appeared to me to be unaccountable and ungenerous. Mackenzie had only returned to Meerut twenty-four hours before his ride to Kurnaul from an expedition accompanied by Hugh Gough to rescue English ladies and children, who had escaped from Delhi, and were known to be in a village some miles from Meerut. They were told they went with their lives in their hands, as their escort was composed of the men of their regiment, whose fidelity might fail at any moment. It was a critical undertaking, and only succeeded by daring and diplomacy combined; and it was only their "do or die" spirit which led General Hewitt to ask Mackenzie to undertake the perilous duty of carrying despatches to Kurnaul. For details

I would refer Captain Trotter to a brief article in the *National Review* for March 1893, called "Lieutenant Mackenzie's Ride."

In *Blackwood's Magazine*, March 1899, is an article upon "Hodson of Hodson's Horse." It contains many mis-statements and errors, and never adverted to the mass of first-hand evidence which had been published in the sixth edition of the *Life of Lord Lawrence* and in the *English Historical Review* for January 1892. In this respect Captain Trotter has followed the anonymous author's example. I would strongly urge him to study attentively both the papers to which I have referred. He will find from the first-hand evidence therein recorded that, although in the objections which I have made to his book I have confined myself to matters on which I can speak from personal knowledge, the book is marred by other faults both of omission and of commission.

I have now finished an unpleasant task, which is the only way open to me to refute Captain Trotter's accusations and mis-statements. I have not penned one word in a vindictive spirit, but of necessity have been forced to be plain-spoken. I gladly admit Hodson's gallantry, energy, and many soldierly qualities; and to a certain extent admit his difficulties. I have wished that I had never had anything to do with the Court of Inquiry, for I should have been a less wise and less sad man as regards the character and acts of the subject of Captain Trotter's biography.

I can affirm that no officers ever undertook so disagreeable a duty with a better or kindlier feeling for the accused than those who composed the Court, of which I am the sole survivor. On the issue of the Brigade order, Hodson and his wife came to my house to express their pleasure at my nomination as a member.

"Dei gratiâ veritas praevalebit."

CRAWFORD CHAMBERLAIN, *General.*

FOLKESTONE, *October* 28, 1901.

POSTSCRIPT

While correcting the proof copy of this paper, my attention was drawn to an article in the *Saturday Review* of the 26th inst., entitled "General Sir Charles Gough's view of Hodson of Hodson's Horse."

I am sorry to dissent so deeply from his opinion, but I think he is in error in considering that the Guides were "at that time [Hodson's] newly formed and broken up into numerous small detachments." The Guides were raised in 1847 or even 1846; and although small parties were detached, there was no reason why their accounts should not have been properly kept.

As regards the "Canning Minute" and the file which was lost, as Hodson's case had been decided by the Government of India, there was no need whatever that Hodson should see it. Lord Canning simply wished for explanations on certain points.

Daly's letter to Bosworth Smith speaks for itself.

As regards Bisharat Ali, I am confident that Sir Charles does not know the real story; and had he been in Hodson's place and received the true help which Bisharat Ali rendered so heartily, he would never have acted as Hodson did, but would have made his case one of reference to higher authority, explaining the why and the wherefore.

As to "sparing the King of Delhi," the *Historical Review* of January 1892 records how Donald Stewart and Charles Gough *saw the unauthorised guarantee which had been given to the Queen.* Donald Stewart and Turnbull were present when Hodson importuned General Wilson to allow him to promise the King his life. Stewart could not understand Hodson's persistence at the time, but afterwards when he saw the guarantee all was clear. Saunders consulted Sir John Lawrence as to whether other unauthorised guarantees given by Hodson should be respected; and Lawrence said, "Yes, no matter under what influence they were given."[1]

October 30, 1901.

[1] See *English Historical Review*, January 1892, pp. 75-76, or Holmes's *History of the Indian Mutiny*, 5th ed., pp. 614-615.

ERRATUM

On page 19, line 9 from foot, *for* Charles Gough *read* Charles Saunders.

LA QUESTION

DES FRONTIÈRES

DU SIAM ET DU CAMBODGE

DROITS DE REPRODUCTION ET DE TRADUCTION RÉSERVÉS

LA QUESTION

DES FRONTIÈRES

DU SIAM ET DU CAMBODGE

PAR

LE CAPITAINE IBOS

DE L'INFANTERIE COLONIALE

(**Extrait** de la *Revue des Troupes coloniales.*)

PARIS

HENRI CHARLES-LAVAUZELLE

Éditeur militaire

10, Rue Danton, Boulevard Saint-Germain, 118

—

(MÊME MAISON A LIMOGES)

15. DEC. 03

LA QUESTION

DES FRONTIÈRES

DU SIAM ET DU CAMBODGE

I

L'orientation de la politique siamoise. — L'expansion siamoise vers l'est et les revendications cambodgiennes. — Conséquences du protectorat français sur le Cambodge.

Lorsque Norodom, roi du Cambodge, pressé par les circonstances, accepta la tutelle de la France, il avait l'espoir de racheter la perte de son indépendance par la reconstitution complète, grâce à notre appui, de l'empire khmer. A la faveur des guerres civiles qui désolaient le Cambodge, vers la fin du XVIIIe siècle, les Siamois avaient, en effet, occupé dès 1795 les gouvernements de Battambang et d'Angkor (Siem-Reap) ; les souverains cambodgiens, trop faibles, n'avaient pu, depuis, recouvrer ces provinces, mais aucun traité n'avait ratifié cette spoliation. Plus tard, vers 1840, profitant de nouvelles rébellions et de l'invasion annamite, les Siamois continuèrent leur expansion vers l'Est ; leurs postes couvrirent peu à peu les provinces de Chongkhan, Melouprey, Tonlé-Repou, mais l'annexion totale ne fut terminée que pendant les premières insurrections de Si-Wotha, c'est-

à-dire postérieurement à l'établissement officiel de notre influence à Pnom-Penh.

En 1867, lors de la signature du traité de Bangkok, où le gouvernement siamois reconnut le protectorat de la France sur le Cambodge, la remise au roi Norodom des provinces indûment occupées ne fut pas stipulée. Il en résulta que, dans les conférences qui eurent lieu en 1868, la frontière fut fixée sans trop de difficultés entre la mer et le Tonlé-Sap, mais que l'entente ne put se faire au sujet du tracé entre le lac et le Mékong. Les commissaires siamois, qui avaient obtenu la cession de la province de Battambang, voulurent aussi conserver, outre celle de Siem-Reap (Angkor), les provinces de Congkhan, Melouprey, Tonlé-Repou, dont l'occupation illégale n'était pas même achevée.

Ces prétentions étaient exagérées; elles causèrent le départ des commissaires français. La frontière ne fut donc pas délimitée au nord du Tonlé-Sap et les Siamois se crurent en droit de conserver les provinces en litige.

Le traité de Bangkok, terminant la courte campagne de 1893, ne fit, pas plus que le précédent traité, mention des provinces de Battambang et de Siem Reap, ni de celles au sud des Dong-Reck, occupées par les Siamois pendant les rébellions qu'ils avaient favorisées au Cambodge.

Il était bien stipulé, dans le traité de 1893, que le gouvernement siamois n'entretiendrait aucune force militaire dans une zone de 25 kilomètres de largeur bordée par le Mékong et dans les provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap, que les fortifications des provinces et de la zone seraient rasées, que la police y serait faite par les autorités locales et que le gouvernement français pourrait placer des consuls dans l'intérieur du Siam (à Korat et Muang-Nan, notamment); mais le gouvernement siamois ne tint, en réalité, aucun compte de ces

co-anglais de 1896, il sembla même prendre plaisir à multiplier les causes d'intervention.

Le traité de Bangkok, quoique nous donnant de sérieux avantages territoriaux, n'avait pas semblé aux personnalités coloniales françaises être la consécration définitive de notre expansion en Indo-Chine. Le gouvernement siamois, d'autre part, comprit que ce traité de paix n'était qu'un armistice, que son puissant voisin, mis en appétit par l'annexion de la rive gauche du Mékong, chercherait à occuper, à la première occasion favorable, la vallée du Mé-Nam tout entière; il s'efforça donc, par des combinaisons diplomatiques, de sauvegarder, dès 1893, l'indépendance des pays conquis par la race thaï. Le gouvernement anglais, enfin, qui avait à Bangkok des intérêts économiques et politiques considérables, dont toutes les manœuvres avaient eu pour but de « bloquer la France à l'est du Mékong, de prendre le roi de Siam par la main et de le conduire dans la grande famille indo-anglaise », résolut de contrecarrer nos idées d'expansion, de les limiter tout au moins, afin de réserver comme un champ d'action commun aux puissances européennes la partie la plus riche du royaume de Siam.

Ainsi, tandis que nos journalistes, nos conférenciers, montraient sans cesse Bangkok comme le but à atteindre, la diplomatie anglaise agissait de façon à nous en interdire l'accès. Le gouvernement siamois, dans sa recherche d'alliances intéressées, ne pouvait donc mieux s'adresser qu'à Londres. Les effets de cette entente se firent sentir dans la convention franco-anglaise de janvier 1896 (1).

Cet arrangement nous interdit, en effet, pratiquement toute action militaire ayant Bangkok pour objectif; la sanction des mesures coercitives que les circonstances

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(1) Voir « Les Droits de la France au Siam », par le lieutenant



—LÉGENDE—
Limite officielle du Cambodge
Frontière fictive actuelle
Limite des revendications cambodgiennes
Empiètements des Siamois postérieurement au protectorat
EMPIÈTEMENTS DES SIAMOIS
DEPUIS 1867
(TERRITOIRES EN LITIGE)
LAOS FRANÇAIS
CAMBODGE
GOLFE DU SIAM
Dhang Smet
DONG RECK
Ham Moun
Sé Samlan
H. Prasat
KOUKAN
Dom Jaï
Dom Noi
Takron
Soaitchet
Wattana
N. Sissophon
Sissophon
Mongkolbourt
Pac Prea
Tuc Cho
Peam Sema
Angkhor
SIEMREAP
Roluo
Phra Prasap
CHONGKAN
St. Srên
Taleng
St. Siemreap
Nong Prea
MELOUPREY
Sé Lampao
Chûtes de Khône
TONLE REPOU
Sé Kong
STUNGTRENG
Me Khong
KRATIÉ
KOMPONG THOM
KOMPONG CHENANG
PURSAT
St. Pursat
St. Kresauh
Stung Sên
TONLE SAP
Moun
Aur Loc
Dong Tri
St. Dong Tri
Stung Sangké
BATTAMBANG
Sach Toui
Khl. Pai Lin
Pai Lin
N. Srakéo
N. Chantaboun
CHANTABOUN
MONTAGNES BLEUES
Kh. Jai
PNOM PENH

pourraient nous obliger à employer se trouve limitée à la chaîne de partage des eaux des bassins du Mé-Nam et du Mékong. Nous avons donc la faculté d'annexer la partie la moins peuplée et peut-être la moins riche, dans son ensemble du Siam, partie que nous appelons la « zone d'influence française » et qui n'a qu'une faible valeur économique. Toutefois, l'ouverture du chemin de fer Bangkok - Korat, la création de nombreuses lignes télégraphiques et téléphoniques, la présence de garnisons relativement nombreuses et de vice-rois actifs et intelligents, montrent que le gouvernement siamois ne se laisserait pas déposséder, sans protester, de ces vastes territoires.

Les clefs de la zone d'influence sont à Korat pour la partie située au nord des Dong-Reck, à Sissophon pour le bassin du Tonlé-Sap. Une marche sur Korat serait une entreprise sérieuse, de longue haleine, il est vrai, mais dont les aléas et les frais probables ont été exagérés; ils paraissent néanmoins avoir influencé jusqu'à présent notre politique au Siam, en nous imposant une grande prudence, malgré l'attitude presque provocante de nos voisins. Sissophon, au contraire, est un but immédiat, pouvant être atteint sans difficultés, nous rendant maîtres, presque sans coup férir, de vastes territoires en litige et des provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap, dont la possession a pour nous une grande importance. C'est dans ces régions, en effet, que la lutte d'influence est la plus vive, que le gouvernemnet siamois multiplie les vexations maladroites; c'est là que sont les principaux centres d'affaires du bassin de Tonlé-Sap; c'est enfin là que nous devons exercer avec ses charges, mais aussi ses avantages, notre rôle de protection sur le Cambodge (1).

En janvier 1899, M. Doumer, alors gouverneur général de l'Indo-Chine, essaya, pendant un voyage à Bangkok, d'établir les relations de la France et du Siam d'après un *modus vivendi* plus conforme à notre prestige et surtout à nos intérêts; mais son action isolée n'eut aucun résultat. Le roi Chulahlong-Korn, qui semble-t-il, avait accueilli avec faveur les propositions de M. Doumer, ne put donner suite à ses bonnes dispositions à notre égard. Il ne fut bientôt plus question de la reconstitution complète du royaume de Luang-Prabang, en échange de l'évacuation de Chantaboun, ni de l'admission des Français dans les fonctions publiques aux mêmes conditions que les Anglais, les Allemands, les Belges ou les Danois. Les rapports de voisinage, d'abord cordiaux, puis simplement courtois, devinrent très difficiles. Sur les bords du Mékong, des forces de police siamoises pénétrèrent à plusieurs reprises en territoire français, des commerçants annamites furent molestés; le Siam porta l'effort de sa politique agressive dans les provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap, dont il appréciait l'importance politique, où le prince Yukantor, dont on n'a pas oublié la bruyante équipée, a de nombreux amis et partisans. Les derniers incidents dont cette région a été le théâtre semblent être l'origine d'une phase nouvelle qui pourrait nécessiter une intervention militaire, ne pouvant amener d'ailleurs aucune complication diplomatique en Europe, en raison de l'arrangement franco-anglais de 1896.

Aymonier, Delaporte, Garnier, Pavie, les rapports de de Coulgeans, etc., et la carte de l'Indo-Chine de la mission Pavie.

II

Les incidents de 1899 et de 1900. — Constitution d'une commission mixte de délimitation. — Procédés diplomatiques siamois. — La création d'un consulat français à Battambang. — Dissolution de la commission mixte et conséquence des négociations.

En décembre 1899, une troupe armée, commandée par trois fonctionnaires siamois venant de Koukan, prétendit percevoir l'impôt dans des villages situés sur le territoire de la province de Kompong-Thom. Un détachement de milice cambodgienne, envoyé en reconnaissance, surprit les Siamois dans leurs opérations, les captura et saisit leurs armes et leurs papiers. Le prince Dewan, ministre des affaires étrangères à Bangkok, pour prévenir toute réclamation diplomatique, se hâta de porter plainte à la légation de France, accusant les autorités cambodgiennes de violation de territoire et d'arrestation illégale de fonctionnaires siamois. En même temps, le chef du district de Koukan, agissant vraisemblablement d'après les instructions du commissaire royal d'Oubon, annonça son intention d'envoyer en territoire cambodgien de nouveaux collecteurs en armes et de châtier les villages de la frontière. Pour rassurer les populations, le résident de Kompong-Thom, se conformant aux ordres du résident supérieur de Pnom-Penh, fit établir à Phra-Prasap un poste de garde indigène ayant pour but la surveillance de la région et la protection des localités cambodgiennes contre les exactions des Siamois.

Le prince Dewan protesta de nouveau, et, s'inspirant de l'enquête faite par son collègue de l'intérieur, prince

tion de France, appelant l'attention de notre Ministre sur « un nouvel empiètement en territoire siamois, effectué par un officier français et 25 hommes armés (1). Enfin, résumant tous ses prétendus griefs, et comme preuve des dispositions amicales de son gouvernement, le prince Dewan demanda :

1° La nomination d'une commission mixte pour la délimitation de la frontière entre les provinces de Koukan et de Kompong-Thom ;

2° L'arrêt des travaux du poste de Phra-Prasap, jusqu'à ce que la commission franco-siamoise ait terminé sa mission.

Le nouveau ministre de France à Bangkok, M. Klobukowski, semblait disposé à donner à notre politique une énergique impulsion. Son premier soin fut de négocier la création d'un consulat français à Battambang (2). et la nomination à ce poste de M. de Coulgeans, consul à Korat, un des compagnons de M. Pavie, qui avait maintes fois donné des preuves d'habileté, de tact et d'énergie. Cette démarche avait pour but de montrer au Siam notre renonciation définitive aux provinces de Battambang et d'Angkor, consacrées siamoises par les traités précédents, et de faciliter nos revendications sur les territoires cambodgiens jusqu'aux Dong-Reck. En même temps, M. Klobukoswski transmettait à M. Doumer la note du gouvernement siamois et demandait la désignation de commissaire français pour la constitution de la commission mixte.

Après de longues tergiversations, le prince Dewan accepta la création d'un consulat français à Battambang, où nos intérêts n'avaient été jusqu'alors défendus que par un « commissaire du gouvernement » aux attri-

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(1) Rapport du résident supérieur du Cambodge (26 septembre

butions mal définies et qui, malgré sa bonne volonté, n'avait obtenu que des résultats négatifs (1). M. de Coulgeans, pendant son passage à Bangkok, eut l'assurance formelle que toutes les difficultés relatives à son installation, telles que l'achat d'un terrain pour le consulat, le recrutement de la main-d'œuvre, etc..., seraient résolues à son arrivée, et se mit en route pour son nouveau poste. En même temps, M. Doumer constituait, le 21 octobre 1901, la commission française de la façon suivante :

M. de Coulgeans, président; le capitaine Ibos, et un mandarin cambodgien, membres; M. Ténot, secrétaire. Un interprète et une escorte de 30 miliciens du Cambodge étaient adjoints à la commission que la canonnière *la Baïonnette* transportait à Battambang, où elle devait se mettre en relations avec la commission siamoise composée de trois fonctionnaires dont deux parlant le français. M. Klobukowski allait en personne installer la commission. M. de Coulgeans, d'ailleurs, la précédait, afin de se mettre en relations avec les autorités locales et de préparer l'arrivée du ministre de France et des commissaires français. Mais l'ère des difficultés commençait et allait démontrer la duplicité des fonctionnaires siamois.

Les vexations les plus criantes attendaient en effet M. de Coulgeans, arrivé à Battambang le 13 octobre, et qui ne fut pas reçu par les autorités de la province. Le gouverneur, pya kathatorn, fit répondre une première fois qu'il était sorti. Notre consul, fort au courant des usages, aidé par sa parfaite connaissance de la langue cambodgienne, parvint le lendemain à forcer la consigne. Le gouverneur se montra fort aimable, mais déclara qu'il ignorait la situation politique de M. de Coulgeans,

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(1) Pendant un congé de plusieurs mois qu'il passait en France,

qu'il n'avait pas reçu d'ordres du Ministre de l'intérieur pour l'installation d'un consulat et qu'il fallait en référer au commissaire siamois, son supérieur hiérarchique. Les dignitaires de la province, balat, chaufea, etc., imitèrent en l'exagérant la réserve de leur chef et furent invisibles.

M. de Coulgeans, accoutumé aux procédés dilatoires de nos voisins, ne se montra pas surpris des affirmations du pya kathatorn, malgré l'étrangeté de sa réponse qui faisait intervenir un commissaire siamois dans la question du consulat de Battambang. La diplomatie du Siam, comme celle de tous les pays d'Extrême-Orient, est coutumière de ces volte-face. Donner d'une main et retirer de l'autre, feindre les malentendus et les quiproquos, embrouiller les questions les plus simples pour, finalement, revenir au point de départ et gagner du temps, tels sont les procédés familiers aux diplomates siamois. Gagner du temps est beaucoup en affaires internationales, et c'est un des plus puissants moyens d'action des Extrême-Orientaux. Quoi qu'il en soit, M. de Coulgeans résolut de ne pas brusquer les événements avant la prochaine arrivée de M. Klobukowski et de la commission française à Battambang, mais de se rendre auprès du commissaire siamois et de prendre son gouvernement en flagrant délit de duplicité.

Le commissaire ou kha luan pour le bassin du Tonlé-Sap était un général du titre de pya-sakada. Depuis le traité de 1893, qui interdit au Siam l'entretien de troupes dans les provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap (Angkor), il résidait à Sissophon, petite localité très bien située à 60 kilomètres environ au nord de Battambang, sur la Nam-Sissophon, qui finit dans le Stung-Sangké (rivière de Battambang) à Pac-Prea. Notre consul avisa le pya sakada de sa prochaine visite et, le 16 octobre, il arrivait à Sissophon. Le commissaire siamois était absent

depuis la veille et son entourage ignorait l'époque de son retour. M. de Coulgeans revint donc à Battambang et ne fut pas surpris d'apprendre que le gouverneur cambodgien était lui aussi parti à la chasse aux éléphants pour une durée indéterminée. Il rendit compte alors de l'impossibilité où il se trouvait de traiter l'établissement du nouveau consulat par suite de l'absence des autorités locales et de la mauvaise foi du gouvernement.

Il était dans une situation assez précaire. Des rumeurs peu rassurantes circulaient dans la population. L'on n'ignorait pas, à Battambang, le motif de la présence de M. de Coulgeans ; la question du terrain réclamé passionnait les esprits; le pya kathatorn, en quittant la ville, avait assuré qu'il n'y reviendrait que pour chasser les Français, des ordres étaient donnés pour priver le consul de personnel et de vivres, et pour la mise en quarantaine des négociants français. Le kha luân de Sissophon venait enfin, le 20, résider à Battambang, et exerçait un contrôle direct sur l'administration de la province (1), malgré les clauses du traité de Bangkok. Il sembla ignorer la présence de M. de Coulgeans dans la ville et sa visite à Sissophon, et ce dédain pour notre représentant fut vivement commenté.

M. Klobukowski et la commission française arrivèrent dans la journée du 26 octobre. La canonnière, ne pouvant remonter jusqu'à Battambang par suite de l'étroitesse et de la sinuosité du chenal, s'était arrêtée à Pac-Prea ; mais les 30 miliciens d'escorte débarquèrent en armes et en uniforme, au grand ahurissement du pya sakada, qui était venu avec son état-major saluer le ministre de France.

M. Klobukowski lui déclara qu'il voulait bien le re-

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(1) Au même moment, un commissaire royal du rang de colonel



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(prov. de Battambang)

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cevoir à titre personnel, mais non comme général siamois, commissaire du gouvernement à Battambang, où sa présence était une violation flagrante des traités. Il refusa de se rendre au confortable logement qui était préparé pour lui et déclina l'invitation de visiter les ruines d'Angkor ; il protesta contre la conduite inqualifiable du gouverneur de Battambang et du pya-sakada lui-même envers notre consul. Le commissaire siamois ne put donner que de vagues explications. Il assura ignorer la création d'un consulat français à Battambang, la constitution d'une commission mixte pour la délimitation des provinces en litige et affirma résider à Battambang par suite d'un ordre exprès de son gouvernement.

Quelques jours auparavant, l'on avait arrêté dans le Laos français un émissaire siamois conduisant 8.000 cartouches aux Khas révoltés des montagnes d'Annam. Cet appui donné à des rebelles, la présence d'un général siamois à Battambang, la mauvaise fois du prince Dewan dans l'affaire du consulat et de la constitution d'une commission mixte semblèrent à M. Klobukowski des motifs suffisants pour autoriser un essai de fermeté. Il prescrivit au commandant de la canonnière de rester à l'ancre à Pac-Prea jusqu'à nouvel ordre, et mit M. Doumer au courant de la situation, pour que le gouverneur général de l'Indo-Chine pût prendre à temps les mesures nécessaires s'il en était besoin ; il avisa le prince Dewan que M. de Coulgeans serait, jusqu'au règlement définitif de la situation, commissaire du gouvernement français à Battambang, chargé de surveiller l'exécution intégrale du traité de 1893, et télégraphia au ministre des affaires étrangères l'exposé des faits et son sentiment sur l'opportunité d'une action énergique. Enfin, il compléta ses instructions à la commission française qui devait, dans l'hypothèse d'opérations de délimitation, tout en soute-

négociations ». Il importait en effet de ne pas rompre les pourparlers par une démarche que le gouvernement français pouvait ne pas ratifier et dont l'échec aurait eu, par conséquent, les résultats les plus fâcheux pour notre influence. Cela fait, M. Klobukowski quitta Battambang, le 27 octobre, pour se rendre à Bangkok, afin de suivre de près les événements.

Le moment était bien choisi pour liquider la situation difficile créée par le traité de 1893. Le gouvernement siamois semblait, comme on vient de le voir, fournir à plaisir des prétextes d'intervention. A Battambang, des indigènes cambodgiens et annamites, soupçonnés de sympathiser avec les Français, étaient emprisonnés et mis aux fers. Des achats de matières premières pour la construction du consulat, faits par les négociants français, étaient confisqués avant livraison, par ordre du pya katathorn ; les chrétientés de Sach-Pouï, Battambang et Tuc-Cho étaient menacées. La partie la plus nombreuse de la population de la ville et de la province, dont les sympathies allaient vers Pnom-Penh, plutôt que vers Bangkok, était terrorisée par une centaine de gens sans aveu, dont le gouverneur avait fait une sorte de garde du corps et qui devaient être le noyau d'une force irrégulière destinée à repousser l'invasion des Français. Le gouverneur lui-même qui, jusqu'à l'installation du pya sakada à Battambang, se considérait avec raison comme un petit souverain presque indépendant, oubliait sa parenté avec une des femmes du roi Norodom pour ne songer qu'au changement dans sa situation politique, causé par les événements qu'il prévoyait (1). D'après ses conseils, le pya sakada

(1) Adjudicataire direct ou indirect de toutes les fermes de la province, et jouit, de ce chef seulement, d'un revenu de 125.000

faisait venir à Battambang des soldats déguisés, qui recevaient leur armement dans la citadelle, où ils se tenaient cachés. Des préparatifs de défense étaient même faits, suivant la rumeur publique, dans l'intérieur de la citadelle, vaste fortification démodée et peu redoutable, mais dont nous avions le droit d'exiger la démolition.

Cependant, la commission française et son escorte s'installaient tant bien que mal dans le bâtiment de l'ancien commissariat. M. Doumer lui expédiait une vedette armée de la marine pour lui assurer, en cas d'incident, des communications rapides et sûres. D'après ses ordres, l'on prenait en Cochinchine des dispositions pour la mobilisation d'une partie de la brigade d'occupation, et le gouverneur général se prépara à châtier les Siamois de leurs outrecuidants procédés et à assurer à la France la reconnaissance des Cambodgiens par la reconstitution complète de la nationalité khmère.

Mais le gouvernement français n'estima pas le moment venu d'une action au Siam, même limitée à l'occupation des provinces de Battambang, Siem-Reap et des districts en litige au sud des Dong-Reck. Dès le 25 octobre, en effet, le prince Dewan, feignant d'attribuer à la commission française des intentions agressives, avait prescrit au ministre de Siam à Paris, le prince Wadhana, de protester auprès de M. Delcassé contre la présence de la canonnière *Baïonnette* dans les eaux siamoises de Tonlé-Sap et d'une troupe de militaires et marins français à Battambang. Le prince Wadhana s'acquitta consciencieusement de sa mission et devança le

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il avait pu différer son voyage pendant deux ans, sous les prétextes les plus futiles. Il avait été cependant obligé de s'exécuter, et les frais occasionnés par ce voyage, sous la forme d'innombrables pots-de-vin qui lui avaient conservé sa situation, l'avaient à peu près ruiné. Cela explique son animosité à l'égard des Français, dont la

compte rendu télégraphique de notre ministre à Bangkok. Il omit de dire que la canonnière avait transporté M. Klobukowski et les commissaires français et que la force armée n'était qu'une troupe de milice peu nombreuse, servant d'escorte à la commission de délimitation. Il eut donc toute facilité pour accuser de duplicité le gouvernement général de l'Indo-Chine et le représentant de la France au Siam qui, d'après lui, escomptaient les incidents que pouvait causer la présence d'une troupe cambodgienne à Battambang, pour avoir des prétextes d'intervention.

Cette protestation du prince Wadhana eut pour résultat l'envoi à M. Klobukowski de nouvelles instructions du gouvernement français. Dans ces instructions, le ministre des affaires étrangères indiquait la création du consulat de Battambang comme le premier but à atteindre ; il ajoutait qu'il fallait calmer les appréhensions des Siamois par le renvoi de l'escorte cambodgienne, de la canonnière et de la vedette, et insistait sur l'utilité de relations courtoises entre la commission française et les autorités locales, et sur la nécessité absolue de ne pas engager la France dans une extension territoriale.

M. Klobukowski sut assurer l'exécution de ces instructions sans leur donner l'apparence d'une renonciation à nos droits. La fermeté et l'habileté de M. de Coulgeans contribuèrent d'ailleurs beaucoup à présenter la reprise de nos relations avec le pya sakada, l'exode progressif des miliciens et des bateaux comme des « gages de notre bon vouloir » donnés à la suite de concessions siamoises.

Après de nombreuses péripéties, faciles à prévoir en Extrême-Orient et mettant parfois à de rudes épreuves l'amour-propre de nos nationaux, la question du consulat se trouva réglée. Grâce aux instances de M. Doumer,

d'un hôpital indigène, dirigé par un médecin français, et d'une succursale de la Banque de l'Indo-Chine.

Le pya kathatorn, de retour à Battambang, et qui, lors des fêtes de l'anniversaire du couronnement du roi (1) avait fait jurer aux notables de s'opposer par les armes à l'achat des terrains nécessaires, en était pour sa courte honte. M. de Coulgeans, à son tour, semblait ignorer sa présence et traitait toutes les affaires directement avec le pya sakara, qu'il affectait de considérer comme la seule autorité locale, procédé qui laisse la porte toujours ouverte à nos revendications.

Le prince Dewan avait mis la même lenteur à constituer la commission siamoise de délimitation, quoiqu'il eût, le premier, proposé cette solution. Les commissaires n'arrivèrent à Battambang que le 30 novembre ; il était trop tard. M. Klobukowski avait, le 21, dissous la commission française, qui n'était plus d'aucune utilité, puisque, *a priori*, il ne pouvait y avoir d'accord entre ses conclusions et celles de la commission siamoise.

Le secrétaire, M. Ténot, demeura auprès de M. de Coulgeans à Battambang, comme chancelier du consulat ; le capitaine Ibos et le mandarin cambodgien reprirent la route de Pnom-Penh et de Saïgon.

Le résultat de ces longues négociations peut se résumer ainsi :

1° Le commissariat du gouvernement français à Battambang est changé en consulat, ce qui peut avoir des avantages, le Siam étant un pays soumis au régime des capitulations ;

2° Il n'y a rien de modifié en réalité dans la question

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(1) Les fêtes furent superbes : le négociant allemand de Battambang y représentait seul la colonie européenne. Ni le consul de

de frontières, ce qui peut paraître consacrer les anciennes spoliations et nuire à notre prestige au Cambodge ;

3° Le gouvernement siamois a placé des représentants militaires siamois exerçant des fonctions administratives à Battambang et Siem-Reap, ce qui est contraire aux dispositions du traité de 1893 ;

4° Notre influence morale a beaucoup diminué à Battambang, sauf dans la mission catholique, par suite des intrigues allemandes et des concessions successives qu'on représente comme des actes de faiblesse ;

5° Nous sommes exposés à de continuelles violations de territoire au nord du Cambodge, et les provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap servent plus que jamais de refuge aux contrebandiers, pillards et voleurs de bestiaux, aux déserteurs et aux criminels cambodgiens, ; c'est un véritable foyer d'intrigues politiques.

III

L'influence française au Siam. — Importance économique des provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap. — Conclusions.

La diplomatie, seule, semble devoir être impuissante à modifier cette situation. Dans les pays d'Extrême-Orient, l'influence morale d'une nation européenne et son influence politique sont en raison directe de la crainte qu'elle inspire ou de l'importance de son commerce. Or, à Bangkok, le mouvement commercial français est nul. Notre pavillon n'est représenté que par les vapeurs bihebdomadaires subventionnés des Messageries fluviales de Cochinchine et de la ligne annexe de Singapore, qui voyagent le plus souvent sur lest et ne transportent que les fonds et la correspondance de la légation et des consulats. Les industries, les grandes entreprises, les transactions commerciales appartiennent aux Anglais et aux Allemands, leurs nouveaux et redoutables concurrents. Dans la transformation de son royaume, le roi de Siam s'est entouré de conseillers européens, anglais en majorité, qui organisent l'administration centrale et les grands services ; 1.500 sikhs, venus des Indes anglaises, font la police de Bangkok. Il ne faudrait pas attribuer à ces seuls faits la diminution de notre influence au Siam.

La construction de chemins de fer, la pose de lignes télégraphiques, l'organisation de tramways et d'éclairage électrique, le percement de canaux, la distribution

Compagnies déjà constituées ; pas un particulier, pas une société française ne se sont présentés. Le personnel administratif ou technique européen se recrute en grande partie au concours ; les journaux siamois publient fréquemment les demandes du gouvernement et les conditions d'admission ; jamais un Français ne s'est mis sur les rangs. La protection des catholiques, qui n'ont guère besoin de protection par suite des mœurs du pays, l'inscription sur les listes de protection des consulats d'asiatiques étrangers plus ou moins recommandables, sont, avec le stationnaire de la légation et le voyage bi-hebdomadaire du *Donaï*, les seules preuves, à Bangkok, de l'existence de la France. C'est peu en comparaison des 70 millions du commerce anglais, des 30 millions du commerce allemand, et c'est pourquoi notre influence est nulle au Siam, où le souvenir de notre coup de main de 1893 n'a pas été plus vivace que ne le sera, en Chine, le souvenir de la prise de Pékin.

Il est donc à craindre qu'on soit obligé de recourir à la force pour obtenir la tranquillité sur nos frontières cambodgiennes et le respect des anciens traités. La conquête de toute la « zone d'influence » est discutable ; l'occupation, limitée aux provinces de Battambang et de Siem-Reap, et, par contre-coup, aux anciens districts jusqu'aux Dong-Reck, suffirait sans doute pour produire des résultats politiques et surtout économiques considérables et immédiats.

Tout a été dit sur l'importance historique et sur la richesse de ces régions, dont Battambang est le joyau. Le mouvement commercial est intense, surtout pendant la saison des hautes eaux, de juin à décembre. On peut l'évaluer à 3 millions de francs pour Battambang seulement ; il pourrait être considérablement accru par l'amélioration facile du Stung-Sangké entre la ville et le lac et par la construction d'un chemin de fer re-

liant Battambang à Pnom-Penh, permettant la mise en valeur d'une contrée où les richesses naturelles abondent, où le sol est fertile, le climat agréable, où les colons annamites se fixeraient volontiers.

Les indigènes, en grande majorité de race cambodgienne, sont d'ailleurs plus actifs que les habitants du Cambodge. L'étendue des terrains cultivés est immense. Les rizières s'étendent à perte de vue ; la valeur de leurs produits exportés n'a pas été, en 1901, inférieure à 40.000 tonnes pour les seules villes de Battambang et de Mongkolbouri.

Le commerce du bois, presque entièrement exercé par des Annamites, est rémunérateur ; la pêche alimente les marchés de poisson salé de Cholon et de Pnom-Penh, et les districts de l'intérieur jusque vers Korat ; l'élevage des bestiaux est prospère, grâce aux transactions par charrettes, qui se font surtout en saison sèche dans les directions de Chantaboun et de Pékim ; il fournit aussi des cargaisons de peaux et de cornes ; plusieurs centaines de piculs de cardamome sont récoltés dans les forêts des montagnes.

L'exploitation de ces ressources, bien que très imparfaite, donne aux habitants une large aisance. Dans toutes les maisons on trouve des produits européens : lampes, verrerie, harnachements, étoffes et bimbeloterie, valises et couvertures, chaussures et habillement, parfumerie, liqueurs, armes, comestibles, etc., dont les indigènes font le plus grand usage. J'ai vu, à Battambang, des chevaux et des équipages qui auraient été remarqués dans les rues de Saïgon et sur la promenade dite « le tour d'Inspection » ; des Cambodgiens et des Chinois y circulent à bicyclette, et l'ancien gouverneur de Siem-Reap avait même un canot à vapeur acheté à Bangkok

Les habitants de race cambodgienne (1) cultivent le sol ; les Annamites sont bûcherons et pêcheurs ; les Chinois et les Indiens ont entre leurs mains le commerce (2), les opérations de banque et d'usure, et aussi le monopole de la contrebande. Cette contrebande s'exerce sous l'œil bienveillant des autorités locales et cause un préjudice considérable au commerce français en pays cambodgien. En effet, les cotonnades étrangères, par exemple, importées directement au Cambodge paient le plein tarif des droits de douane (une centaine de francs par 100 kilog.) ; si elles sont à destination du Siam, elles pénètrent en transit et ne paient que 20 p. 100 du tarif; les cotonnades françaises entrent en franchise. Les commerçants de Battambang et de Siem-Reap se font par conséquent adresser des cargaisons de cotonnades étrangères en transit, et, pendant la saison des hautes eaux, profitant des facilités de communication, les écoulent en territoire cambodgien où, par leur faible prix de revient, elles empêchent l'introduction de cotonnades françaises. La répression de la contrebande suffirait à elle seule à justifier notre occupation de Battambang et de Siem-Reap.

La population de ces provinces subit actuellement des exigences fiscales considérables. Le dernier voyage du roi en Europe, les fêtes de la crémation de la reine-

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(1) Dans la province de Battambang, on peut évaluer ainsi la population : 2.000 Annamites, 3.000 Laotiens, 6.000 Chinois, 5.000 Birmans (presque tous aux mines de rubis de Paï-Lin), 4.000 Siamois, 20.000 Cambodgiens avec affinités siamoises, 65.000 Cambodgiens de race pure. Il est difficile d'estimer la population de la province de Siem-Reap; elle ne doit pas dépasser 40.000 habitants, dont un millier de Chinois et quelques Annamites. Il n'existe point de renseignement sérieux sur le chiffre des habitants des districts en litige au sud du Dong-Rech (100.000 tout au plus).

(2) A l'exportation, Indiens et Chinois font en général seuls leurs affaires ; pour l'importation, ils sont en grande partie les

Citadelle de Battambang

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mère et de divers princes ont fortement obéré le trésor royal. Le gouverneur Pya Kathatorn a été, lui aussi, presque ruiné pendant son séjour à Bangkok. Des impôts nouveaux, le recouvrement d'arriérés douteux, des amendes injustes et nombreuses ont fait naître un vif mécontentement. Malgré les affirmations du prince Yukanthor, les sujets du roi Norodom ne sont pas ainsi pressurés. Grâce aux incessantes communications entre Battambang, Siem-Reap et Pnom-Penh, les Cambodgiens du Siam établissent des comparaisons qui ne sont pas toutes à l'avantage de leur souverain actuel. L'esprit de race est resté très vivace chez eux, et, s'ils ne désirent pas la domination française, on peut, du moins, affirmer qu'ils verraient sans déplaisir leur retour dans la famille khmère, à condition toutefois que les premiers résidents et fonctionnaires français à Battambang et Siem-Reap fussent des hommes connaissant parfaitement la langue, les usages et le caractère national.

Nous avons vu que les causes d'intervention ne nous manquent pas : la présence d'un général siamois à Battambang et d'un colonel à Siem-Reap, où ils exercent des fonctions administratives, l'existence dans ces villes de citadelles, peu redoutables il est vrai, mais qui devraient être démolies depuis 1893, les violations de frontière dans la province de Kompoug-Thom, l'impunité assurée aux criminels et déserteurs cambodgiens, dont il est impossible d'obtenir l'extradition, les vexations dont nos clients sont victimes à Battambang, la contrebande intense que les Chinois et Indiens des deux provinces font à notre détriment. Même limitée à l'occupation de Battambang, de Siem-Reap et des districts cambodgiens situés entre le Cambodge actuel et les Dong-Reck, Sissophon et le Mékong, notre extension serait, pour le Siam, un avertissement salutaire.

Nous obtiendrons ainsi l'unification et la reconstitu-

tion sous notre protectorat de la race cambodgienne, une influence plus complète à Pnom-Penh, la domination sur les régions riveraines du Tonlé-Sap, riches et peuplées, et où pourrait s'exercer fructueusement l'activité de nos colons, de nos commerçants et de nos industriels ; ajoutons, en terminant, que la possession du Sissophon, position stratégique remarquable, donnerait la stabilité à notre installation et que les dépenses très faibles de cette occupation seraient immédiatement compensées et au delà, aussi bien que les frais d'administration, par les ressources des provinces restituées au Cambodge.

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NOTES

STRIKING NATIVES

AND COROLLARIES

FOR

BRITISH OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS

By Captain S. de V. JULIUS,
Royal Sussex Regiment.

ALLAHABAD
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
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PREFACE.

I offer the following few pages of rough notes and opinions for the kindly notice of those officers and soldiers of British regiments who, whether directly interested—as I have been so often—in the *petits malheurs* of cantonment life, or only vaguely worried by the general wrongness of things Eastern, may have nothing better to do in some idle moment than to read them. There will be found in the three succeeding chapters of this pamphlet an attempt to present to the minds of soldiers, in an everyday form, what the writer feels is a misunderstood subject.

Ten years ago the question of the relations existing between his men and their domestic menials was not one to cause much mental exercise to the C. O. of a British regiment. To-day, however, the servant question is as much before us in our barrack homes in India as it ever has been in those other homes to which we all hope to return.

It is a common saying that the East does not change. I beg leave to say that now-a-days if you will take the trouble to add a sufficient dose of West to a given quantity of East, the resultant change is not only apparent to the close observer, but is likely to cause, if adroitly managed, a series of changes which may in the end be startlingly obvious to the most obtuse sceptic.

In Chapter II I have discussed cases of what are known by the terms "affrays" and "strikings." To my mind the best way of dealing with them is as follows:—

(*i*) lose no time in investigating;

(*ii*) have one officer responsible in your regiment for the investigation of these cases on the spot, and at once;

(*iii*) all that can be found out will be there and then, and you can afterwards, if necessary, let the case go forward; but remember it is often an expert's matter at first. Later, it can be placed in the hands of the proper authorities.

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for

British Officers and Soldiers.

CHAPTER I.

WHEN THE SOLDIER IS BEYOND CANTONMENT LIMITS.

I do not wish in this chapter to enter upon any controversial matters regarding the shooting pass rules, nor to advocate that every city and village near cantonments shall be placed out of bounds for all troops in garrison. I do, however, wish to draw attention to the fact that soldiers do not leave cantonments for shooting, fishing and general recreation in the country, away from towns, in anything like the numbers that they used to, and that commanding officers are more and more unwilling to grant shooting passes to any but the older and thoroughly trustworthy men

This year has seen the departure from India, of a great number of old '*Qui hai*'* soldiers, who were accustomed to shoot and roam about before the present shooting rules were

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* See Sir Power Palmer's speech to the Northern Army at the recent Delhi

introduced, and I think I am not wrong in saying that these men continued to shoot just as much after their introduction as before, and were quite to be trusted not to get themselves or their officers into trouble.

But there are now a large number of the men in India for whom I for one will not sign a shooting pass. Not because they themselves are different from their predecessors, but because they have not the experience to enable them to avoid a breach of the rules or a possible affray with villagers. Nor do I think they are likely to succeed to the experiences of those who are passing. The influx has been so large and the change from old to younger soldiers so marked. Moreover, men prefer a bicycle now to a gun; and much of that first allurement to go in for shooting parties will be missing. In effect I am inclined to the view that shooting trips by the private soldier will become less and less frequent.

Now what I am about to say may be pooh-poohed by some, but I do not intend my remarks to apply to the whole of India; only to those places and districts of which I have experience of my own and in which I have shot, in the plains in the Punjab and in Oudh. I do not refer to the hills, about which I shall have something to say later.

In certain shooting districts, which I shall not name, I, personally, have found it inadvisable to go alone and unwise not to have a chaprasi with me. A friend of mine who has an intimate knowledge of the villagers in the parts I am referring to, and forty years' experience

district in which we were shooting together, that he considered it risky for anyone to go alone, and said that in any question of evidence between soldiers and villagers the power of the Brahmin was greatly to be dreaded. Long observation has taught me that the first fact we have to set before ourselves in granting shooting passes is, that in many localities the whole country population has a very deep-rooted dislike of having soldiers anywhere on their land at all, to which, of late years, they have added a considerable show of determination to get rid of them at all costs to themselves.

The framers of the present shooting pass rules appear to have had a wholesome appreciation of the powers of native witnesses in combination against soldiers, and have made great safeguards for the soldiers' own benefit in them: but I must still hold that they also lay enough responsibility on the officer signing the pass to make him very shy of granting it to young or newly-arrived soldiers.

I have never hesitated to sign passes for the old hands of my company to bad districts, but I would sooner sleep on a charge of dynamite than send three youngsters shooting in one of them.

In certain districts of Northern India, with which I am well acquainted from a shooting point of view, I have encouraged soldiers to shoot as much as possible, where—provided they camp on the edge of their jhil and have a sensible native with them, or, as it used to be, one man of the party well able to converse with natives (very rare this)—there is no fear of trouble. At any rate the danger of molestation without pretext is unknown.

If one shoots one has a good idea of how far the men may be advised to shoot in any district a few weeks after coming into it for the first time: and of course experienced men will take one's advice as to localities, places to camp, etc., quick enough. But, on the whole, when the villagers may be suspected of a tendency to annoy or even attack shooting parties, whose whole idea is to keep well away from them, it is better not to allow shooting at all.

In some places I could name, I believe that if a soldier passed through a village alone he would run the risk of being either beaten or insulted.

I am quite open to correction on this point, but I am of opinion myself that the hostility of the villagers in many places, combined with the restrictions of the rules and the departure from India of so many old soldiers at one time, consequent on the declaration of peace in South Africa, are, all put together, likely to mark the end of shooting trips by soldiers to the extent formerly practised.

But the hills are very different and present fewer of the objectionable features of cantonment life than do the plains. At any rate, with regard to shooting there is little risk of hitting a native on the khud side, and the natives themselves are far less susceptible to the presence of the soldier, and the chance of his getting into trouble is very small. I tried the experiment in the hills of giving 25 men three guns to take out whenever they liked and to shoot where they liked throughout an entire shooting season.

harm was done and not much good either as regards the bags, which chiefly consisted of foxes, of which there were hundreds everywhere;—only a maximum of exercise and recreation was obtained. The hills are a grand shooting ground for soldiers with a desire for camping out and roaming about. But, with exceptions, I think the plains are not.

So far I have discussed the question of shooting only. Men will also fish or chase hares with their dogs if they get the chance, but I do not notice that soldiers care to leave cantonments in the plains for a stroll into the surrounding country (anyone who knows the usual Indian landscape would ridicule the idea), and yet the soldier has to do something unless he stays in the lines all day. Frequently the city is placed, for various reasons, out of bounds, and then what is left? A walk along one of the cantonment roads? Yes, generally; or a visit to the temperance lodge. Here is the chief reason of the great advance in temperance among soldiers;—the fact that these lodges supply, though inadequately, the keen and growing demand for that without which other classes in India cannot exist at all, namely, a place of general meeting for amusement and recreation at the close of the Indian day. But the men dearly love the privilege of going to the nearest city. And myself I do not see why they should not go. I would much rather put the Saddar Bazaar out of bounds or remove it altogether than the city. At any rate the city is further and is a better object for a walk; it has some interest about it which the Saddar Bazaar has not; and its shops are worth visiting, whilst the Saddar's are not

However, without eulogising the cities of India further as a suitable place of recreation for our soldiers—a difficult task and unworthy—let me say at once that if there is an increasing tendency to place the city out of bounds, combined with a growing disposition to discourage shooting or going away from cantonments far into the country, then I will come to what I want to deduce from this chapter. That the time has arrived to make the cantonment and regimental lines more suitable for men living an artificial life for a limited period in a land where all the outlets and natural surroundings of home life are denied them.

At the risk of being accused of reflecting upon the efficiency of regimental institutes, than which nothing is further from my intention, I assert that there is a great demand for places of refreshment and amusement at the end of a walk from barracks or as objects for a bicycle ride.

This demand is at present being met as follows:—

(*i*) By the bungalows of the I. O. G. T. and of the I. O. R.

(*ii*) By garrison institutes.

(*iii*) By ladies who start soldiers' homes.

(*iv*) By the Ministers of the various denominations through organisations of their own, or in private ways.

(*v*) By most disreputable places of resort in some of the cantonments bordering on cities with a large

But the first four on this list are not equal to the situation; they only show which way the wind is blowing, and what is wanted is some universal undertaking. Not, if possible, under military management at all, but on co-operative lines to set up clubs in a spot best suited to each large station, where soldier and artizan may enjoy those necessities of existence, in the way of recreation of a social as well as physical kind, which the nature of life in India seems to demand for the Britisher.

Lastly, if all I have said is true and the changes I have denoted are found to be taking place, now is the time to strike a new line. If there is a tendency to relinquish the sporting gun for the bicycle, let us meet the demand halfway. Let us prevent loafing, and if the consequences of differences and *fracas* between natives and soldiers beyond cantonment limits continue to be as fruitful of results as we have seen in the last year or two, let us provide the outlet of a place beyond cantonments worth visiting.

CHAPTER II.

THE REGIMENTAL FOLLOWER AND CANTONMENT NATIVES.

Of all the native inhabitants of our cantonments the one who most concerns us is our regimental follower.

Let us consider what manner of native he is.

First of all he strikes us as of thicker skin and less sensitiveness in his dealings with Europeans than the ordinary native.

This is true; for these regimental and barrack servants have often grown up in the same service in which their fathers lived and in many cases their grandfathers, and when this is the case there can be no doubt of its immense advantage to the regiment whose servants they are.

The fact is the regimental follower has become a sort of casteman of a new caste (using the term in the sense of a class separated from the rest of the community). He is the soldier's servant, who understands his master's weaknesses and strength, his moods and fancies, his qualities and his defects. He is born and bred of the regimental bazaar, and is often as ignorant of the beyond of cantonments as the soldier himself.

What he does know however is how to live in contact with Thomas Atkins; giving sometimes chaff for chaff, seldom feeling at all

words carelessly flung after him in unchoice barrack Hindustani, as ready to dodge the empty can flung good-naturedly at his head as to assist in any odd job for the sake of a pice or two. His English is often fluent, however inferior in other ways—a matter of no small importance in preserving harmony between East and West in India. The soldiers' Hindustani is not easily understood by the native, but the English of the regimental bazaar is good enough to save a misunderstanding, the precursor of most rows.

The public and private regimental follower has hitherto been contented, hardworking and fairly satisfactory from the regimental point of view.

Of course his disadvantages are manifest; his dirty and Eastern habits make it advisable to lessen as far as possible his numbers within barracks.

This is gradually being done in many ways, such as the abolition of the punkah coolie—punkahs are to be pulled by mechanical means; the abolition of the native cook—soldiers to a great extent now cook their own food, to the benefit of their health as regards immunity from disease if not from indigestion. All outsiders have been long forbidden access to our lines, and life in barracks is decidedly benefitting from these changes.

But the millennium in this respect has not yet been reached, and until the last follower has been dismissed from regimental employ in India, the subject which occupies this chapter, namely the relations between the soldier and

joy of life for those who have to deal with the differences arising between them.

Now before offering any remarks on the best way to avoid "affrays" (I use the official term) between soldiers and natives, I desire to point out that a subtle change has been noticeable during the last few years in the general behaviour of the natives themselves and also in that of the men, though, with regard to the latter, in a far more marked degree.

Not so very long ago, at any rate not to go further back than when the writer first came to India, cases of natives being struck by soldiers were certainly a great deal commoner than at the present time; but what always struck one about it was this:—That unless the blow or kick were a severe one or the injury received were dangerous, no particular thought was given to the matter by anyone, and the recipient of the hammering seemed to generally take it as part of the day's work. This, be it said, was of course not the case when the native was not of the regimental bazaar. Yet, although at that time the native follower lived contentedly enough in spite of occasional rough usage, regarding such things as "shovings out of the light" and playful "smacks" on the head as in the day's work, and bearing no particular resentment therefrom, still there were graver cases which it did not behove those in authority to treat as trivial or accidental; and, all things considered, the rules which have since been introduced to prevent the escape from severe punishment

the present state of public opinion on such matters.

Unfortunately the justification for these rules has been found in the numerous cases which have been brought so prominently forward during the last few years, wherein it has been open to doubt whether full investigation would have been made without them.

The change noticeable in the native in the last few years is undoubtedly due to the bazaar interpretation of the abovementioned new procedure. And it has taken the form of covert, and, to the soldier, intensely aggravating insolence. Natives of the class referred to are like schoolboys in this respect, that they will be cheeky to older boys, *i.e.* the soldiers, when the master's, *i.e.* the officer's, back is turned. At school the older boy licks the other for cheek; but not if the school is of a certain modern type, in which case the older boy must use self-control and find redress in its exercise.

What has happened is this, that a brutal assault upon a native cannot now escape full enquiry or be hushed up. But there is between whiles a mighty pother about insignificant incidents which all but pure theorists know must inevitably be continually happening in the every-day life of cantonments. The extremely silly but useful and good creature who works for our men in barracks is, I feel, being rapidly deteriorated by the process which has been going on.

The writer claims truth in what he says regarding the increased "aggravatingness" and "cussedness" (to use descriptive terms) of the barrack servant, and thinks that company

officers of experience must have noticed the same.

Now the change referred to as having taken place in the soldier's treatment of natives is, I think, much more marked.

I refer to the older men, not to the recruity, whose treatment of natives is marked by the same stages in behaviour from the time of arriving in Deolali till he has done his first hot weather as ever was, and ever will be, rules or no rules. I refer to those men who have felt, and marked the effect of the measures which have been adopted from time to time in their action on themselves and their officers and their followers.

The soldier's demeanour has in the last few years become almost comic in its sarcastic outbursts and real caution.

The change has been great, and although the cases of brutality have all been more noticed by the public, and have therefore seemed more numerous, they are in reality by far fewer in number than formerly, and in actual proportion to the cases of incentive, few indeed.

The self-control displayed daily and hourly by our soldiers in India, under—to them—most riling circumstances, has been brought forcibly home to the writer during the last three years.

In each of the following cases, taken from a great number as typical of all sides, dealt with by me, the men concerned were personally known to me and also their characters and habits.

Case (A)

A soldier, whom I will call X., is going his rounds whilst employed as forest ranger,

and sees a villager stealing wood, and to make it worse, from a spot, where the hillside is in a dangerous condition and all persons are forbidden to walk. X. blows his whistle to summon any native forest guard who may be within call, to have the man apprehended.

This fails, so X. proceeds to take the man into custody himself, and is conducting him without resistance to the cantonment police chowki, when about 20 fellow villagers arrive and threaten to use force to effect the release of the villager. X. avoids the danger of being hit and possibly seriously beaten with *lathis* by releasing the thief and immediately escaping from the spot.

In view of what may happen when the first blow from a *lathi* has been given, X. acted rightly and with commendable discretion.

The villager was afterwards identified and fined by me.

But the sequel to this incident is interesting. The villagers who rescued the wood thief lived in a Native State bordering the cantonment, and the affair was reported in that quarter, only, with results which are not to be expected in British territory.

What the orders passed on that particular village were I neither knew nor wished to know, but I venture to say that the recurrence of such an incident has been postponed a dozen years, and coincidently wood stealing in cantonments, became a thing of the past.

Not so however in the Government reserves roundabout, where a proportionate rise in wood stealing took place. But at any rate

In the same year and station as Case (A) thirteen unusual occurrences occurred in seven months which were reported.

From amongst these I select

Case (B)

which shows how the least loss of temper may mean playing into the hands of the other party.

A., whose rank need not be mentioned, in this case kicks the postman for undoubted insolence and puts himself in the wrong by using physical violence, and still further so by demanding delivery of a parcel before paying for it.

A. then takes the parcel, saying he will settle with the postman for the amount of its cost when he comes next day.

Had A. at once told the local military authorities nothing would have been simpler than to report the insolent behaviour of the postman officially and officially regret the kicking, which was of the mildest description and left no mark whatever. A. was new to the country and only needed reproof and advice.

But mark what occurs. The postmaster is a Babu, and thinking that his case is not strong enough yet, sends the same postman with a peremptory demand for the money next day.

I need not attempt to describe the indescribable manner in which a native bent on mischief can by his demeanour keep within the law and yet drive the incautious Britisher to complete exasperation.

Suffice to say he was again assaulted, this time to some effect, and the Babu, then feeling his position strong enough, writes a truly Oriental letter, full of veiled threat and high-sounding official phraseology, demanding

reparation on pain of a report to the General Officer Commanding the district.

At this the eleventh hour had A. only sought the advice of his immediate superiors, I do not doubt that the local military and civil authorities could have made it warm for Mr. Babu.

But no! He sends Rs. 100 to the Babu and a request that the matter may go no further.

What next! An hundred rupees may become two hundred, thinks this Babu, let alone that his reputation is becoming noised abroad in the bazaar.

In goes the petition to the General, the fat is in the fire, and as a final result the enraged and betrayed A. beats the Babu in his own post-office.

Thus the unusual occurrence is complete.

This was a case where the civil authority would have inflicted a fine of about ten rupees for a common assault. But note the astute game of the Babu, how carefully he screens all knowledge of the affair, from first to last, from the local authorities, who, whether civil or military, would have made small work of him and his little game.

The following case which occurred only this year is related on account of its curious evidence.

Case (C).

Sergeant A. has occasion in the course of duty to call the company bhishti to fill the washhouse tanks, which should have been done an hour earlier.

He uses rough language to the bhishti to hurry him up. The bhishti retorts with voluble abuse in Hindustani. The sergeant has no evidence that he was abused and knows not one word of Hindustani, but is able to give a rythmical imitation of what the bhishti said.

I identify this as a well known epithet of abuse, and writing it on a slip of paper turn it over.

Then two or three natives are made to guess what was said, and all find the same meaning.

Had this been said under other circumstances to a private soldier, say of hasty temper, who understood Hindustani, this bhishti might have been struck. Therefore, although I regretted that a bhishti, our best native in cantonments, should be the recipient of punishment, he is sent to prison for six days.

The sergeant was well known to me to be entirely ignorant of Hindustani and unable to understand a single word.

Case (D).

At a time previous to the present rules on Boxing Day at 8 a. m. a tum-tum driver of the Saddar Bazaar, who is personally known to me, is brought to me so injured about the face and head as to be unable to speak. A quarter of an hour after in barracks he has identified his assailants from amongst a score of other men, and in a short time the ins and outs are brought to light. The three men are further identified by the inhabitants of a house in the city as having been together on the day in question,

driven there by the injured man. The case is therefore the same morning disposed of with no delay of any kind.

Case (E)

In the following case the good sense of one native alone saved three soldiers from a very good chance of being beaten almost to death. Three soldiers broke out of barracks in the night (they were sleeping in a tent with a corporal in charge) and visited a large and valuable vegetable garden.

They were seen by the mali in charge and his son in the darkness tearing off cabbages and trampling down other beds, etc. The mali expostulated but was knocked down, and seeing himself helpless withdrew and reported to the owner of the garden next morning. The three men having done an immense amount of damage by trampling down the beds, filled a white cloth with cabbages and proceeded homewards.

On the way an influential native, who was indirectly interested in the preservation of the garden, intercepted the three men, noticed the cloth carried by one of them on his back, and asked them in English where they had been. They avoided him and took to flight. Now this native was aware what the men had been doing and had it in his power to summon some thirty or forty natives of a very sturdy class all armed with *lathis* to his assistance in a few moments, and owing to the nature of the ground and the darkness the three men would have been caught with the greatest ease.

But he knew the risk of what might happen in the dark to the three men and refrained.

At 9 a. m. next morning the owner of the garden and I had fitted the stumps remaining in the ground to the cabbage stalks outside a certain cookhouse, and some vigorous cross-examination led to the finding of a bed sheet stained with mud and the green of vegetables, together with boots, etc., which left no doubt as to who the culprits were.

In nearly all the cases covering a period of nearly five years from which the above are selected, the writer was fortunate enough to be in the position of the soldiers' officer, generally his Commanding Officer as well, and also of magistrate of the cantonment. Consequently from whatever source it was desirable to obtain the light of truth for one's investigation it was easy to obtain and had not to be procured from third and fourth parties.

And here I come to a point I wish to make, which is this, that where the cantonment is small and an officer doing regimental duty holds also the post of cantonment magistrate, with the control of the garrison military police as S. S.O. and the cantonment native police under him, if he has any experience at all he will find little difficulty in settling at once any case of difference between soldiers and natives, on the spot himself, and without the facts being obscured by interested parties. Delay is the one thing to avoid in dealing with cases of striking natives or *vice versâ* soldiers being struck.

A few weeks before writing these lines one of my garrison police was struck on the back by a brick hurled by a native who had a grudge against the man. I cannot trace the offender, though I have a shrewd idea who it was. For-

tunately the necessity of finding him is not so great as if the soldier had struck the native (whose back might not have proved so substantial a protection against the impact of the pucca brick), would have been the necessity of finding the soldier. Of one thing there can be little doubt, that in the pettiest barrack dispute as much energy of ingenuity is brought to bear to hide the truth as in the larger issues of more important affairs, and expert investigation is as necessary to obtain a correct solution in the one as in the other.

All that I have adduced so far has been in support of this, that the best form of investigation into "unusual occurrences" between soldiers and natives *in the first instance* is by officers having control of both classes from which the principal actors come.

CHAPTER III.

THE PUNKAH COOLIES.

To hark back somewhat, I have purposely omitted any cases in the preceding chapter of striking punkah coolies (cases which are by far the most numerous, as there is a distressing sameness about them all).

But a few remarks about the real cause and its way of removal, in these so common cases, may here not be out of place.

I give a short account of the evils attending the system of punkah-pulling in the hot weather, and the system I introduced in a certain station in 1899 and 1900 to avoid them; first saying that since that date the Government of India have of themselves adopted some of the measures here set forth.

What happens is this; in the middle of the hot night the punkah stops, and a man in the barrack-room, roused to desperation by heat and sleeplessness rushes forth, careless of consequences, and kicks the punkahwallah in the wrong spot, his spleen.

Do you blame him?

Yes and No.

It depends partly on whether he stopped to put his boots on.

Why does it happen?

Because in most cases the punkahwallah is either half-starved or else too old for the work or else too young.

Now in the station of A. it had been the custom to give the contract for punkah-pulling to a certain native, who provided the coolies and kept the punkahs swinging.

At the end of the first six weeks or so from the date of starting the pulling, the first month's pay was received and handed to the contractor to pay the coolies.

The coolies are the poorest of village folk, they arrive in barracks on the opening day, like a herd of frightened kine.

Their effects—rags, a few lotas, and now and then a string bed. Scarce a pice between the lot.

How are they going to live those six weeks till they get their pay?

The contractor will give them their actual grain day by day, quality bad, quantity insufficient!

At the end of a month nearly all of each coolie's pay is due by him to the contractor.

Why else would a contractor have taken a contract?

Next, the contractor should have supplied none but able-bodied coolies; but on the first inspection he shows only 50 per cent. such.

The other 50 per cent. are old men and boys.

What can you do?

The punkahs must start next day. The contractor, if necessary with tears in his eyes, protests how he has laboured to get able-bodied men, but, owing to such and such reason they could not come that day, so, sooner than let the sahib in, he had brought a few old men and boys to carry on for a day or two and he will without fail replace them in a week.

All right, carry on.

We carry on as follows:—

If we inspect the barracks, each punkah is manned by stalwart men. But if we parade the whole punkah-pulling establishment, it is shorter in numbers and worse in physique than on the opening day.

How do you account for it?

The contractor can!

There is a good reason for every man's absence, and those able-bodied coolies will be here to-morrow. Here's a pretty pass! The men grouse quietly to themselves in the barrack-rooms, the contractor expands and grows fat, the coolies grow thin, you tear your hair!

Shall we dismiss the contractor?

Better not, unless we want to be left stranded in the middle of the hot weather without a single coolie or much chance of getting one; the medical officer saying the men will die; and a carefully arranged boycott preventing any native entering your service. Thus, and thus, and thus!

Now for some remedies.

In 1899 long before the time to pull the punkahs, I asked to have the pay of the "establishment," as it is called, in advance, so that I could pay the coolies myself, weekly in arrear, and let them buy their own food. This being against the regulations was refused, so I got together enough money from another source and proceeded as follows:—

I got my coolies in gangs of twenty from different villages; each gang from the same one or two villages; and each under a sort of "jemadar," little more than a coolie himself.

To each jemadar I gave an extra 3 rupees a month solely to keep up his gang to twenty, and for keeping them in order.

I fostered jealousy between the jemadars for my favour, to prevent collusion.

The coolies were told off to their punkahs for the season in front of the men in each barrack, who with their n.-c. o.'s were made one and all personally responsible for reporting the absence of their own coolies, three to each train. The coolies' names and castes were written up on the barrack wall, and underneath was hung a printed slip explaining why all this was necessary and advantageous.

The scheme worked well with the following advantages:—

(*a*) The coolies had confidence because they knew their jemadar before they came, and were not at the disposal of a rapacious master whom they did not even know.

(*b*) They always worked for the same soldiers and were not liable to be moved to another part of barracks at any time away from their own pals (a great source of annoyance to punkah coolies).

(*c*) The coolies did their work because they got each man his pay, which meant enough food in his stomach. By the end of the season I had dismissed one jemadar on the complaint of the coolies of his gang for an attempt at extortion.

The next season, 1900, the same coolies all came again, eagerly, with the same jemadars

save one; and no trouble existed in stating them.

No case of striking occurred in two years, and the men were greatly pleased at the efficiency of the punkah service.

In the case of sergeants' bunks, married quarters, offices, etc., I simply handed the coolies and their payment over to the persons concerned.

The system of never having more than twenty coolies from one village or group of villages made it far harder to get a coolie to go and work in another gang, thus preventing the trick of substituting for absentees.

The deliberate attempts of the previous contractor to upset the show were not ended till that individual was had up and fined and turned out of the cantonment.

So much for illustrations from everyday life in barracks. It will be observed that I have not related sensational or serious cases, and for this reason that they might appear to exaggerate the position of affairs.

I do not intend to enunciate any new system or rules which will do away with one of the bugbears of Indian life for Officers Commanding British infantry regiments I rather desire to point out cause and effect from my own experience, and feel I cannot do better than append a few remarks by way of guidance.

If company officers can spare the time they will find that an acquaintanceship and study of that portion of the quartermaster's establishment which is told off to their own companies will repay them.

A careful hearing of the complaint of the company dhobi, and a close cross-examination

all round may enable them to put their finger on the weak spot in the rules for the issue and return of the men's washing, which is causing the trouble.

An attentive ear to the sweeper's voluble excuses for not having swept up the verandahs may lead to some petty discovery which the quartermaster can set right, and so on.

Remember that in dealing with natives of this class and keeping them contented and hardworking, a patient hearing, when necessary, is worth more than gold and silver. Above all let the natives be the servants of the captain and the company, not of the quartermaster only.

I conclude this chapter with an incident which has just been told me by a corporal whom I know well and for whose absolute veracity I can vouch.

On his way to the hills recently in company with two other men he had occasion to require an ekka at his own expense.

He accordingly asked the ekka chowdry, an individual appointed by the Deputy Commissioner, for an ekka.

The chowdry refused, although he had a great number of ekkas to spare in his yard, and followed up his refusal by saying, "You will be pulling my punkah in another five years." The corporal showed such self-control as to quickly make the chowdry give an ekka and ask not to be reported.

The intention of the chowdry could only have been to get himself struck or shoved, and I fear had this been so, the case when tried, as it might have been, by the civil magistrate,

would have made the chowdry famous in the locality for ever. Fortunately our men do not always lose their tempers under provoking circumstances.

I am no scare-monger nor alarmist, but I assert most positively that we who are treated in this country with so much exaggerated respect by the native when we occupy a position of any importance in civil or military life do not fully realise what the reverse may mean. It is not necessary to ask the private soldier; ask rather those whose knowledge of natives is considerable, but whose daily pay and means are scanty and position humble, and they will explain to you why the ekka chowdry should make so apparently senseless a remark.

It is for this reason, that he may, like an evil-spoilt child, say something insulting to his betters without fear of deprivation, loss or punishment.

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